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The earth’s atmosphere traps incoming heat from the sun such that, on
average, we bath in comfortable temperatures, instead of constantly freezing.
This greenhouse eﬀect, as it is called, has been known for quite some time
(Fourier 1827; Arrhenius 1896) and depends on the concentration of amongst
others carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and ozone
(O3) in the atmosphere. The greenhouse eﬀect ﬁrst became a policy issue
in the 1980’s when it was found that temperatures had risen rapidly on
earth during the past century. The main hypothesis for the cause of this
was an increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere caused by
human activity, mainly the burning of fossil fuels. In order to assess the risk
of human-induced climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was establishment in 1988. During the 1990’s it was shown
convincingly that global warming is caused by human activities.
In order to tackle global warming negotiations on an international cli-
mate change agreement were started, resulting in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed in Rio de Janeiro in
1992. Here, the industrialized countries promised to make eﬀorts to stabilize
GHG emissions at their 1990 level by the year 2000. There was however no
commitment to speciﬁc emission levels. These came in 1997 in Kyoto where
the Annex B countries (the industrialized countries) agreed on a reduction
in GHG emissions from the Annex B countries in CO2 equivalents of 5.2
1
2percent in the commitment period 2008-2012 relative to 1990. The abate-
ment commitments were diﬀerentiated between the Annex B countries with
the EU promising 8%, the US 7%, Japan and Canada 6% and the Russian
Federation a stabilization of emissions relative to 1990. In March 2001,
the USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. However, the ratiﬁcation of
the protocol by the Russian Federation in 2005 meant that agreement was
eﬀectuated.
One of the major problems in combating global warming is that the costs
of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases are very high and fall in the pres-
ence, while the major beneﬁcial eﬀects of reduced global warming will ﬁrst
arise in the far future. Hence, reducing costs of emission reduction should
be one of the main concerns in the design of a climate change agreement.
According to economic theory, costs of achieving a given level of emissions
are lowest when the marginal abatement costs between emission sources are
equalized (Baumol and Oates 1988). Since abatement costs normally diﬀer
between countries, one step toward marginal cost abatement is to diﬀer-
entiate abatement commitments between countries. But even though the
abatement commitments in the Kyoto Protocol are diﬀerentiated, they by
no means ensure that the total emission limit is reached at lowest costs. To
reduce the overall costs of committing to the abatement obligations, ﬂexi-
bility instruments were already introduced in Rio de Janeiro in the form of
Jointly Implemented activities. In the Kyoto protocol, these were expanded
to four instruments: the Bubble (Art. 4), Joint Implementation (JI) (Art.
6), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Art. 12) and International
Emissions Trading (IET) (article 17). The ﬁrst instrument, the Bubble, al-
lows groups of countries to meet their abatement obligations jointly. This
was especially created for the EU, so that it could negotiate as a single party,
while it was still possible to diﬀerentiate the total burden between the EU
countries, as was done later in the burden sharing agreement. JI and CDM
are both project-based instruments, where a baseline of emissions has to
be estimated per project and emission reductions are measured against this
baseline. The main diﬀerence between JI and CDM is that JI can only take
place between two countries that have committed to an emission ceiling in
3the period 2008-12, while with CDM, the host country is a non-annex B
country. IET can only take place between Annex B countries and amounts
to a transfer of greenhouse gas quotas between countries.
As such, JI and IET were not immediately embraced by all countries.
Especially the EU was sceptic about the ﬂexibility mechanisms (Ringius
(1999)). One of the main reasons for this scepticism was that emissions
trading in its various guises was seen as a loophole for countries that did not
wish to reduce emissions domestically. Furthermore, for several countries,
notably the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the emission commitment un-
der the Kyoto Protocol was such that their expected emissions in 2008-2012
were lower than their emission ceiling. IET makes it possible for these coun-
tries to sell emission quotas without having to reduce emissions. This trade
in ’hot air’, as it is called, will increase total emissions in the period 2008-
2012 relative to when such trade is not allowed. Many proposals have been
made since on how to reduce the eﬀect of hot air trading (see Woerdman
(2002), pp. 139-144 for an overview). That especially IET has made it to
the Kyoto Protocol is mainly thanks to the position of the US. They made
it clear they would only accept an agreement which included international
emissions trading. Even though other countries eventually accepted this
demand, the US has not ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol.
In the Kyoto Protocol, the ﬂexibility mechanisms are only sketched
roughly and subsequent Meetings of the Parties have clariﬁed only a part of
these issues. Therefore, details of the design and functioning of the ﬂexibility
mechanisms still need to be worked out. For IET, some of the questions are
whether only governments are allowed to trade, or whether private parties
can trade too, and in the latter case whether countries have to implement
tradable permits as a prerequisite for international trade between private
parties or whether international emissions trading also can be based on
other national instruments.
In order to comply with the commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the
EU has implemented its own emissions trading scheme (DIR 2003/87/EC).
The scheme comprises four major sectors1 with a total number of about
1Energy activities, iron and steel industry, mineral industry and pulp, paper and board
411,000 installations. Initially, the scheme only covers CO2 emissions from
these sectors, but it may be enlarged to cover other GHGs and sectors.
All installations covered are given an initial endowment of permits mainly
through grandfathering, i.e., they receive them for free, although a small part
of the permits can be auctioned oﬀ by the government. Hence, the scheme
is one with a cap on total emissions. Since the EU is a party in the Kyoto
Protocol, the EU emissions trading scheme does not classify as IET under
Kyoto Protocol Art. 17, but as a domestic instrument. However, from the
point of view of the EU member states, it is international emissions trading.
The EU scheme commenced on January 2005 and has two trading phases;
the ﬁrst that runs from 2005 to 2008 and the second that runs parallel with
the Kyoto commitment period of 2008-2012.
Prior to the implementation of the EU scheme a discussion on the de-
sign of an EU emissions trading scheme was taking place, initiated by the
European Commission. Proposals put forward showed that there are several
possible ways to organize emissions trading between private parties. Propos-
als by member states on how to organize emissions trading within the EU
also contained diﬀerent designs, and in certain cases there were even propos-
als with a diﬀerent design for diﬀerent sectors (see CO2 Trading Commission
2002). Industry also lobbied with the European Commission perhaps mainly
in the hope of being held outside the scheme, but also to aﬀect the design
of the scheme.
It is clear that international emissions trading is not equally acceptable
to all, be it nations, sectors of industry or other interest groups. The accept-
ability of IET will be dependent on several factors such as its eﬀect on total
emissions, its eﬀect on welfare and the distributional eﬀects of the scheme.
These factors are partly inﬂuenced by how international emissions trading
takes place, i.e. the design of the scheme. In this book, we will analyze some
aspects that aﬀect the acceptability of international emissions trading.
A ﬁrst issue is how international emissions trading aﬀects the abatement
target countries set, which is the subject of chapter 2. International emis-
sions trading changes the costs of emissions for the participating countries.
industry
5A high cost country can buy emission quotas in the market to cover its
emissions at lower costs. It can now aﬀord a higher abatement commitment
since it can buy emission reductions at relatively low costs. On the other
hand, a low cost country, which is a potential seller of emission quotas,
will want to set a lower abatement commitment since setting a higher emis-
sion ceiling implies that it can sell more quotas. But when both low and
high cost countries change their abatement commitment when faced with
international emissions trading, total world emissions are likely to change
too. Together, the change in abatement commitment and the change in to-
tal emissions of the group of countries involved aﬀect welfare for the single
country. As we will show, it is not certain that this eﬀect is always posi-
tive. The change in national welfare will, at least for welfare maximizing
countries, inﬂuence countries’ position on whether international emissions
trading should be allowed or not.
When international emissions trading is accepted, the next issue is how
the scheme could be organized. In chapter 32 we will present several pos-
sible designs for international emissions trading. Basically, international
emissions trading can be organized either as trade between governments or
as trade between emission sources. With government trading, international
emissions trading amounts to a transfer of national quotas from the seller to
the buyer country, so that the national emission ceiling becomes higher for
a buyer and lower for a seller. After the trade, the countries involved have
to adjust their national policies accordingly.
International emissions trading between emission sources can be orga-
nized in several ways. The basic issue here is the national design of emissions
trading. International emissions trading can then be organized by linking
the national emission trading schemes with each other. For this it is not
necessary that all countries choose the same form of private emissions trad-
ing. One possible design for emissions trading between private actors is to
put a cap on total emissions and to divide this cap over emissions sources
in the form of permits. Sources are than allowed to trade permits with
2A previous version of chapter 3 has been published as Boom and Nentjes (2003)
6each other. This is the classical textbook case of tradable permits3 which
in this book will be denoted by permit trading. Permit trading can be or-
ganized in several ways, depending on who is regulated (emission sources,
or suppliers or distributors of fossil fuels), and on whether all or only some
sectors are covered by the scheme. Alternatively, instead of a cap and trade
scheme, one could impose some other emission standard and allow the sale
of emission reduction credits when ﬁrms can stay below the emission target
deﬁned by the standard. We argue that the emission standard will be a
relative standard that limits emissions per unit of some input or output.
In this book, this type of emissions trading is modeled as trading based on
an emission standard per unit of output, and is denoted by credit trading
throughout. Permit and credit trading have quite a diﬀerent impact on the
regulated industry. In general, credit trading leads to higher output and
higher abatement costs than permit trading.
After the introduction and overview of several types of emissions trading
in chapter 3, we will focus on permit and credit trading in the remainder
of the book. First, in chapter 4, we will give an analysis of permit and
credit trading under both perfect and imperfect competition on the product
market in a national setting. The question to be researched is how the two
types of emissions trading under the distinct market structures aﬀect welfare
and other economic variables. We analyze both the short run eﬀect where
entry and exit are not possible and the long-run eﬀect where entry and exit
are possible. Hence we are able to show the diﬀerence in impact on total and
ﬁrm output, on prices and on the number of ﬁrms in the industry. Credit
trading turns out to be an ineﬃcient instrument under perfect competition.
However, under imperfect competition it may outperform permit trading.
Permit and credit trading can also be combined. By this we mean that
two sectors or countries can be regulated with a diﬀerent type of emissions
trading. Trade between these two sectors is then possible by linking the two
markets. In chapter 4 we give an analysis of combining permit and credit
trading and show its eﬀect on the two regulated sectors.
3See Baumol and Oates 1988; Hanley et al. 1997; Kolstad 2000; Tietenberg 2003 or
Perman et al. 2003 for an introduction
7In chapter 4 it is, implicitly, assumed that all actors, i.e., government and
industry, are rational, have complete and perfect information and perfect
foresight. When introducing environmental regulation, this makes it pos-
sible for the government to set regulation at its long-run equilibrium level.
At the same time, entry or exit to the industry happens at such a level that
the new equilibrium number of ﬁrms is attained instantaneously. Further-
more, ﬁrms adjust to the new regulation by adjusting their production and
emission levels so that they also are in their new long-run equilibrium. But
suppose that the government and industry do not have such information
and foresight, how would that aﬀect the outcome? In chapter 5 we give a
discrete time model where we use some other assumptions on the behavior
of governments and ﬁrms than the ones stated above. Speciﬁcally, in chap-
ter 5 we assume that ﬁrms react instantaneously to regulation by adjusting
their output and emission level. However, entry and exit of ﬁrms is based
on proﬁts of ﬁrms in the sector in the previous period. For the government,
two types of behavior are given. The government can react myopically, in
which case it sets environmental policy with the assumption that ﬁrms do
not adjust output and that entry and exit do not take place. It can also have
perfect foresight and perfect information, in which case it sets the equilib-
rium policy from the start of regulation. We show that with myopic behavior
by the government credit trading can lead to sustained volatility in the regu-
lated sector under both perfect and imperfect competition. With persistent
volatility, the industry never reaches a new equilibrium and output, prices
and emissions ﬂuctuate over time. When the government has perfect fore-
sight, it sets optimal policy from the start. In that case, persistent volatility
is only observed under imperfect competition.
In chapters 6 and 7 we again assume perfect and complete information
and perfect foresight by the government and immediate adjustment of ﬁrms
to prices. Both chapters give models with international trade in the goods
market. We assume the existence of an international emissions quota mar-
ket that the government can allow its ﬁrms to participate in. In these two
chapters we analyze whether a welfare maximizing government prefers per-
mit or credit trading as national instrument when it has market power in
8the international goods market and whether it wants to allow its ﬁrms to
participate in international emissions trading. In chapter 6 we present the
case where the regulated industry is perfectly competitive, while in chapter 7
we assume that there is an international duopoly with one ﬁrm per country.
When a country has market power on the international goods market, it will
have an incentive to manipulate the price of the good to improve the wel-
fare of the home country, even though this will reduce welfare abroad. Here,
we assume that the government cannot aﬀect the price of goods directly,
e.g. through import and export duties, and also that it has committed to
a speciﬁc national emission target, so that the only way it can manipulate
industry’s output is through its choice of instrument of environmental pol-
icy. As mentioned above, permit and credit trading have a diﬀerent impact
on industry output and hence, in this setting, the government may prefer
a diﬀerent instrument in diﬀerent circumstances. We show under which
circumstances a government prefers credit or permit trading and that in
certain cases it prefers not to allow its ﬁrms to participate in international
emissions trading.
In chapters 2 to 7 we assume a government that maximizes national
welfare. This allows us to show that under certain circumstances, a gov-
ernment should choose permit trading while in other cases it should choose
credit trading. The word ’should’ in the previous sentence already indicates
that the analysis in chapters 2 to 7 has a normative character. Here we
mean normative in the sense of: if the government has the objective of max-
imizing welfare, then it should act according to the conclusions derived from
welfare economics when the assumptions underlying welfare economics are
present in reality. It is a welfare economic analysis in that it shows which
policies are optimal for the government to implement. However, this does
not imply that governments in the cases that were presented actually will
use the instrument that is optimal. The question then is why this happens,
which forces are responsible, which policy objectives they want to promote
and what instruments are likely to be implemented and why. These ques-
9tion are dealt with in chapters 84 and 95 by the use of public choice theory.
Public choice is the economic study of non-market decision making, or the
application of economics to political science (Mueller 1989, p. 1). As in eco-
nomics, it is assumed that the economic agent is a rational, self-interested
utility maximizer. This also implies that all actors involved in the decision
on which instruments to implement in environmental policy ﬁrst and fore-
most want to maximize their own utility. So politicians do not maximize
national welfare, but their own utility under certain constraints, such as a
fair chance of being reelected. It should be noted that public choice the-
ory does not say that eﬃciency considerations are necessarily unimportant.
They are however not the only considerations of importance.
In chapters 8 and 9 we assume that interest groups can inﬂuence pol-
icy decisions by politicians. For environmental policy the relevant interest
groups are: the regulated ﬁrms and the organizations representing them, the
labor unions and environmental organizations. We shall consider the civil
service or ’environmental bureaucracy’ as a group which can have interests
of its own. We leave aside here how these groups can inﬂuence such deci-
sions, but the literature gives several examples (see Austen-Smith (1997) for
an overview). The ﬁrst question then is how the interests of the diﬀerent
groups can be speciﬁed. The next question is which preferences for environ-
mental policy instrument follow from this for the diﬀerent interest groups. A
third question is which of these groups are most likely to aﬀect policy. This
book focusses on international emissions trading and consequently, we are in
particular interested in which instrument of international emissions trading
gets the support of the strongest interest groups and therefore is most likely
to be implemented. However, a preference for international emissions trad-
ing scheme can not be seen in isolation. Such a preference can be dependent
on the preference for a national policy instrument. Therefore, chapter 8
gives an overview and assessment of the existing literature on interest group
preference for national instrument of environmental policy. Using this as
4A previous version of chapter 8 has been published as Boom (2002b)
5Previous versions of parts of chapter 9 have been published as Boom and Svendsen
(2000a) and Boom (2002a)
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a basis, chapter 9 then gives an analysis of the preference for international
emissions trading scheme. We show that international emissions trading is
not unanimously supported, and that groups are divided over which form of
international emissions trading to implement. Furthermore, there are sev-
eral groups that would like to limit international emissions trading in several
ways.
A summary and conclusions are given in chapter 10.
Chapter 2




In December 1997, 38 countries committed themselves to the reduction of
their greenhouse gases in the Kyoto Protocol. An important feature of the
Kyoto Protocol is that it allows wide scale international trade of emissions.
Article 17 of the protocol states that “The parties included in Annex B (i.e.
the countries that have committed to an emission ceiling) may participate
in emissions trading for the purpose of fulﬁlling their commitments”.
The article on emissions trading was included in the Kyoto Protocol
after pressure by the US. Already before negotiations started, the US had
made it clear that they would only commit to abatement if international
trade of emissions was allowed. It was clear that the US had an interest in
international emissions trading as a potential buyer. The potential sellers
would be the countries where emissions could be reduced at attractively low
costs, such as the Ukraine and Russia.
The result of the negotiations was that the USA agreed to reduce green-
house gas emissions by 6 percent in 2008-2012, while Ukraine and Russia
11
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committed to keep their emission levels at the 1990 level. The latter fact
was viewed with great dissatisfaction by many countries and most environ-
mental organizations, since it was very unlikely that these two countries
would reach these emission levels even without abatement measures. This
created the issue of ‘hot air’, which means that a country can sell emissions
without having to reduce emissions. In the end, the US did not ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, while Russia did so after long hesitation, so that the Kyoto
Protocol has come into force but will not be implemented fully.
The story above suggests that the inclusion of international emissions
trading has changed the outcome of the negotiations. In this case, the
potential buying country, the USA, accepted an emission ceiling, which can
be stated as the willingness to accept a more stringent emission ceiling than
it would have done without the option of international emissions trading.
On the other hand, it seems as if the potential selling countries, the Ukraine
and Russia, have negotiated higher emission ceilings than would have been
the case without international emission trading.
In this chapter, we analyze how allowing international emissions trading
aﬀects the emission ceiling set by countries. We do so in a model with a
global environmental problem where we compare the case with emissions
trading to the one without emissions trading. In the model, countries can
set their own emission ceilings and their decision will depend on the price
that will arise in the permit market. We will analyze the eﬀect of emissions
trading on the individual emission ceilings of the countries involved, the
eﬀect on total emissions, and the eﬀect on countries’ welfare.
Previous work in this ﬁeld includes Bohm (1992), Eyckmans and Proost
(1996) and Helm (2003). Bohm (1992) analyzes the case where countries set
their emission ceilings cooperatively while they are not able to inﬂuence the
price of permits. The analysis is informal and restricted to linear marginal
damage from emissions and constant marginal costs of abatement. Bohm
ﬁnds that, in this setting, the country that will sell permits will set a higher
emission ceiling when international emissions trading is possible, while the
buying country will set a lower emission ceiling. Because emissions trading
has an eﬀect on wealth, it will change the demand for polluting goods, and
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hence aﬀect emissions. The result of this is that total emissions may well
rise when international emissions trading is allowed, compared to an inter-
national agreement which does not include international emissions trading.
In Eyckmans and Proost (1996) emission ceilings are ﬁxed at the no
policy level and countries are then allowed to trade emissions. Eyckmans
and Proost assume that countries are price takers. They conclude that
when countries diﬀer in their marginal damage of emissions there will be
only one buyer, which is the country with the highest marginal damage.
This country in eﬀect retires some of the permits. That is, the country
will buy more permits than it will use. A major diﬀerence with the model
given in this chapter is that in Eyckmans and Proost (1996) countries do
not change their emission ceiling when emissions trading becomes possible,
while in our model they do.
Helm (2003) discusses the case where countries set their emission ceil-
ings non-cooperatively with countries having market power, although he
does not say so explicitly. Helm shows how, in this case, the possibility
of emissions trading aﬀects a country’s choice of emission ceiling and that
emissions trading may lead to higher total emissions. Furthermore, Helm
asserts that emissions trading may well lower a country’s welfare, even in
the case where total emissions decrease. In this chapter, we will show that
the latter assertion does not hold. Furthermore, Helm only gives an interior
solution for his game. However, such an interior solution may not exist. In
this chapter, we show what the boundary solution is, and what eﬀect it has
on total emissions.
In this chapter, we will discuss three cases: 1) countries behave non-
cooperatively and cannot aﬀect the price of permits through their emission
ceiling, 2) countries behave non-cooperatively, but have market power, and
3) countries behave cooperatively. In all cases, the permit market is assumed
to be perfectly competitive, which would be the case if all countries leave
the trading of permits to their ﬁrms.
The analysis in this paper adds to literature in several ways. First of
all, it gives the ﬁrst analysis of the eﬀect of emissions trading on individual
emission ceilings in the case where countries have no market power. Second,
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we expand the analysis by Helm (2003) to include boundary solutions and
show that one of his core results does not hold. Furthermore, we show how
the introduction of emissions trading aﬀects a cooperative solution, whereas
previous analysis dealt with non-cooperative models.
In section 2.2, we analyze the case where countries do not cooperate on
emission reduction, but can agree on international emissions trading. First,
the case where countries have no market power is analyzed, whereafter the
case with market power is considered. In section 2.3 the cooperative case is
analyzed. To this end, the Nash bargaining solution is used. The conclusions
are given in Section 2.4.
2.2 A Non-Cooperative Model
In the analysis of the non-cooperative equilibrium, we assume that countries
can make an agreement on international emissions trading, but do not nego-
tiate on emission reduction. There are several arguments for modeling the
issue in this way. First of all, there is nothing that prevents countries from
trading emission permits without having agreed to a certain reduction in
emissions. A group of countries that have individually set a national ceiling
on emissions may simply ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to trade emissions amongst them-
selves. The fact that it has not occurred so far does not imply that it cannot
occur. Furthermore, there is some evidence that international environmen-
tal agreements work more as a self-selection device, collecting countries with
lower emissions, instead of leading to lower emissions in themselves (Mur-
doch and Sandler 1997; Murdoch et al. 1997; Congleton 2001). Hence,
there is a good reason for assuming that countries behave non-cooperatively
when setting their emission level, even if they agree on emissions trading.
Therefore, a non-cooperative model may very well be better at capturing
the outcome of negotiations on an IEA than a cooperative model.
In the model, there are N countries that all emit a pollutant which
mixes completely over the countries. Welfare of the countries is a function
of damage from emissions and the costs from emissions. Speciﬁcally, let ei
be the emissions of the pollutant from country i. Damage is a function of all
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emissions, i.e., Di = Di(E), with E =
∑N
i=1 ei. It is assumed that damages
are increasing in emissions, i.e., D′i > 0 and D
′′ ≥ 0. Costs of emissions are
a function of own emissions only and are given by Ci = Ci(ei), with C ′i < 0
and C ′′i ≥ 0.
2.2.1 No Emissions Trading
When emissions trading is not possible, country i’s emissions enti are equal
to its emission ceiling e¯nti . Here, the superscript nt denotes the no trad-
ing case. We assume that countries set the ceiling on their emissions non-
cooperatively. The objective of the country then is
max
enti
Wi = −Di(Ent)− Ci(enti )
The ﬁrst order condition is:
∂W i
∂enti
= −D′i − C ′i = 0 (2.1)
This shows that countries choose their emission levels such that the marginal
domestic costs of abatement equals the marginal damage of emissions. It
follows from the ﬁrst order condition that higher marginal damage will result
in a lower emission ceiling. Conversely, higher marginal abatement cost leads
to a higher emission ceiling.









reaction function can be derived from it. Although it is not possible to give
an expression for the reaction function itself, one can derive the slope of the





D′′ + C ′′





This shows that as foreign emissions increase, the country reacts by reducing
its own emissions, although by less than the initial increase.
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2.2.2 Countries are Price Takers
When countries agree on trading emissions amongst themselves, the analysis
changes on several points. First of all, a price of permits, diﬀerent from the
marginal costs of abatement of the countries in the case without trading,
will arise. This will aﬀect all countries’ willingness to abate. Furthermore,
the welfare of the countries is now not only determined by the damage and
costs of emissions, but also by the beneﬁts of emissions trading.
In this section, we analyze the case where countries trade emissions, but
have no inﬂuence on the price of permits. With the countries acting as price
takers, the decision to buy or sell emissions is dependent on the price P of
emissions. In the following, let the superscript pc denote the trading case
where countries are price takers.









i . There are two variables to be set: the emission ceiling
of the country, and the actual emissions. The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂Wi
∂epci
= −C ′i − P = 0 (2.4)
∂Wi
∂e¯pci
= −D′i + P = 0 (2.5)
Equation (2.4) says that country i will reduce its actual emissions to a level
where the marginal costs of abatement are equal to the price of emission
permits. Equation (2.5) shows that when countries are price takers, they
want to set their emission ceilings such that the marginal damage from their
own emissions is equal to the price of emission permits.
Since all countries that issue permits must have marginal damage equal
to the permit price, there is only a competitive equilibrium in special cir-
cumstances. First we derive:
Proposition 1 When countries diﬀer in marginal damage from emissions,
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and they take the permit price as given, only the country with the lowest
marginal damage will issue and sell permits.
Proof First we show that there can only be one country issuing permits.
Let there be m ≥ 2 countries issuing permits to a total of E∗. Call two of
these countries L and H with D′L(E
∗) < D′H(E
∗). Then (2.5) cannot be
satisﬁed simultaneously for both i = L,H.
Finally we show that is when there is one supplier, it has to be country
1 which is the country with the lowest D′i. Suppose country j = 1 is the sole
supplier with ∂Wj/∂e¯
pc
j = 0. Then ∂W1/∂e¯
pc
1 > 0, so that country 1 sets
e¯pc1 > 0. However, when country 1 is the sole supplier, all other countries
j, j = 1, have ∂Wj/∂e¯pcj < 0, so that they don’t issue any permits.
Note that this result is in sharp contrast to the one reached by Eyckmans
and Proost (1996). In their model countries are also price takers. They
assume that with trading, every country i receives de facto emission permits




i ) = 0. When country j buys a unit of emission reduction
from country i, country i reduces its emissions (from E0i ) by one unit, and
country j pays P to country i. In equilibrium, only the country with the
highest marginal damage will buy emission reductions. The other countries
free ride on the highest-damage country. So in Eyckmans and Proost (1996)
countries do not alter their emission ceiling when emissions trading becomes
possible. This is the main reason why their result diﬀers from ours.
When there is only one country issuing permits, this country should
realize that it has market power. Thus, price taking behavior cannot occur
when countries diﬀer in marginal damage. The other extreme would be the
case where all countries have the same marginal damage function. In that
case, equation (2.1) shows that all countries would already have the same
marginal abatement cost without trade. Making the permits tradable will
not change their emission level.
A more interesting situation arises when there are a number of countries
(enough for them to be price takers) with the same lowest marginal damage
cost function. For the remainder of this section, we assume:
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Condition 1 D′i ∈ {D′L, D′H} with D′L < D′H and there are enough coun-
tries L and H to prevent market power.
Now we can derive:
Proposition 2 Under Condition 1, when there is perfect competition in the












Proof : For all countries L, condition (2.5) is the same, so that only the
total E¯pc is determined but the individual e¯pcLi are not. Given that (2.5) is
satisﬁed for i ∈ L, ∂Wj/∂e¯pcj < 0 for all j ∈ H by Condition 1.
Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 1 and equations (2.4) and (2.5)







































































then ﬁnd −C ′i (epci ) < −C ′i
(
enti
) ∀ i ∈ N which implies Epc < Ent. How-
ever, we assumed that E¯pc = Epc < E¯nt = Ent, so this is not possible. For

















. This again implies Epc < Ent
which cannot hold.









from (2.1) and (2.6) which implies epcLi < e
nt
Li
. E¯pc > E¯nt together

















least one country H.
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This shows that when all countries are price takers, emissions with trad-
ing are higher than without. The reason for this is that with permit trading,
only the countries with the lowest marginal damage issue permits. These
countries are less concerned about the environmental damage from issu-
ing permits, and therefore issue more permits than the buying countries H
would issue without trade. It follows that the amount of permits issued by
the seller countries is higher than their emission ceiling without emissions
trading. So in this case, all sellers have hot air.
The rationale for the choices of the buyers and sellers is as follows. Sup-
pose that the L-type countries expect that the H-type countries will set
e¯Hi = 0. Then, the optimal strategy for the L-type countries is to set e¯Li
such that D′Li = P . P , the market price of permits reﬂects both the marginal
costs of abatement, according to equation (2.4), and the marginal beneﬁt
of increasing the ceiling, according to (2.5). Since permits are traded freely
on the market, the H-type countries now can cover all their emissions by
buying permits in the market. However, at the same time D′Hi > P , so the
marginal net beneﬁt of issuing permits is negative for the buyers. Therefore,
they will not issue any of them.
The next issue is the eﬀect of a shift to emissions trading on welfare
of the countries involved. The change in welfare from a shift to emissions




)−Di (E¯pc)+ Ci (enti )− Ci (epci )− P (epci − e¯pci )
This allows us to state the following
Proposition 3 Countries L gain from trading only if they sell enough per-
mits. Countries H gain only if the reduction in abatement costs from trading
is large enough.

















i ) < 0. Hence, for a country L, ∆Wi > 0 if e¯
pc
i − epci is positive and






) − Ci (epci ) > 0.
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Furthermore, e¯pcHi = 0 so that P (e
pc
i − e¯pci ) = Pepci > 0. Then, for a country
L, ∆Wi > 0 when Ci
(
enti
)− Ci (epci ) is large enough. 
It is clear from Proposition 3 that countries may lose from the shift to
emissions trading. The major problem is that total emissions always increase
under perfect competition. To gain from the shift to emissions trading it is
necessary that the sellers make a large enough proﬁt on the sales of permits,
while buyers should experience a large enough decrease in abatement costs.
2.2.3 Market Power
In this section, it is assumed that countries have market power. However,
they only have an inﬂuence on the price of permits through the level of the
emission ceiling they set, and not through the actual emission level. This
would be the case if there is perfect competition in the permit market, which
would arise if countries allow private entities to trade, instead of trading
directly between governments.
The above implies that the price of permits is a function of the aggregate
emission ceiling, i.e. P = P (E¯t), E¯t ≡ ∑Ni=1 e¯ti, where the superscript t
stands for the case of trading with market power.
To determine the equilibrium price of emission permits, we will model
the interaction between the countries as a Cournot-Nash model. The model
has two stages. In stage one, countries determine their emission ceiling,
while in the second stage actual trading takes place. As is usual with stage
games, we will analyze the game backward, starting with stage two.
In the second stage, countries have set their emission ceiling e¯ti and now
have to decide how much to trade. Each country chooses emissions so as to
min
eti
Ci(eti) + P (e
t
i − e¯ti)
The ﬁrst order condition is
−C ′i = P (2.8)
Hence, abatement costs are equalized between countries. Furthermore, the
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Diﬀerentiating (2.8) and (2.9) with respect to E¯ gives








= 1 ∀ i = 1, · · · , N










Combining and rearranging gives


















) ∈ (0, 1)
We now turn to stage two of the game where all countries determine
their emission ceiling. The objective of country i is to
max
e¯i
Wi = −Di(E¯t)− Ci(eti(E¯t))− P (E¯t)(eti(E¯t)− e¯ti) (2.11)
The ﬁrst order condition is
∂W i
∂e¯ti

















Summation of both sides over N gives the required result.
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The second order condition for welfare maximization is
∂2W i
∂(e¯ti)







The ﬁrst and third term are positive and therefore pointing in the right
direction. However, the sign of the second term depends on the sign of
P ′′ and on whether the country is a seller or buyer. Hence, it is uncertain
whether the second order condition always holds. It will hold when the
term P ′′(ei − e¯i) is small enough, which is assumed in the remainder of this
chapter.
Rewriting equation (2.12) using (2.8) gives
D′i + P
′(eti − e¯ti) = −C ′i (2.14)







This equation gives the relation between the emission ceiling of a country
and its actual emissions.
The relation between the emissions ceiling of one country to those of the
other countries can be expressed in a reaction function. The slope of this
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From the second order condition (2.13), the denominator of (2.15) is positive.
For the equilibrium to be stable, we need the nominator to be positive
as well. This is assumed to be the case, and hence we ﬁnd that −1 <
∂e¯i/∂E¯−i < 0.
In the remainder of this section, we examine how the possibility of in-
ternational emissions trading changes the abatement commitments of the
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countries. Furthermore, the eﬀects on total emissions, and welfare will be
examined.
Abatement Commitments
We saw before that when countries are price takers, a seller will set a higher
and a buyer a lower emission ceiling with trading than without. With market
power, this may change. Now the countries will try to aﬀect the price of
permits in a direction advantageous to them. The result is as follows.
Using the Mean Value Theorem (see Sydsæter and Hammond 1995, p.








Proposition 4 When countries have market power:
1. The higher D′i, the higher e
t
i − e¯ti for the countries i that set e¯ti > 0.
There may be countries that set e¯ti = 0. These will be the countries with the
highest D′i.
2. For the countries i that set e¯ti > 0, a permit seller will set e¯
t
i  e¯nti











P ′(eti − e¯ti)
(2.17)
where C¯ ′′i is deﬁned by (2.16).
Proof 1. Equation (2.12) must hold for all countries i with e¯ti > 0.













= −D′j − P ′etj + P < 0 (2.18)
In that case, these countries will set e¯tj = 0.
2. From (2.16), we have:
e¯ti − enti = e¯ti − eti +
C ′i(e
t
i)− C ′i(enti )
C¯ ′′i
Thus:




















i)− C ′i(enti )
e¯ti − eti
 0
Substituting (2.1) and (2.14), this becomes:
C¯ ′′i 
D′i(E¯
t) + P ′(eti − e¯ti)−D′i(E¯nt)
e¯ti − eti
Dividing both sides by −P ′ and substituting (2.10) gives (2.17). 
For an intuitive explanation, we examine the LHS and RHS of (2.17)
in turn. First look at the LHS of (2.17). As can be seen from (2.10), this
is equal to C¯ ′′i / − P ′. If −P ′ is large, a small change in the total amount
of permits will have a large eﬀect on the price of permits. Hence, in this
case, countries have a strong incentive to aﬀect the price in the direction
advantageous to them. If C¯ ′′i is large, a small change in emissions has a
large eﬀect on marginal abatement costs. Now, suppose that a seller has a
combination of a low C¯ ′′i and high−P ′. Then it takes only a small decrease in
permits to achieve a large increase in permit price. At the same time, given
the change in the permit price, the country will lower its own emissions by
a large amount. This makes it possible for the country to sell more permits
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at a rather low extra marginal abatement costs for itself. For a buyer, the
reverse happens. Lowering the price of permits implies that the country will
buy more permits. When C¯ ′′i is low, the country’s emissions will increase
much and hence the country can lower costs of abatement by issuing more
permits.
Now turn to the RHS of (2.17). For a seller, the term P ′(eti − e¯ti) is
positive, while for a buyer it is negative. Hence, for a seller, the RHS of
(2.17) is relatively large when E¯t > E¯nt, while for a buyer, the RHS is large
when E¯t < E¯nt. So, when the RHS is large for a seller, marginal damage
from emissions is high. It then pays for the country to lower total emissions
by lowering its emissions ceiling. Conversely, a buyer will want a higher
ceiling when the RHS is relatively large.
What happens in the end depends on the relative size of the eﬀects.
So, if for a seller, marginal abatement costs change little with a change in
emissions (C¯ ′′i is low) while it has strong market power (−P ′ is large), and
at the same time total emissions under trading are larger than they were
under the no trading regime, the country has a strong incentive to limit
the number of permits. This is both because it can increase its gain from
trading, and because it can lower its damage from emissions by doing so.
Note that also with market power, it is very well possible that seller
countries set e¯ti > e¯
nt
i , which means that they receive hot air. This will
happen when marginal emission costs increase much when shifting to trading
and the price function is rather ﬂat (C¯ ′′i / − P ′ is large) and when trading
does not lead to much lower total emissions.
In an interior solution, all countries set a positive emission ceiling. How-
ever, an interior solution is not always possible. This will be the case when
for at least one country, the net beneﬁts of lowering total emissions are
positive, but its own emission ceiling is zero already. Hence, in that case,
the country cannot lower total emissions any further by lowering its own
emission ceiling. This then gives the boundary solution where at least one
country sets its emission ceiling equal to zero.
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Aggregate Emissions
The next issue to address is the inﬂuence of trade on total emissions. We
have seen above that both potential sellers and buyers will alter their emis-
sion ceilings. Only by chance will these changes cancel each other out,
leaving total emissions unchanged. It is far more likely that total emissions
will change as a result of emissions trading.
Recall that we have deﬁned the damage in all countries to be a strictly
increasing function of aggregate emissions which is at least twice diﬀeren-
tiable. Hence, marginal damage is also a strictly increasing function of
aggregate emissions. Since aggregate emissions are equal for all countries,
we know that total damage and marginal damage move in the same direction
for all countries when aggregate emissions change. Then, when we aggre-
gate the marginal damage of all countries, the same relation exists; when
aggregate emissions increase, aggregate marginal damage increases, and vice
versa. Therefore, to examine the diﬀerence in aggregate emissions, we can
compare the level of aggregate marginal damage both with and without
emissions trading.
First we look at the case where all countries issue permits. Then (2.12)
holds for all countries i, i = 1, ..., N. From equations (2.1) and (2.12), trade























i− e¯ti) = 0, i.e. the
permit market is in equilibrium. This means that emissions increase with












Proposition 5 Total emissions may be higher under an emissions trading
scheme than in the noncooperative equilibrium without trading. Speciﬁcally,
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in the interior solution where all countries issue permits:









Hence, only when the price of emissions is equal to the average of the
marginal costs of abatement without trade of the countries, the move to
trade will not change total emissions. If the price of permits is lower (higher)
than the average marginal costs without trading, total emissions will be
lower (higher) with trade than without trade. The rationale for this is that
if the price of permits is lower than the average marginal costs without trade,
the average marginal beneﬁts of issuing permits2 decrease and countries will
on average issue less permits. The reverse holds for a higher price of permits
than the average of the marginal costs without trade.
The above holds for the interior solution where all countries issue per-
mits. There can also be a boundary solution where one or more countries do
not issue permits. When there are countries j that don’t issue any permits,
we can deﬁne a λj for these countries:
λj ≡ −D′j(E¯t)− P ′(E¯t)etj + P (E¯t) < 0
The inequality follows from (2.18). Here λj is the shadow value of an
additional permit, which is negative for the country that sets e¯tj = 0 because
it would prefer a lower total permit level.
In this case we ﬁnd that





−∑Ni=1 C ′i (enti )
N
(2.19)
Hence, in the boundary solution, we ﬁnd that total emissions may be
higher with trading than without, even when the permit price is lower than
the average marginal abatement costs in the case without trading. This is
because the countries that don’t issue any permits cannot reduce the number
2The benefits of issuing more permits are either that a country can reduce its own
abatement, or sell more or buy less permits.
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of permits they issue any further.
The above shows that international emissions trading can lead to both
lower and higher total emissions.
Welfare
There are two eﬀects from emissions trading on welfare. First of all, emis-
sions trading will alter the costs of abatement for the trading countries. For
the buyers of permits, the costs of abatement will be lower with trading. For
the sellers, the costs will be higher, but they will be compensated through
the price they receive for the permits. It is clear that all countries will be
winners in this respect. The second eﬀect is that trading alters the incen-
tives for countries to emit and thereby alters the aggregate emission level. If
total emissions decrease because of the possibility of emissions trading, then
beneﬁts, and thereby welfare, in all countries will rise. However, if emissions
trading leads to higher overall emissions levels, this decreases welfare of all
countries involved in the problem.
Deﬁne eoti as the emissions of country i when it does not participate in
the emissions trading scheme while all other countries continue to emit E¯t−i





Furthermore, let Eio ≡ E¯t−i + eoti be the total emission level when all other
countries participate in the emissions trading scheme, but i does not trade.








Di(Eio)−Dti + Ci(eoti )− Cti − P (eti − e¯ti)
] (2.20)
where ∆ represents a discrete change. The ﬁrst term between square brack-
ets in (2.20) denotes the change in welfare from the shift by all other coun-
tries to emissions trading, with country i staying outside the trading scheme.
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The second term between square brackets denotes country i’s welfare gain
from joining the international emissions trading scheme when all other coun-
tries are already participating in it. Thus a country gains from emissions
trading when the ﬁrst term is postive and when it is negative, but not too
large.
Proposition 6 When total emissions are lower with emissions trading than
without emissions trading, all countries gain from emissions trading. How-
ever, when E¯t > E¯nt, there may be countries that lose from emissions trad-
ing.
Proof The ﬁrst term in square brackets in (2.20) negative (positive) if
Eio > Ent (Eio > Ent). This is because −1 < deoti /d E¯−i < 0 by (2.2) and
the term
[
Dnti −Di(Eio) + Cnti − Ci(eoti )
]








































We know that D′i > 0 and that −1 < deoti /d E¯−i < 0 by (2.2), so that
the ﬁrst term is positive. Furthermore, C ′i < 0, so that the second term is
positive as well.
The second term in brackets in (2.20) is nonnegative, and positive when
e¯ti = eoti . If, when allowed to trade, country i decides to issue eoti permits
and not to trade, then there is no welfare change. However, if the country
sets e¯ti = eoti and trades, then welfare increases.
Thus when E¯t ≤ E¯nt, then W ti ≥ Wnti for all countries i. However, when
E¯t > E¯nt, there may be countries that lose from emissions trading. 
The rationale for this result is straightforward. As long as other coun-
tries keep their emission levels constant, a country always gains from trad-
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ing. However, emissions trading may alter the total emission level. When
total emissions decrease as a result from trading, damage in all countries
decreases. So in this case countries gain from trading and from lower overall
emissions. However, when trading leads to an increase in emissions, dam-
age increases. If the increase in damage is large enough, it may outdo the
individual gain from trading.
Note that this result is diﬀerent than the one found by Helm (2003).
Helm ﬁnds that even when total emissions decrease as a result from trading,
some countries may experience a decrease in welfare. The problem is that
Helm only analyzes several scenarios, without showing that these scenarios
can actually arise.
2.3 A Cooperative Model
In the previous section, we used a non-cooperative model to analyze the
eﬀect of a shift to emissions trading. Alternatively, a cooperative model
can be used. In this section we analyze a model where countries cooperate
on emission reduction, but do not accept the use of direct side payments.
Both the case where emissions trading is not allowed and where it is allowed
is analyzed. The cooperative solution used here is the Nash bargaining
solution.3
2.3.1 No international emissions trading
If the countries decide not to allow international emissions trading, the Nash
bargaining solution is the (e¯cn1 , e¯
cn







Here, (A1, A2, · · · , An) is the threat point and superscript cn denotes the
cooperative case without trading. The threat point gives the net beneﬁts for
3For an explanation of the Nash bargaining solution see Friedman (1991) and Muthoo
(1999). An application in environmental economics is given by Hoel (1991).
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both countries if no agreement is reached. It is assumed that in the absence
of an agreement, the outcome is the non-cooperative equilibrium without
international trading. The ﬁrst order condition of the Nash bargaining so-




−D′i − C ′i




−Dj − Cj −Aj = 0 (2.21)






j = −αiC ′i where αi ≡
1
Wi −Ai (2.22)
Since αi ≥ 0, equation (2.22) implies that in the Nash bargaining solution
countries take the foreign damage inﬂicted by domestic pollution into ac-
count, although disproportionately so since a country either weighs its own
damage higher than the foreign country’s, or it weighs the other country’s
damage higher. From this it follows that aggregate emissions will be less un-
der the Nash bargaining solution without trade than in the non-cooperative
equilibrium without trade.
Proposition 7 Assume that Ci(e∗) = Cj(e∗) for all e∗ ≥ 0 and all i, j ∈
N , then the higher a country’s marginal damage, the more it gains from
cooperation.
Proof : Suppose there are two countries h, l ∈ N with D′h > D′l. Then, for






j = −αhC ′h = −αlC ′l (2.23)
Suppose that e¯cnh ≥ e¯cnl , then −C ′h(ecnh ) ≤ −C ′l(ecnl ). But since we also have
that −C ′h(enth ) > −C ′l(entl ) it follows that W cnh −Ah > W cnl −Al and hence
that αh < αl. But then (2.23) cannot be satisﬁed. Hence, we must have
32
that e¯cnh < e¯
cn
l , so that −C ′h(ecnh ) > −C ′l(ecnl ). Then, we need αh < αl for
(2.23) to hold. 
The reason that high-damage countries gain more from cooperation than
low-damage countries is that cooperation leads to lower total emissions. For
high-damage countries, the decrease in damage is higher for every decrease
in total emissions.
As long as the gains from cooperation are unequal, it is not optimal to
equate marginal abatement costs across countries. The high-damage coun-
tries pay for their higher gains with higher marginal abatement costs.
2.3.2 International Emissions Trading
With international emissions trading, the countries have to set both their
emission limit and their actual emissions. Since countries behave coopera-
tively, no country will use its market power to increase its welfare. There-
fore, there is no diﬀerence between the case with market power and the one
where countries are price takers. A country takes the eﬀect of a change
in its own emission ceiling on all countries’ trade in permits into account.
















[−Di(E¯ct)− Ci(ecti )− P (E¯ct) (ecti − e¯cti )−Ai] (2.24)
It is assumed that when the countries do not reach an agreement on emission
reduction, they will not allow emissions trading between them either. Hence,
the threat point is the non-cooperative equilibrium without international
emissions trading. In the following we will replace −Di(E¯)−Ci(ei)−P (ei−
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Wj −Aj = 0 (2.26)
with P ′ given, as before, by (2.10). Equation (2.25) is the usual condition
that with trade, the country sets its marginal abatement costs equal to the






′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] = αiP (2.27)
Proposition 8 If there is an interior solution, with (2.27) holding for all
countries, the full cooperative solution is realized with equal welfare gain for
all countries. If there is no interior solution, a boundary solution will arise
where at least one buyer country sets e¯cti = 0 < e¯
cn
i . For the countries with
e¯cti = 0 < e¯
cn






′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] > αiP (2.28)
In this case, the welfare gain for the countries with e¯cti = 0 is larger than for
the other countries.
Proof For an interior solution, (2.27) has to hold for all countries. This
can only be the case when αi = αj ∀ i, j ∈ N , which implies Wi − Ai =




ct) = −C ′i(ecti ) ∀ i, j ∈ N
which is equal to the full cooperative solution.
In a boundary solution, ∂J/∂e¯cti < 0 at e¯
ct
i = 0 for at least one country
i. From (2.26) and (2.27) it then follows that for these countries (2.28) must
hold. Call the countries for which (2.28) [(2.27)] holds the (un)constrained
countries c (u). From a comparison of (2.27) and (2.28) it is clear that
αc < αu for all c, u ∈ N. By (2.22), this means that Wc−Ac > Wu−Au. 
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The full cooperative solution will only be realized when the transfer pay-
ments that are possible through emissions trading are large enough. How-
ever, we implicitly have assumed that e¯ ≥ 0. This seems to be a realistic
assumption in the sense that a country is not likely to announce a negative
abatement goal. However, if we allow for e¯ < 0 it can easily be seen that
an interior solution is always possible. This of course amounts to saying
that when countries are willing to pay side payments, the full cooperative
equilibrium is attainable.
We can divide the countries into two groups:
Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne:







′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] (2.29)
Denote countries with D′i > θi by high-damage countries hi ∈ H, and
countries with D′i < θi by low-damage countries li ∈ L.
We can now state:
Proposition 9 High-damage countries are permit buyers and low-damage
countries are permit sellers.
Proof Rewrite (2.27) as
D′i + P






′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] = P
Then for countries with D′i > θi, with θi deﬁned by (2.29), it must hold that
ecti > e¯
ct
i , while for countries with D
′





In the boundary solution, (2.28) holds for the constrained countries,
while (2.27) holds for the unconstrained countries. Rewriting (2.28), using









′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] > P
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Then ﬁrst of all, since P ′ecti < 0, it holds that D
′
i > θi for these countries.
Furthermore, the fact that e¯cti = 0 and ei > 0 implies that these countries
are buyers. 
Abatement Commitments





i )− C ′i(e¯cni )
ecti − e¯cni
(2.30)
Comparing the outcome without emissions trading with the one with emis-
sions trading for an individual country then leads to the following result:
Proposition 10 i) In the full cooperative solution, a permit seller will set





















P ′(ecti − e¯cti )
(2.31)
ii) In the boundary solution at least one buyer country sets e¯cti = 0 < e¯
cn
i .
Furthermore, a permit seller will set e¯cti  e¯cni while a buyer with e¯cti > 0















j ) + P
′(ectj − e¯ctj )
]
−∑Nj=1 αcnjαcni D′j(E¯cnj )
P ′(ecti − e¯cti )
(2.32)
Proof From (2.30), we have:
e¯cti − ecni = e¯cti − ecti +
C ′i(e
ct
i )− C ′i(ecni )
C˜ ′′i
Thus:
















i  e¯cni and for buyers (with e¯cti < ecti ),




i )− C ′i(ecni )
e¯cti − ecti
 0












Dividing both sides by −P ′ and substituting (2.10) gives (2.32). For
(2.31), substitute αi = αj , i, j = 1, · · · , N into (2.32).
In the interior solution, the solution found here is an example of the
Split-The-Diﬀerence rule often found with the Nash bargaining solution (see
Muthoo (1999) p. 15). Hence, in that case, the welfare gain is equal for all
countries. What this means is that in the interior solution, emissions trading
makes it possible for the high-damage countries to pay side payments to the
low-damage countries, such that the full cooperative solution can be reached.
However, it may happen that the side payments necessary to reach the full
cooperative solution are too large to be implemented with emissions trading.
In that case, we end up in a boundary solution. It is clear that in that case,
the constrained countries gain more than the unconstrained countries, since
the constrained countries would like to transfer more wealth to the other
countries, but cannot do so.
The intuitive explanation of the individual emission ceilings is basically
the same as the one found in the non-cooperative model with market power.
However, in the current case, the countries take the eﬀect of their emission
ceiling on other countries in account. The result in this case is that also when
countries play cooperatively, they may set a higher or lower emission ceiling,




As before, we want to know whether emissions trading leads to higher or
lower emissions. First, deﬁne:











′ (ectj − e¯ctj )] (2.33)
Unconstrained countries with e¯cti > 0 have γi = 0 by (2.27), while con-
strained countries with e¯cti = 0 have γi < 0 by (2.28). γi is the shadow value
of an additional permit, which is negative for a constrained country, because
it would prefer less permits. We can then state
Proposition 11 Total emissions may be higher or lower with emissions
trading. Speciﬁcally,








































where Ω may be smaller or larger than zero.










D′j = −C ′i
D′i + P






′ (ectj − e¯ctj )]+ γi = P




i in both cases and compar-































)⎤⎦ /N  −∑Ni=1 C ′i (ecni )
N
When E¯ct ≥ E¯cn, D′j
(
E¯ct
) ≥ D′j (E¯cn). However, ∑αj/αi = N when
αj = αi and
∑
αj/αi > N when αj = αi. Hence, Ω may be smaller or
larger than zero when there is an interior solution with emissions trading. If
there is no interior solution with emissions trading, we do not know whether
αcnj /α
cn




i , so that Ω can be larger or smaller
than zero. 
It may seem counterintuitive that when countries cooperate emissions
trading may lead to higher total emissions. After all, emissions trading
should lead to lower overall costs of abatement and thereby to an incentive
to cut emissions. However, the Nash bargaining solution tries to reach an
outcome where all countries receive the same gain from cooperation. Then,
when marginal damage of emissions of the low-damage countries is very
low, a decrease in emissions will not lead to a large increase in welfare.
To reach the same increase in welfare as the high-damage countries, low-
damage countries then have to increase the number of permits beyond the
level without trading.
Welfare
For the welfare eﬀect of emissions trading we ﬁnd
Proposition 12 Assume that Ci(e∗) = Cj(e∗) for all e∗ ≥ 0 and all i, j ∈
N . Then, if there is an interior solution with emissions trading, total welfare
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always increases as a result of emissions trading and low-damage countries
always gain, while high-damage countries may lose from emissions trading.
Proof Deﬁne Π(E¯, e) =
∑N
i=1 Wi(E¯, ei), where e is the vector of individual
emissions. From Proposition 8 we know that the interior solution gives
the full cooperative solution, which by deﬁnition leads to maximum total
welfare. So we must have that Π(E¯ct, ect) ≥ Π(E¯cn, ecn). For the interior














. Combining this with Π(E¯ct, ect) ≥ Π(E¯cn, ecn) it then follows
that Wli(E¯
ct, ectsi) ≥ Wli(E¯cn, ecnsi ) and that Whi(E¯ct, ectbi) may be larger or
smaller than Whi(E¯
cn, ecnbi ) depending on the size of the increase in total
welfare and on the redistribution of welfare over the countries. 
The intuition behind the result is that when countries behave cooper-
atively, emissions trading always leads to higher total welfare. However,
emissions trading gives rise to side payments from buyers of permits to sell-
ers. So in all, the cake to be divided among the countries has increased
as a result of emissions trading and sellers of permits receive a larger part
of the cake. Hence, sellers always gain from trading. Buyers of permits
on the other hand receive a smaller part of the cake under trading. They
may then lose from trading if they receive substantially less than in the no
trading case. Of course, they still gain compared to the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
Hot Air
In the non-cooperative model, sellers often receive hot air. That is, their
emission ceiling with emissions trading is often higher than their emissions
ceiling without emissions trading. To see when a seller receives hot air
in the cooperative model, we must compare the ceiling of a seller in the
cooperative outcome with emissions trading with the ceiling of a seller in
the non-cooperative outcome without emissions trading.






i )− C ′i(e¯nti )
ecti − e¯nti
(2.35)
We can then derive


















j ) + P
′(ectj − e¯ctj )
]
−D′i(E¯nti )
P ′(ecti − e¯cti )
(2.36)
Proof From (2.35), we have:
e¯cti − e¯nti = e¯cti − ecti +
C ′i(e
ct
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Dividing both sides by −P ′ and substituting (2.10) gives (2.36). 
To see when a seller is likely to receive hot air, consider the LHS and
RHS of (2.36) in turn. A seller is more likely to receive hot air when the LHS
of (2.36) is large. Recall, that the LHS can be written as Cˆ ′′i / − P ′ (from
(2.10)). This is large when the marginal costs of abatement rise sharply
with a decrease in emissions and when the price function is rather ﬂat. In
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that case, the country can lower costs by increasing the emissions ceiling.
At the same time, the country does not have much incentive to increase the
price of permits since the price function is very unresponsive.
A seller is also more likely to receive hot air when the RHS of (2.36) is
small. This is the case, when total emissions in the cooperative equilibrium
are much smaller than total emissions in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In
this case, the country will not decrease its welfare by much when increasing
its amount of permits.
To sum up, in the Nash bargaining solution with emissions trading, a
seller is most likely o receive hot air when the international environmental
agreement has led to substantial emission reductions and the gain to the
seller from the increased endowment of permits does not come at high costs
to the other participants in the agreement.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the eﬀect of international emissions trading on the
choice of national emission ceiling by the countries involved. It was shown
that when emissions trading is allowed, countries will alter their abatement
commitments which aﬀects total emissions and welfare. As this chapter
shows, emissions trading can lead to both lower and higher total emissions
and in the case of non-cooperative behavior, also to lower total welfare
compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium without emissions trading.
We have discussed three cases: 1) countries behave non-cooperatively
and cannot aﬀect the price of permits through their emission ceiling, 2)
countries behave non-cooperatively, but have market power, and 3) countries
behave cooperatively. In all cases, the permit market is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, which would be the case if all countries leave the
trading of permits to their ﬁrms.
In the ﬁrst case, we show that when countries are heterogeneous, an
equilibrium with all countries behaving as price takers is not possible. The
country with the lowest marginal damage will supply all permits and there-
fore is a monopolist. Only when there are enough countries with the same
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and lowest marginal damage will it be possible to have perfect competition.
These lowest cost countries will then be the only countries issuing permits.
We have shown that that the permit-issuing countries set a higher total
emission ceiling than under no emissions trading, while the other countries
set their emission ceiling equal to zero. In this case, emissions trading will
lead to an increase in total emissions compared to non-cooperative abate-
ment without emissions trading. Welfare of the countries involved may well
decrease in this case, because of the increase in total emissions.
In case two, countries have market power. This means that they can in-
ﬂuence the permit price through the emission ceiling they set. In that case,
the eﬀect of emissions trading on the individual emission ceilings becomes
more complex. In essence, there are two opposing eﬀects that derive from
the fact that a buyer faces lower, while a seller faces higher marginal abate-
ment costs with international emissions trading than without. The higher
marginal abatement costs will induce a seller to set a higher emission ceil-
ing. However, because the country has market power, it tries to manipulate
the price by decreasing the volume of permits in the market. This causes a
seller to set a lower emission ceiling. On the other hand, the lower marginal
costs are for the buyer, the lower he would like to have the emission ceiling.
But he also tries to keep the permit price low and that is an incentive for
the buyer to set a higher emission ceiling. The total eﬀect depends on the
strength of these two eﬀects for buyers and sellers respectively. Therefore,
total emissions may decrease, but may also increase as a result of emissions
trading. It may happen that an interior solution does not exist. If that is
the case, there will be a boundary solution in which at least one country
that does not issue permits. This leads to higher total emissions than in
the interior solution where all countries issue permits. In general, welfare
will increase for all countries when total emissions decrease, but may de-
crease when total emissions increase as a result from trading. Evidently, the
presence of market power does somewhat mitigate the impact of emissions
trading on individual emission ceilings, total emissions and welfare. Now at
least, international emissions trading can lead to lower total emissions.
In the third case, countries behave cooperatively. However, side pay-
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ments are not possible. We use a Nash bargaining approach to deﬁne the
cooperative equilibrium and to model the eﬀect of emission trading. Here,
the eﬀect of emissions trading becomes even more complex. Now countries
also take the eﬀect of their own emissions on other countries into account,
and the extent to which they do so may change when going from the no-
trading regime to the trading regime. However, also here, countries may set
a lower or higher emission ceiling and total emissions may decrease or in-
crease as a result of emissions trading. In this case, sellers of permits always
gain from a shift to emissions trading, while buyers of permits may see their
welfare decrease. This is diﬀerent from the previous cases where emissions
trading could lead to lower welfare for both buyers and at least some sellers.
The analysis in this chapter shows that hot air, meaning that a seller
sets an emission ceiling in excess of its actual emissions, is a common conse-
quence from the introduction of international emissions trading. In the two
non-cooperative equilibria analyzed here, sellers virtually always receive hot
air. In the cooperative solution, hot air is not as common, but is still pos-
sible when the international environmental agreement leads to substantial
emission reductions and the endowment of hot air does not aﬀect the permit
price substantially.
The analysis shows that emissions trading is more likely to lead to an
increase welfare when the marginal damage and abatement costs curves of
seller countries are relatively ﬂat. This seems to be the case in the Kyoto
protocol (see Ellerman and Decaux 1998), which would indicate that the
inclusion of emissions trading has led to lower overall emissions and higher
welfare.
There are several extensions possible to this chapter. First of all, we
found that some countries may experience a decrease in welfare as a result
of emissions trading. It is possible then, that such countries would want to
block any agreement on emissions trading, or at least would want to block
the entry of certain countries to the emissions trading scheme.
This leads to another possible extension, namely that emissions trading is
only allowed between a subgroup of countries, possibly only the stable coali-
tion. In the cooperative solution, there is another possibility. In our analysis,
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we have assumed that in the cooperative solution with emissions trading,
countries use the noncooperative equilibrium without emissions trading as
the threat point. We then found that welfare in the Nash bargaining so-
lution with emissions trading could be lower for some countries than their
welfare would be in the Nash bargaining solution without emissions trad-
ing. However, if instead the countries used the cooperative solution without
trading as a threat point, emissions trading would always lead to higher
welfare for all countries. The reason for this is that in the Nash bargaining
solution, countries can never receive less than the payoﬀ in the threat point.
Hence, by using the Nash bargaining solution without emissions trading as
the threat point, no country will be worse oﬀ after the introduction of emis-
sions trading. Which of the two scenarios is the most appropriate one is
open for discussion. It should however be noted, as we did in the introduc-
tion, that for some countries, e.g. the US, the inclusion of emissions trading
in the Kyoto protocol was a precondition for signing it.
Another issue is hot air. As this chapter shows, sellers often receive hot
air, especially in the non-cooperative case. However, there is much resistance
to the possibility of trading hot air. Within the current model, one could
analyze the eﬀect of emissions trading with the additional restriction that
hot air is not possible.
Chapter 3
Alternative Design Options
for Emissions Trading: A
Survey and Assessment of
the Literature
3.1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 sets ceilings for the emissions of greenhouse
gases of Annex B Parties to be achieved in the commitment period 2008-
2012. For some parties, such as the US and EU, keeping emissions below
their assigned amounts will imply high marginal costs whereas others, for
example Russia and Ukraine, can realize their emission targets with little
economic eﬀort. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol introduces ﬂexibility by
allowing international emissions trading in greenhouse gases. Parties can
avoid high marginal cost of emission reduction by buying their assigned
amounts from countries which accept an equivalent decrease of their assigned
amounts since they are able to expand their emission control at relatively
low marginal cost.
In the political discussion, international emissions trading is seen as
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transactions between national governments, increasing or decreasing their
assigned amounts. After the revision of the national emission targets, ade-
quate national policies and instruments should be designed and implemented
to realize the revised targets. On the other hand, economists who have re-
ﬂected and written on international emissions trading have pointed out that
the ﬂexibility of the Kyoto Protocol and cost savings would be much higher
if international emissions trading between private parties is made feasible:
private parties have better information than governments on their emission
control costs, as well as the incentive to keep costs as low as possible.
Private party trading means that a ﬁrm in country X can buy or sell
emission permits from, respectively to a ﬁrm in country Y. It sets the stage
for a truly international market for tradeable emission permits; the tasks of
national governments being restricted to registering the concurrent changes
in assigned amounts and to monitoring and enforcing compliance of national
ﬁrms.
This type of trade in emission allowances between private parties under
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol should be clearly distinguished from Joint
Implementation as deﬁned in article 4. Although J.I. also involves a trans-
action between private parties residing in Annex B countries, allowing one
party (in the donor country) to increase its emissions thanks to the extra
emission reduction by the other party (in the guest country), its design is
basically diﬀerent and its economic impact as well.
In this chapter we shall discuss the design of government trading and two
types of private trading; permit trading and credit trading. With permit
trading, a cap is placed on ﬁrm and total emissions, after which ﬁrms are
allowed to trade emission allowances. Credit trading on the other hand is
based on relative standards with no absolute cap on emissions. In our analy-
sis we concentrate on emissions of carbon dioxide and on the type of design
that oﬀers the legal setting for transactions between private parties. Quite
understandably the literature on the subject focuses on the international
dimension. Yet adequate functioning of the international ﬂexibility mecha-
nisms highly depends on how well the national instruments are designed and
implemented. This simple truth is often overlooked. In this contribution we
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shall therefore concentrate on the national basis of international permit and
credit trading.
Among economists (see Ellerman 1998; Bohm 1999; Hahn and Stavins
1999; Zhang and Nentjes 1999) there is a consensus that international permit
trading between private parties makes only sense if it is embedded in well-
enforced national schemes of tradable permits. Consequently international
emissions trading is basically private party trading within internationally
linked national schemes of tradable emission permits. Various designs of
national permit trading schemes have been proposed in the past few years.
We shall give a survey in section 3.3 and discuss their strengths and weak-
nesses, selecting what we consider to be the major issues. The link between
national cap and trade schemes and international emission trading is ad-
dressed in section 3.4.
Although the interest in tradeable permit schemes is growing, direct
regulation still is the dominant national instrument of environmental pol-
icy; for air pollution usually in the form of performance standards. To meet
the bottlenecks caused by the rigidity of direct regulation, ﬂexibility has
been introduced in the US by allowing trade in emission reduction credits.
Whereas it is normally argued that credit trading has to be based on ex-
plicit abatement arguments, we show in this chapter that this need not be.
Actually, credit trading can be organized in much the same way as permit
trading. This also extends to the international level, where international
credit trading can be set up by linking national trading schemes. The result
is that international credit trading does not fall under article 4 of the Kyoto
Protocol, but under article 17, which deﬁnes emissions trading. The partic-
ularities of national credit schemes and the major diﬀerences with cap and
trade programs will be discussed in section 3.3.2 and Joint Implementation
as international credit trading is the subject of section 3.4.2.
3.2 Government Trading
One view of international GHG emissions trading is that the trading enti-
ties should be governments. In this case, trading is a transfer of assigned
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amounts and the commitments of the trading countries change accordingly.
These changes in commitment will have to be reﬂected in changes in domes-
tic policy. The buyer of emission quotas can relax its policy, while the seller
will have to tighten policy. Altering environmental policy will take time, in
many cases much time. This is a feature of government trading that has a
profound impact on the design of this trading scheme
It is to be expected that government trading will take place in the early
stage when national reduction policies are designed and at a late stage
shortly before or in the commitment period 2008-2012. Presently national
governments are planning what measures have to be taken to be able to com-
ply in the commitment period. Discovering that marginal costs of emission
reduction are going to be quite high, like in the Netherlands, they will look
for possibilities to raise the national emission ceiling by purchasing emissions
at a price below their marginal costs. Other governments will discover they
are able to sell emissions since the cost of national emission reduction will
remain low. To avoid changes in environmental policy later on, governments
will try to conclude the trades before the national policies are set. Before
and in the commitment period, some governments will discover they are
not going to comply, since planning can never be perfect in the face of an
unknown future. Other governments may expect overcompliance. Again,
they will see an opportunity to trade: not for reasons of eﬃciency, like in
the planning stage, but for compliance.
The most likely scheme of government trading to arise is bilateral trade
in big quantities, since this is the least complex way of doing business and
saves transaction costs. For the reasons mentioned, one also expects trade
to be rather infrequent. Also remind that only the 38 Annex B countries
can trade. Hence, there are relatively few traders. Because of the restricted
number of trades, probably clustered in the beginning and at the end of the
period 2000-2012, we shall not see a well performing market with regular
price signals.
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3.2.1 An Analysis of Government Trading
The performance of government trading depends on several factors such as
cost eﬃciency, ﬂexibility and complexity of the scheme. As will become
clear, government trading does not perform equally well on these points,
but has some distinct strengths and weaknesses.
In general, government trading will lead to improvements in cost eﬃ-
ciency in the trading countries, especially when trading occurs in the plan-
ning phase. Countries with relatively high marginal costs of abatement can
lower costs through the purchase of emission quotas from countries with
lower marginal costs. After the trade, the marginal costs in the two trading
countries will be more equal than they were before.
Although government trading will improve cost eﬃciency, it will not
minimize costs. There are two major reasons for this. The ﬁrst is the
lack of information on the part of the government about the abatement
costs of the emission sources. This can be called the domestic factor, since
it only depends on factors that are internal to the country. The other,
international, reason is that there are only a limited number of traders in a
pure government trading system. Because of this, it is likely that the market
is thin and that some, or all countries can behave strategically.
The information governments collect when planning their emission re-
duction measures, including the purchases and sale of emissions abroad, will
be on a high level of aggregation. It will also be incomplete and uncertain.
This makes that the government’s estimate of how much emissions to trade
at a certain (minimum or maximum) price is unreliable and not necessarily
the most cost-eﬀective choice. Such an estimate is made even more diﬃcult
by the fact that it may be quite unclear what price can be fetched before
the emission exchange contract between governments has been concluded.
How serious this problem is depends on when government trading oc-
curs and on which instrument is used domestically. If the government wants
to trade emissions before any policy is applied, any estimate of marginal
abatement costs will be very uncertain. If on the other hand the govern-
ment has regulated the emissions of greenhouse gases, the estimates can be
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more precise. This will especially be the case when tradable permits are
used. Through such a system, the marginal abatement costs of the emis-
sion sources will be revealed to the government, making it easier to assess
whether a certain trade is proﬁtable or not. However, implementing the in-
strument before the start of international emissions trading leads to higher
administrative costs since now the distribution of the total emission ceiling
over the emission sources has to be performed more than once.
After the trade of emissions, governments have to allocate emissions or
emission reductions nationally. How this is done depends on the instrument
applied. However, the lack of information on the side of governments will
lead to an ineﬃcient outcome, unless tradable permits or emission charges
are used (see Bohm and Russell (1985) and Barde (1995) for a discussion
of national instruments). With command and control instruments, an emis-
sion level has to be set for every emission source. Since this cannot be done
perfectly without full information, abatement costs will diﬀer per emission
source. Although taxes will lead to an eﬃcient outcome, it is hard to de-
termine the optimal tax level without perfect information, hence taxes may
not lead to the desired abatement level. Only with tradable permits will
the desired abatement level be realized with certainty in an eﬃcient manner
(Weitzman 1974).
The second major problem connected with a government trading system
is the small number of traders in the market. In eﬀect, only the 38 Annex
B countries can participate in emissions trading. The number of countries
actually trading will be even less, partly because for some countries, not
much can be gained from trading, partly because a number of countries will
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The problem is further aggravated by the fact
that the trades that will occur will be large and infrequent. All of this gives
rise to some problems. Firstly, it is very likely that the market for emission
quotas will be thin, which makes it hard to retrieve information from the
market. Secondly, some countries will be able to exert market power.
A market is said to be thin when only few transactions take place in
the market and trades take place infrequently. In such a market no real
market price will develop; prices will only be known after each trade, that
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is if the traders are willing to reveal it. As the number of traders in a
government trading scheme is small and the trades will be large and in-
frequent, it is very likely that a government trading scheme will lead to a
thin market in emission quotas. As is shown by Diamond (1982), Howitt
and McAfee (1987,1988), and Liski (1999), thin markets are not eﬃcient in
general. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the trades that come about
will hardly ever be conducted at the price that would arise in a competitive
market. Hence, trades will not be eﬃcient. Secondly, countries cannot a pri-
ori be certain at which price the trade will be conducted, and hence whether
trade will be beneﬁcial for them. Therefore, some countries may choose not
to trade, although beneﬁts could be reaped from trade. The uncertainties
about national marginal costs of emission reduction and about the price of
emissions makes that marginal costs will not be equalized between countries,
since the uncertainty will give a bandwidth around the actual marginal costs
within which the country will not trade.
In an international emission market, market power can be deﬁned as the
possibility of a seller (buyer) of quotas to sell (purchase) the quotas at a price
above (below) the market price with perfect competition. As Hahn (1984)
and Westskog (1996) show, the market power of a country is dependent on
the demand or supply of permits by a country. This in turn depends on
the diﬀerence between the optimal amount of permits for a country, and its
initial emission quota. If the diﬀerence between these is large, the demand
or supply of that country becomes large. Besides this, the total number of
permits, or the size of a country, will have an inﬂuence. Small countries with
a large deviation between optimal number of permits and emission ceiling
are not likely to have much market power. A large country with a large
diﬀerence between initial quota and equilibrium emission level will be more
likely to exert an inﬂuence on the price of emission quotas, either by acting
as a monopolist or as a monopsonist. In both cases the equilibrium price
of permits will be diﬀerent from the price that would occur in a perfectly
competitive market, which leads to a suboptimal outcome.
How real will the problem of market power be in the coming trading pe-
riod? Ellerman and Decaux (1998) analyze several emissions trading scenar-
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ios. When only emissions trading between Annex B countries is considered
the former Soviet Union (FSU) accounts for virtually all exports of emission
quotas (345 out of 351 Mton). It is however unlikely that the FSU will act
as a single unit. On the other hand, Russia and the Ukraine will probably
supply the main part of the emission quotas, with Russia being the largest
of the two. On the buying side, the US, Japan and the EU are of about
equal size (106, 95 and 106 Mton respectively). Hence, if the EU can act as
a single unit, there are three large buyers. However, it is more likely that
the EU countries will trade separately. In that case, we have one very big
seller (Russia) and two big buyers (the US and Japan) with a rather large
competitive fringe on the buying side. When not only trade between Annex
B countries is possible, but also trade with non-Annex B countries through
CDM, the picture changes drastically. In that case, the total volume of trade
becomes much larger (935 Mton) and the FSU only supplies about 20% of
the emission quotas, while China will provide about 45% (437 Mton). The
US will be the biggest purchaser (390 Mton) followed by the EU (234 Mton)
and Japan (132 Mton). In both scenarios then, some large buyers and sellers
exist. Especially in the ﬁrst case, market power on the seller side may cause
a problem since virtually all quotas will be supplied by the FSU.
Another impediment to an eﬃcient outcome is the presence of transac-
tion costs, and the costs connected with gathering information (see Stavins
1995). Both types of costs are likely to be high per transaction with gov-
ernment trading. As is argued above, information about other countries’
abatement costs will be imperfect and some eﬀorts may be used to gather
data on costs to improve knowledge. Furthermore, negotiations are needed
to reach an agreement on the quantity and the price of the trade. However,
since we expect the quantity of trade per transaction to be large, these costs
will not be large per unit of emissions traded. It is however important to
note that the transaction costs depend crucially on the design of the inter-
national trading regime (Woerdman 2001). If many conditions have to be
fulﬁlled before a trade is allowed, or if restrictions are set on trading, trans-
action costs will be increased. This would not be a problem exclusive to
government trading, but would be felt in all forms of international emissions
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trading.
The above shows that government trading is not a perfect trading scheme.
It brings improvements in cost eﬃciency, but does not deliver full eﬃciency.
Government trading does however possess certain characteristics that make
it an attractive trading scheme despite the disadvantages.
Since government trading will only alter the commitments of the trad-
ing countries, it does not aﬀect the choice of policy instrument that can be
implemented domestically. This is rather diﬀerent from the private trading
schemes that will be discussed later where the trading scheme ﬁxes a domes-
tic instrument. With government trading then, the instrument of regulation
can be chosen freely. This may be an advantage if the country or some major
interest groups for some reason have a preference for an instrument other
than tradable permits or domestic credit trading. Some countries may also
want to prevent trading with countries that have weak enforcement policies
or that can trade ’hot air’ (see below).
A system of government trading is also attractive because it does not
require a long preparation time. No additional rules for monitoring and
enforcement are needed, besides those that are needed for monitoring com-
pliance with the Kyoto Protocol anyway. Hence, trade can take place almost
instantaneously. In fact, trade can already commence before national regu-
lations are implemented.
The complexity of the government trading scheme is rather low. In most
cases, only two countries will be involved in a transaction, although multi-
lateral trade, as within the EU is possible. The fact that trade is between
countries makes monitoring relatively easy. Government trade is a transfer
of GHG quota between countries. Hence, it changes the emission ceiling of
the trading countries. During the commitment period, governments have
to report their actual emissions of GHG gases and the size of their emis-
sion quota to an international agency. However, this would also have to
be done in the case without international emissions trading. Government
trade therefore does not lead to additional monitoring costs compared to a
situation without trade.
The Kyoto Protocol has raised the problem of ’hot air’. With hot air
54
is meant that some countries have received a higher emission ceiling than
their actual emission level will be. Hence, these countries can sell emission
quotas without having to reduce emissions domestically. The result is that
aggregate emissions will be higher with trade than without trade. With
government trade, it is very likely that hot air will be sold, thereby reducing
environmental eﬀectiveness. For this reason, restrictions on emissions trad-
ing have been proposed by many, for example the EU and environmental
organizations (see Boom and Svendsen 2000b; Woerdman 2002). It is how-
ever very unlikely that the countries that beneﬁt most from trade in hot air
will accept such restrictions without a change in their commitment.
Government trading brings about improvements in eﬃciency, but does
not lead to a fully eﬃcient outcome. However, government trading has some
distinct advantages. Probably the main advantage is that it leaves coun-
tries completely free in their choice of national instrument. Furthermore,
it is a simple and straightforward trading scheme that is easy to under-
stand and gives governments greater possibilities of control over the trading
partners than a scheme of private emissions trading allows. The latter ad-
vantages make that government trading is a politically highly acceptable
trading scheme.
3.3 Private Emissions Trading
With private emissions trading the trading entities are private parties such
as ﬁrms and households. In the following we will discuss two types of private
trading: permit trading and credit trading. In permit trading, a ceiling, or
cap, is placed on total emissions, after which tradable permits to the amount
of the ceiling are distributed to some parties. In credit trading, emission
sources are regulated through a relative standard prescribing some emission
level per unit of output or input. Credits can than be sold for so far as a
source stays below this relative standard.
Whereas government trading does not put restrictions on the choice of
national policy instrument, international private trading schemes, such as
permit and credit trading, are feasible only when they are crafted on private
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emissions trading as national instrument. This makes it necessary to discuss
the design of private trading systems at the national level before analyzing
the pros and cons of international trading schemes. As will be shown below,
both permit trading and credit trading can be designed in diﬀerent ways,
which may have an impact on the performance and acceptability of the
schemes at the international level.
3.3.1 Design of a national permit trading scheme
The basic elements of a scheme of tradable emission permits at the na-
tional level are the following: set a ceiling on total emissions of the group
of participants in the scheme; distribute the emission permits among par-
ticipants; allow trade; monitor (transfer of) emission permits and of actual
emissions and enforce compliance with he scheme. Diﬀerences between pro-
posed schemes arise from diﬀerences in how these elements have been worked
out.
Since carbon dioxide is released by burning the carbon contained in fossil
fuels emissions can be controlled by restricting the use of (carbon in) fossil
fuels. In the discussion on appropriate design of tradable carbon permit
schemes a major issue is at what level to organize it.
Four basic designs of permit trading can be distinguished (Jepma et al.
1998; Hargrave 1998): upstream, downstream, hybrid and mixed approaches.
In an upstream scheme, the producers, processors and transporters of fos-
sil fuels are regulated. In a downstream scheme, the consumers of fuels
can trade emissions and in a hybrid scheme large consumers of fossil fuels
are directly regulated, while the remainder of fuel consumption is regulated
through an upstream scheme. In a mixed scheme, large emitters are regu-
lated through a tradable permit system, while small emitters are regulated
through some other instrument. These four schemes and an alternative
scheme will be discussed below.
Several criteria have to be taken into consideration in the evaluation of
the four design options (Hargrave 1998; Hargrave et al. 1999)
• Environmental eﬀectiveness The larger the coverage of total carbon
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dioxide emissions of the scheme, the greater the certainty that the
emission level set by the government is realized.
• Economic eﬃciency Economic eﬃciency depends on the coverage of
emissions in the scheme and on the number of sources captured.
• Eﬀects on competition Competition can be distorted when competitors
do not face the same marginal costs of abatement.
• Administrative burden Intricate systems increase the costs of setting
up and maintaining the trading scheme. The administrative burden
depends on (Hargrave 1998)
1. The number of regulated sources. The larger the number of
sources, the more information is needed in the setting up of the
system.
2. The availability of needed data. If the data is readily available,
the previous point becomes less important.
3. The level of reporting requirements and the level of monitoring
needed. If reporting requirements are very intricate, the costs for
the regulated sources are high. High levels of monitoring mean
high costs for the monitoring authority.
4. Proper accounting. Ideally, ﬁrms are only required to hold emis-
sion quotas for emissions of greenhouse gases, and only for do-
mestic emissions.
• Relationship to exiting policies and measures When not all emissions
are captured by the trading scheme, but some are regulated through
other instruments, the interaction between the systems can have both
environmental and economic consequences.
Upstream Approach
In an upstream approach, not the emitters of carbon receive permits, but
instead the suppliers of fossil fuels have the obligation to cover their fuel sales
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(in terms of carbon) with permits. Producers, processors, and distributors of
oil, coal and natural gas receive permits for free or buy them at an auction.
After the initial distribution, they can trade the permits amongst each other.
The price of permits, which will result in the market, will be passed on to
the consumers through the price of fossil fuels. Hence, the consumers pay
a kind of ’carbon tax’. The result is that fuels with higher carbon content,
such as oil and coal, will rise more in price than those with a low carbon
content, such as natural gas.
Two main advantages of an upstream approach can be identiﬁed (Har-
grave 1998; Jepma et al. 1998; Bohm 1999). First, an upstream approach
would comprise virtually all fossil fuel use, and thereby carbon emissions. A
second advantage is that there are relatively few regulated entities in such
a system and only their carbon sales have to be monitored and compared
with the permits the suppliers have acquired. Therefore, the administrative
costs of an upstream system will be low.
Several disadvantages of an upstream system are mentioned in the lit-
erature. The main problem with an upstream approach is the low political
acceptability of such a scheme. Since here are (almost) no options for the
suppliers of fossil fuels to reduce the carbon content of the fuel, the carbon
cap is actually a fuel cap. According to Hargrave (1998), this may induce
strong resistance from producers since it will aﬀect their proﬁts. This is,
however, not a very strong argument since any measure to curb greenhouse
gas emissions will aﬀect the producers and suppliers of fossil fuels. The re-
sistance against an upstream system is more likely to be connected with the
way of distributing the permits.
If in an upstream system the permits were to be grandfathered, the re-
ceivers of the permits would be rewarded a large rent. Since they will transfer
the main part of the costs of the permits to the end-users, the permit hold-
ers do not pay for the reduction of emissions in any direct way (Cramton
and Kerr 1998). In this way, a small group of producers and transmitters
of fossil fuels receive large rents without incurring costs. Although grandfa-
thering might change producers into enthusiastic supporters of the scheme
(see Dijkstra 1999 and Svendsen 1998b), it will have the same distributional
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impact on end users as a carbon tax. It is, however assessed that it is not
politically acceptable that such large rents are distributed to a relatively
small group of large companies (Cramton and Kerr 1998; Hargrave 1998;
Woerdman 2000). This leaves open the option of auctioning the permits.
However, this will meet resistance from the aﬀected sectors: the suppliers
as well as the end users. Since there are relatively few suppliers that will
be involved, they will be very eﬀective at organizing themselves (see Olson
1965). It is therefore likely that they will have an inﬂuence on the policy
outcome. The same is true of the few very large energy intensive end users.
Besides this principal political bottleneck, several other disadvantages of
upstream trading are mentioned in the literature. One of the arguments is
that consumers have no incentive to reduce their emissions of carbon other
than through the reduction of fuel use. Hence, techniques aiming at re-
moving carbon after the fuel has been used (end of pipe technologies) will
not be developed (Hargrave 1998). In our view, this could be easily solved,
by introducing refunding for carbon removal after fuel use. An other some-
what peculiar argument runs that an upstream approach may not provide as
great an incentive for energy eﬃciency and fuel switching as a downstream
approach. The argument is based on the assumption that energy consumers
do not respond to price signals in the same way as to quantity signals.
Hargrave (1998) does however not give any references to conﬁrm this view.
Hence, it is not certain whether this is a certiﬁed fact, or just an opinion.
Finally, it is mentioned that the low number of participants in the scheme
increases the possibilities for market power by one or a few participants (see
also Jepma et al. 1998). It is assessed though that market power would not
be a problem in the US, since the number of regulated ﬁrms in an upstream
system would be about 2000, with the largest ﬁrm having a market share of
about 6% (Cramton and Kerr 1998). According to Koutstaal (1997), even
in a small country like the Netherlands there would be 40 to 50 traders in
an upstream scheme, which should be suﬃcient for a viable permit market.
We conclude that upstream schemes have the attractive features of wide
coverage and low administrative costs. However, they meet the political
obstacle that grandfathering as well as auctioning of the permits will meet
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strong resistance form interest groups.
Downstream
In a downstream system, all emission sources are required to hold emission
permits and the emissions of all sources will be monitored. The government
can either distribute the permits for free (grandfathering), or auction the
permits. In all permit trading schemes so far, the permits have been grand-
fathered (see UNCTAD 1998; Stavins 2000). The reason for this is that it
enhances the political acceptability of the scheme.
One of the major issues in permit trading is the distribution of the per-
mits. Basically, the government can choose to auction the permits or it
can give the permits away for free (grandfathering). The two methods of
distribution give the same permit price and lead to the same eﬃciency of
the system. However, each has some speciﬁc advantages and disadvantages.
Some central issues are the so called ’double dividend’ eﬀect and the polit-
ical acceptability of the scheme. With the double dividend is meant that
the revenue of an environmental tax or an auctioned tradable permit system
can be used to reduce distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy. In that
way, damaging emissions are reduced, while at the same time the economy
is made more eﬃcient through a lowering of distortionary taxes (Bovenberg
and de Mooij 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Goulder et al. 1997; Parry
et al. 1999). Seen in this way, instruments that generate a revenue may be
preferred to those that do not raise a revenues. Another use for the revenue
may be to distribute it to the parties aﬀected most by the regulation. This
would enhance the political acceptability of the scheme. However, the rev-
enue may also be used for more distortionary subsidies or consumption. In
that case, the revenue-raising capacity of an auctioned system may be seen
as a disadvantage. Hence, in comparing the two ways of permit distribu-
tion, one needs to know speciﬁcally what the revenue, if any, will be used
for, before one can make an assessment (Bohm 2002).
Besides full eﬃciency, downstream trading has the advantage that it is
highly politically acceptable. Since the system regulates those that have to
60
reduce the emissions, and thereby incur the costs for doing so, it will be
rather acceptable to grandfather the permits, even though this implies the
distribution of a rent for free. Grandfathering the permits will make the
scheme much more acceptable for the regulated parties than distribution
through an auction (Hargrave 2000).
However, the political acceptability gained through grandfathering comes
at a cost. First of all, grandfathering may act as a barrier to entry in the
regulated sectors. If permits are grandfathered, incumbent ﬁrms in the in-
dustry receive their permit for free, but new entrants must buy permits from
the incumbents to be able to produce. This then imposes higher costs on
new entrants than on incumbents. This line of reasoning has been criticized
for ignoring the fact that ﬁrms should take the opportunity costs of per-
mits into account. That is, a permit, received for free or bought at a price,
represents a value in that it could be sold on the market at the going rate.
Using a permit for covering emissions implies sacriﬁcing the revenue from
selling the permits, which is a cost. Seen in this way, it makes no diﬀer-
ence for ﬁrms whether they receive permits for free, or have to buy them on
an auction or on the market. The only diﬀerence is that the shareholders
receive a one oﬀ bonus. However, Koutstaal (1997) has argued that under
certain conditions grandfathering permits to incumbents can raise barriers
to entry. Interest rates on loans often depend on the share of own capital
in total capital of a ﬁrm, grandfathered permits then make it easier for the
incumbents to borrow money than for new entrants and in this way, they
gain a competitive edge over new entrants. It is clear that such an advantage
for incumbents would be lost immediately when the government decides to
auction all permits. Another problem with grandfathering permits is that
a distribution rule has to be decided on. If the permits are auctioned, all
the government has to do is to set the total amount of permits and auction
them. With grandfathering, the government has to decide whether to dis-
tribute the permits on the basis of historical emissions, on output, on future
expected emissions or output, or on some other basis. Then, it has to be de-
cided how to distribute them over the participating emission sources. Such
a process invites lobbying and even lawsuits against the regulator, slowing
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down the regulatory process and increasing the costs of regulation.
Next to grandfathering a second factor increasing the acceptability of
downstream trading, which pertains in particular to the US, is the familiar-
ity with the system (Festa 1998). In the US, several kinds of downstream
trading (credit and permit trading) have been used (see Tietenberg 1989;
Klaassen and Nentjes 1997; Svendsen 1998b; Schmalensee et al. 1998 for
some assessments). However, downstream trading is also known in Europe,
for example in the milk production and ﬁshing quota in the EU and manure
production quota in the Netherlands (Boom et al. 1998; Stavins 2000). The
familiarity with the system will make the system easier to explain and might
diminish resistance from politicians and bureaucrats. In a downstream sys-
tem, all individual emission sources are regulated. This means that there
are many traders facing the same price, trading will be regular, making that
new information is dispersed quickly through the market and there is lit-
tle risk of market power (Jepma et al. 1998). The size of the market will
also make the development of derivatives such as options possible which will
make the market even more eﬃcient.
Besides these, some other advantages of downstream trading are men-
tioned in the literature. According to Festa (1998) a downstream system is
a greater stimulus for innovation than an upstream system. Festa asserts
that price signals are not always suﬃcient motivation for consumers to im-
plement proﬁtable energy savings but that quantitative signals are suﬃcient
motivation. Again, there is no evidence provided to support this claim. An-
other argument related to innovation, is that a downstream system where
emissions are monitored at the sources also provides incentives to remove
carbon, after emission use (Festa 1998).
Although the literature endows a downstream system with many advan-
tages, some disadvantages are mentioned too. There is an almost general
consensus that there are high administrative costs connected with a down-
stream approach (Festa 1998; Hargrave 1998; Jepma et al. 1998). One of the
reasons for this is that the permits have to be distributed to all the sources
and their emissions have to be monitored. If the distribution is based on
historical emissions per source, the distribution will be very costly, since
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then the government needs to know the emission data from all sources for
some period in the past. Although this already will be costly, the monitor-
ing of the emissions and checking of compliance by comparing permits and
emissions at every source will be extremely expensive.
One remedy to this problem would be to lower the coverage of the system
by including only large sources or speciﬁc sectors. Other sources and sectors
would of course have to be regulated with other instruments. That could
contain the problem that the burden of emission reductions would fall solely
on the ﬁrms placed under a cap and reduce carbon leakage as well (Hargrave
1998).
In summary we conclude that a major argument for downstream systems
is the possibility of grandfathering; thus reducing the opposition from inter-
est groups against restriction of carbon use. But on the other side the high
administrative cost of a pure downstream system thwarts the feasibility of
such a scheme.
Hybrid
In a hybrid system, large polluters are regulated directly as in a down-
stream system, while other polluters are targeted through an upstream sys-
tem (Koutstaal 1997). Hybrid trading can be seen as a compromise system
between upstream and downstream trading, giving low administrative costs
and a reasonable level of political acceptability.
An advantage of a hybrid system is that the number of parties to be
monitored and to be checked on compliance is relatively low so that the
administrative costs of the system are low, although larger than in an up-
stream system. It will also secure a reasonable number of traders making the
system more eﬃcient and ﬂexible (Jepma et al. 1998). At the same time,
the environmental eﬀectiveness of the scheme is high because all sources are
covered; the large sources directly through the downstream part and the
small sources indirectly through the upstream part of the system.
One of the major issues in a hybrid system is the distribution of the
permits. The permits of the emission sources regulated directly through
63
tradable permits can be grandfathered. These ﬁrms will have to bear the
costs of emission reductions and therefore political resistance against grand-
fathering will be low. The permits for the fossil fuel suppliers have to be
auctioned since handing out for free to fuel suppliers without any real abate-
ment eﬀort in return will not be accepted politically.
A challenge connected with a hybrid system is to avoid double counting
(Hargrave 2000). Fuels consumed by sources included in the trading program
must be exempt from the indirect fuel tax that is put on the fuel price by
the producers through the upstream system.
Basically the hybrid scheme is a compromise of upstream and down-
stream elements. In terms of advantages and disadvantages it chooses the
political middle of the road of average political acceptability (lower than
downstream and higher than upstream) and average administrative cost
(lower than downstream, higher than upstream).
Mixed
In a mixed system, large polluters are regulated through a downstream
tradable permit system, while other sources are regulated through some
other instrument, such as performance standards or taxes. The advantages
of such a system are that it gives an eﬀective and eﬃcient policy for large
emitters. At the same time, it also includes small emitters, (Jepma et al.
1998). Furthermore, a high coverage of total carbon dioxide emissions is
possible in such a system. The instrument that is most likely to be used to
regulate the small emitters is a tax. Taxes are relatively easy to monitor,
whereas the monitoring system needed for standards would be as high as
in a downstream system. Hence, they would not give lower administrative
costs.
The disadvantages of a mixed system stem mostly from the fact that
two or more instruments are used simultaneously (see Hargrave 1998). First
of all, it would bring high administrative costs because additional programs
have to be set up besides the permits trading system. In our view this is
a ﬂawed argument. Administrative cost will be lower than in case of pure
64
downstream permit trading. Second, if these other measures lead to other
marginal costs of abatement in the other industries, ineﬃcient allocation of
emission control between sectors and carbon leakage may still take place. A
third problem with other measures is that they do not guarantee that the
countrywide emission ceiling is met.
Even though many problems are associated with a mixed system, it is the
system preferred by the European Commission (COM 2000). Remarkably,
the European Commission does not even mention other design options for
emissions trading. The main reason why the European Commission prefers
a mixed system is that in this way companies will be able to trade on a EU
permit market, which in turn will give them the opportunity to prepare for
international emissions trading. The problem of carbon leakage is dealt with
in one sentence: ”the potential competitive distortions caused by leaving out
some sectors, or smaller sources within the covered sectors can be limited
by ensuring that equivalent policies and measures are imposed on sectors
and sources not covered by the trading system” (COM 2000, p. 13). Here
the European Commission seems to think that it is easy to set ’equivalent
policies and measures’. It is however not likely that an equal price can be
created though other measures. Moreover, it will be impossible to adapt
these measures as the price of permits changes over time.
Most of the authors mentioned above agree that the upstream design
will outperform the other alternatives (Bohm 1999; Cramton and Kerr 1998;
Festa 1998; Fischer et al. 1998; Jepma et al. 1998; Hargrave 1998, 2000).
The reason for this is that an upstream design gives a high coverage of emis-
sions and low administrative costs. Precisely on these points a downstream
system performs badly. Even though a downstream system will have more
parties participating in the permit market and might therefore be more ef-
ﬁcient than an upstream system, it is assessed that this cannot outweigh
the above-mentioned problems. There is also some support for a hybrid
system, although the administrative costs for preventing double counting
can be high. A mixed system is almost unanimously rejected (apart from
the European Commission) because of the problems that arise when com-
bining diﬀerent instruments. There is however an alternative to the designs
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discussed so far that the above-mentioned authors do not discuss.
Alternative design
In another strand of the literature on CO2-emissions trading, an alternative
design is mentioned, which combines elements from upstream and down-
stream systems (see Koutstaal 1993,1997, Zhang and Nentjes 1999; Duijse
et al. 1998; Nentjes and Rietveld 2000). In this system, allowances are
grandfathered to sources (big and small), as it would be in a downstream
system, but compliance is monitored upstream at the level of producers
and importers (see Table 3.1). The approach seeks to improve the political
acceptability by extending grandfathering to small sources and avoid high
administrative cost by concentrating monitoring of compliance on the few
ﬁrms operating upstream.
Permits for large-scale fuel users could be grandfathered proportional to
their carbon use in a reference year. Remind, this is the usual approach when
quantity is rationed and quotas are distributed among ﬁrms. Grandfathering
to small users can be done on a general basis: it is proportional to CO2
emissions resulting from average fuel use per adult person in a reference
year. In this way the administrative cost of establishing the fuel use of each
single person, or household in a reference year is avoided. It can be expected
that it will be politically more acceptable to grant permits for a basic good,
such as fuel for consumer households, on an egalitarian base rather than
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proportional to past use.
The scheme requires that an end user who purchases fossil fuels ’pays’ for
the emissions by handing over emission permits to the fuel distributor. The
distributor in turn can only buy fuels if he transfers the adequate number
of permits to his supplier. In this way, the permits end up in the hands
of producers and importers of fuel. They have to demonstrate, at the end
of the year, that their sales of fuels (potential CO2 emissions) are covered
by an equivalent number of permits in their possession. The number of
permits they actually can receive is restricted by the quantity of permits
grandfathered to sources. The scheme is to a large extent self enforcing: the
seller of fuels has an interest to receive the right number of permits from
the purchaser. Since checking compliance is restricted to the relatively few
upstream ﬁrms and the scheme is self-enforcing at the downstream levels
the administrative costs of monitoring and enforcement are kept low.
The administrative cost of initial distribution and the transaction costs
of permit transfer and of trade between downstream sources can be kept
low by delegating implementation to a national agency and organizing the
scheme in the form of carbon accounts and making permit transfer using
pin card technology. All participants are registered at the national agency.
End users receive in the beginning of the year their permits for that year
on their account. The agency also sends them the carbon pin card. When
purchasing fuels, for example after ﬁlling up at a petrol station, the end user
uses his pin card to transfer an amount of permits (which corresponds with
the carbon content of the acquired fuel) to the permit account which the
distributor holds at the national permit agency. Transfer of carbon permits
to the account of the gas and electricity distributor can be synchronized
with paying the gas and electricity bill. Permit trade between end users
can be facilitated by placing machines at strategic points where they can
electronically increase or decrease their carbon account by buying or selling
at the current carbon permit price. The machines are exploited by compa-
nies who trade professionally in carbon permits. The current market price
arises from the transactions of and between the permit trading companies.
At the end of the year the national agency establishes for every user unit
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the balance of the permit account. This is equal to: grandfathered permits
(via chip card or account) plus the purchased permits minus the permits
sold minus the permits used and transferred. This balance can be positive,
but not negative. The positive balance is added to the permit account for
the next year.
The implementation costs consist of the registration of the participants
as well as the yearly allocation of permits and mailing of pin cards. We
roughly estimate this to a few euros per participant. The costs of permit
transfers between accounts will be comparable to the cost of money transfers
between bank accounts. The monitoring focuses on the limited number of
fuel importers and producers. Valued at a carbon price of 40 euro per
ton of CO2, a reasonable estimate of administrative cost is 1 percent of
total carbon value (Nentjes and Rietveld 2000). The transaction costs of
purchasing additional permits or selling excess permits will be not higher
than two percent per transaction as we know from experience in the US.
The ﬂexibility of the scheme arises from the possibility to trade permits
freely; thus allowing ﬁrms and households to adjust the number of permits
to their actual CO2 emissions. Families living in small, well insulated apart-
ments and without a car will end up with a permit surplus at the end of
the year, which can either be sold or banked to cover emissions next year or
later. This feature of grandfathering permits to all fuel users would increase
the political support for the scheme compared to other designs. Simulta-
neously, the administrative cost, although they are higher than with an
upstream system, are kept low, thus avoiding the major bottleneck of the
pure downstream scheme.
One of the reasons why the administrative costs for the government
are low in the alternative design are low is that they are transferred to
the suppliers and distributors of fossil fuels. The idea behind it is that they
administrate the ﬂows of fossil fuels anyway and will thereby have lower costs
of monitoring and control than would be the case with a separate agency.
One disadvantage of the system is the large set up costs that are associated
with it. At every place where fossil fuels can be bought, it must be possible
to trade permits too. Hence, trading points have to be set up at every gas
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station. There is also some uncertainty about the level of the transaction
costs in the system. Although the absolute costs per transaction will be
low, the relative costs may be high. This will again apply especially to the
transport sector. With every stop at the ﬁlling station, permits have to be
transferred from the car owner/driver to the owner of the ﬁlling station. The
number of permits transferred per transaction may be very low, but the time
and costs per transaction are constant. How high the costs are is uncertain
and should be determined before a ﬁnal judgment can be made about the
eﬀectiveness of the system. Another possible disadvantage of the alternative
scheme is that the population has to be acquainted with the system to lower
resistance. It is likely that the system is seen as cumbersome and complex by
the population, which would be the largest barrier to political acceptability
of the scheme.
The alternative system presented here has as its major advantages that
it is very eﬃcient, and has relatively low monitoring and enforcement costs.
The political acceptability of the scheme is enhanced by the possibility to
grandfather all permits, but the public may perceive it as cumbersome and
complex and may therefore resist it.
3.3.2 Credit Trading
Credit trading has originally been developed in the eighties in the US in
the EPA emissions-trading program to introduce ﬂexibility in a stringent
scheme of direct regulation of emission standards for sources. The original
spatial level for credit trading was the region, since it was developed for
non-uniformly dispersing pollutants. In case of a national climate change
policy based on performance standards, the credit-trading scheme could be
implemented on a national scale. To our judgment the legal framework for
such a type of national credit trading is already in place in the US and other
countries could follow the example.
Credit trading is an instrument that cannot be used on its own but must
always be combined with some other instrument that sets a baseline for
emissions. The most commonly used instrument is some form of relative
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standard that does not place a cap on total emissions. Such relative stan-
dards can specify the allowed emissions per unit of output or per unit of
some input. The allowed emissions per year are calculated by multiplying
allowed CO2 emissions per unit of output (input) by the level of output (in-
put) that year. In this way, the emission baseline is determined ex post and
need not be estimated beforehand. Although ex post estimation of the base-
line may seem a large departure from the usual procedure, it does not diﬀer
so much from it in the end. Even when the baseline is estimated beforehand,
the baseline is continuously adjusted as new developments arise. Hence, in
the end, the baseline is the same, whether one estimates it beforehand and
adjusts it, or whether one sets it ex post.
After the implementation of the relative standard, ﬁrms can start to
trade credits. A ﬁrm can simply start selling credits whenever it expects
that its total emissions will be below its baseline. At the end of the trading
period, usually a year, all emission sources have to show that they are in
compliance, i.e. that their actual emissions are below allowed emissions.
Allowed emissions are here deﬁned as the relative standard multiplied by
the level of output plus the net purchased emission credits. If ﬁrms are not
in compliance, they could be given a grace period in which they can purchase
credits up to the level of their actual emissions as is the case in the US SOx
trading program.
It should be noted that with credit trading deﬁned in this way, there is
no need for explicit abatement projects to create credits. When a change
in production leads to lower emissions per unit of output for example, the
ﬁrm will stay below its baseline. This can hardly be deﬁned as a project.
However, the ﬁrm would receive credits for this. A consequence of this
is that credit trading not necessarily leads to reductions in emissions at
the seller. If the government sets the relative standard higher than the
emissions per unit of output will be the ﬁrm can sell credits without reducing
emissions. It is clear that this deﬁnition of credit trading diverges from the
common descriptions of it. However, project based credit trading can be
seen as a restricted version of the general credit trading design that we give
here. Most of the experience with credit trading is with the project based
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kind. However, in the Netherlands, two general credit trading schemes are
proposed. A recent proposal for NOx emission trading (for all stationary
sources lager than 20 MWth, about 200 ﬁrms) seeks to achieve the NOx
emission target of 55 kilo tonnes in 2010 by setting a performance standard
of 50gr. NOx emissions per GJ energy input in 2010. (Kamerstuk 26578 nr.
3, Vergaderjaar 2000-2001). Also for CO2, an emissions trading scheme is
discussed. This will be based on an energy eﬃciency standard set through
negotiations with industry. Hence, in the NOx trading scheme the basis is
a relative input standard, while the basis for the CO2 trading scheme is an
output standard.
As will be clear, the above description of credit trading has much in com-
mon with permit trading with a cap. The only diﬀerence is the instrument
that forms the basis of the trading system. With permit trading this is a
ceiling on the total emissions of a ﬁrm. With credit trading, this is some
relative standard that does not set an absolute ceiling on emissions, but a
relative one; emissions are allowed to vary with output (or some input).
The disadvantages of credit trading can almost be characterized as the
cardinal sins in economics: low eﬀectiveness and low eﬃciency. The low
eﬀectiveness of the system is caused by the low eﬀectiveness of the relative
standards that are used as a basis for credit trading. Firms that enter the
industry and expanding ﬁrms get a license to emit for free up to the level
set by the relative standard. In case of unexpected rapid economic growth
the emission target for the group of sources will be exceeded even though
compliance at the ﬁrm level is perfect. In the proposed Dutch NOx emissions
trading scheme such a development should be signaled by an evaluation in
2006. If deemed necessary the performance standard will be made more
stringent, but not sharper than 40 gr NOx per GJ. This makes clear that
the credit trading scheme requires more central planning and intervention
than a cap and trade scheme without certainty that it will prevent too lax
or too late adjustment of performance standards. In cap and trade schemes
the whole problem is avoided by simply not allowing additional emissions
for free once the allowed emissions have been distributed.
Next to eﬀectiveness the eﬃciency of credit trading is to be criticized.
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Just as permit trading, a credit trading system will improve cost eﬃciency
for the trading ﬁrms as compared to no trading. Firms with low emission
reduction costs will abate more than is necessary, and can sell credits to ﬁrms
with high abatement costs. The result is that the marginal abatement costs
of the trading ﬁrms will be more equal. However, a credit trading system
will not be as eﬃcient as permit trading. With credit trading there is an
imbalance between emission reduction through a reduction in production
and through other measures. More precisely, production is too high under
credit trading based on performance standards, leading to higher marginal
abatement costs (Ebert 1998, 1999 and Dijkstra 1999). The reason for
this is that by regulating emissions through relative standards, ﬁrms cannot
comply by reducing total emissions, but only by reducing emissions per unit
of output or input. Hence, reducing emissions by reducing output will not
give a better compliance. By regulating in such a manner, one eﬃcient
possibility of reducing emissions, reducing output, is excluded. It will be
clear that this can never lead to the most eﬃcient outcome.
Under relative standards, and thereby credit trading, ﬁrms that expand
production receive additional emission allowances and ﬁrms that reduce pro-
duction loose emission allowances. The same happens for ﬁrms that enter
or exit the market. They respectively receive emission allowances for free
or loose them on exit. Hence, a ﬁrm that wants to leave the market cannot
sell its credits. Although this may lead to lower emissions if the other ﬁrms
do not react by increasing production, it may also give an incentive for in-
eﬃcient ﬁrms to stay in the market. With permit trading, ﬁrms with very
low proﬁtability would stop production and sell their permits since this will
maximize proﬁts. However, with credit trading, reducing output does not
generate credits and therefore, ﬁrms with low proﬁtability have no incen-
tive to terminate production. In this way, a low cost option to reduce CO2
emissions is foreclosed.
The major advantage of credit trading is that it has a high political ac-
ceptability (Boom and Svendsen 2000a,b and Boom 2001). Resistance from
industry will be low since credit trading based on relative standards gives
ﬁrms maximum ﬂexibility. This system allows them to increase emissions
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with output and provides additional ﬂexibility through the possibility of
emissions trading. Furthermore, the emission allowances are distributed for
free to the emission sources. Another important factor, especially to export
oriented industry, is that the price of the goods produced in the regulated
industries will be lower under credit trading than under permit trading.
In this way, industry will have an advantage over foreign competitors reg-
ulated trough taxes or tradable permits. Precisely this aspect was clear
in the failed proposals for CO2 emissions trading in the Netherlands (CO2
Trading Commission 2002). Here the so-called sheltered sectors (those not
facing foreign competition) will be regulated through an upstream system
based on tradable permits, while the exposed sectors (those facing foreign
competition) will be regulated through a credit trading system based on
relative standards.
For all parties involved in designing and participating in the scheme,
mainly politicians, civil servants and industry, credit trading has the advan-
tage of familiarity. The basis of credit trading, relative standards, is well
known to all groups. It is likely that the most preferred instrument is the
one that deviates least from the existing policy (Lindblom 1959).
In many analyses, credit trading is associated with high transaction costs
(UNCTAD 1998). Looking at the history of credit trading, this also seems to
be vindicated by the practical experience with the instrument. However, in
the design of credit trading outlined above, transaction costs will be as low
as with permit trading. Transaction costs will be high when credit trading is
based on abatement projects where the baseline is determined beforehand.
In that case, the baseline has to be adjusted continuously and the project
needs to be monitored constantly to ensure that the projected abatements
level is realized. In the credit trading system described above, such projects
are not necessary and neither is ex ante estimation of the baseline.
Another commonly held belief is that the preparation time for credit
trading is long. Two points have to be taken into account here: the prepa-
ration time for setting up the program and the preparation time for individ-
ual trades. At least within Europe, permit trading is a radical break with
the past in two ways. First of all, permit trading is based on ceilings on
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total emissions. This is not a very common way of designing environmental
policy. More often, relative standards or taxes are used. With both these
instruments, total emissions are allowed to increase when output increases.
Hence, emission ceilings close the open access to emission space. On top
of that, emissions trading is allowed, which also constitutes a break with
the past. The process of putting both subjects on the political agenda for
discussion and deciding to implement it will take time. With credit trad-
ing, the underlying instrument does not constitute a break with the past.
Therefore, we expect that less time is needed to implement it. However,
also credit trading constitutes a break with the past in that it allows for
emissions trading. For both types of private emissions trading, making the
necessary adjustments in legislation will be substantive and time consuming.
Experience in the US with the development of credit trading in the 1980s
and tradable permits in the 1990s and also the introduction of credit trading
for NOx in the Netherlands and CO2 trading in the EU in the ﬁrst years
of the twenty ﬁrst century has aﬃrmed these predictions. If permit and
credit trading are both based on sound national policies, and credit trading
is designed in the way outlined above, there will not be a large diﬀerence
in the transaction costs per individual trade. Therefore, we do not expect
important diﬀerences in transaction cost in case of national schemes. In sec-
tion 4 we shall discuss how far this also holds for international application
of the ﬂexibility mechanisms.
The upshot of the above discussion is that although performance stan-
dards complemented with credit trading are less eﬀective and less eﬃcient
than cap and trade schemes they may meet less resistance from dominant
interest groups, which makes the schemes politically more feasible.
3.4 International permit and credit trading
3.4.1 International permit trading
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows international emissions trading with
a cap. Although the Protocol only talks of emissions trading between Par-
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ties, i.e. transactions between government of Annex B countries, there is
wide consensus that it can include emissions trading with a cap between
private parties (Bohm 1999; Hahn and Stavins 1999; Zhang and Nentjes
1999). International emission trading between private parties requires that
caps have been established for participating ﬁrms. The caps on total emis-
sions have to be set by national authorities and applied to the ﬁrms in their
respective jurisdictions. Monitoring of ﬁrms’ emissions, ownership of per-
mits and their transfer, as well as enforcement are also tasks of national
authorities in the ﬁrst place. The requirements imply that international cap
and trade schemes cannot work unless national cap and trade schemes have
been established in the ﬁrst place. They may comprise the whole economy
or selected sectors or group of sources only. International emission trade ba-
sically is international linkage of national emission trading schemes. Once
the unit of trade has been deﬁned, eg one tonne of carbon, ﬁrms can trade
internationally.
The national agencies to which the implementation of the national pri-
vate trading scheme have been entrusted, should inform each other about
transfrontier permit transactions. Suppose a Dutch ﬁrm buys permits from
a ﬁrm in Denmark. The agency in Denmark registers the reduction of per-
mits of the Danish ﬁrm and of course has the task to see to it that the Danish
ﬁrm complies by not emitting more than its reduced number of permits al-
lows. The Danish agency also registers that the international transaction
has reduced the Assigned Amounts of Denmark. The Dutch agency regis-
ters the increase of the permit account of the ﬁrm in the Netherlands and
the increase of Assigned amounts of the Netherlands. Coordination means
here that the two agencies inform each other and check whether the number
of permits sold in Denmark equals purchases in the Netherlands, to ensure
consistency in the transfer of Assigned Amounts. Each agency is responsible
for compliance with the after trade emission ceiling in its own country. Of
course UNFCCC institutions set up for compliance monitoring also have to
be informed in due time on the change in assigned amounts of countries,
caused by international emission trading of private parties.
The alternative for international private party emission trading, con-
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ceived as internationally interlinked national cap and trade schemes, would
be that national authorities deﬁne a cap for sectors or groups of ﬁrms and
place them directly under the control of an international emissions author-
ity which would have to work out and supervise the international emissions
trading scheme. It is highly unlikely that national states would be willing
to give up so much of their national sovereignty in the face of the possibility
of linking national cap and trade schemes.
If it is accepted that national authorities enforce compliance of private
parties engaged in national and international permit trade, this implies that
the private seller of permits is liable in the case of non-compliance. If the
seller’s emissions exceed the reduced quantity of permits he possesses, the
national authority has to apply sanctions. Introducing buyer liability for
private parties means that the legislator in the buying country doubts the
ability of the emission authority of the selling country to enforce the scheme
and therefore needs the help of buyer liability. Buyer liability would make
that the buyer has to assess the ’quality’ of the permits he buys (will they
be covered by genuine emission reductions or not).
The discussion on seller versus buyer liability that has been going on
(see Yamin et al. 2001; Zhang 2000) is only relevant in so far as liability
between Parties, i.e. national governments that have signed the Kyoto Pro-
tocol as Annex B Party, is at stake. Seller liability would be conform the
system we have expounded in this chapter. Buyer liability seems to make
sense if there are sound reasons to distrust the capability or willingness of
some national authorities to enforce their national schemes properly. How-
ever, buyer liability would complicate the system of internationally linked
national cap and trade schemes. A country that has been a buyer and sees
its assigned amounts reduced, because it has purchased from a selling coun-
try that has not reduced its emissions suﬃciently, is under the obligation to
tighten the national cap. In case of grandfathering this would mean an un-
expected reduction of permits for ﬁrms, thus creating an additional source
of uncertainty for ﬁrms in the cap and trade scheme.
In our view a more appropriate approach to cope with the problem of
inadequate monitoring and enforcement by some countries is to allow par-
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ticipation in international private party emission trading only for countries
with certiﬁed international cap and trade schemes. The criterion used in cer-
tiﬁcation should in particular specify the requirements of registering permit
ownership, monitoring emissions, establishing compliance and application
of sanctions (see Zhang and Nentjes 1999; Boom and Nentjes 2000). If a
country fulﬁlls these criteria, it is likely that it will comply with its com-
mitment. One can imagine that under the supervision of the UNFCCC, the
criteria are drafted and implemented much like the European Union drafted
and applied its criteria for participation in the Euro-scheme. This solution
presupposes that only the seller country is liable. Otherwise, setting up the
criteria would have no meaning.
Since not all Annex B countries would meet the requirements for car-
bon permit trade an international system of linked national tradable permits
schemes might initially start with only a handful of countries. Consequently,
the ’full eﬃciency’ of the scheme will only be achieved between the subset
of participating countries. The Annex B countries not qualifying for par-
ticipation in the emissions trading scheme, can still trade emissions trough
joint implementation. A start with a small number of states does not pre-
clude subsequent expansion to include other qualiﬁed countries according
to the rules of procedure agreed before trading begins. Such an expansion
will bring more emission sources into an international permit trading scheme
and increase the scope for eﬃciency gains.
Although the requirements seem rather harsh, it should be noted that
they are nothing more than the requirements for prudent national envi-
ronmental policy. When a country does not satisfy these requirements it
will not even be able to either monitor its domestic sources or to enforce
environmental policy on them or both. Hence, in that case any domestic en-
vironmental policy will fail. In case of tradable permits the outcome would
be disastrous.
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3.4.2 International credit trading
Similar to cap and trade schemes international credit trading can be crafted
upon national credit trading programs. National schemes are interlinked
internationally by allowing credit trade with private parties in other An-
nex B countries with well-established national schemes of credit trading.
We remind that national credit trading normally will be based on national
performance standards, allowing limited, free emissions to entrants and ex-
panding ﬁrms. Emission reduction credits are earned by emitting less than
allowed emissions calculated by multiplying emission standards with the
appropriate measure of capacity.
International credit trade is feasible and eﬃcient if conditions are met
similar to those relevant for international cap and trade: credits should be
expressed in the same unit or diﬀerent with ﬁxed conversion factors, national
agencies should register international credit transfer and inform each other
and monitor and enforce compliance of the sources under their jurisdiction.
Participation in the scheme would be reserved for countries with certiﬁed
national credit schemes. The answer to the question on which issues in-
ternational coordination or even harmonization is necessary are similar to
those for the cap and trade program, although the controversy on auctioning
versus grandfathering are avoided, since performance standards have always
implied grandfathering.
Does the Kyoto Protocol allow international credit trading and if so
which Article(s) does or do apply here? In our view article 17 of the Proto-
col does not apply exclusively to cap and trade schemes, but credit trading
as well. The article deﬁnes the transfer of Parts of Assigned Amounts be-
tween Parties government, it does not say anything on how the underlying
international exchange between private parties should be organized. It is
clear that the article refers to emissions trading between Parties that have
committed to an emission ceiling. However, nothing is said to suggest that
private parties that trade should be placed under a cap too. The interpre-
tation is that the Parties are responsible for meeting the emission ceilings
and not the individual ﬁrms. It could be argued, and some authors have
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done so (Yamin et al. 2001; Hahn and Stavins 1999; Janssen 2001), that
Joint Implementation is a type of baseline-and-credit trading. One might be
tempted to go one step further and see international credit trade as an activ-
ity covered by Article 6 - the Joint Implementation article. At ﬁrst sight it
seems that despite the similarities between Joint Implementation and credit
trading as speciﬁed in section 5.3.1 these are also major diﬀerences, making
the application of article 6 to international credit trading less appropriate.
Article 6 speciﬁcally mentions that joint implementation should be based
on investment projects that lead to emission reductions. Credit trading as
deﬁned above does however not ﬁt this description. With joint implemen-
tation, a Party (a national government) can earn emission reduction units
(allowing it to raise its emissions above its Kyoto emission commitment) by
reducing emission below a baseline in a project carried out in the jurisdic-
tion of another Party; the emission reduction units will lower the transferred
emission ceiling of that other Party. The consensus is that Joint Implemen-
tation projects usually will be carried out by private parties in the donor
and the host country. Article 6 states that approval of the project by the
Parties is required. A plausible interpretation is that the emission reduc-
tion units or credits of a Joint Implementation project are calculated ex
ante, even before the investment is carried out. They have the property of
future (expected) emission reductions over the commitment years 2000 to
2012. Approval and certiﬁcation of the emission reduction units is required
ex ante. The Parties, that is the governments of the host and donor country
should then ex ante agree on the emission reduction units to be transferred
form the host country to the donor country.
In our design of international credit trade, the credits need not come from
speciﬁc emissions reduction projects. If a reduction in production leads to
lower emissions per unit of product, a lower demand of the product may
lead to overcompliance by the ﬁrm. In that case, the ﬁrm could receive
credits since it stayed below the relative standard. This would however
hardly qualify as an emission reduction project. Furthermore, in our design
trade in future emission reduction between private parties is possible, but
only registration of the transfer is required. Future emission reduction units
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are transferred between the private parties and simultaneously between the
Parties. Ex ante approval is not needed. Ex post, for example on an annual
basis starting in 2008, compliance will be checked at the ﬁrm level: do actual
emissions not exceed the allowed emissions that have been calculated on the
base of the performance standard multiplied with output and transferred
credits. When the enforcement regimes in both countries are adequate that
legal entities in both countries will comply.
Another diﬀerence with joint implementation is that credit trading does
not have to lead to genuine emission reductions. For example, the govern-
ment could set the relative standard higher than the actual emissions per
unit of output will be. In that way, the ﬁrm can receive credits for staying
below the standard without having to reduce emissions. This also implies
that credit trading does not necessarily exclude trading in hot air. Only
if trading is explicitly based on projects where the baseline is deﬁned on
expected emissions, the permits or credits will always be backed by genuine
emission reductions. In all other cases, this will not have to be so.
A further question is whether and how schemes of private party emis-
sion trading with a cap (nationally and internationally) can be combined
with private party credit trading on an international scale. How do the two
schemes interact and what are the consequences for eﬀectiveness and eﬃ-
ciency? (see also Nentjes and Rietveld 2000, pp. 183-185)). Some countries
may want to implement the two schemes for diﬀerent sectors, as is the case
in the Netherlands. It is even more likely to meet such a combination at
the international level. As will be shown in chapters 6 and 7, countries may
have a preference for one of the trading schemes depending on the trade
balance in the goods market and on the diﬀerence between domestic and
international price of credits and permits (see also Ulph 1996b; Dijkstra
1998). Some countries will therefore implement a credit trading system,
while others will implement a permit trading system. A discussion of all the
economic implications of continuing credit trade and permit trade requires




In this chapter, three international emissions trading schemes have been
presented: government trading, permit trading and credit trading. The
main diﬀerence between government trading on the one hand and permit
and credit trading on the other hand is that in the latter two schemes the
traders are private parties, while in the ﬁrst one, governments trade.
Government trading will enhance eﬃciency, although the small number
of possible traders this scheme imply that the market is likely to be thin. The
result is an ineﬃcient market where market power and strategic behavior
may be detrimental eﬀects. On the positive side, government trading does
not restrict the choice of national policy instrument. Furthermore, it gives
governments greater control over trading, making it possible to ban trade
with countries without a good compliance or with countries possessing hot
air.
In this chapter, we have presented blueprints for two international emis-
sions trading schemes between private parties. Both schemes have in com-
mon that a well functioning international ﬂexibility mechanism requires im-
plementation of a well deﬁned and enforced national schemes: national cap
and trade, respectively performance standards complemented with credit
trading. On this basis, IET can be organized as internationally linked na-
tional schemes with seller liability between private parties and between Par-
ties for assigned amounts. A well functioning, transparent permit market,
respectively credit market with low transaction costs and low administrative
costs can develop. Internationally linked, well designed national schemes of
permit trading with a cap, respectively credit trading both create ﬂexibil-
ity nationally and internationally for carbon users and tend to equalize the
marginal cost of CO2 emission control: a basic tenet of technical eﬃciency.
The eﬃciency of permit trading is highly dependent on the design of the
domestic schemes of tradable permits. Although a large part of the literature
points to an upstream scheme as the best design, such a design implies
auctioning of permits, which decreases its political feasibility. An alternative
is possible that will potentially perform better. In this alternative design all
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sources receive for free tradable permits, but the monitoring is done at the
level of the suppliers of fossil fuels. In this way, high eﬃciency is combined
with low administrative costs and relatively high political acceptability.
The crucial diﬀerence between cap and trade and performance standards
with credit trading schemes is how the entry to ’emission space’ is organized.
Where credit trading is an addition to performance based direct regulation
or covenants, entering ﬁrms and expanding incumbent ﬁrms can obtain ad-
ditional emissions for free and ﬁrms that terminate their business loose the
license to emit. In permit trading with a cap this is not the case. This
may make that there is more support from industry for credit trading than
for permit cap and trade schemes. However, by giving up tradable permits
with an emission ceiling as a national instrument, the government sacri-
ﬁces its control of total emissions and the certainty of realizing the emission
goals set in the Kyoto Protocol. Next to that, performance standard based
credit trading does not put a price on residual emissions not exceeding the
standard. It leads to ineﬃciently high energy intensive output, requiring
ineﬃciently high emission abatement.
However, for various reasons, some government may prefer credit trading
to permit trading. It is therefore likely that both schemes will be used and
that they will be combined at the international level. Such a combination
does however give several problems. One is caused by the fact that credit
trading does not put a ceiling on emissions. This is already a problem at the
national level, but may be aggravated at the international level. Further-
more, a combination of credit and permit trading will lead to ineﬃciencies.
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Chapter 4
Permit Trading and Credit
Trading: A Comparative
Static Analysis with Perfect
and Imperfect Competition
4.1 Introduction
In the economic literature, emissions trading is almost always equated with
a system based on a ceiling or cap on total emissions. In such a scheme,
the government agency determines a cap on total emissions and divides this
into permits that are distributed in some way over the existing ﬁrms, after
which the ﬁrms are allowed to trade the permits. A prime example of such a
scheme is the US SO2 trading scheme that started in 1995 (see Schmalensee
et al. 1998). Also the EU greenhouse gas emissions allowances trading
scheme, that started on January 1 2005 is a cap and trade system (DIR
2003/87/EC ).
Even before cap and trade, or permit trading, schemes had started, an-
other type of emissions trading had been developed in the US and formal-
ized in the EPA emissions trading program. Leaving aside the details, the
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program boils down to a scheme of emissions standards made ﬂexible by
allowing trade in emission reduction credits. Firms which succeed to keep
actual emissions below the level required by the emission standard get emis-
sion reduction credits. Firms buying those credits are allowed to emit more
than the level deﬁned by the emission standard. Emission standard is here
deﬁned as maximum emissions per unit of some input or output. Firms are
then allowed to sell credits when they can stay below the emission ceiling
deﬁned as the standard times the amount of input or output. Just as with
permit trading, ﬁrms are allowed to trade before the realization of emission
reductions (see Boom and Nentjes 2003). The lead trading program in the
US is one example of emissions trading based on relative standards (see
Svendsen 1998b). In 1982, the US Environmental Protection Agency lim-
ited the lead content in gasoline to 1.1 grams per gallon and tightened the
standard in following years to 0.1 grams in 1986. Reﬁneries that remained
below the standard could sell credits to other reﬁneries. Another example
is the Dutch NOx emissions trading scheme that started on June 1, 2005
(Ministry of VROM 2004a,b). In this scheme, a diﬀerence is made between
combustion installations and process installations. The former emit NOx as
a result of the combustion of fuels. The standard for these installations is
based on the amount of NOx per gigajoule (GJ) fuel used, decreasing from
65 gram/GJ in 2004 to 50 g/GJ in 2010. Hence, combustion installations
are faced with a relative input standard. Process installations however are
regulated through a relative output standard determined as allowed NOx
emissions per unit of output that is diﬀerent for diﬀerent processes. Again,
ﬁrms that remain below the standard are allowed to sell credits. In the
following, emissions trading based on a cap on emissions will be denoted by
permit trading, while emissions trading based on relative output standards
will be denoted as credit trading.
It is very well possible for permit and credit trading to be combined,
both at the national and at the international level. The UK greenhouse
gas emissions trading scheme already combines both systems (DETR 2001).
Here, some sectors were initially regulated, either through emission ceilings
or relative standards, while others were not regulated. The latter could vol-
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untarily join a permit trading scheme that was initiated through an auction
of subsidies for emission reduction proposals. Simultaneously, the already
regulated sectors are allowed to trade credits under some restrictions. In
the Netherlands, a CO2 emissions trading scheme was proposed where the
energy intensive exporting sectors were regulated though a credit trading
scheme, while the remaining sectors were regulated through permit trading
(CO2 Trading Commission 2002). The European Commission has chosen to
apply a cap and trade system, so that a combination of permit and credit
trading for greenhouse gases should not be possible within the EU after
2005. However, if non-EU countries start credit trading schemes and would
be allowed to link them to the EU scheme, combined trading will still be
possible.
Credit trading is based on relative standards and therefore shares many
characteristics with the latter instrument. This is especially the case when
the industry is homogeneous since then there will be no trade in emissions.
The working of relative standards under perfect competition is discussed
by Ebert (1998,1999) and Dijkstra (1999) (see also Helfand 1991). The
conclusions from this literature are that relative standards lead to higher
industry output and higher marginal abatement costs than emission ceilings
and permit trading. Furthermore, Dijkstra (1999) shows that in the long
run, production per ﬁrm is lower and the total number of ﬁrms is higher
under relative standards than under permit trading.
Boom (2001) was the ﬁrst to give credit trading some thought. His
analysis shows that output will be larger under credit trading than under
permit trading (see also Boom and Nentjes 2003). Fischer (2001) discusses
several instruments, one of which is credit trading. Fischer shows that credit
trading can be seen as a tax on emissions equal to the credit price combined
with a subsidy per unit of output equal to the average value of emissions
embodied in output (credit price times the relative standard times output).
Because of this, output will be larger under credit trading than is optimal.
Furthermore, if the relative standard is set such that the credit price is equal
to the Pigouvian tax rate, total emissions will be higher than the social
optimum amount. Hence, to achieve the socially optimal pollution level a
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stricter standard has to be set, resulting in a higher credit price. Fischer
assumes constant marginal production costs, and is therefore not able to
analyze the eﬀects on industry structure. Gielen et al. (2002) discuss the
two systems in the framework of perfect competition in the goods market and
discuss the linkage of the two schemes. They also ﬁnd that credit trading
leads to lower product prices and higher marginal abatement costs than
permit trading. They do give a long-run model of the problem, but do not
analyze the eﬀect of the two schemes on ﬁrm size and the number of ﬁrms
in the industry. Kuik and Mulder (2004) analyze the eﬀect of permit, credit
and combined trading on the Dutch economy. Fischer (2003) discusses the
eﬀect of combining permit and credit trading. She concludes that such a
combination always leads to higher total emissions. However, this conclusion
is based on the assumption that governments will not set a stricter relative
standard in the credit sector.
The aim of this chapter is to give an insight in the functioning of and the
diﬀerences between emissions trading based on emission ceilings and trad-
ing based on relative standards and of the implications of combing the two
schemes. To this end, a partial equilibrium model of a polluting industry
is developed. Two types of market structure are considered: perfect com-
petition and oligopoly. In both cases, the number of ﬁrms is endogenous in
the long run. To make a comparison between the instruments possible, it is
assumed throughout the chapter that the government has imposed a ceiling
on total industry emissions.
As mentioned above, the existing literature has already given some in-
sight in the diﬀerences between permit and credit trading. This chapter
adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, it gives a more formal
analysis of the impacts of the two schemes and analyzes the long-run impacts
on industry structure. This enables us to present proofs of the diﬀerent im-
pacts of the two schemes. Second, the chapter gives a full analysis of the
performance of the two schemes under imperfect competition. Ebert (1998)
already gives a short analysis of some of the eﬀects of relative standards
under imperfect competition, but does not give a full analysis and does not
compare credit trading with other instruments. Diﬀerent from other stud-
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ies on environmental policy under imperfect competition, entry and exit is
endogenous in our model. As will become clear, modeling imperfect com-
petition in this way will lead to rather diﬀerent results compared to when
one assumes that the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. Another issue often ignored
is that the number of ﬁrms is an integer, also under perfect competition. In
the general model, we will ignore this integer constraint as well. One might
conjecture that this is rather harmless, because the number of ﬁrms is very
large (Dijkstra 1999, p. 91, fn 14). In the speciﬁc model, where the num-
ber of ﬁrms is an integer, we will examine the consequences of an integer
constraint. Finally, we analyze the eﬀects of combining permit and credit
trading formally, showing that this may both decrease or increase welfare.
The analysis consists of two parts. In the next section, a partial equi-
librium model is developed. Here, both the short-run and long-run conse-
quences of the two types of emissions trading are discussed and the eﬀects
on ﬁrm and total production, abatement costs, numbers of ﬁrms in the in-
dustry and welfare are given. Furthermore, an analysis of combined trading
is given in section 4.2.4. However, some issues remain unresolved in the gen-
eral model. Therefore, and to illustrate the properties of the two schemes,
a more speciﬁc model is developed in section 4.3. This model is used to
generate some simulations that give further insight into the working of the
two schemes. Finally, section 4.4 gives some conclusions.
4.2 A General Model
In this section, a general model of permit and credit trading is developed,
which will be used to analyze the cases of perfect and imperfect competi-
tion. In all cases, it is assumed that the government wants to regulate the
emissions E of a pollutant so that the total level does not exceed the limit
L, where L is binding. The pollutant is emitted by an industry, consisting
of n > 1 identical ﬁrms. Costs of production for a single ﬁrm are given
by C(q, E), where q gives the level of output. The properties of the cost
function are Cq > 0, Cqq ≥ 0, CqE ≤ 0, CE < 0 and CEE ≥ 0. Inverse





With perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms in the market is large and
no single ﬁrm has an inﬂuence on the product or emissions quota price. In
this section, we ignore the integer constraint on the number of ﬁrms. We
will ﬁrst analyze optimal ﬁrm behavior in the short run and then discuss
the eﬀects on the industry in the long run.
Short run. In the short run entry and exit do not take place. Therefore,
the number of ﬁrms in the sector is given. Because of this, it is possible that
ﬁrms will receive a proﬁt, or incur losses in the short run.
With permit trading, each incumbent ﬁrm receives an initial amount of
permits E¯. The price of permits that arises in the market is denoted by Rp.
The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is then given by
π = pq − C(q, E)−Rp(E − E¯)




= p− Cq = 0 (4.1)
∂π
∂E
= −CE −Rp = 0 (4.2)
The ﬁrst condition says that marginal revenue, in this case price, should
be equated with marginal costs of production. Since CqE < 0, regulation
gives an increase in production costs and therefore an increase in the prod-
uct price. The proﬁt-maximizing emission level is found by equating the
marginal costs of emissions to the price of permits. Condition (4.2) ensures
that marginal abatement costs are equalized between ﬁrms. Both conditions
together ensure that emission are reduced to the total emission ceiling at
lowest cost.
With credit trading, the scheme is not based on an absolute standard,
but on a limit on emissions per unit of output. Let the relative standard be
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given by e¯. Total allowable emissions for the ﬁrm is then e¯q plus or minus
the number of credits bought or sold respectively. Under these conditions,
proﬁts for the ﬁrm are given by
π = pq − C(q, E)−Rc(E − e¯q)




= p− Cq + Rce¯ = 0 (4.3)
∂π
∂E
= −CE −Rc = 0 (4.4)
These can be combined to give
p = Cq + e¯CE (4.5)
Since (4.4) holds for all ﬁrms, marginal abatement costs will be equalized
between ﬁrms. Hence, credit trading achieves an eﬃcient distribution of the
abatement burden across ﬁrms. However, as a comparison between (4.3)
and (4.1) shows, the production levels under the two schemes will not be
identical. With credit trading, the term Rce¯ makes that ﬁrms no longer
equate marginal production costs to the price of the product, but to a lower
level, indicating that in equilibrium total output will be higher and the
product price lower under credit trading. The additional factor can be seen
as an output subsidy (Fischer (2001)) since the ﬁrm is allowed to emit more
when it produces more.
It is now possible to determine the diﬀerence in impact of the two schemes
in the short run:
Proposition 14 Under perfect competition and in the short run, and with
equal total emissions, credit trading will lead to higher total and ﬁrm output
(Qc > Qp, qc > qp) and to a higher emission quota price (Rc > Rp) than
under permit trading. Firm emissions are identical under the two schemes
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Proof : In the short run, nc = np = n. Since Lc = Lp = L, we have that
Ec = Ep. Furthermore, from (4.1) and (4.5) it follows that Qc > Qp. This
combined with nc = np = n gives qc > qp. The fact that qc > qp combined
with Ec = Ep gives Rc > Rp since CEq < 0. 
Long Run In the long run, the number of ﬁrms is variable. Besides proﬁt
maximization, it is now required that ﬁrms remaining in the industry have
zero proﬁts.
For permit trading, this implies that the long-run conditions for a ﬁrm
are
p = Cq (4.6)
pq = C(q, E) + RpE (4.7)
−CE = Rp (4.8)
nE = L (4.9)
Note that the permits E¯ grandfathered to the ﬁrms do not appear in the
conditions above. The reason is that the permits represent an opportunity
cost to the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm does not cover its opportunity costs of emission,
it would be better oﬀ if it sold its permits and closed production.
The long-run conditions for credit trading are
p = Cq + e¯CE (4.10)
pq = C(q, E) (4.11)
−CE = Rc (4.12)
nE = L (4.13)
The last condition together with the assumption that ﬁrms are identical
implies that E = e¯q. As a ﬁnal condition for both schemes, the inverse
demand function is given by
p = p(nq) (4.14)
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It is possible to compare the equilibria under the two schemes. For permit
as well as credit trading, we ﬁnd from (4.6) and (4.7), and (4.10) and (4.11)
respectively, that under both schemes optimal production is determined by
C(q, E) = qCq −RE (4.15)
We can now show the following
Proposition 15 Under perfect competition and in the long run and with
equal total emissions, credit trading leads to higher industry output (Qc >
Qp), higher emission quota price (Rc > Rp), lower ﬁrm output (qc < qp),
lower ﬁrm emissions (Ec < Ep) and a higher number of ﬁrms in the industry
(nc > np) than under permit trading.
Proof : We will ﬁrst see that pc < pp. Suppose that pc > pp. Then













From (4.15) it follows that (q, E) follows the same path for the two schemes,
but at a diﬀerent speed. Furthermore, E/q must decline as L declines from
a non-binding level to zero. So from (4.16) it follows that (Ep, qp) is ahead
of (Ec, qc). Then from dE/dL, dq/dL > 0 (see appendix 4.A) it follows that













But we had assumed
C(qc, Ec)
qc
= pc > pp >
C(qp, Ep)
qp
This shows that pc > pp is impossible, so that we must have pc < pp.




















Equation (4.15) implies that if Rc = Rp, output and emissions and hence
E/q per ﬁrm are identical under the two schemes. Then from (4.17) and
dR/dL > 0, it follows that Rc > Rp. From this and (4.15) it then follows
that Ec < Ep and qc < qp. Furthermore, from Qc > Qp and qc < qp it
follows that nc > np. 
This shows that the long-run eﬀects are rather diﬀerent from the short-
run eﬀects. In the short run, output per ﬁrm is higher under credit trading
than under permit trading, while emissions per ﬁrm are equal under the two
schemes. In the long run, both output and emissions per ﬁrm are smaller
under credit trading than under permit trading. On the other hand, an
important similarity between the short and long run is that abatement costs
per unit of output are higher under credit trading than under permit trading.
In appendix 4.A, the eﬀect of a change in total emissions limit L on
product price, output, emissions per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms is derived.
With this, we can also analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of regulation,
where we assume that L changes from not binding to just being binding.
As is shown in the Appendix, for both permit and credit trading we ﬁnd
dq/dL > 0, dE/dL > 0 and dp/dL ≤ 0. The introduction of emissions
trading, starting from a position without emission control policy, will result
in a decrease in production per ﬁrm, a decrease in emissions per ﬁrm and an
increase in the price of the product. The latter also implies that total output
will be lower. For both schemes, it remains unclear whether the number of
ﬁrms increases or decreases as a result of regulation. The outcome depends
on the cost function and on the slope of the demand function. The steeper
the demand curve, the more likely it is that the number of ﬁrms will increase
as the limit on total emissions is set lower. When the demand curve is rather
ﬂat, one would expect a reduction in the number of ﬁrms. Hence, under both
emissions trading schemes regulation could result in an increase or a decrease
in the number of ﬁrms in the market.
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4.2.2 Imperfect Competition
With imperfect competition, each ﬁrm has an inﬂuence on the market price
of the product. We will assume Cournot competition between the competi-
tors so that p = p(Q), i.e., price is a function of total output and individual
ﬁrms can aﬀect the market price by changing their output.
The emission trading scheme is conﬁned to the sector analyzed, which
implies that ﬁrms should also have market power on the emissions quota
market. In such a market, ﬁrms will bargain with each other over the price.
The outcome is dependent on the market power of the individual ﬁrms and
the initial distribution of emission quotas over the participants in the quota
market. A complicating factor is that incumbent ﬁrms may form a cartel,
refusing to sell emission quotas to new entrants, thereby eﬀectively deterring
entry if emissions are necessary for production. The existence of an eﬀective
competition authority could prevent such behavior, however. In order not
to complicate the analysis more than necessary and to keep focus on the
main issue of the chapter, it is assumed that ﬁrms cannot eﬀectively deter
entry. Furthermore, it is assumed that the outcome of bargaining between
ﬁrms is the perfectly competitive emission quota price.
Short run. With imperfect competition and permit trading, the proﬁt
function for a ﬁrm becomes
π = p(Q)q − C(q, E)−Rp(E − E¯)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p′q + p− Cq = 0 (4.18)
∂π
∂E
= −CE −Rp = 0 (4.19)
So, the ﬁrm should equate marginal revenue with marginal production costs
and marginal costs of abatement with the price of permits.
When regulation takes the form of credit trading, the proﬁt function
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becomes
π = p(Q)q − C(q, E)−Rc(E − e¯q)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p′q + p− Cq + Rce¯ = 0 (4.20)
∂π
∂E
= −CE −Rc = 0 (4.21)
It is clear that the short-run ﬁrst order conditions for imperfect competition
closely resemble those for perfect competition. The only diﬀerence is that
under imperfect competition ﬁrms take the eﬀect of changes in their own
output on the price of the product into account.
This gives the following result:
Proposition 16 Under imperfect competition and in the short run, credit
trading will lead higher total and ﬁrm output (Qc > Qp, qc > qp) and to
a higher emission quota price (Rc > Rp) than under permit trading. Firm
emissions are identical under the two schemes (Ec = Ep).
Proof : See Proof of Proposition 14.
Hence, the short-run eﬀects of the two schemes under imperfect compe-
tition are basically the same as under perfect competition.
Long Run. In the long run the number of ﬁrms can vary through entry
and exit. More precisely, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms will be such that
if one more ﬁrm entered the market all ﬁrms would make a loss. That is, n∗
is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms for which it holds that
π(n∗) ≥ 0, and π(n∗ + 1) < 0 (4.22)
Note that we can state these conditions in this way because we have assumed
that all ﬁrms are identical.
95
With permit trading, the long run proﬁt function becomes
π = p(Q)q − C(q, E)−RpE (4.23)
The long-run conditions for permit trading with imperfect competition are
then
p′q + p = Cq
p(Q)q ≥ C(q, E) + RpE
−CE = Rp
nE = L
and (4.22). The slope of the reaction function is found by total diﬀerentiation





qp′′ + 2p′ − Cqq < 0 (4.24)
where Q−i =
∑n
j=1,j =i qj . The denominator is negative by the second order
condition (see appendix 4.B), and so we need the numerator to be negative
as well to assure that the Nash equilibrium is stable. In the following we
shall assume that this is the case. In fact, we shall assume that the stricter
condition:
nqp′′ + 2p′ < 0 (4.25)
is satisﬁed. This also guarantees that the denominator on the RHS of (4.24)
is negative.
With credit trading, the ﬁrm knows that its actions will have an inﬂuence
on the standard set. Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm increases its output, total
industry output increases and therefore the government will set a stricter
standard in order to keep industry emissions constant. Recall from above
that the standard is e¯ = LQ . The proﬁt function with credit trading can then
be rewritten as







The long-run conditions for proﬁt maximization then become








p(Q)q ≥ C(q, E)
−CE = Rc
nE = L
and (4.22). From a comparison of (4.26) with (4.20), it is clear that in the
long run, ﬁrms have less incentive to expand production since they know
that a change in output will have an inﬂuence on the relative standard set.
With monopoly Q = q, and (4.26) becomes p′q + p = Cq. That means that
a monopolist is perfectly aware that as it changes its output, the change in
the standard will be equivalent. Hence, in this case, there is no diﬀerence
between a credit and a permit trading scheme, or for that matter, regulation
through an absolute or relative standard. In general then, the lower the
number of ﬁrms in the market, the more closely the outcomes under credit
and permit trading resemble each other.



















The denominator and numerator are negative by (4.25), so that the Nash
equilibrium is stable.
For the relative impact of the two schemes in the long run we ﬁnd
Proposition 17 In the long run under imperfect competition, the number
of ﬁrms under credit trading will be equal or larger than under permit trading
(nc ≥ np). Then,
1. If nc = np, credit trading will lead to higher total and ﬁrm output
(Qc > Qp, qc > qp) identical ﬁrm emissions (Ec = Ep) and to a
higher emission quota price (Rc > Rp) than under permit trading.
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2. If nc > np, credit trading leads to higher total output (Qc > Qp) and
lower ﬁrm emissions (Ec < Ep).
Proof : Assume that nc = np. From the proﬁt functions and (4.18) and
(4.20) it then follows that under both permit and credit trading proﬁts can
be written as
π = qCq + ECE − p′q2 − C(q, E)
Diﬀerentiating partially with respect to q yields:
∂π
∂q
= qCqq + ECqE − q(2p′ + nqp′′) > 0
The inequality follows from (4.25) and (4.61). Since qc > qp from (4.18)
and (4.26) when nc = np, it also follows that πc > πp when nc = np. This
shows that there is a greater possibility for entry under credit trading than
under permit trading and hence, that nc ≥ np. In Part 1), since nc = np
and Lc = Lp, it follows that Ec = Ep. Furthermore, as we have seen above,
it is clear that Qc > Qp. This combined with nc = np gives qc > qp. The
fact that qc > qp combined with Ec = Ep gives Rc > Rp since CEq < 0.
In Part 2), Qc > Qp follows from dp/dn < 0 (see appendix 4.B). Ec < Ep
follows immediately from nc > np and Lc = Lp. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the relationship between
qc and qp and that between Rc and Rp for nc > np. As is clear from the
analysis in appendix 4.B, for both schemes, q decreases as the number of
ﬁrms increases. However it is not clear whether qc is larger or smaller than
qp. For the emission quota price, the result of an increase in the number of
ﬁrms is ambiguous. Therefore, we cannot say whether the credit price will
be larger or smaller than the permit price.
For a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, we can determine what the eﬀect of a change
in L is on most other variables and thereby the eﬀect of introducing regu-
lation. In appendix 4.B, it is shown that dq/dE > 0, dp/dE < 0 for both
schemes, and dRp/dEp < 0 for permit trading. For credit trading, the ex-






Figure 4.1: Some L not obtainable with PT
non-binding to binding, dRc/dEc < 0. So the introduction of emission trad-
ing, starting from a position without regulation, will always lead to lower
ﬁrm and total output and to higher marginal abatement costs. When entry
or exit takes place we cannot analyze the eﬀect of a change in L because
the number of ﬁrms changes discretely which will have a large eﬀect on the
change in the other variables.
We have assumed in this chapter that the goal of environmental policy is
to achieve a certain level of emissions L, lower than the unconstrained emis-
sion level. The question is however, whether environmental policy always
can achieve the emission limit set.
Proposition 18 In a permit trading scheme, let L decrease from the non-
binding level to zero. Then if np decreases, some L may not be attainable.
Under permit trading, lowering the emissions limit may lead to the exit
of a ﬁrm. It may then be that the unconstrained emission level of the
remaining ﬁrms is lower than the emission limit. The result is that for some
L, actual emissions will be lower than the limit. This is illustrated in Figure
1. An example of this is given in Section 4.3.2.
Proposition 19 In a credit trading scheme, let e¯ decrease from the non-












Figure 4.3: Some L obtainable
with diﬀerent e¯
i) If nc decreases, some L cannot be realized.
ii) If nc increases, some L can be realized with diﬀerent e¯.
Proof : i) If e¯ remains the same, and nc decreases, it is shown in appendix
4.B that total output decreases as well. Since
∑n
i=1 Ei = e¯Q, it follows
that total emissions also decrease discretely. It then follows that certain
L cannot be realized. ii) If at ﬁxed e¯ the number of ﬁrms increases, total
output increases (see appendix 4.B) and thereby total emissions. Hence, at
the e¯ where nc increases, total emissions increase, whereafter they decrease
as e¯ decreases. It then follows that certain L can be obtained with diﬀerent
e¯ and nc.
This shows that under credit trading the government cannot reach cer-
tain L when the number of ﬁrms decreases. The reason is that a decrease
in the number of ﬁrms will also lead to a decrease in total output. Since
under credit trading total emissions are given by total output times the rel-
ative standard, it follows that total emissions will decrease as well and in
a discrete manner. The result is that actual emissions will be lower than
the total emission limit that the standard aimed to achieve. This is shown
in Figure 4.2. If on the the other hand the number of ﬁrms increases when
the standard is tightened, the government can reach the same emission level
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with diﬀerent standards and diﬀerent numbers of ﬁrms. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.3. Basically the reverse happens compared with when the num-
ber of ﬁrms decreases. At the standard where an additional ﬁrm enters the
market, total output, and thereby total emissions will increase. Then as
the relative standard is lowered even further, emissions fall again. If the
government is aware of this fact, it should choose the standard that gives
highest welfare. This clearly is the standard that gives the highest number
of ﬁrms and thereby the highest output.
We will see examples of both parts of Proposition 19 in Section 4.3.2.
4.2.3 Welfare
The emission trading schemes described above will have diﬀerent impacts
on welfare. To compare the performance of the two instruments, we assume
that they are set such as to give the same amount of total emissions L.
Here, welfare is given by consumer plus producer surplus. This is given by
the area under the demand function minus production costs. The problem




p(Y )dY − nC(q, E)− λ(nE − L) (4.27)
In the short run, only production is variable, while the number of ﬁrms, n,
and the total ceiling on emissions, L, are ﬁxed. The latter two imply that
E and λ are ﬁxed. Maximizing (4.27) with respect to q gives as the short
run ﬁrst order condition
p = Cq
In the long-run, all variables can change. Therefore, to ﬁnd the optimum,
we must maximize (4.27) with respect to q, n, E, and λ, which gives
p = Cq





This enables us to state the following for perfect competition:
Proposition 20 Under perfect competition, only permit trading leads to
optimal welfare, while credit trading leads to lower welfare.
Proof : Comparing (4.28) with (4.6)-(4.9) and (4.10)-(4.13), it follows im-
mediately that permit trading fulﬁlls all optimality conditions for welfare
while credit trading does not. 
This result may seem somewhat odd since credit trading leads to higher
output and thereby to a larger consumers’ surplus. Since proﬁts are zero
under both instruments, one might derive from this that credit trading would
lead to higher welfare. There are however two other eﬀects that have to
be taken into account. First, costs of production are higher under credit
trading. Credit trading is an ineﬃcient instrument because it limits the
options for reducing emissions. One eﬀective way to reduce emissions is
by reducing output. However, under credit trading, this option will not
be utilized to its maximum because reducing output also reduces the total
allowable amount of emissions for the ﬁrm. Second, under permit trading,
the ﬁrm has to cover the opportunity cost of its emissions, which is not the
case under credit trading. This is a cost to the ﬁrm, but it is a resource
rent reaped by the shareholders. Under credit trading, the resource rent is
competed away.
With imperfect competition, it is not immediately clear which instru-
ment leads to highest welfare. There are three eﬀects that have to be taken
into account. In general, imperfect competition leads to lower than optimal
production. As we have seen above, credit trading leads to higher output
than permit trading and therefore seems to have an advantage. Credit trad-
ing also results in more (at least not less) ﬁrms in the sector. This means
that under credit trading ﬁrms have less market power, which again leads
to a higher output level than under permit trading. However, credit trading
also leads to higher abatement costs than permit trading. The overall eﬀect
depends on the size of the three eﬀects.
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4.2.4 Combining Permit and Credit Trading
When permit and credit trading are combined, emission quotas will ﬂow
from the sector with the lowest to the sector with the highest quota price. We
will only discuss the case where the two sectors are identical in every respect,
except that they operate on two diﬀerent markets (with identical demand
functions) and that one sector is regulated through permit trading while the
other is regulated through credit trading. As was shown above, under perfect
competition and under imperfect competition with nc = np, the credit price
is always higher than the permit price and permits will ﬂow to the credit
sector. However, with imperfect competition and nc > np, this need not be
the case so that here credits may ﬂow to the permit sector. The eﬀect will
be that the sector selling emission quotas will reduce production and the
product price will increase. The buying sector will expand production and
the product price in this sector will fall. Thus combined trading stimulates
output of the sector which initially had the highest emission quota price at
the expense of output of the other sector.
Proposition 21 Assume two perfectly competitive industries that are iden-
tical in every respect, but produce two diﬀerent products. One industry is
regulated through permit trading and the other through credit trading. Allow-
ing emissions trading between the two sectors will lead to identical emissions
quota price (Rc = Rp = R), the permit sector selling quotas to the credit
sector, and
1. in the short run, to a decrease in output per ﬁrm and an increase in
product price in the permit sector. In the credit sector, ﬁrm output
will increase and product price will decrease. Furthermore, it will lead
to higher ﬁrm emissions and output (Ec > Ep and qc > qp) and lower
product price (pc < pp) in the credit sector than in the permit sector.
2. in the long run to a decrease in output and emissions per ﬁrm and an
increase in the product price in the permit sector. In the credit sector,
the product price will decrease, while ﬁrm emissions and output may
increase or decrease. In both sectors, the number of ﬁrms may increase
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or decrease. Furthermore, combined trading will lead to identical ﬁrm
emissions (Ec = Ep), identical ﬁrm output (qc = qp), a higher number
of ﬁrms (nc > np), and a lower product price (pc < pp) in the credit
sector than in the permit sector.
Proof. Combining the two schemes will give Rc = Rp = R since the quota
market is deﬁned as perfectly competitive. Since Rc > Rp in the short run
(Proposition 14) as well as in the long run (Proposition 15), the quota price
will decrease for the credit sector and increase for the permit sector. As a
result, the permit sector sells quotas to the credit sector. Then
1. In the short run, combining the schemes leads to a decrease in Ep
and an increase in Ec. In appendix 4.A, it is shown that dqp/dEp >
0, dpp/dEp < 0, dqc/dEc > 0 and dpc/dEc < 0. Thus, combined
trading results in a decrease in qp and pc and an increase in pp and qc.
Since separate schemes already feature qc > qp and pc < pp, the same
inequalities hold for combined trading.
2. In the long run, combining the schemes leads to a decrease in Lp and
an increase in Lc. In appendix 4.A, it is shown that dqp/dL > 0,
dEp/dL > 0, dpp/dL < 0 and dpc/dL < 0 while the signs of dnp/dL,
dqc/dL, dEc/dL and dnc/dL are ambiguous. From (4.15) it follows
that q and E follow the same path with permit and credit trading.
Combined with Rc = Rp = R, this means that Ec = EP and qc = qP .
From (4.6) and (4.10) we ﬁnd that pc < pp. Combining this with
qc = qp, it is clear that nc > np must hold. 
With imperfect competition and nc > np, we could not state whether
the credit price was higher or lower than the permit price. Therefore, for
imperfect competition, we can only state a result for the case where nc = np:
Proposition 22 Assume two imperfectly competitive industries that are
identical in every respect, but produce two diﬀerent products. One indus-
try is regulated through permit trading and the other through credit trading.
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Assume furthermore that the outcome in the emissions quota market is the
perfectly competitive quota price so that Rc = Rp = R. Then, under com-
bined trading, in the short run and in the long run with nc = np, the permit
sector sells quotas to the credit sector, resulting in Ec > Ep. In the per-
mit sector ﬁrm output will decrease and product price will decrease, while in
the credit sector, ﬁrm output will increase and product price will decrease.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that Ec > Ep, qc > qp and pc < pp.
Proof : With nc = np under separate schemes, Rc > RP (Propositions 16
and 17). Combined trading then leads to an increase in Ec and a decrease
in Ep. As is shown in appendix 4.B, for both the short and long run,
dq/dE > 0 and dp/dE < 0 for both schemes. Since with separate schemes
we had qc > qp and pc < pp, the result follows immediately. 
Welfare
It follows directly from the analysis of Section 4.2.3 on welfare that a sys-
tem where one sector is regulated through permit trading and the other
through credit trading is not welfare maximizing. However, this does not
immediately show what happens to welfare when a permit and credit sector
are allowed to trade. This is shown formally below, both for the short and
the long run for perfect competition and for the case where nc = np under
imperfect competition.
The eﬀect of combining the two schemes on total welfare can be analyzed
by determining the change in welfare as a result of a change in the division
of the emission ceiling over the two sectors.




pc(Qc)dQc − ncCc(qc, Ec) +
∫ Qp
0
pp(Qp)dQp − npCp(qp, Ep)
With the total emission limit given by
ncEc + npEp = Lc + Lp = S (4.29)
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Combined trading leads to an increase in Ec. Diﬀerentiating welfare
with respect to Ec, while holding nc and np constant, and using (4.30) gives


















In the long run, the number of ﬁrms can change, and from (4.29) we ﬁnd


































Perfect Competition For the case of perfect competition, (4.31) can be
















For the long run, (4.32) can be rewritten using (4.6), (4.7), (4.10) and
(4.11) and noting that Ec = e¯qc and that E dndL + n
dE















This allows us to state the following
Proposition 23 Assume two identical perfectly competitive industries that
produce a diﬀerent product, with one industry regulated through permit trad-
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ing and the other through credit trading. In this situation, combining the
emissions trading schemes may lead to a welfare increase both in the short
and in the long run. However, full combined trading is never optimal.
Proof : Monotonicity requires that emissions per ﬁrm must decrease with











dEc < 1. For the separate schemes it holds that
CEc < CEp < 0. Hence, the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (4.33) is positive,
while the second term is negative and for perfect competition dW/dEc may
be positive or negative. This implies that combining the two schemes can
lead to an increase in welfare. Note however that when there is full trading,
CEp = CEc and (4.33) becomes negative. Hence full trading is not optimal,
but welfare under full trading may be higher under full combined trading
than under separate schemes.












It then follows that the sign of (4.34) can be positive or negative. Again
here, when there is full combined trading, CEp = CEc and (4.34) becomes
negative. 
With perfect competition there are two eﬀects. First, abatement costs
increase in the permit sector and decrease in the credit sector (CEp −CEc).
Since initially marginal abatement costs are higher in the credit sector than
in the permit sector, this eﬀect leads to a welfare increase. Second, pro-
duction increases in the credit sector and decreases in the permit sector.
In itself, the production change in the permit sector is not distortionary,
because output is optimal, given total emissions. In the credit sector, how-
ever, output is larger than optimal, and the gap between actual and optimal
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dEc ) and causes a decrease in welfare. The total eﬀect on welfare
then depends on the size of these two eﬀects. If marginal abatement costs
are much higher in the credit sector, while the output eﬀect is not very large,
combining the two schemes may lead to an increase in welfare compared to
leaving the two schemes separate.
Imperfect Competition For the case of imperfect competition, (4.31) can





















We then ﬁnd the following
Proposition 24 Assume two identical imperfectly competitive industries
that produce a diﬀerent product, with one industry regulated through permit
trading and the other through credit trading. In this situation, combining
the emissions trading schemes may lead to a welfare increase in the short
run.






negative. Furthermore, (4.35) still holds. Hence, also (4.36) is ambiguous
and for imperfect competition dW/dE may be positive or negative. 
With imperfect competition there are again two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect
is the same as with perfect competition. That is, abatement costs increase
in the permit sector and decrease in the credit sector as a result of the
transfer of permits to the credit sector. The second eﬀect is the output eﬀect.
Production in the credit sector increases, while it decreases in the permit
sector. This leads to a certain loss in the permit sector equal to ncpp′qp dq
p
dEp .












dEc leads to a loss
in welfare because credit trading leads to a distortion in the production
level. However, the increase in production also leads to a higher consumers
108
surplus (given by ncpc′qc dq
c
dEc ), which leads to higher total welfare. Hence
under imperfect competition, an increase in welfare is more likely when the





That is, combining the two schemes is more likely to lead to an increase
in welfare when the inverse demand function is concave and output in the
credit sector increases more than it decreases in the permit sector.
For imperfect competition, we cannot show the long-run eﬀect of com-
bining the two schemes on welfare when nc > np. The problem is that it
is hard to determine when entry or exit will take place and a change in the
number of ﬁrms will have a large impact on the results.
4.3 Simulation
The analysis above leaves many questions open. Under perfect competition,
the eﬀects of combined trading on the number of ﬁrms and welfare are still
not fully clear. Moreover, the size of the eﬀects discussed above is unknown.
Recall also that in the analysis above we ignored that the number of ﬁrms
under perfect competition is an integer. This may aﬀect the outcomes and
should be investigated. In the simulation model given below, the number
of ﬁrms is an integer, both under perfect and imperfect competition. Fur-
thermore, the outcome under imperfect competition is not entirely clear,
especially in the long run when nc > np. To analyze these problems, we will
deploy a more speciﬁc model. Numerical simulations will then be used to
analyze several scenarios.
The speciﬁc cost function used in the remainder of the chapter is given
by
C(q, E) = aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K a, b,K > 0 (4.37)
Here, a and b are parameters and K gives ﬁxed costs. It can easily be veriﬁed
that this cost function satisﬁes all ﬁrst and second order conditions stated
above for the general function. Furthermore, the inverse demand function
109
is linear and is given by
p(nq) = α− βnq α, β > 0 (4.38)
The solutions of the simulation model are given in appendix 4.C.
4.3.1 Perfect Competition
The general analysis in Section 4.2 already provided a thorough insight into
the workings of the two schemes under perfect competition. The only ques-
tion unanswered in that part was how the number of ﬁrms in the sector
changes as it becomes regulated. We will therefore analyze this long run ef-
fect here in some detail. Furthermore, we will discuss the eﬀect of a change in
emission reduction targets, marginal abatement costs and demand function
on the regulated sector.
The simulation results for perfect competition are given in Tables 4.1 to
4.6. All examples are constructed such that without regulation, ﬁrm output
and emissions are 1, the number of ﬁrms is 100 and product price is 2. In
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 the eﬀect of a change in b in the cost function (4.37) is
given for an emissions reduction level of 30%. In Tables 4.4 to 4.6, b is kept
constant at 1, but the emission reduction level is varied between 10 and
100%. For each case, change in b or in L, there are three subcases. The
three subcases diﬀer from each other in that the demand function becomes
more elastic.
In the model used for the simulations the number of ﬁrms is an integer.
This diﬀers from the model used in Section 4.2.1 where the number of ﬁrms
does not have to be an integer and typically isn’t. This has some implications
for the results. The main diﬀerence with the general model is that in the
simulations, proﬁts may be positive. Firms will then not produce in their
lowest average cost position, but at a larger output level. The results from
Section 4.2.1 may now no longer hold. The simulations provide several
examples of these deviations from the theory given in Section 4.2.1. In the
following, we will ﬁrst discuss the results for the separate schemes and after
that those for combined trading.
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Table 4.1: Perfect Competition: Inelastic Demand 1
a = 1, K = 1, α = 102, β = 1, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2, L = 70
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.966 103 0.680 2.505 0.573 0.961 104 0.673 2.093 0.575
2 0.926 107 0.654 2.938 1.086 0.924 108 0.648 2.179 1.104
3 0.897 110 0.636 3.356 1.562 0.891 112 0.625 2.256 1.593
4 0.870 113 0.620 3.740 2.001 0.859 116 0.603 2.328 2.046
5 0.844 116 0.603 4.094 2.406 0.837 119 0.588 2.412 2.486
6 0.827 118 0.593 4.455 2.801 0.809 123 0.569 2.473 2.881
7 0.804 121 0.579 4.759 3.152 0.789 126 0.556 2.548 3.272
8 0.788 123 0.569 5.078 3.502 0.770 129 0.543 2.618 3.644
9 0.773 125 0.560 5.379 3.833 0.752 132 0.530 2.685 3.998
10 0.759 127 0.551 5.664 4.147 0.735 135 0.519 2.748 4.334
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.966 103 0.679 2.506 0.574 0.961 104 0.674 2.093
2 0.926 107 0.652 2.947 1.095 0.924 108 0.651 2.176
3 0.897 110 0.634 3.371 1.578 0.891 112 0.628 2.252
4 0.869 113 0.616 3.767 2.029 0.867 115 0.613 2.337
5 0.844 116 0.599 4.135 2.447 0.844 118 0.599 2.415
6 0.820 119 0.583 4.479 2.840 0.816 122 0.579 2.474
7 0.797 122 0.567 4.804 3.211 0.796 125 0.566 2.542
8 0.781 124 0.558 5.134 3.572 0.777 128 0.553 2.609
9 0.760 127 0.543 5.433 3.912 0.764 130 0.547 2.683
10 0.746 129 0.534 5.731 4.239 0.746 133 0.534 2.742
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 4991 4991 9983 4991 4991 9983
2 4983 4983 9966 4983 4983 9966
3 4976 4975 9950 4975 4975 9950
4 4968 4967 9936 4967 4968 9936
5 4961 4960 9921 4960 4962 9922
6 4955 4953 9908 4953 4955 9908
7 4949 4946 9895 4946 4949 9895
8 4943 4939 9882 4940 4942 9882
9 4937 4933 9870 4933 4937 9870
10 4931 4927 9858 4927 4931 9858
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In general, the simulation results conﬁrm the results of the general analy-
sis given in Section 4.2.1. Any deviations are due to the integer constraint on
the number of ﬁrms. Regulation leads to lower industry output and higher
product prices. Furthermore, the simulations show that in most cases pro-
duction per ﬁrm is higher under permit than under credit trading, but that
total production and the number of ﬁrms are higher under credit trading.
The Tables also show that in general, the credit price is higher than the per-
mit price. Note however that there are some irregularities in Table 4.4. For
emission reduction levels of 10, 20 and 90% the ﬁrm output level is higher
under credit trading than under permit trading, while the theoretical analy-
sis showed that the reverse should be the case. Notice however also that
the number of ﬁrms is the same under both schemes. As we showed earlier,
under the same number of ﬁrms, ﬁrm output must be higher under credit
trading than under permit trading. Furthermore, for emission reduction
levels of 60, 70 and 80% the credit price is lower than the permit price.
As mentioned, a question still left open by the general analysis is the
eﬀect of regulation on the number of ﬁrms. As is shown in appendix 4.A,
the number of ﬁrms may increase or decrease as a result of regulation, al-
though credit trading always leads to a higher number of ﬁrms than permit
trading. As a review of Tables 4.1-4.6 shows, the number of ﬁrms in the
market depends on the slope of the inverse demand function, and thereby
the elasticity of demand, and on the marginal costs of abatement. In the
cases given in Tables 4.1 and 4.4, the slope of the demand function is −1
and the elasticity of demand under no regulation is -0.02. Under both per-
mit and credit trading, the number of ﬁrms increases as compared with no
regulation, although more so with credit trading than with permit trading.
However, as the slope of the inverse demand function becomes ﬂatter and
demand more elastic, the number of ﬁrms in both sectors decreases as is
clear from Tables 4.2 and 4.5 where the elasticity is -0.2 and Tables 4.3 and
4.6 where elasticity is -2 under no regulation. The explanation for this is as
follows. Regulation increases the cost of production and thereby the price
of the product. If demand is inelastic, total output will not change much,
while output will decrease by a large amount if demand is elastic. At the
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Table 4.2: Perfect Competition: Inelastic Demand 2
a = 1, K = 1, α = 12, β = 0.1, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2, L = 70
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.973 98 0.714 2.464 0.518 0.962 103 0.680 2.090 0.565
2 0.948 97 0.722 2.803 0.906 0.928 106 0.660 2.164 1.070
3 0.938 95 0.737 3.086 1.209 0.904 108 0.648 2.241 1.533
4 0.934 93 0.753 3.316 1.449 0.875 111 0.631 2.293 1.951
5 0.933 91 0.769 3.507 1.641 0.854 113 0.620 2.351 2.344
6 0.936 89 0.787 3.668 1.796 0.835 115 0.609 2.403 2.710
7 0.933 88 0.796 3.790 1.924 0.822 116 0.603 2.461 3.065
8 0.941 86 0.814 3.910 2.028 0.805 118 0.593 2.501 3.388
9 0.941 85 0.824 4.000 2.118 0.789 120 0.583 2.538 3.693
10 0.943 84 0.833 4.079 2.193 0.778 121 0.579 2.582 3.996
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.963 99 0.693 2.467 0.541 0.971 102 0.700 2.100
2 0.941 97 0.695 2.869 0.986 0.945 104 0.698 2.173
3 0.925 95 0.698 3.211 1.361 0.922 106 0.695 2.229
4 0.913 93 0.703 3.508 1.682 0.908 107 0.698 2.286
5 0.904 91 0.708 3.771 1.962 0.902 107 0.706 2.344
6 0.899 89 0.715 4.003 2.206 0.898 107 0.714 2.394
7 0.895 87 0.723 4.211 2.420 0.894 107 0.721 2.436
8 0.894 85 0.731 4.397 2.608 0.890 107 0.727 2.473
9 0.887 84 0.733 4.550 2.776 0.887 107 0.733 2.504
10 0.890 82 0.743 4.705 2.926 0.892 106 0.746 2.544
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 492.3 491.6 983.9 491.5 492.4 983.9
2 486.6 484.1 970.7 484.1 486.9 971.0
3 482.2 477.6 959.7 477.5 482.7 960.2
4 478.7 471.4 950.2 471.5 479.8 951.2
5 476.0 465.9 941.9 466.0 477.8 943.8
6 473.8 460.8 934.6 461.0 476.4 937.4
7 471.9 456.4 928.3 456.4 475.5 931.9
8 470.4 451.9 922.3 452.2 474.8 927.1
9 469.1 447.7 916.8 448.4 474.5 922.9
10 468.0 444.1 912.1 444.9 474.6 919.4
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Table 4.3: Perfect Competition: Elastic Demand
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2, L = 70
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
1 0.996 79 0.886 2.213 0.220 0.972 96 0.729 2.066 0.487
2 0.998 75 0.933 2.252 0.257 0.957 94 0.745 2.101 0.848
3 1.003 73 0.959 2.268 0.263 0.944 93 0.753 2.122 1.150
4 1.005 72 0.972 2.276 0.265 0.937 92 0.761 2.138 1.408
5 1.000 72 0.972 2.280 0.280 0.933 91 0.769 2.151 1.634
6 1.008 71 0.986 2.284 0.268 0.931 90 0.778 2.162 1.834
7 1.006 71 0.986 2.286 0.275 0.924 90 0.778 2.169 2.040
8 1.003 71 0.986 2.288 0.281 0.924 89 0.787 2.177 2.205
9 1.002 71 0.986 2.289 0.285 0.919 89 0.787 2.182 2.385
10 1.000 71 0.986 2.290 0.289 0.922 88 0.796 2.189 2.524
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
1 0.991 72 0.839 2.287 0.305 0.991 95 0.838 2.059
2 0.991 64 0.895 2.366 0.385 0.992 93 0.896 2.077
3 0.993 60 0.923 2.404 0.419 0.994 92 0.924 2.086
4 0.991 58 0.940 2.423 0.435 0.997 91 0.942 2.093
5 0.998 56 0.954 2.441 0.445 0.996 91 0.952 2.094
6 0.996 56 0.958 2.442 0.451 1.000 90 0.962 2.100
7 0.997 55 0.964 2.452 0.459 0.999 90 0.967 2.101
8 1.000 54 0.972 2.460 0.459 0.999 90 0.971 2.101
9 0.997 54 0.971 2.462 0.467 0.999 90 0.973 2.101
10 1.001 53 0.978 2.469 0.467 0.999 90 0.976 2.101
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 46.77 44.03 90.80 44.22 47.61 91.83
2 46.21 40.87 87.08 42.12 47.98 90.09
3 45.99 38.73 84.72 40.94 48.28 89.22
4 45.87 37.28 83.15 40.35 48.49 88.84
5 45.80 36.30 82.10 39.72 48.66 88.38
6 45.75 35.63 81.38 39.74 48.74 88.48
7 45.71 34.67 80.39 39.37 48.82 88.19
8 45.69 34.40 80.09 39.08 48.90 87.98
9 45.67 33.69 79.36 39.02 48.94 87.96
10 45.65 33.66 79.31 38.69 49.00 87.69
114
Table 4.4: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 1
a = 1, b = 1, K = 1, α = 102, β = 1, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 0.998 100 0.900 2.192 0.196 1.000 100 0.900 2.020 0.200
20 0.987 101 0.792 2.362 0.389 0.990 101 0.792 2.058 0.395
30 0.966 103 0.680 2.505 0.573 0.961 104 0.673 2.093 0.575
40 0.938 106 0.566 2.618 0.743 0.933 107 0.561 2.163 0.745
50 0.903 110 0.455 2.702 0.896 0.899 111 0.450 2.245 0.897
60 0.863 115 0.348 2.756 1.030 0.859 116 0.345 2.334 1.029
70 0.827 120 0.250 2.807 1.153 0.823 121 0.248 2.449 1.150
80 0.787 126 0.159 2.831 1.257 0.783 127 0.158 2.565 1.251
90 0.746 133 0.075 2.832 1.341 0.747 133 0.075 2.701 1.343
100 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 0.998 100 0.899 2.194 0.198 1.000 100 0.901 2.019
20 0.987 101 0.791 2.365 0.392 0.990 101 0.794 2.057
30 0.966 103 0.679 2.506 0.574 0.961 104 0.674 2.093
40 0.929 107 0.559 2.599 0.741 0.933 107 0.563 2.162
50 0.903 110 0.456 2.699 0.893 0.899 111 0.452 2.243
60 0.863 115 0.348 2.756 1.030 0.859 116 0.344 2.335
70 0.820 121 0.247 2.787 1.147 0.823 121 0.249 2.447
80 0.787 126 0.163 2.823 1.249 0.783 127 0.159 2.564
90 0.746 133 0.075 2.833 1.342 0.747 133 0.076 2.700
100 0.708 140 0.000 2.833 1.417 0.708 140 0.000 2.833
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 4999 4999 9998 4999 4999 9998
20 4996 4996 9992 4996 4996 9992
30 4991 4991 9983 4991 4991 9983
40 4985 4985 9969 4985 4985 9969
50 4977 4977 9953 4977 4977 9953
60 4967 4967 9934 4967 4967 9934
70 4956 4956 9912 4956 4956 9912
80 4944 4944 9888 4944 4944 9888
90 4931 4931 9863 4931 4931 9863
100 4918 4918 9835 4918 4918 9835
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Table 4.5: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 2
a = 1, b = 1, K = 1, α = 12, β = 0.1, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 1.003 98 0.918 2.174 0.169 0.998 100 0.900 2.016 0.197
20 0.988 98 0.816 2.319 0.343 0.985 101 0.792 2.047 0.387
30 0.973 98 0.714 2.464 0.518 0.962 103 0.680 2.090 0.565
40 0.943 100 0.600 2.571 0.686 0.937 105 0.571 2.160 0.731
50 0.907 103 0.485 2.657 0.843 0.904 108 0.463 2.238 0.882
60 0.874 106 0.377 2.740 0.993 0.864 112 0.357 2.323 1.014
70 0.831 111 0.270 2.782 1.121 0.825 116 0.259 2.428 1.133
80 0.791 116 0.172 2.821 1.238 0.787 120 0.167 2.553 1.241
90 0.751 122 0.082 2.840 1.338 0.750 124 0.081 2.696 1.339
100 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 1.002 98 0.911 2.185 0.182 0.999 100 0.908 2.015
20 0.986 98 0.804 2.336 0.364 0.986 101 0.804 2.043
30 0.963 99 0.693 2.467 0.541 0.971 102 0.700 2.100
40 0.941 100 0.587 2.590 0.708 0.938 105 0.584 2.152
50 0.906 103 0.474 2.673 0.862 0.905 108 0.474 2.230
60 0.866 107 0.364 2.735 1.003 0.871 111 0.370 2.330
70 0.830 111 0.265 2.789 1.129 0.832 115 0.267 2.438
80 0.791 116 0.173 2.820 1.238 0.788 120 0.169 2.551
90 0.746 123 0.079 2.825 1.333 0.751 124 0.084 2.691
100 0.710 129 0.000 2.840 1.420 0.710 129 0.000 2.840
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 499.2 499.0 998.2 499.0 499.2 998.2
20 496.6 496.2 992.8 496.2 496.6 992.8
30 492.3 491.6 983.9 491.5 492.4 983.9
40 486.3 485.4 971.7 485.4 486.3 971.7
50 478.6 477.7 956.4 477.7 478.7 956.3
60 469.5 468.6 938.1 468.5 469.7 938.1
70 458.9 458.3 917.2 458.3 459.1 917.4
80 447.1 446.8 894.0 447.2 447.1 894.3
90 434.3 434.2 868.6 434.0 434.8 868.8
100 420.6 420.6 841.2 420.9 420.9 841.7
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same time, regulation decreases the optimal production level for the ﬁrm
and more so with credit trading than with permit trading. Then, when
emissions are regulated, total output does not decrease much with inelastic
demand, while optimal output does decrease, so that more ﬁrms can exist in
the market. When demand is more elastic, total output decreases more and
fewer ﬁrms can survive in the market. At some point, demand decreases by
so much with an increase in price that the total number of ﬁrms decreases
compared with no regulation.
It is interesting to see that in general the outcome depends on the elastic-
ity of demand. For example, the higher the elasticity of demand, the lower
the emissions quota price, and the larger the diﬀerence between the permit
and credit price. With high elasticity, an increase in price gives a relatively
large decrease in output and thereby also in emissions. Hence, the price
on emissions does not need to be very high to achieve a certain reduction
in emissions. But credit trading gives a smaller decrease in emissions for
a given emissions quota price because of the implicit output subsidy that
is inherent in this system. The eﬀect of the output subsidy will be larger,
the larger the elasticity is. Hence, the credit price must be higher than the
permit price and the diﬀerence must be larger when demand is more elastic.
For combined trading, the simulations show that in general, permits ﬂow
to the credit market and the resulting emission quota price lies in between
the original permit and credit prices. The result is an increase in production
in the credit sector, both per ﬁrm and in total, and a decrease in production
in the permit sector. So combining the two schemes leads to even larger
ineﬃciencies in that credit sector production is increased above the already
too high level. However, also here the integer constraint on the number
of ﬁrms gives deviations from the theoretical analysis of Section 4.2.1. In
several cases the product price in the credit sector is higher under combined
trading than under separate schemes. This occurs in Table 4.1 for b = 4, 5, 6,
Table 4.2 for b = 1, 2, Table 4.4 for an emission reduction level of 60% and in
Table 4.5 for emission reduction levels of 30, 60 and 70%. This does however
not imply that in these cases, production in the permit sector is stimulated.
This occurs only in Table 4.5 for an emission reduction level of 60%. Note
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Table 4.6: Perfect Competition: Change in emission reduction 3
a = 1, b = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01, q0 = 1, n0 = 100, E0 = 1, p0 = 2
Permit Trading Credit Trading
EmRed qp np Ep pp Rp qc nc Ec pc Rc
10 1.001 93 0.968 2.069 0.067 0.998 99 0.909 2.012 0.178
20 1.000 86 0.930 2.140 0.140 0.987 98 0.816 2.033 0.341
30 0.996 79 0.886 2.213 0.220 0.972 96 0.729 2.067 0.486
40 0.989 72 0.833 2.288 0.311 0.951 94 0.638 2.106 0.625
50 0.983 64 0.781 2.371 0.404 0.930 90 0.556 2.163 0.750
60 0.971 56 0.714 2.456 0.514 0.901 86 0.465 2.225 0.872
70 0.949 48 0.625 2.545 0.647 0.870 80 0.375 2.304 0.990
80 0.917 39 0.513 2.642 0.809 0.836 71 0.282 2.407 1.108
90 0.860 29 0.345 2.751 1.031 0.789 58 0.172 2.542 1.234
100 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
EmRed qp np Ep pp R qc nc Ec pc
10 1.001 90 0.953 2.099 0.097 1.000 99 0.952 2.010
20 0.997 81 0.898 2.192 0.198 0.999 97 0.900 2.031
30 0.991 72 0.839 2.287 0.305 0.991 95 0.838 2.059
40 0.978 64 0.769 2.374 0.418 0.980 92 0.770 2.099
50 0.967 55 0.700 2.468 0.534 0.965 88 0.699 2.150
60 0.947 47 0.616 2.555 0.661 0.946 83 0.615 2.215
70 0.920 39 0.519 2.641 0.801 0.917 77 0.516 2.294
80 0.879 32 0.399 2.719 0.960 0.881 68 0.401 2.401
90 0.818 26 0.243 2.787 1.151 0.820 56 0.245 2.541
100 0.708 24 0.000 2.830 1.415 0.708 24 0.000 2.830
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
EmRed PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 49.66 49.21 98.87 49.30 49.76 99.06
20 48.60 47.08 95.68 47.36 49.00 96.36
30 46.77 44.03 90.80 44.22 47.61 91.83
40 44.10 40.04 84.14 40.17 45.45 85.61
50 40.50 35.60 76.10 35.07 42.50 77.57
60 35.85 30.27 66.13 29.33 38.37 67.70
70 30.01 24.42 54.43 22.94 32.78 55.72
80 22.73 18.02 40.75 16.33 25.31 41.64
90 13.56 10.66 24.22 9.534 15.02 24.55
100 1.472 1.472 2.943 1.472 1.472 2.944
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that in this case the emissions quota price for combined trading lies between
the permit and credit price. Note also that in the same table for emission
reduction levels of 80 and 90% the product price in the permit sector is
lower under combined trading than in the separate scheme. In these two
cases, both sectors are stimulated as a result of combining them. Another
irregularity is that in certain cases the emissions quota price for combined
trading lies below both the permit and credit price for the separate schemes.
This is the case in Table 4.4 for an emission reduction level of 40, 50, 70 and
80% and in Table 4.5 for emission reduction levels of 90%. The explanation
for these diﬀerences with the results of Section 4.2.1 is basically the same
as the one given for the separate schemes. When the number of ﬁrms is an
integer, production occurs in a point away from the lowest cost point and
production under one scheme may be further away from this point than for
the other scheme. This makes all of the above mentioned anomalies possible.
Concerning welfare, we showed in Section 4.2.3 that permit trading al-
ways leads to higher welfare than credit trading. This is also shown in
Tables 4.1-4.6, where welfare in all cases is highest under permit trading.
A more interesting question is whether combining a permit and a credit
trading scheme will lead to an increase or a decrease in welfare. In Section
4.2.4 we showed that both results are possible. The simulations illustrate
this, although they more often show an increase in welfare than a decrease.
Actually, the only instance where welfare decreases as a result of combining
the two schemes is given in Table 4.5 for an emission reduction level of 50%.
In all other cases, welfare either does not change or increases when the two
schemes are combined. This shows that even small diﬀerences in marginal
abatement costs can trigger an increase in welfare from combining the two
schemes.
4.3.2 Imperfect Competition
In Section 4.2 we gave a theoretical analysis of permit and credit trading
under imperfect competition. For the case of equal numbers of ﬁrms under
both schemes, we showed that credit trading leads to higher ﬁrm and total
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Table 4.7: Imperfect Competition 1
a = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1
q0 = 7.14, n0 = 4, E0 = 7.14, p0 = 21.43, π0 = 2.04 L = 20
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
1 7.92 3 6.67 26.25 26.91 2.50 6.90 4 5.00 22.42 3.44 3.79
2 7.67 3 6.67 27.00 19.56 4.00 6.71 4 5.00 23.15 4.50 6.85
3 7.50 3 6.67 27.50 14.58 5.00 6.57 4 5.00 23.73 5.36 9.40
4 7.38 3 6.67 27.86 11.00 5.71 6.45 4 5.00 24.20 6.09 11.60
5 7.29 3 6.67 28.13 8.29 6.25 6.35 4 5.00 24.59 6.73 13.52
6 7.22 3 6.67 28.33 6.17 6.67 6.27 4 5.00 24.92 7.29 15.23
7 7.17 3 6.67 28.50 4.47 7.00 6.20 4 5.00 25.21 7.80 16.76
8 7.12 3 6.67 28.64 3.08 7.27 6.13 4 5.00 25.46 8.26 18.15
9 7.08 3 6.67 28.75 1.91 7.50 6.08 4 5.00 25.68 8.69 19.43
10 7.05 3 6.67 28.85 0.92 7.69 6.03 4 5.00 25.88 9.08 20.60
20 10.00 2 10.00 30.00 100.00 0.00 5.72 4 5.00 27.11 11.98 28.87
50 10.00 2 10.00 30.00 100.00 0.00 5.40 4 5.00 28.40 16.22 39.95
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
1 7.80 3 6.21 26.59 24.30 3.18 6.93 4 5.34 22.26 2.67
2 7.43 3 6.08 27.71 14.10 5.42 6.80 4 5.44 22.82 2.81
3 7.15 3 5.98 28.54 6.54 7.08 6.70 4 5.52 23.21 2.74
4 6.94 3 5.89 29.18 0.69 8.36 6.62 4 5.58 23.50 2.59
5 8.33 2 7.49 33.34 42.19 8.36 6.62 4 5.79 23.50 1.72
6 8.33 2 7.63 33.34 41.61 8.36 6.62 4 5.93 23.50 1.13
7 8.33 2 7.73 33.34 41.20 8.36 6.62 4 6.03 23.50 0.72
8 8.32 2 7.80 33.35 40.78 8.38 6.62 4 6.10 23.51 0.41
9 8.25 2 7.77 33.50 38.29 8.74 6.60 4 6.12 23.59 0.26
10 8.19 2 7.74 33.62 36.14 9.06 6.59 4 6.13 23.66 0.12
20 7.04 3 6.85 28.87 0.00 7.73 7.78 3 7.59 26.66 39.01
50 7.06 3 6.98 28.82 0.00 7.64 7.79 3 7.71 26.64 38.54
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 412.98 394.52 807.50 406.00 399.31 805.31
2 403.40 378.18 781.58 389.53 390.60 780.12
3 396.92 366.57 763.50 376.65 384.75 761.40
4 392.47 357.13 749.60 366.54 380.54 747.08
5 389.15 349.55 738.71 348.39 384.06 732.45
6 386.48 343.54 730.02 349.56 386.42 735.98
7 384.79 338.52 723.31 350.40 388.10 738.50
8 382.93 333.97 716.90 350.70 389.32 740.02
9 381.41 330.41 711.82 348.60 388.85 737.46
10 380.40 327.23 707.63 346.65 388.66 735.31
20 400.00 309.79 709.79 382.02 410.87 792.89
50 400.00 298.08 698.08 384.21 412.53 796.74
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production and a higher emissions quota price than permit trading. The
results were less clear cut for the case where the number of ﬁrms is not
identical under the two schemes. The only results that could be derived
are that the number of ﬁrms and total output will be higher under credit
than under permit trading. Furthermore, it was shown that it depends on
the circumstances which instrument will lead to higher welfare and that the
eﬀect of combined trading on welfare was unclear.
In this part, we will try to answer the questions left open by the general
analysis. Furthermore, as was done under perfect competition, the eﬀects
of varying emission reduction targets, marginal abatement costs and the
demand function on the regulated sector will be discussed.
The simulation consists basically of two cases with diﬀerent demand
functions. For both cases, b, a measure for the marginal abatement costs in
equation (4.37), and the emission reduction level are varied to yield diﬀerent
results. Furthermore, the welfare levels and some special cases under per-
mit and credit trading are discussed. The simulation results for imperfect
competition are shown in Tables 4.7 to 4.13. In Tables 4.7, 4.9 and 4.11
the inverse demand function is relatively ﬂat, while in the other Tables, the
slope is relatively steep. In all cases, there are four ﬁrms when there is
no regulation. However, because the demand functions are diﬀerent, ﬁrm
production and emissions are diﬀerent in the two cases. For both demand
functions, demand is inelastic in all cases.
The ﬁrst main result that can be derived from the simulations is that
the number of ﬁrms under credit trading is always at least as high as that
under permit trading. This result is expected since the demand function is
linear, so that inequality (4.25) holds. Furthermore, the product price p is
always lower under credit trading. This conﬁrms the results of the analysis in
Section 4.2. The simulations also conﬁrm the results of the general analysis
for the case where the number of ﬁrms is equal under the two schemes. Here,
ﬁrm and total output are higher under credit trading and the credit price is
higher than the permit price.
Another general result is that the number of ﬁrms can increase or de-
crease as a result of regulation. This holds under both instruments. As with
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perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms will increase when demand is very
inelastic (Tables 4.8 and 4.12) and decrease when demand is more elastic
(Tables 4.7 and 4.9). The explanation for this is the same as under perfect
competition: regulation lowers the optimal production level, and more so
under credit trading than under permit trading, while demand decreases
more, the more elastic demand is. This implies that there will be room for
more ﬁrms the more inelastic demand is.
For the case where the number of ﬁrms is higher under credit trading
than under permit trading, the general analysis did not yield many clear
results. In the simulations, ﬁrm output is always lower under credit trading
than under permit trading. However, this is not a conclusive result since we
only have a few simulations.
As already mentioned, the product price is lower under credit trading
than under permit trading. Furthermore, the product price increases with
b (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Since b is the parameter controlling the size of
the marginal abatement costs this result is expected. One might also expect
that prices rise the larger the total emission reduction is (i.e., the lower L
is). Although this holds as long as the number of ﬁrms remains the same
or decreases, it may not hold when the number of ﬁrms increases. This
is shown in Table 4.12, for both permit trading and credit trading, where
the product price falls when the number of ﬁrms increases, even though the
emission reduction level is higher. Here, two eﬀects are at play. In the ﬁrst
place, the higher emission reduction level will increase marginal abatement
costs. However, if at the same time proﬁts rise with stricter policy, as is the
case here, entry will take place at some point. As is shown in appendix 4.B,
entry leads to higher total output and lower product price. In some cases,
the output-increasing eﬀect of entry is larger than the cost-increasing eﬀect
of stricter policy so that prices fall.
Also under imperfect competition, the permit price may be higher than
the credit price. This is shown in Table 4.12 for emission reduction levels of
40 to 80%. Notice that at these emission reduction levels there are four ﬁrms
in the permit sector and ﬁve in the credit sector. At the same time, proﬁts
are high in the permit sector and low in the credit sector. This implies
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Table 4.8: Imperfect Competition 2
a = 1, K = 100, α = 150, β = 6.6
q0 = 4.29, n0 = 4, E0 = 4.29, p0 = 36.86, π0 = 39.59 L = 12.00
Permit Trading Credit Trading
b qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
1 4.22 4 3.00 38.69 36.58 2.43 4.25 4 3.00 37.75 40.85 2.50
2 4.15 4 3.00 40.34 33.80 4.62 3.55 5 2.40 32.69 0.92 4.62
3 4.10 4 3.00 41.82 31.21 6.59 3.53 5 2.40 33.47 1.87 6.79
4 4.05 4 3.00 43.17 28.83 8.37 3.51 5 2.40 34.20 2.77 8.87
5 4.00 4 3.00 44.40 26.60 10.00 3.49 5 2.40 34.89 3.62 10.88
6 3.96 4 3.00 45.52 24.53 11.49 3.47 5 2.40 35.55 4.42 12.82
7 3.92 4 3.00 46.56 22.59 12.86 3.45 5 2.40 36.18 5.17 14.69
8 3.88 4 3.00 47.51 20.78 14.12 3.43 5 2.40 36.77 5.90 16.50
9 3.85 4 3.00 48.38 19.08 15.28 3.41 5 2.40 37.34 6.58 18.25
10 3.82 4 3.00 49.20 17.49 16.36 3.40 5 2.40 37.89 7.24 19.95
20 3.60 4 3.00 54.96 5.70 24.00 3.26 5 2.40 42.29 12.47 34.55
50 4.28 3 4.00 65.19 43.47 28.35 3.04 5 2.40 49.70 21.36 63.95
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
b qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
1 4.22 4 2.99 38.71 36.57 2.45 4.25 4 3.03 37.73 40.79
2 4.15 4 3.00 40.34 33.80 4.62 3.55 5 2.40 32.69 0.92
3 4.09 4 2.98 41.91 31.15 6.69 3.53 5 2.42 33.43 1.77
4 4.04 4 2.96 43.37 28.64 8.64 3.51 5 2.43 34.11 2.53
5 3.99 4 2.94 44.74 26.28 10.46 3.49 5 2.45 34.74 3.19
6 3.94 4 2.92 46.04 24.03 12.17 3.47 5 2.46 35.33 3.78
7 3.89 4 2.91 47.25 21.90 13.78 3.46 5 2.47 35.87 4.30
8 3.85 4 2.89 48.40 19.88 15.30 3.44 5 2.49 36.38 4.76
9 3.81 4 2.88 49.49 17.95 16.74 3.43 5 2.50 36.85 5.17
10 3.77 4 2.86 50.52 16.12 18.11 3.42 5 2.51 37.30 5.53
20 3.47 4 2.75 58.47 1.62 28.65 3.32 5 2.60 40.58 7.58
50 3.79 3 3.37 74.88 18.32 42.25 3.20 5 2.78 44.41 7.01
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
b PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
1 1115,36 1117,38 2232,73 1115,43 1117,50 2232,93
2 1100,35 1045,14 2145,49 1100,35 1045,14 2145,49
3 1091,16 1037,66 2128,83 1088,13 1037,98 2126,11
4 1081,43 1030,11 2111,54 1078,48 1030,64 2109,12
5 1071,20 1022,56 2093,76 1068,29 1023,92 2092,21
6 1063,67 1015,09 2078,77 1057,73 1016,93 2074,66
7 1055,87 1007,70 2063,57 1047,19 1013,61 2060,80
8 1047,68 1000,29 2047,97 1038,90 1007,60 2046,50
9 1042,23 993,03 2035,25 1030,91 1004,49 2035,41
10 1036,62 989,27 2025,89 1021,95 1001,53 2023,47
20 995,07 940,07 1935,14 957,15 974,86 1932,01
50 1014,80 869,11 1883,92 908,89 959,98 1868,87
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Table 4.9: Imperfect Competition 3
a = 1, b = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1, q0 = 7.14, n0 = 4, E0 = 7.14, p0 = 21.43, π0 = 2.04
Permit Trading Credit Trading
%Red qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
10 —∗ — — — — — 7.08 4 6.43 21.67 2.87 1.31
20 8.16 3 7.62 25.54 33.29 1.07 7.00 4 5.71 22.00 3.34 2.57
30 7.91 3 6.67 26.25 26.91 2.50 6.90 4 5.00 22.42 3.44 3.79
40 7.68 3 5.71 26.96 21.78 3.93 6.77 4 4.29 22.92 3.16 4.97
50 7.44 3 4.76 27.68 17.90 5.36 6.62 4 3.57 23.51 2.51 6.10
60 7.20 3 3.81 28.39 15.26 6.79 6.46 4 2.86 24.18 1.45 7.20
70 6.96 3 2.86 29.11 13.87 8.21 —∗ — — — — —
80 6.73 3 1.90 29.82 13.73 9.64 6.96 3 1.90 29.13 28.73 10.10
90 6.49 3 0.95 30.54 14.83 11.07 6.62 3 0.95 30.13 23.52 11.34
100 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
%Red qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
10 8.25 3 7.99 25.26 36.08 0.52 7.12 4 6.86 21.52 2.26
20 8.02 3 7.09 25.93 29.61 1.86 7.04 4 6.11 21.84 2.62
30 7.80 3 6.21 26.59 24.30 3.18 6.93 4 5.34 22.26 2.67
40 7.59 3 5.35 27.24 20.12 4.48 6.81 4 4.56 22.78 2.44
50 7.37 3 4.50 27.88 17.03 5.76 6.65 4 3.77 23.39 1.92
60 7.17 3 3.66 28.50 14.96 7.01 6.47 4 2.97 24.11 1.09
70 6.96 3 2.83 29.13 13.85 8.26 7.32 3 3.18 28.06 31.95
80 6.69 3 1.76 29.93 13.82 9.87 6.99 3 2.06 29.04 28.26
90 6.47 3 0.86 30.60 15.00 11.20 6.64 3 1.04 30.07 23.24
100 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19 12.50 6.25 3 0.00 31.25 17.19
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
%Red PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 —∗ 412.86 — 413.87 415.37 829.24
20 423.60 405.40 829.00 418.10 409.77 827.87
30 412.76 394.16 806.92 406.20 399.71 805.90
40 398.01 379.32 777.33 391.23 385.20 776.43
50 379.34 360.99 740.33 373.40 366.24 739.64
60 356.77 339.23 696.00 352.90 342.70 695.60
70 330.28 — — 329.33 344.73 674.06
80 299.88 303.97 603.85 294.78 308.95 603.72
90 265.57 268.02 533.58 262.16 271.38 533.54
100 227.34 227.34 454.69 227.34 227.34 454.69
∗ — indicates that the emission reduction level is not obtainable (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11).
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Table 4.10: Some L not obtainable with permit trading
a = 1, b = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1, q0 = 7.14, n0 = 4, E0 = 7.14, p0 = 21.43, π0 = 2.04
% em.red. L
 
E qp np Ep pp πp Rp
4.6729 27.2363 27.2363 7.0687 4 6.8091 21.7253 0.0000 0.5192



















12.4999 25.0000 25.0000 8.3333 3 8.3333 25.0000 38.8889 0.0000
12.5006 24.9998 24.9998 8.3333 3 8.3333 25.0000 38.8884 0.0001
Table 4.11: Some L are not obtainable with credit trading
a = 1, b = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1, q0 = 7.14, n0 = 4, E0 = 7.14, p0 = 21.43, π0 = 2.04
e¯ % em.red. L qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
0.3438 69.8225 8.6221 6.2703 4 2.1555 24.9187 0.0000 8.2296
0.3438 74.2603 7.3542 7.1310 3 2.4514 28.6071 31.2473 9.3591
that ﬁrm production in the credit sector is close to the zero proﬁt point,
while that in the permit sector occurs at less eﬃcient levels. In this case,
ﬁrm production in the permit sector takes place at such an ineﬃcient level
that marginal abatement costs become higher than in the credit sector, even
though credit trading is a less eﬃcient form of regulation. Note also that the
permit price falls as we move from 80 to 90% emission reduction. At 90% a
new ﬁrm has entered the permit sector and ﬁrm production is suddenly very
close to the zero proﬁt level, and therefore much more eﬃcient than before.
Hence, with imperfect competition, ﬁrm entry may lead to lower marginal
abatement costs and thereby lower emission quota prices.
We now turn to the eﬀect of the two schemes on proﬁts. In Tables 4.7 and
4.8, for a given number of ﬁrms, under permit trading proﬁts decrease in b,
while under credit trading they increase in b. Furthermore, with the number
of ﬁrms constant, regulation leads to a decrease in proﬁts with permit trading
and to an increase with credit trading. Basically, regulation has two eﬀects.
First of all, regulation increases production costs and thereby lowers proﬁts.
Second, it lowers ﬁrm production. As long as the number of ﬁrms remains
constant, this also means lower total production and thereby higher price.
125
Since production under oligopoly is higher than the joint proﬁt maximizing
level (the monopoly level) the latter eﬀect gives higher proﬁts for all ﬁrms.
It is as if the government through its policy has made the ﬁrms commit to
a lower production level. The simulations show that under permit trading
the former eﬀect is stronger than the latter, while the reverse is the case
under credit trading. The intuition for this is that under permit trading,
output is already closer to the monopoly level than under credit trading.
Reducing output will then have a smaller positive eﬀect on proﬁts under
permit trading than under credit trading.
The eﬀect of decreasing L on proﬁts is diﬀerent at diﬀerent levels of L.
For permit trading proﬁts ﬁrst fall given n, and then rise as L diminishes
(Tables 4.9 and 4.12). Table 4.9 shows the reverse happening for credit
trading, while in Table 4.12 proﬁts rise continually with lower L. With a b
higher than 3.3, credit trading always results initially in a rise in proﬁt and
then a decline with lower L (not shown).
In Propositions 18 and 19 we showed that under both schemes it is
possible that certain emission levels cannot be attained. This is illustrated
in Tables 4.9 to 4.11. As Table 4.10 shows, under the given circumstances,
emission reduction levels between 4.67% and 12.5% are not obtainable with
permit trading. The reason is that at emission reduction level 4.67% the
number of ﬁrms in the market decreases to three and the emission limit
becomes non-binding. Here, the three remaining ﬁrms emit a total amount
of 25 without regulation, which corresponds to an emission reduction level
of 12.5%. Only at an emission reduction level higher than 12.5% does the
emission limit become binding again. In this case, the non-obtainability of
certain emission levels stems from the fact that as the limit decreases, the
number of ﬁrms decreases as well. Then, in certain cases, the unconstrained
emission level of the ﬁrms is lower than the emission limit.
For credit trading something similar happens. Here, the government
does not set a total emission limit, but a relative standard. Then, as the
relative standard is lowered, exit may occur, as is shown in Tables 4.9 and
4.11. As a result, total output decreases, but since the relative standard
is ﬁxed at this level, total emissions will decrease too. In Table 4.11 this
126
Table 4.12: Imperfect Competition 4
a = 1, b = 1, K = 100, α = 150, β = 6.6, q0 = 4.29, n0 = 4, E0 = 4.29, p0 = 36.86, π0 = 39.59
Permit Trading Credit Trading
%Red qp np Ep pp πp Rp qc nc Ec pc πc Rc
10 4.26 4 3.86 37.47 38.25 0.81 4.28 4 3.86 37.07 40.08 0.85
20 4.24 4 3.43 38.08 37.25 1.62 4.27 4 3.43 37.36 40.49 1.68
30 4.22 4 3.00 38.69 36.58 2.43 4.25 4 3.00 37.75 40.85 2.50
40 4.19 4 2.57 39.30 36.25 3.24 3.57 5 2.06 32.30 0.20 3.02
50 4.17 4 2.14 39.92 36.26 4.05 3.55 5 1.71 32.80 0.50 3.67
60 4.15 4 1.71 40.53 36.60 4.86 3.53 5 1.37 33.38 0.78 4.33
70 4.12 4 1.29 41.14 37.28 5.66 3.51 5 1.03 34.03 1.06 4.97
80 4.10 4 0.86 41.75 38.30 6.49 3.49 5 0.69 34.76 1.32 5.61
90 3.46 5 0.34 35.95 0.47 6.23 3.47 5 0.34 35.57 1.57 6.25
100 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88
Combined Trading
Permit Sector Credit Sector
%Red qp np Ep pp πp R qc nc Ec pc πc
10 4.26 4 3.85 37.48 38.23 0.83 4.28 4 3.87 37.06 40.06
20 4.24 4 3.42 38.10 37.22 1.65 4.27 4 3.44 37.35 40.47
30 4.22 4 2.99 38.71 36.57 2.45 4.25 4 3.03 37.73 40.79
40 4.20 4 2.64 39.21 36.28 3.12 3.57 5 2.01 32.34 0.33
50 4.18 4 2.25 39.76 36.22 3.85 3.55 5 1.63 32.88 0.74
60 4.16 4 1.87 40.30 36.44 4.57 3.53 5 1.25 33.51 1.18
70 4.14 4 1.49 40.85 36.91 5.29 3.51 5 0.87 34.22 1.63
80 4.12 4 1.13 41.35 37.60 5.96 3.49 5 0.50 34.99 2.01
90 3.46 5 0.34 35.96 0.49 6.24 3.47 5 0.35 35.57 1.54
100 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79 6.88 3.44 5 0.00 36.47 1.79
Welfare
Separate Schemes Combined trading
%Red PT CT Tot CPT CCT Tot
10 1124.85 1126.57 2251.42 1124.78 1126.62 2251.40
20 1120.17 1123.18 2243.35 1119.99 1123.31 2243.30
30 1114.11 1118.02 2232.13 1113.95 1118.36 2232.32
40 1106.67 1050.51 2157.18 1107.89 1049.57 2157.47
50 1097.86 1043.10 2140.96 1100.26 1041.18 2141.44
60 1087.67 1034.32 2122.00 1091.56 1031.10 2122.66
70 1076.11 1024.17 2100.28 1081.82 1019.34 2101.17
80 1063.17 1012.65 2075.82 1071.70 1006.61 2078.31
90 998.46 999.74 1998.20 998.26 999.97 1998.22
100 985.44 985.44 1970.88 985.44 985.44 1970.88
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Table 4.13: Some L can be obtained with diﬀerent e¯
a = 1, b = 1, K = 100, α = 150, β = 6.6
q0 = 4.29, n0 = 4, E0 = 4.29, p0 = 36.86, π0 = 39.59
Credit Trading
e¯ %.red. qc nc Ec pc πc Rc L
0.6730 33.317 4.246 4 2.858 37.895 40.956 2.777 11.431
0.6670 33.928 4.245 4 2.832 37.923 40.974 2.827 11.327
0.6610 34.539 4.244 4 2.806 37.952 40.993 2.878 11.222
0.6550 35.150 4.243 4 2.779 37.981 41.011 2.928 11.117
0.6490 35.761 4.242 4 2.753 38.010 41.028 2.978 11.012
0.6430 36.372 4.241 4 2.727 38.040 41.046 3.028 10.908
0.6396 36.715 4.240 4 2.712 38.057 41.055 3.056 10.849
0.6396 33.296 3.576 5 2.287 32.008 0.000 2.577 11.435
0.6370 33.576 3.575 5 2.277 32.019 0.009 2.596 11.387
0.6310 34.217 3.574 5 2.255 32.046 0.028 2.638 11.277
0.6250 34.857 3.575 5 2.234 32.073 0.047 2.680 11.167
0.6190 35.497 3.573 5 2.212 32.100 0.067 2.722 11.058
0.6130 36.137 3.572 5 2.190 32.127 0.086 2.765 10.948
0.6070 36.777 3.571 5 2.168 32.155 0.105 2.807 10.838
happens when the relative standard is 0.3438. Here, proﬁts become zero and
a ﬁrm will exit. In this case, emission reduction levels between 69.82% and
74.26% are unobtainable.
Under credit trading it is also possible that certain emission levels can
be reached by two diﬀerent relative standards (see Proposition 19). This
is illustrated in Table 4.13. Table 4.13 shows what happens as the relative
standard is tightened from 0.673 to 0.607. At ﬁrst, proﬁts increase as the
emission limit decreases. Then, when the relative standard is 0.6396, proﬁts
become so large that entry occurs. This results in an increase in total output.
Since the relative standard determines allowed emissions per unit of output,
this also implies that total emissions will increase, which is also shown in the
Table. Only at a relative standard of about 0.61 are total emissions back
at the level where entry occurred. Table 4.13 shows that emission reduction
levels between 33.3 and 36.72 can be attained with two diﬀerent relative
standards. As mentioned before, in this case, the government has to make
a choice which relative standard it will use to achieve the desired emission
reduction level. To maximize welfare, the government should choose the
level that gives the highest number of ﬁrms since this increases total output
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and diminishes market power.
Combining the two emissions trading schemes leads in all cases to a
stimulation of the sector with the highest quota price at the expense of the
other sector. In most cases, this means that the credit sector is stimulated.
Only in Table 4.12 for emission reduction levels of 40% to 80% is the permit
sector stimulated since here the permit price is higher than the credit price.
One of the unresolved issues is which instrument leads to highest welfare.
As a glance at Tables 4.7-4.12 shows, in most cases, permit trading leads to
higher welfare than credit trading. Only in a few cases does credit trading
lead to higher welfare. These cases are given in Table 4.8 for b = 1, Table 4.9
for emission reduction levels of 80 and 90%, and in Table 4.12 for emission
reduction levels of 10, 20, 30 and 90%. It is worth noting that these are all
cases where marginal abatement costs are either low or high. At these levels,
the diﬀerences in abatement costs between permit trading and credit trading
are less pronounced and the additional production under credit trading has
a larger impact on welfare than the increase in abatement cost under this
scheme.
Combining the two schemes can lead to both an increase or a decrease in
welfare. Increases in welfare are shown in Table 4.7 for b = 6 to b = 50, Table
4.8 for b = 1 and for b = 9 and in Table 4.12 for emission reduction levels
of 30-90%. In Table 4.7 the increase in welfare comes from the large saving
in abatement costs as a result of combining the schemes. As is clear from
Table 4.7, there is a large diﬀerence between the permit and the credit price,
while the quota price under combined trading is quite close to the permit
price in the separate scheme. In Table 4.12 it should be remembered that
here combined trading stimulates the permit sector for emission reduction
levels of 40% to 80%. So here, welfare increases because the permit sector
is stimulated as a result of combining the two schemes.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed and compared two types of emissions trading to
see whether they function similarly or diﬀerently under two market struc-
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tures: perfect and imperfect competition. The ﬁrst type is permit trading,
which is emissions trading based on an absolute cap on emissions, while
credit trading is based on relative caps on emissions. Credit trading works
similar to an emissions tax combined with an output subsidy. The major
general result is that credit trading leads to higher total output than permit
trading. The explanation for that phenomenon is that in the credit trading
scheme, ﬁrm output is subsidized by allowing additional emissions, whereas
in a permit trading scheme, additional output requires either extra abate-
ment costs or purchase of permits. This result holds under both perfect
and imperfect competition. However, in other respects, the eﬀect of the two
schemes may be rather diﬀerent under perfect and imperfect competition.
The general model shows that under perfect competition, credit trading
always leads to higher abatement costs than permit trading. This is the
consequence of the higher level of output in the credit trading sector, which
requires higher abatement costs per unit of output compared to the sector
with permit trading. Since marginal abatement costs are higher in the credit
trading sector, the price of credits is higher than the price of permits. The
implicit subsidization of output in the credit scheme has consequences for
welfare. Since ﬁrms get extra credits for free when increasing output, total
output in the credit sector is too high. At the margin of production, marginal
beneﬁts to the consumer are lower than the actual marginal cost of produc-
tion. This implies that the marginal abatement costs are not included fully
in the market price of output. The combination of too high output and too
high marginal abatement costs makes credit trading an inferior instrument
compared with permit trading.
The two schemes can be combined by allowing the use of credits to cover
emissions in the permit sector and vice versa. Emissions trading will lead to
a uniform price in the two sectors, lowering the price of credits, while raising
the price of permits. The lower abatement costs stimulate output in the
credit sector, increasing the sector’s emissions while the higher abatement
costs reduce output and emissions in the permit sector. Consequently, the
discrepancy in terms of output and abatement eﬀort between the two sectors
will increase by allowing emission trading between them, making the welfare
130
loss due to overproduction in the credit sector still larger. However, there is
also a positive welfare eﬀect. The sale of emission allowances from ﬁrms in
the permit sector to ﬁrms in the credit sector makes that abatement increases
in the permit sector where marginal abatement costs are relatively low,
whereas abatement decreases in the credit sector, where marginal abatement
costs are relatively high. The result is that total abatement costs go down.
The savings on total abatement costs can exceed the welfare loss due to
higher production in the credit sector. This is most likely to be the case
when marginal abatement costs rise sharply and price elasticity of output
demand is low. In the reverse case, welfare will decrease. In the simulations,
it was shown that the general conclusions do not always hold when the
number of ﬁrms is taken to be an integer value. Hence, general models will
give too simpliﬁed a view on the problem.
Under imperfect competition, it still holds that under separate schemes,
the credit sector has higher output at lower output price, higher marginal
abatement costs and a higher price for emission allowances than the permit
sector. Combining the two sectors also has the same impact of equalizing the
price of emission allowances and increasing the discrepancy in sector outputs
and emissions. Mainly, the welfare impacts are diﬀerent. In the case of
imperfect competition, output is below the welfare maximizing level. Here
the stimulus credit trading gives to output, which is missing in the permit
trading scheme, counteracts the output distortion caused by the structure
of the market. The positive welfare eﬀect may be such that a credit trading
scheme performs better on welfare than a permit scheme. If the separate
sectors are linked and the discrepancies in output increase, they may have a
positive impact on welfare (which it never has under perfect competition),
thus supporting the positive eﬀect of lower abatement costs.
However, the above general conclusions on imperfect competition are
subject to the proviso that the full mathematical proof of the above relations
have only been derived for the case where the credit and permit schemes have
the same number of ﬁrms. For the likely case where there are more ﬁrms in
the credit sector than in the permit sector, the formal proof could not be
given and we had to rely on simulations. In all, except one, speciﬁc ranges of
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simulations, the above general conclusions are conﬁrmed for the case where
credit trading leads to a higher number of ﬁrms in the industry than permit
trading. The exception is the case where with separate markets, the permit
price is higher than the credit price. The anomaly seems to reﬂect the
impact of entry and exit of ﬁrms when there are few incumbents.
The major message of this chapter for policy makers is that under im-
perfect competition, one cannot in general say that credit trading is an
ineﬃcient instrument.
In this chapter, we have assumed that governments set their instrument
such that an absolute limit on emissions is reached. This may be unrealistic,
especially for the case of relative standards and credit trading, since the
government may have too little information to set the standard correctly.
An issue that would warrant further research is how the instruments work
when ﬁrms are heterogeneous. In this chapter, ﬁrms are homogeneous and
therefore, there is no trading in the separate schemes.
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4.A Comparative Statics for Perfect Competition
In this Appendix, the eﬀects on output per ﬁrm q, emission level per ﬁrm
E, product price p and number of ﬁrms n of a change in the total limit
on emissions L will be derived. Assuming a change from a non-binding




In the short run, the following conditions must hold under permit trading
p = Cq (4.39)
−CE = Rp (4.40)
p = p(nq) (4.41)
Diﬀerentiating equations (4.39)-(4.41) totally with respect to E gives
dp
dE
− CqE − Cqq dq
dE
= 0 (4.42)






























np′ − Cqq < 0 (4.47)
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The signs of equations (4.45)-(4.47) follow from the assumptions on the cost
function and condition (4.59).
Long Run
In the long run, we need that (4.39)-(4.41) and the two following conditions
hold
pq = C(q, E) + RpE (4.48)
nE = L (4.49)






is positive semideﬁnite (4.50)
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The signs for the diﬀerent equations are found through conditions
CqqCEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (4.59)
H ≡ q2Cqq + 2qECqE + E2CEE ≥ 0 (4.60)
qCqq + ECqE > 0 (4.61)
qCqE + ECEE < 0 (4.62)
Conditions (4.59) and (4.60) follow from the second order condition given
in (4.50). The LHS of (4.59) is the determinant of (4.50) and must be non-
negative. Condition (4.60) follows from the fact that hCxxh′ ≥ 0 for any
vector h. In this case, h = (q E). Condition (4.61) is required to guarantee
monotonicity with credit trading. By monotonicity we mean that industry
emissions should decline when L decreases (see Dijkstra (1999) p. 80 for
a discussion). Condition (4.62) ensures that under credit trading product
price decreases with emissions.
It is clear from (4.60) and (4.59) that the denominator of (4.54)-(4.58)









dL ≤ 0. However, dn
p
dL can either be positive or negative, as the
ﬁrst term in the nominator is positive and the second term is negative.
Note however that if p′ = 0, dn
p
dL > 0, implying that as the emissions limit
decreases, the number of ﬁrms will decrease when demand is inﬁnitely elastic.
On the other hand, when p′ → −∞, dnpdL < 0, implying that when demand





For credit trading, the following conditions must hold in the short run
p = Cq −RcE
q
(4.63)
−CE = Rc (4.64)
p = p(nq) (4.65)

























q (CE + ECEE + qCqE)
















nqp′ (CE + ECEE + qCqE)
ECE + q2np′ − q (ECqE + qCqq) < 0 (4.68)
The denominators in (4.66)-(4.68) are negative because of (4.61). The signs
of (4.66) and (4.68) then follow from (4.62). The sign of dRc/dE is ambigu-
ous. However, when going from no regulation (where CE = 0) to regulation,
dRc/dE < 0.
Combined Trading For combined trading, the comparative statics change
somewhat. Above, we analyzed the eﬀect of a change in total emissions
through a change in the emission standard e¯. Now, total emissions in the
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credit sector change through an inﬂux of quotas. As a result, total output in
the credit sector rises. Then the emission standard has to be tightened, so
that without the extra quotas, total emissions would be equal to the initial











= Mq′CE + nq2
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p′ − CqE − q′Cqq
)




q (e¯CEE + CqE)







np′CEE + CqE2 − CEECqq
)






nqp′ (e¯CEE + CqE)
e¯CE + qnp′ − q (e¯CqE + Cqq) < 0 (4.72)
The denominators are negative by the fact that e¯ < E/q and (4.61). The
signs of (4.70) and (4.72) follow from (4.62) and the sign of (4.71) follows
from (4.59).
Long Run
In the long run, (4.63)-(4.65) and the following conditions must hold
pq = C(q, E) (4.73)
nE = L (4.74)
The second order condition is given by (4.50).
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nq2p′ (ECEE + qCqE) + CE
(
E2CEE + 2qECqE + q2Cqq
)
(nq2p′ + ECE) (E2CEE + 2qECqE + q2Cqq)
(4.79)
Using conditions (4.59) to (4.62), it is clear that the denominator of (4.75)-









dL ≤ 0. However, as with permit trading, the sign of dn
c
dL is not
immediately clear since the ﬁrst term in parenthesis in the nominator is
negative, while the second term in parenthesis is positive. Hence, the number
of ﬁrms can both increase or decrease as a result of regulation. However,
as with permit trading, dndL > 0 for p
′ = 0 and dndL < 0 for p
′ → −∞.
This implies that when demand is inﬁnitely elastic the number of ﬁrms will
decrease as the emissions limit decreases and that when demand is totally
inelastic the number of ﬁrms will increase when the emission limit decreases.
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Combined Trading
For the credit sector under combined trading, we still need conditions (4.63)-
(4.65) and (4.74) to hold, but the zero-proﬁt condition changes to
pq = C(q, E) + Rc(E − e¯q) (4.80)
Furthermore, e¯ is now given by (4.69). Diﬀerentiating (4.63)-(4.65), (4.73)






































And (4.51)-(4.53). The solution is
dq
dL
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2 − CEE Cqq
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/D < 0 (4.83)
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To determine the sign of (4.81)-(4.86) we need conditions (4.59)-(4.62). D is
negative from M < nE, (4.59) and (4.60). dq/dL and dE/dL are positive by
(4.61) and (4.62). dR/dL and dp/dL are negative by (4.59) and M < nE.
The sign of dn/dL is ambiguous.
To ﬁnd out whether combined trading leads to higher or lower welfare in
the short run, we need to know the sign and size of Eq
dq
dE − dEdL . From (4.81)







= − [n2q2p′ + MCE) (E2CEE + 2qECqE + q2Cqq] /D
This shows that − 1n < Eq dqdE − dEdL < 0




In the short run, the following conditions must hold for permit trading
p + p′q = Cq (4.87)
−CE = R (4.88)
p = p(nq) (4.89)





























Cqq − p′′q − 2p′
)− C2qE > 0 (4.92)










V + [(n− 1)CEEZ]





(n− 1)(qp′′ + p′) + (qp′′ + 2p′ − Cqq) < 0 (4.96)
The denominators on the RHS are negative by (4.25) and Cqq > 0. So in
the short run, a tightening of environmental policy leads to lower output, a
higher permit price and a higher product price.
Credit trading
In the short run, the following conditions must hold for credit trading
p + p′q = Cq − e¯R (4.97)
and (4.88) and (4.89).
For the comparative statics, diﬀerentiate (4.97), (4.88) and (4.89) totally
1The inequalities follow from (4.62) and (4.25).
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np′ [CE + qCqE + ECEE ]
q(nqp′′ + (n + 1)p′) + Eq CE − [qCqq + ECqE ]
< 0 (4.100)
with V > 0 given by (4.92) and Z > 0 by (4.93). The denominators are
negative by (4.25) and (4.61). The numerators are negative in (4.98) and
positive in (4.100) by (4.62) and (4.25). The sign of the numerator in (4.99)
is ambiguous. Note however that when environmental policy goes from non-
binding to binding, CE = 0 and (4.99) is negative. So under credit trading,
a tightening of environmental policy will lead to lower ﬁrm and industry pro-
duction, while the credit price may increase or decrease. However, initially,
when environmental policy becomes binding, the credit price will rise.
Combined Trading
Under combined trading, (4.88), (4.89) and (4.97) still need to hold for the
credit sector. However, e¯ is now given by e¯ = M/(ncqc). Diﬀerentiating





































nqV − nq(n− 1)CEE (qp′′ + p′)− Mq CECEE





np′ (nqCqE + MCEE)
nq (nqp′′ + (n + 1)p′) + Mq CE − (nqCqq + MCqE)
< 0 (4.103)
with V > 0 given by (4.92) and M < nE. The denominators are negative
by (4.25) and (4.61). The numerators are positive in (4.101) and negative in
(4.103) by (4.62) and (4.25). The numerator in (4.102) is negative by (4.92)
and (4.25).
4.B.2 Long run
Unlike the case with perfect competition, the number of ﬁrms now does not
change continuously as environmental policy becomes stricter and stricter.
The strictness of environmental policy will aﬀect the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. If proﬁts
decrease, a ﬁrm will leave the industry just before proﬁts turn into losses,
thereby restoring proﬁtability for the remaining ﬁrms. If proﬁts increase,
this might attract another ﬁrm to the industry, which will reduce proﬁts for
each ﬁrm. In subsection B.2.1, we will derive the comparative statics for the
case where the number of ﬁrms remains constant. In subsection B.2.2, we
analyze the eﬀects of a change in the number of ﬁrms.
Constant number of ﬁrms
Permit trading. The comparative statics for permit trading are the same
as for the short run. We only need to determine the eﬀect on proﬁts. From
(4.23) and (4.88), proﬁts can be written as:
π = pq − C(q, E) + ECE (4.104)














Y ≡ CqqCEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (4.105)




[qCqE + ECEE ] (n− 1)p′ − EY + ECEE(np′′ + 2p′)
(n− 1)(qp′′ + p′) + (qp′′ + 2p′ − Cqq)
The denominator on the RHS is negative by (4.25). The sign of the nu-
merator is ambiguous, since all terms are positive by (4.62), (4.105) and
(4.25).
Thus, the eﬀect of the strictness of environmental policy on proﬁts, and
thereby on the entry or exit of ﬁrms, is ambiguous.
Credit trading. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to q now becomes:






The ﬁrst order condition with respect to E is still (4.88).
For the comparative statics, diﬀerentiate (4.106), (4.88) and (4.89) to-





































and (4.90) and (4.91). Deﬁning:3













2The inequality follows from (4.59).
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/F < 0 (4.110)
with V > 0 given by (4.92) and Z > 0 by (4.93). The numerator is negative
in (4.108) and positive in (4.110) by (4.62). The sign of (4.109) is ambiguous.
The result is basically the same as in the short run. A tightening of environ-
mental policy leads to lower ﬁrm and industry output, while the credit price
may increase or decrease. Note however that when environmental policy is
tightened from non-binding to binding, the credit price will increase since
in that case CE = 0.
In the long run, proﬁts under credit trading are given by
π = pq − C(q, E) (4.111)








































where F < 0 is given by (4.107). The sign of the nominator on the RHS of
(4.112) is ambiguous since the ﬁrst term is positive by (4.62) and −F CE is
positive. Thus, the eﬀect of the strictness of environmental policy on proﬁts,
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and thereby on the entry or exit of ﬁrms, is ambiguous.
Combined trading. Under combined trading, the comparative statics
for the credit sector are somewhat diﬀerent than the analysis given above
for credit trading. Speciﬁcally, e¯ is now given by e¯ = M/(ncqc). For the






























and (4.90) and (4.91). Deﬁning:4















(n− 1) CEE + n q CqE
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Cqq − (n + 1)p′ − nqp′′








(n− 1) CEE + n q CqE
)
/S < 0 (4.116)
The signs of the numerators follow from (4.62) for (4.114) and (4.116) and
from (4.92) for (4.115).
Diﬀerentiating proﬁts in (4.104) with respect to E, using (4.106), (4.114)




























where S < 0 is given (4.113). The sign of (4.117) is ambiguous which follows
from (4.62), (4.59), (4.60) and (4.25).
Therefore, in all cases, it is ambiguous in general whether proﬁts, and
by implication the number of ﬁrms, increase or decrease as environmental
policy is tightened.
A change in the number of ﬁrms







































ECqE + nq(p′ + qp′′)




EV + Z [nqCqE + (n− 1)ECEE ]




p′ [qCqq + ECqE − p′q]
Cqq − (n + 1)p′ − nqp′′ < 0 (4.123)
with V > 0 given by (4.92) and Z > 0 by (4.93). The denominator is
positive by (4.25). The numerators in (4.121) and (4.123) are negative by
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(4.25). The sign of (4.122) is ambiguous. So an increase in the number
of ﬁrms will under permit trading lead to lower ﬁrm output, but higher
industry output. The permit price may either increase or decrease as a
result of the higher number of ﬁrms.
To see what happens to proﬁts as n changes, write proﬁts in (4.104) as
π = pq − C [q, L/n]−RL/n (4.124)




















np′H − E2Y − nq2p′ [2p′ + qp′′]+ p′E [ECEE − qCqE ]





G = nCqq − n(n + 1)p′ − n2qp′′
The sign of (4.125) is ambiguous. Hence, under permit trading, proﬁts may
rise or fall with an increase in the number of ﬁrms. However, when p′′ ≥ 0,
(4.125) is negative, so that in that case, an increase in the number of ﬁrms
always leads to a decrease in proﬁts. This is the case given in the simulations
and the results given in Tables 4.7-4.12 conﬁrm this outcome.
Credit trading. Diﬀerentiating (4.106), (4.88) and (4.89) totally with
















































and (4.119) and (4.120). Deﬁne
A ≡ nq ((n + 1)p′ + nqp′′)+ (n− 1)E
q
CE − [nqCqq + (n− 1)ECqE ] < 0








































[−nH + E (qCqE + ECEE) + nq2p′ + ECE]) /A < 0 (4.128)
with Y > 0 given by (4.105). The numerator in (4.128) is positive by (4.60)
and (4.62). The numerators of (4.126) and (4.127) are ambiguous. Hence,
as with permit trading, entry leads to higher industry output. However, the
eﬀect on ﬁrm output and the credit price is ambiguous.
Next, we want to know the eﬀect of a change in the number of ﬁrms on






















J ≡ nq ((n + 1)p′ + nqp′′)+ (n− 1)E
q
CE − [nqCqq + (n− 1)ECqE ] < 0
(4.130)
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− nq2 [p′ + qp′′]]}/J
The sign of the denominator is ambiguous. Hence, also under credit trading,
proﬁts may rise or fall with an increase in the number of ﬁrms. This result
could imply that an increase in the number of ﬁrms will lead to an increase
in proﬁts. However, in the simulations given in section 3.2, it can be seen
that an increase in the number of ﬁrms always leads to a decrease in proﬁts.
Combined Trading. We will not present the comparative statics for com-
bined trading. The reason is that the eﬀect of a change in n on both sectors
simultaneously would have to be evaluated. The result then is hard to de-
rive and the outcome is likely to be ambiguous. However, Tables 4.7 to 4.12
show that when the number of ﬁrms increases, output and emissions per
ﬁrm decreases, as does the product price and the emissions quota price. For
a decrease in the number of ﬁrms, we observe the opposite. Note however
that in Table 4.9, when the number of ﬁrms in the credit sector drops from
4 to 3, the emissions quota price increases. This is probably caused by the
simultaneous increase in emission reductions. However, the simulations also
show that an increase in the number of ﬁrms always leads to a decrease in
proﬁts, while the reverse holds for a decrease in the number of ﬁrms.
4.C The Simulation Model
4.C.1 Perfect Competition
No Regulation. The situation without regulation is the starting point of
the analysis and gives a benchmark for the changes caused by regulation.
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Without regulation, proﬁts for a ﬁrm are given by
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (4.131)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E) = 0 ⇒ q = E (4.132)
Besides these conditions, in the long run there should be no proﬁts:
2aq + 2b(q − E) = aq
2 + b(q − E)2 + K
q









Denote by n˜ the number of ﬁrms without taking the integer constraint into








The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is then given by the largest integer less or
equal to n˜. Denote the equilibrium values of ﬁrm output, product price and
number of ﬁrms in the no-regulation case by q0, p0 and n0 respectively.






The long-run proﬁt maximization problem for the ﬁrm is
max
q,E
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −RpE
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (4.133)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rp = 0 (4.134)
Two further condition that need to hold in the long-run equilibrium are
nE = L (4.135)
2aq + 2b(q − E) = aq
2 + b(q − E)2 + K + Rp E
q
(4.136)
Combining equations (4.133)-(4.136) gives the following equation for the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms n˜
b L +
√
K n˜2(a + b)− a bL2
n˜ (a + b)
=
2 bL + n˜ α
n˜ (2 a + 2 b + n˜ β)
The equilibrium n = n∗ is then found by rounding down to the nearest
integer. Using n∗, q∗ can be found through
q =
2bL + nα
n(2a + 2b + nβ)
After this, the other variables can be found using (4.38) and (4.133)-(4.136).








With credit trading, the problem for the ﬁrm is
max
q,E
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rc(E − e¯q)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) + Rce¯ = 0 (4.137)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rc = 0 (4.138)
The other conditions that need to hold are that the industry emission ceiling
is met and proﬁts are zero, respectively:
nE = L (4.139)
2aq + 2b(q − E)−Rce¯ = aq
2 + b(q − E)2 + K + Rc(E − e¯q)
q
(4.140)
In equilibrium, E = L/n, and no emissions trading will take place since all
ﬁrms are identical.
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms n˜ can be inferred from
4bL + n˜α +
√
n˜ (n˜α2 − 8bL (−α + Lβ))− 16abL2




aKn˜2(a + b)− abL2
(a + b) n˜
Again, n∗ is found by rounding down to the nearest integer. As before, the
system can be solved numerically by inserting n∗ in the equation for q∗:
4 bL + nα +
√
n (nα2 − 8 bL (Lβ − α))− 16 a bL2
2n (2 a + 2 b + nβ)
and then solving for the other variables using equations (4.137)-(4.140).
Combined Trading In the case of combined trading, the condition nE = L
153
for both sectors must be replaced by the following two conditions
ncEc + npEp = 2L (4.141)
Rp = Rc = R
The ﬁrst condition merely says that total emissions should be equal to total
allowable emissions, while the second condition states that the emission
quota prices should be equalized between the two markets.
The number of ﬁrms in the permit sector can be found from (4.133),




R2 − 4 bK)+ (α−R)√4ab (4 bK −R2)
β (4 bK −R2)





Since trading with the permit sector is allowed, emissions E will in general be
diﬀerent from e¯q. Then, using (4.137), (4.138), (4.140), (4.142) and (4.38),












aδ + (R− α)
√
4abδ + b ((R− α)2 + 4LRβ)
)}
where
δ = 4bK −R2
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in both sectors is again found by rounding
down. In the simulation model, the number of ﬁrms is an integer, and
therefore, ﬁrm output and emissions need no longer be identical under the
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(ncR− ncα)2 + 4LncR (2a + ncβ)
2nc (2a + ncβ)
Ep = qp − R
2b
Ec = qc − R
2b
The equations for np, nc, Ep, Ec are all functions of R. Inserting these
equations in the emissions constraint (4.141) gives an equation with only R
unknown. This can then be solved and used to solve for the other unknowns.
4.C.2 Imperfect Competition
No Regulation Assuming that all ﬁrms are identical, proﬁts are given by:
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K
where Q =
∑n




= α− βq(n + 1)− 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) = 0
∂πi
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei) = 0 ⇒ qi = Ei
In the long run all ﬁrms in the market should at least cover their costs, i.e.,
πi ≥ 0 and entry should not be proﬁtable. These conditions can be given
as:
πi(n0) ≥ 0, and πi(n0 + 1) < 0
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where n0 is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market without regu-
lation. Denote by n˜ the equilibrium number of ﬁrms without taking the
integer constraint into account. This is given by:
n˜ =
−2 a√K −√K β + α√a + β√
K β
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market, n0, is then given by the
greatest integer less than or equal to n˜. The equilibrium output level per
ﬁrm is given by:
q0i =
α
2a + (1 + n0)β
Permit Trading The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm becomes:
π = p(Q)q − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rp(E − E¯)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= α− βq(n + 1)− 2aq − 2b(q − E) = 0 (4.143)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rp = 0 (4.144)
Since we have assumed that ﬁrms are identical, emissions after trading will
be E = L/n.
Equilibrium output per ﬁrm follows from (4.143)
q =
2 bL + nα
n (2 a + 2 b + β + nβ)
(4.145)
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms can be found by solving for q in the zero





















λ = 4b2L2, µ = 4bLαβ, and ν = 2a + 2b + β + n˜β
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is found by solving (4.146) for n˜ and round-
ing down to the nearest integer.
Credit Trading With credit trading, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm become:
π = p(Q)q − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −RcE − e¯q)
where e¯ = L/Q. The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q










= 2b(q − E)−Rc = 0 (4.148)
The equilibrium output can be found from (4.147)
q =






(−2bLn + 4bLn2 + n3α)2 − 8bL2 (−1 + n)n3 (ν)
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms can be be found by solving for q in the


































αβφ− 20b2L2β − 4bLβφ
n˜3ν2
+
αφ + 8b2L2 + 4bL2β
n˜3ν
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is found by solving this for n˜ and rounding
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down to the nearest integer.
Combined Trading Here we need the following conditions
2L = ncEc + npEp (4.150)
Rp = Rc = R
For the permit sector we can derive the following equations for output per
ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms in the permit sector from (4.145), (4.144) and
the zero proﬁt condition
qp =
−R + α
2 a + β + np β
4bK −R2 + 2bβ(n˜















η ≡ 2a + β + n˜pβ
This can be solved numerically. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms for every
emission quota price R is found by rounding the value for n˜p down to the
nearest integer.
Also under imperfect competition, the relative standard for the credit
sector is now given by L/nq. For output per ﬁrm in the credit sector, we
ﬁnd from (4.147) and (4.148)
qc =




ρ ≡ 2a + β + ncβ, σ ≡
√
nc4(R− α)2 + 4L (−1 + nc)nc2R (ρ)
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The number of ﬁrms in the credit sector can be derived from (4.151) and
the zero proﬁt condition
4bK −R2 + bβ(n



























Using these equations and the ﬁrst order condition for emissions, we can de-
rive equations for np, Ep, nc, and Ec that are only functions of R. However,
because the number of ﬁrms in each sector is an integer, and the expressions
above give a rational number, we cannot derive an expression for the equi-
librium value of R. Instead, the equilibrium value of R was found through
iteration, where the starting value of the iteration was Rp for every case and
a small amount was added until the equilibrium value was found.
Chapter 5
A Smooth Path or a Bumpy




In modelling environmental regulation, it is usually assumed that ﬁrms and
the industry as a whole adjust instantaneously to the new regulation and
move to the new equilibrium. The transitory phase is not modelled and it
is implicitly assumed that the path to the new equilibrium is a smooth one.
The fact that this phase is not modelled could be interpreted as implying
that this path is not important and that the transitory phase is just that,
something that will go away. The new equilibrium will arise and it is this
outcome we are interested in.
However, the transitory phase is of importance and needs more attention.
If the path to the new equilibrium is rather volatile, ﬁrms will incur costs
from the uncertainty that surrounds them. Prices observed now need not
be a good prediction of prices in the future. Hence, the eﬃciency of an
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instrument also depends on how fast and how smooth it gets the industry
from no regulation to the new equilibrium with regulation. That is, if the
industry reaches the new equilibrium at all. It is possible that the path
embarked on with the implementation of regulation is so volatile that the
industry never settles down in an equilibrium.
This chapter explicitly models the transitory phase for four instruments,
absolute standards, relative standards, credit trading and permit trading, in
both a perfectly and an imperfectly competitive industry. For that purpose,
a dynamic model is developed in which ﬁrms can enter or exit the market,
depending on the proﬁtability of the incumbent ﬁrms. Two scenarios are
analyzed. In the ﬁrst scenario, the standard that will hold in the equilib-
rium with regulation is set from the ﬁrst period. In the second scenario,
environmental policy is revised in every period according to the situation in
the previous period. Relative standards are deﬁned as allowed emissions per
unit of output. Since total output can change in every period, the standard
has to be adjusted to realize the emission target. The same holds for credit
trading since this form of emissions trading is based on relative standards.
With absolute standards, the quantity of allowed emissions per ﬁrm will
have to be adjusted with entry or exit. For emissions trading, no such ad-
justment is needed, since there exists a ceiling on total emissions which is
realized in every period.
This chapter builds on work by Dijkstra (1999) and chapter 4. Dijkstra
(1999) analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent instruments on a perfectly competitive
industry, given that the government wants to achieve a certain abatement
level. He shows that diﬀerent instruments have diﬀerent impacts on the
industry, with relative standards leading to the highest output level and
permit trading with grandfathering leading to the highest proﬁts. These
results clearly have implications for the political acceptability of the diﬀerent
instruments. Chapter 4 gave a model of permit and credit trading, analyzing
both perfect and imperfect competition (see also Fischer 2001 and Gielen
et al. 2002). Chapter 4 showed that the two types of emissions trading have
diﬀerent impacts on the industry. The speciﬁc model used in chapter 4 is
also used in this chapter.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the model
is developed. Sections 5.3 and 5.4) present the regulation scenarios and
simulation results for perfect, respectively imperfect competition. Several
cases are given to illustrate the eﬀect of regulation on the industry. In
Section 5.5 some general conclusions are given.
5.2 The Model
Consider an industry, consisting of n ﬁrms that produce a homogeneous
good. Production per ﬁrm is given by q and the price of the good is p. In
producing the good, ﬁrms emit a pollutant E, which the government wants
to regulate. The overall goal of the government is to limit total emissions
to the level L.
Firm costs are given by
C(q, E) = aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K (5.1)
Here, a and b are parameters and K gives ﬁxed costs, with a, b,K > 0.
For this cost function, it holds that Cq > 0, Cqq > 0, CE < 0, CEE > 0,
CqE = CEq < 0.
The inverse demand function is linear and is given by
p = α− βnq (5.2)
with α, β > 0.
In the following, I will analyze the eﬀect of four forms of environmental
regulation on the industry; permit trading, credit trading, relative standards
and absolute standards. Under permit trading, the government divides the
total emission ceiling in permits and distributes these over the polluters, ei-
ther by grandfathering or auctioning, after which the polluters can trade the
permits. With credit trading, the government sets a relative standard that
limits emissions per unit of output. Firms that can stay below this relative
standard can sell credits. Absolute standards set a ceiling on emissions per
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ﬁrm. I will ﬁrst discuss the case when there is perfect competition, and
then when there is imperfect competition in the industry. In both cases,
the necessary models are developed after which they are used to generate
simulations that show the functioning of the instruments under diﬀerent
circumstances.
We analyze two forms of government behavior; myopic behavior and
perfect foresight. With perfect foresight, the government knows the optimal
long-run standard under credit trading and relative and absolute standards.
The government then implements this long-run standard from the start.
With permit trading, the government does not set a standard, so here the
type of foresight of the government does not matter. With myopic behavior,
the government sets its policy in each period based on information from
the previous period. Hence, with absolute standards, the government sets
the limit on emissions per ﬁrm at time t, E¯t, by dividing the limit on total
emissions by the number of ﬁrms in the previous period:
E¯t = L/nt−1 (5.3)
With permit trading, there are two possibilities. One possibility is that the
government hands out permits every period to ﬁrms that produced output
in the previous period, so that E¯t is given by (5.3). This implies that new
entrants will have to buy their way into the market. Firms that exit sell
their permits and cease to exist, where exiting ﬁrms are deﬁned as those that
set output equal to zero. Alternatively, the government could auction the
permits at the beginning of every new period. Both ways of distributing will
give the same outcome in the model. With perfect foresight, the government
sets the long run equilibrium values of the diﬀerent instruments from the
start of the regulation program. Combined trading does not alter the way
the government sets its policy.
With relative standards and credit trading, the relative standard is given
by the emission limit divided by total output in the previous period:
e¯t = L/(nt−1qt−1) (5.4)
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Although an equilibrium can be derived, especially under perfect com-
petition (see chapter 4), exit and entry of ﬁrms is used to create dynamics
in the system. Exit and entry are modelled similarly, but slightly diﬀerently
under perfect and imperfect competition. In both cases, entry (exit) occurs
in period t when there are positive (negative) proﬁts in period t− 1. Then
for perfect competition, let the number of ﬁrms in the sector at period t be







Here γ > 0 gives the rate of adjustment and qmin is the output level at which
a ﬁrm earns no proﬁt. That is, qmin is the level of output where marginal
costs are equal to average costs, where costs include both operating costs
and all costs of regulation. It should be noted that the qmin calculated in
this way does not necessarily give the long-run output level. It gives the
lowest cost output level taking present regulation as given. Speciﬁcally, in
calculating qmin, the absolute or relative standards are taken as given or
the permit price (both under permit trading and combined trading) is taken
as given. If present regulation is not at its long-run equilibrium level, then
neither will qmin be.
Using (5.5) implies that entry will happen when proﬁts are positive,
while there will be exit when proﬁts in the industry are negative. To see
this, note that when ﬁrms make a proﬁt, their output is higher than qmin.
Equation (5.5) says that ﬁrms will enter (exit) when output per ﬁrm is
higher (lower) than qmin. Using (5.5) has the advantage that it can be
readily seen how fast ﬁrms adjust. So when γ = 1, ﬁrms adjust fully in the
sense that if policy does not change, entry or exit will be such that, in the
next period, proﬁts are zero in the industry. Setting 0 < γ < 1 then gives
slower than full adjustment, while γ > 1 gives more than full adjustment
(or over-adjustment).
The number of ﬁrms in the industry is an integer. However, (5.5) does
not necessarily give an integer. To deal with this problem, the number of
ﬁrms found through the use of (5.5) is rounded down to the nearest integer.
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In the dynamic model of oligopoly, presented in section 5.4, ﬁrms take
the output of their competitors as given. More speciﬁcally, they assume that
the output levels of their rivals will be the same as they were in the previous
period. Furthermore, the government sets the relative and absolute stan-
dards in the myopic manner as described above under perfect competition.
This will be compared with the case were the long-run equilibrium value
of the standards is set from the beginning. Under perfect competition the
number of ﬁrms was assumed to change as a function of proﬁt in the previ-
ous period. A similar method was employed under imperfect competition.
We assume that ﬁrms determine how many ﬁrms there can be in the current
period. Then entry or exit occurs in the next period up to the level that
could have been sustained in the previous period. This is exactly the same
as what happens under perfect competition with γ = 1.
5.3 Perfect Competition
In this section, the transition from a state without regulation of emissions to
a new state with restrictions on emissions is simulated in the case of perfect
competition. In subsection 5.3.1 the discrete time model is given for the
various types of regulation. In subsection 5.3.2, the simulation results of the
transition phase are presented and discussed.
5.3.1 Regulation scenarios
No Regulation. The situation without regulation is the starting point of
the analysis and gives a benchmark for the changes caused by regulation.
We will assume that the industry is in long-run equilibrium before regulation
is introduced. In this case, proﬁts for a ﬁrm are, from (5.1):
π = pq − C(q, E) = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q




= 2b(q − E) = 0 ⇒ q = E (5.7)
Besides these conditions, in the long run it must hold that pq = C(q, E),
i.e., there should be no proﬁts:
2aq + 2b(q − E) = aq
2 + b(q − E)2 + K
q










The total number of ﬁrms is found by inserting the market price in (5.2)







The three equations for q, p and n fully determine the equilibrium in the no
regulation case.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the government distributes the to-
tal limit on emissions as permits over the ﬁrms. Let E¯i ≥ 0 be the amount
of permits received by ﬁrm i. The maximization problem for the ﬁrm (sup-
pressing the i’s) is, from (5.1):
max
q,E
π = pq − C(q, E)−Rp(E − E¯)
= pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rp(E − E¯)
where Rp is the permit price. The ﬁrst order conditions are given by
∂π
∂q




= 2b(q − E)−Rp = 0 (5.9)
In this case, with identical ﬁrms, emissions trading will equalize emissions
between ﬁrms in every period, i.e., E = L/n. Using this, and inserting for
p from the inverse demand function given in (5.2), we ﬁnd
q =
2bLn + α
2a + 2b + nβ
(5.10)
In the long run, ﬁrms regulated through permit trading will have to
cover both their operating costs C(q, E) = aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K and the
opportunity costs of emissions RpE. That is, in the long run
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −RpE ≥ 0 (5.11)
The reason for this is that if the ﬁrm does not cover the opportunity costs
on emissions, it would be better oﬀ closing down and selling the permits.
In the analysis, we use the minimum average costs level of output. This
output level is given as the q where π = 0 in (5.11). With permit trading,
qmin is found by setting long-run average costs, including the opportunity
costs of emissions, equal to marginal costs:
aq2 + b(q − E)2 + K + RpE
q
= 2aq + 2b(q − E) (5.12)





During every period then the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. Using this, q and
Q = nq can be found. From this, the price of the good can be derived using
(5.2).
Credit Trading and Relative Standards With relative standards, the
government sets a limit e¯ on the emissions per unit of output. The ﬁrm is
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then allowed to emit e¯q in total. With credit trading, the ﬁrm is allowed
to sell credits if it can stay below the total allowed emission level for the
ﬁrm. Since we are dealing with identical ﬁrms in the model, no trade will
take place. Therefore, the analysis of credit trading and relative standards
becomes identical, except for the fact that under credit trading there is a
credit price Rc, while with relative standards, there is a shadow price. In
the following, I will concentrate on credit trading.
Under regulation with credit trading, the ﬁrm will maximize, from (5.1):
π = pq − aq2 − C(q, E)−Rc(E − e¯q)
= pq − aq2 − b(q − E)2 −K −Rc(E − e¯q)
The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂q
= p− 2aq − 2b(q − E) + Rce¯ = 0 (5.13)
∂π
∂E
= 2b(q − E)−Rc = 0 (5.14)
With identical ﬁrms there is no scope for trading, and all ﬁrms will emit up




2a + 2b(e¯− 1)2 + nβ (5.15)
In this case, there are two variables that need to be determined, n and e¯.
As with permit trading, n is determined through (5.5) with qmin for relative




a + b(e¯− 1)2







The two equations for qmin are found by setting long-run average costs equal
to marginal costs and then using (5.14) and (5.4) to eliminate E and R or
e¯.
Absolute Standards With absolute standards, the government sets a limit
E¯ on emissions per ﬁrm. Since ﬁrms are identical in this model, the analysis
of absolute standards is rather similar to the analysis of permit trading
above. However, there is one diﬀerence in that the ﬁrm does not have to
cover opportunity costs of emissions. Hence, with absolute standards, it
must hold that
π = pq − aq2 − b(q − E¯)2 −K ≥ 0 (5.17)
It is clear that this is diﬀerent from the long-run proﬁt function for permit
trading given by (5.11). Otherwise, the ﬁrst order conditions derived for
permit trading also hold under absolute standards, with the diﬀerence that
Rp is replaced by a shadow price λ.
This also implies that qmin for absolute standards is diﬀerent from the
one under permit trading. In this case, qmin found by setting long-run





Combined Trading The model can also be used to analyze the eﬀects of
combining permit and credit trading. With perfect competition, the only
interesting case is the one where two sectors operating on diﬀerent product
markets are connected through emissions trading. If two sectors, from diﬀer-
ent countries for example, operating on the same product market would be
connected through emissions trading, the sector regulated through permit
trading would vanish because of its higher marginal production costs.
In the following, we assume that the two sectors are identical in all
aspects, except that they operate on two diﬀerent goods market, which have
the same demand function, and that one sector is regulated through permit
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trading, while the other is regulated through credit trading. In the case of
combined trading, an additional condition is needed, given by
ncEc − ncqce¯c = npE¯p − npEp
where the superscripts c and p denote the credit and permit sectors respec-
tively. This condition merely says that total emissions should be equal to
total allowable emissions. Using this condition, together with the ﬁrst or-
der conditions for proﬁt maximization for both sectors given in (5.8), (5.9),
(5.13) and (5.14) and inverse demand function (5.2), the price of emission
quotas can be determined as
R =
{





npE¯β − α)+ nc ((e¯− 1)α + npE¯β))]}/{









np + nc (e¯− 1)2
)
+ (nc + np)2 β
)}
The quota price can then be used directly in the ﬁrst order conditions to
calculate qc and qp and the other variables.








Emissions in both cases are given by
E = q − R
2b
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Figure 5.1: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Inelastic Demand
a = 1, K = 1, α = 6, β = 0.04
b = 2, γ = 1
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Also qmin changes for both cases. More precisely, qmin becomes identical for
the two cases (see chapter 4)




The equations for emission quota price, output, emissions and zero proﬁt
output together with demand function (5.2), fully characterize the equilib-
rium in the combined system.
5.3.2 Simulation results
The results of the simulation1 for perfect competition are reported in Fig-
ures 5.1 through 5.10. We will ﬁrst discuss the case where the government
behaves myopically. The simulation results for this are given in Figures 5.1
through 5.4. Figure 5.1 gives some cases with inelastic demand. The price
elasticity of demand in the starting position without regulation is −0.5 in
this case. Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 give cases with elastic demand. The price
elasticity of demand in the starting position here is −1.25 for Figure 5.2 and
−2 for Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Figures 5.5 through 5.7 give some of the same
cases, but for combined trading.
In all cases, the initial condition is the same, with qn = 1, En = 1, pn = 2
and nn = 100, where the superscript n denotes the no regulation case. Total
emissions without regulation are then 100 and in all cases, except the last
case in Figure 5.3, emissions are reduced by 30% giving a limit on total
emissions of 70. Environmental policy is introduced in period two. In all
ﬁgures, the dotted line gives output per ﬁrm, the drawn line gives price of
output and the dashed line gives the number of ﬁrms. The values in the
ﬁgures give the index relative to the no-regulation case.
In the following, we will concentrate on the dynamic eﬀects of regulation
and pay little attention to the comparative statics eﬀects. For the latter,
at least for permit and credit trading, the reader is referred to chapter 4.
1The simulation algorithm was programmed in Fortran and is available
from the author upon request
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Figure 5.2: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 1
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3.6, β = 0.016
b = 2, γ = 1
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Figure 5.3: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 2a
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
b = 2, γ = 1
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b = 12.75, γ = 1



























b = 11, L = 30, γ = 1


























Figure 5.4: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Elastic Demand 2b
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
b = 10, γ = 0
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One important aspect however is entry and exit of ﬁrms. Environmental
regulation diminishes the eﬃcient scale of operation of the ﬁrm. Whether
environmental regulation then leads to entry or exit depends on the elasticity
of demand. If demand is rather inelastic, total output will not change by
much as a result of environmental regulation and ﬁrms will enter. When
demand is elastic, total output will decrease by a large amount, and ﬁrms
will exit.
A number of interesting features are shown in the ﬁgures. First of all,
the transition from no regulation to regulation is often not very smooth,
but may be rather volatile, especially with credit trading. Secondly, in
most cases, credit trading (or relative standards) leads to less change in the
long-run equilibrium than permit trading and absolute standards do. This
was already shown in chapter 4. Thirdly, immediately setting the standard
(relative or absolute) at its long-run equilibrium level may lead to a longer
transition period than myopic behavior by the government.
We start with the volatility in the market caused by regulation. As the
ﬁgures show, there are basically two types of volatility. The ﬁrst one is very
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Figure 5.5: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined Trading,
Inelastic Demand
a = 1, K = 1, α = 6, β = 0.04
b = 2, γ = 1
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short lived: the introduction of regulation can lead to a strong reaction in
the ﬁrst periods, whereafter the system more or less smoothly moves to the
new equilibrium. This is clear in many of the cases, also when the optimal
long-run standards are set from the ﬁrst period onward.
The second type of volatility is of a more persistent nature, though only
credit trading (relative standards) is prone to this type of volatility. Whether
the system becomes volatile depends on several factors, such as the elasticity
of demand, marginal costs of abatement, the rate of adjustment by ﬁrms
(given by γ), and government policy. As is clear from a comparison of the
ﬁgures, there is more volatility with credit trading when demand is elastic
and when marginal abatement costs are high. The clearest case is given
in Figure 5.3. Here permit trading and absolute standards give a more or
less smooth transition path after the initial shock. However, with credit
trading, the system becomes more volatile the higher marginal abatement
costs become. For b = 2, γ = 1, credit trading shows a rather smooth path
with little divergence from the no regulation case. However, when b becomes
larger, the system shows two-period bifurcation (b = 10, γ = 1) and four-
period bifurcation (b = 12.75, γ = 1). Putting more strain on the system by
setting a lower total ceiling makes the system become chaotic (b = 11, L =
30, γ = 1). Hence, in these cases, the system never reaches an equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the model could not be solved for very high elasticity of
demand and high marginal abatement costs. However, the higher marginal
abatement costs, the more volatile the system also becomes here.
Chaos can arise when there is a non-linear relationship between a variable
in a certain period and the same variable in the previous period (see Baumol
and Benhabib 1989 and Shone 2002, Ch.7). In our model, there are two
relationships that make a connection between the current and the previous
value of a variable: the entry/exit condition given in (5.5) and government
policy as given by how the standards are set (equations (5.3) and (5.4)).
A glance at (5.5) shows that the entry/exit rule gives a linear relationship
between the current and the previous number of ﬁrms, so that this cannot
be the cause of chaos in the model. For government policy, the relationship
is diﬀerent between credit trading (and relative standards) on the one hand
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Figure 5.6: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined Trading,
Elastic Demand 1
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3.6, β = 0.016
b = 2, γ = 1
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and absolute standards and permit trading on the other hand. For credit











while for permit trading (if they are grandfathered) and absolute standards











Equation (5.18) shows that under myopic standard setting there is a nonlin-
ear relationship between the current and previous relative standard, while
(5.19) shows that there is a linear relationship for absolute standards and
permit trading. Hence, only with credit trading and myopic setting of the
relative standard the system can become chaotic. Whether there will be
chaos under credit trading (and relative standards) depends on the values
of the parameters, which is also clear from the ﬁgures.
The more elastic demand is, the more output will decrease as a result of
the introduction of a given level of environmental regulation. With relative
standards, this can lead to volatility as was mentioned above. Since the
government is myopic, it sets the initial relative standard too strict. Firms
react by reducing output by more than would be necessary to meet the
overall emission limit. Then, in the next period, the government sets a too
lax standard since it sets the standard based on output in the ﬁrst period
after regulation, leading to too high output. The higher the elasticity of
demand, the larger the swings in output will be. But then, the government
will also set a standard that is further from the correct standard in the initial
periods. These eﬀects are magniﬁed with higher marginal abatement costs,
since the higher marginal abatement costs are, the larger the reduction in
output as a result of environmental regulation. As the ﬁgures show, these
eﬀects can reinforce each other such that the volatility becomes permanent,
and even leads to chaos. It has to be noted though, that chaos is only found
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at rather extreme values of some of the parameters. Hence, in Figure 2,
chaos is found with price elasticity of demand equal to −2 at the starting
point and 70% emission reduction.
Entry and exit of ﬁrms leads to a movement in the opposite direction
from the one following from the shifts in environmental regulation with a
myopic regulator. With inelastic demand, higher speed γ of adjustment by
ﬁrms then leads to higher volatility under credit trading, while with elastic
demand, it dampens the volatility caused by shifts in the relative standard.
For inelastic demand, we give cases with γ = 0 (no entry or exit) and γ = 2 in
the last two boxes of Figure 5.1. With γ = 0, volatility gradually decreases.
However, with γ = 2 there is high volatility under relative standards. This
is a result of the high levels of entry and exit by ﬁrms. Figures 5.2 and 5.4
show that under credit trading and elastic demand volatility is high when
there is no entry and exit (γ = 0). The higher the speed of entry, the lower
the volatility subsequently becomes. To see why this is, start at period two
where environmental policy is introduced. The government sets a relative
standard based on the output level without environmental regulation. One
of the results is that output decreases, and hence, the standard was set too
tight. At the same time, proﬁts are negative. Then in period three the
government will calculate the relative standard anew, but will now set it too
lax since output was very low in the ﬁrst period with regulation. This will
lead to a higher output level in period three. Without exit or entry, this
would lead to a higher than optimal total output level. However, because
proﬁts were negative in period two, ﬁrms will exit in period three and hence
total output will not increase by as much as it would have done if the number
of ﬁrms was ﬁxed. Hence, the exit of ﬁrms dampens the volatility in the
system.
Combining the permit and credit trading in general gives a more smooth
transition. A higher speed of entry and exit under combined trading always
leads to more volatility as the last boxes in Figures 4 through 6 show.
We now turn to the case where the government sets the long-run equilib-
rium standards from the start. The results are given in Figures 5.8 through
5.10. For permit trading, the case where policy is set optimally from the
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Figure 5.7: Perfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined Trading,
Elastic Demand 2
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
b = 2, γ = 1
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Figure 5.8: Perfect Competition, Constant Standards, Inelastic Demand
a = 1, K = 1, α = 6, β = 0.04
b = 2, γ = 1
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start is identical to the myopic case, therefore, in Figures 5.8 through 5.10
we only give the trajectories for credit trading and absolute standards. The
result is that setting a constant standard will give a smooth transition to
the new equilibrium, but may lead to a longer transition period than set-
ting a new standard in every period. Again, the result is dependent on the
elasticity of demand. Comparing Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.8, it is clear that
setting a ﬁxed standard gets the system quicker to the new equilibrium.
However, as demand becomes more elastic, the diﬀerence becomes smaller.
In the ﬁrst case given in Figures 5.2 and 5.9, with b = 2, γ = 1, it takes 22
periods for the industry under credit trading to reach equilibrium with both
myopic and constant standards. For absolute standards, it takes 54 periods
with myopic standards and 46 with ﬁxed standards in the same case. With
b = 10, γ = 1 credit trading does not lead to a stable equilibrium, so nothing
can be said about the time it takes to reach the equilibrium. For absolute
standards however, it takes 136 periods to reach a stable equilibrium with
myopic standards, and 133 periods with constant standards. Hence, in this
case, myopic and constant standards lead to virtually the same length of ap-
proach path to the new stable equilibrium, if such an equilibrium exists. In
the second case with elastic demand, given in Figures 5.3 and 5.10, it takes
longer to reach the new stable equilibrium with constant standards than
with myopic standards. For example, with b = 2, γ = 1 it takes 30 periods
for credit trading to reach the new equilibrium with myopic standards, while
it takes 36 periods with constant standards. For absolute standards, it takes
69 periods with myopic standards and 71 with constant standards. In the
case with b = 12.75, γ = 1, nothing can be said for credit trading because
it does not lead to a a stable equilibrium with myopic standards. However,
for absolute standards it takes 210 periods to reach the equilibrium with
myopic standards and 236 periods with constant standards.
With constant standards, a high speed of entry and exit only leads to
more volatility under inelastic demand. The reason for this is that with
inelastic demand, total output at ﬁrst decreases by too much when the
optimal standard is set from the start, while with elastic demand, the market
adjusts more gradually. With inelastic demand then, the initial spike is
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sustained and sometimes ampliﬁed by entry and exit.
Unfortunately, the model could not be solved for combined trading and
constant standards. Therefore, no results for combined trading with con-
stant standards are reported.
5.4 Imperfect competition
In this section, we give the case with oligopoly. In subsection 5.4.1 the
discrete time model is given for the various types of regulation. In subsec-
tion 5.4.2, the simulation results of the transition phase are presented and
discussed.
5.4.1 Regulation scenarios
No Regulation The no-regulation case is used as a starting point for the
analysis and as a benchmark to measure changes against. We are therefore
only interested in the long-run equilibrium, so no dynamics are incorporated
in this stage. Assuming that all ﬁrms are identical and keeping the cost
function (5.1), proﬁts are given by
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K
where Q =
∑n




= α− βQ− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) = 0
∂πi
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei) = 0 ⇒ qi = Ei
With imperfect competition, ﬁrms can earn a proﬁt, even in the long run.
However, the number of ﬁrms need not be constant over time. The long-run
equilibrium conditions with imperfect competition are that all ﬁrms in the
market should at least cover their costs, i.e., Πi ≥ 0 and that entry should
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Figure 5.9: Perfect Competition, Constant Standards, Elastic Demand 1
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Figure 5.10: Perfect Competition, Constant Standards, Elastic Demand 2
a = 1, K = 1, α = 3, β = 0.01
b = 2, γ = 1
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not be proﬁtable. Thus:
πi(n∗) ≥ 0 and πi(n∗ + 1) < 0
where n∗ is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market. The equilibrium
output level per ﬁrm is then given by
qi =
α
2a + (1 + n∗)β
Permit Trading With permit trading, the government puts a limit L on
total emissions, giving an initial distribution of permits per ﬁrm of E¯ = L/n.
The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm then becomes:
π = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −Rp(Ei − E¯)





The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂π
∂qi
= α− β(qi + Q−i,t−1)− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) = 0 (5.20)
∂π
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei)−Rp = 0
Since we have assumed that ﬁrms are identical, emissions after trading will
be Ei = L/n. Solving for qi from (5.20) gives
qi =
2b(L/n) + α− βQ−i,t−1
2 (a + b + β)
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Also under imperfect competition a ﬁrm regulated through permit trad-
ing must cover the opportunity costs of emissions. Therefore, it must hold
that
πi = p(qi + Q−i,t−1)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −RpEi ≥ 0
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the market, n∗ is the smallest number
of ﬁrms for which it holds that
∑n∗+1
i=1 πi < 0. This is found iteratively.
Hence, in the model, the number of ﬁrms in every period is increased from 2
to the number where proﬁts are lower than zero. Then the number of ﬁrms
in the market is the latter number of ﬁrms minus 1.
Credit Trading and Relative Standards Also here, the analysis of credit
trading and relative standards is identical. Therefore, I concentrate on credit
trading. With credit trading, the proﬁts of a ﬁrm become
πi = p(Q)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K −Rc(Ei − e¯qi)
where e¯ = L/Qt−1. Firm i assumes that Q−i,t = Q−i,t−1, so that the ﬁrst
order conditions for proﬁt maximization are
∂πi
∂qi
= α− β(qi + Q−i,t−1)− βqi − 2aqi − 2b(qi − Ei) + Rce¯ = 0
∂πi
∂Ei
= 2b(qi − Ei)−Rc = 0





a + b (e¯− 1)2 + β
)
Also under credit trading, the number of ﬁrms in the market is found
through iteration.
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Absolute Standards The analysis of absolute standards is identical to the
one of permit trading except for two points. In the ﬁrst place, there is no
market for quotas, so there is no permit price under absolute standards.
This means that Rp should be replaced with a shadow price λ. Secondly,
under absolute standards, the ﬁrm does not have to cover the opportunity
costs of emissions. Hence, the proﬁt condition becomes
πi = p(qi + Q−i,t−1)qi − aq2i − b(qi − Ei)2 −K ≥ 0
Combined Trading As with perfect competition, we can combine the two
systems. From the ﬁrst order conditions for permit and credit trading, we
















2b (a + β)
Additionally, we need a condition on the total amount of emissions in both
systems and a condition that the emission quota price will be the same in
both segments of the market:
ncEc + npEp = npE¯p + ncqce¯c
Rp = Rc = R










βQp−i,t−1 − α + 2E¯β
))
a (nc + np) + b
(
np + nc(e¯− 1)2
)
+ β (nc + np)
The emission quota price can then be used in the ﬁrst order conditions to
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solve for qpi and q
c





α + R(e¯− 1)− βQc−i,t−1
2(a + β)
5.4.2 Simulation results
Simulation results are reported in Figures 10-13. The ﬁrst three ﬁgures gives
some cases where the standards are set myopically. In Figure 12, permit and
credit trading are combined, while in Figure 13 the optimal long-run stan-
dard is set from the onset of regulation. In all cases, the initial conditions
under no regulation are the same, with qn = 7.14, En = 7.14, pn = 21.43,
nn = 4 and proﬁts of 2.04 in every period. Total emissions without regu-
lation are 28.57 and the government wants to reduce this amount by 30%,
leading to a limit on emissions of L = 20. The ﬁgures show the index of
output per ﬁrm (dotted line), product price (drawn line) and the number of
ﬁrms (dashed line) where the no regulation inices are set to 100.
In a sense, one would expect more volatility in a market with oligopoly
competition and Nash behavior than with perfect competition. The reason
is that under these circumstances, any change will lead to reactions by the
competitors. This is exacerbated by the assumption that ﬁrms set their
output depending on their competitors’ output in the previous period. This
introduces a new lagged variable that can cause volatility. On the other
hand however, changes in a oligopolistic market may be less pronounced
and it is less likely that there will be changes in all variables in every period.
For example, the number of ﬁrms may change as a result of the introduction
of environmental regulation, but such a change often only occurs once or
at most twice, at least under permit trading and absolute standards. This
then has a dampening eﬀect on the market.
These two forces, the one increasing volatility, the other decreasing it,
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Figure 5.11: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government
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Figure 5.12: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government
a = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1
b = 3.4












seem to compensate each other more or less since the general results of
the analysis under imperfect competition are rather similar to those under
perfect competition. As with perfect competition, the market is more likely
to be volatile under credit trading than under permit trading. As Figure
10 shows, the system quickly comes to equilibrium under low levels of b.
However, already with b = 0.8, the system seems to become chaotic under
credit trading. Interestingly, a higher b at ﬁrst leads to a more structured
form of volatility, whereafter the system becomes more chaotic again at
b = 3.4. In Figure 11, the case of b = 3.4 under credit trading is given again,
but now for a longer time period. It is clear from this ﬁgure, that there is
high volatility, but that there also is some sense of regularity in the system.
In this case, real chaotic behavior could not be produced. But then, the
model could not be solved for higher levels of b than 3.4.
Combining the two systems leads to some volatility in both the permit
and credit sector. However, the system always seems to go to an equilibrium.
Hence, the volatility of the credit trading scheme spills over to the permit
trading scheme, but eventually, the system eases down.
With imperfect competition, setting the standard at its long-run equilib-
rium value from the start leads to less volatility in the market at lower levels
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Figure 5.13: Imperfect Competition, Myopic Government, Combined
Trading
a = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1
b = 0.8
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Figure 5.14: Imperfect Competition, Constant Standards
a = 1, K = 100, α = 50, β = 1
b = 0.8






































of b as can be seen from the case with b = 0.8 in Figures 10 and 13. However,
at higher levels of b, the system becomes volatile again. This is a result from
the interplay between the entry and exit of ﬁrms and the way ﬁrms set their
production level. This shows that with imperfect competition, volatility can
be a persistent phenomena under credit trading, even when the government
sets a constant standard from the beginning of regulation. This in contrast
to perfect competition where setting a constant standard always leads to a
smooth adjustment to the new equilibrium, even with credit trading.
5.5 Conclusion
In the economic literature, the performance of instruments for environmental
regulation is mostly judged by their eﬃciency. Sometimes political, read
distributional, eﬀects are considered too. This chapter takes into account
that the economic impacts during the transition period from no regulation
to the new equilibrium with regulation should be taken into account too. In
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particular the volatility of output, which is an indicator of ﬂuctuations in
employment, the price consumers pay for output and the number of ﬁrms
since excessive entry and exit during the transition period are a waste the
policy maker would rather want to avoid.
In the model resented, regular adjustment of standards can lead to
volatility in the regulated industry when the instrument used is relative stan-
dards or credit trading. Such volatility is more likely to occur when demand
is elastic, abatement costs are high and the emission reduction goal is rather
ambitious. Swift entry and exit of ﬁrms increases the volatility with low
elasticity of demand, but mitigates the level of volatility with high elasticity
of demand. The volatility generated under credit trading in the dynamic
model is due to the fact that there is a non-linear relationship between the
relative standards in subsequent periods. With absolute standards, there is
a linear relationship, while with permit trading, the government does not
adjust the standard. The diﬀerences in how the standards are set explains
why there is not much volatility with permit trading and constant standards,
even when the government reacts myopically.
Of the types of regulation discussed in this chapter, constant relative
standards are the conventional approach in the European Union (van der
Laan 2002) and also in the USA. Frequent retrospective adjustment of stan-
dards does not occur. The possibility that total emissions will end up above
or below the long run target is simply accepted. Absolute standards or emis-
sion ceilings are only applied by exception. In contrast, emissions trading
in various forms may have the future. Several programs of credit trading
exist in the USA and the UK. The USA was also the ﬁrst in starting a
permit trading program for SO2 emissions. The EU has just launched a
permit trading scheme for CO2 emissions. From the point of view of policy
relevance, a comparison of credit trading and permit trading programmes
to assess their performances during the transition stage from no regulation
to the new equilibrium with regulation in particular in terms of volatility
therefore is in place.
In all simulations of permit trading under perfect competition the num-
ber of ﬁrms and product price increases or decreases smoothly. Only output
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per ﬁrm overshoots its long-run equilibrium in the ﬁrst periods after the
introduction of regulation, but subsequently adjusts smoothly. With imper-
fect competition the adjustment is generally somewhat less smoothly, but
basically the same as with perfect competition. With perfect competition
and constant standards, credit trading leads to an at least equally smooth
adjustment at with permit trading. However, with imperfect competition
credit trading can lead to volatility in the market, even when the standard
is set at its long-run optimal level from the start of the program.
These results suggest that under perfect competition diﬀerences in pains
of adjustment are not likely to play a role in the choice between credit
and permit trading or constant standards. Volatility would then only be a
problem when the government uses credit trading and frequently adjusts the
underlying relative standard. However, with imperfect competition, credit
trading may lead to higher adjustment costs, even when the government does
not adjust the underlying relative standard. In that case, permit trading









The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 allows international trade in greenhouse gas
emissions between the countries that committed to an emission ceiling (the
Annex B Countries). As the discussion within the EU has shown, there are
many issues to be settled before an international emissions trading scheme
can be implemented. One of the most important issues is what the basis
for the national emissions trading schemes should be. Here, the choice is
basically between a cap and trade system and a system based on relative
standards ( Boom 2001, Fischer 2003, Gielen et al. 2002 and chapter 4). In
the ﬁrst system, denoted as permit trading, there is a cap on total emissions,
which is divided into permits that are distributed over the emissions sources,
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who are then allowed to trade them. In the second system, denoted as credit
trading, ﬁrms are allowed to emit a certain amount of emissions per unit of
output. This means that the total level of allowed emissions grandfathered
to the ﬁrm is not ﬁxed, but can change with output. Firms that stay below
the standard can sell emission credits. It is not necessary for a ﬁrm to
reduce emissions before it can issue credits, enabling purchasers to exceed
the emission standard without oﬀending compliance rules. Just as with
permit trading, a ﬁrm can issue a credit if it expects to reduce emissions
(see Boom and Nentjes 2003). As shown in chapter 4, the two schemes have
a diﬀerent impact on the industry. Output is higher under credit trading
than under permit trading and if the total emission goal is the same under
both schemes, marginal abatement costs will be higher under credit trading.
Of these two schemes, permit trading is the most eﬃcient and leads to the
highest welfare when all emission sources are price takers both in the goods
and in the emission quota markets.
Besides the choice between credit and permit trading, governments must
decide whether or not to allow international emissions trading. The eﬀect
of opening up for international trading is that the price of emission quotas
will change, which in turn will aﬀect production within the country. If the
regulated industry is small on a world scale, this is how far the analysis
goes. A country will then always gain from allowing emissions trading since
it will either save on abatement costs, or make a gain from the sale of
permits. This is the classical case for emissions trading, both nationally
and internationally. It also follows that the optimal international emissions
trading scheme under these circumstances is permit trading.
However, countries can have market power in a good, even when their
ﬁrms do not. In that case, the country can aﬀect the price on the world
market by altering domestic production through its policies. As will be clear
from the description of permit and credit trading above, one such policy that
potentially could aﬀect the world market is environmental policy.
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze whether countries have an
incentive to choose their emissions trading scheme strategically when they
have market power in the goods market. To this end, a partial equilibrium
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model with one industry is developed with perfect competition in both the
goods and the emissions quota market. Although a country could have mar-
ket power in the emissions quota market as well, this will be harder to obtain
than market power in a good since several industries will be trading emis-
sion quotas together. In order to concentrate on the choice of instrument,
it is assumed that the countries involved have committed to a cap on total
domestic emissions. Several papers have discussed the eﬀect of environmen-
tal policy on international trade and welfare, but not many papers discuss
instrument choice of a country in such a setting with perfect competition in
the goods market (see next section for an overview of the literature). This
chapter diﬀers from previous work in this area in that it compares instru-
ments of environmental policy in their eﬀect on the welfare of a country and
in that it considers the choice between national and international emissions
trading. The analysis shows that countries may have an incentive to dis-
tort international trade through the choice of emissions trading scheme and
that in certain cases countries have an incentive not to allow international
emissions trading.
In the next section a brief overview of previous, related work is given. In
section 6.3 a partial equilibrium two-stage model is presented. In the ﬁrst
stage, the government decides which form of emissions trading to implement
and whether or not to allow international emissions trading. In the second
stage, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts under perfect competition while taking
the choice of instrument by the government as given. As is usual in stage
games, the two stages will be discussed in reverse order. In section 6.4, we
give an analysis of the Nash equilibrium instrument choice in a two-country
setting. The analysis is given for four scenarios which diﬀer according to
whether the international emissions quota price is lower or higher than the




In all the models discussed in this section it is assumed that ﬁrms operate in
a market of perfect competition. One of the characteristics of such a market
is that no single ﬁrm has an inﬂuence on the price of the good produced.
However a country may be able to aﬀect the price of a good. It will be able
to do so when it produces a considerable part of total world output and
when it implements a policy that aﬀects all domestic ﬁrms in the sector.
Markusen (1975) develops a general equilibrium model of trade and
transboundary pollution. In the model, there are two commodities, one
of which causes pollution and the other, non-polluting, good is taken as the
numeraire. There is no possibility for substitution among inputs or out-
puts so as to reduce emissions, nor is an abatement technology available.
Therefore, the only method to reduce domestic pollution is by reducing pro-
duction. Not only domestic production causes pollution in the home country,
this is also the case with foreign production. However, the foreign country
does not implement any environmental policy. The domestic government
seeks to maximize welfare and has three instruments to do so; it can use a
tariﬀ on exports and imports, a production tax and a consumption subsidy.
Markusen ﬁrst determines the optimal tax structure, after which he analyzes
the three cases where only one of these instruments can be used. Since the
government has market power in both goods, it will try to manipulate rela-
tive prices such that the world market price of the exported good increases
relative to the imported good. At the same time, the government wants to
reduce both domestic and foreign pollution.
The ﬁrst best tax structure can be achieved with any two of the three
policy instruments. This is most easily seen for the combination of a pro-
duction tax and a trade tax. The production tax is set at the usual level,
where marginal abatement costs equal marginal social damage. The trade
tax consists of two parts: a trade part and a pollution part. The trade part
is the usual optimal tariﬀ formula for the two-good case. If the polluting
good is exported, the government will impose an export tax, while if it is
imported, it will impose an import tariﬀ. In that way, the government can
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always increase the price of the export good relative to the import good.
The pollution part of the trade tax aims at reducing foreign pollution. This
part is always positive. Hence, the domestic government will impose an im-
port tariﬀ if the polluting good is imported and an export subsidy when the
good is exported.
Of the three cases where only one instrument can be used, the case
with product taxes is the most interesting for our purpose. With only a
production tax, the three components mentioned above all inﬂuence the
level of the tax. First of all, domestic pollution calls for a positive tax.
However, this production tax will cause the price to rise, which in turn
encourages foreign production and thereby foreign pollution. Hence, with
foreign pollution, the production tax will be lower than without foreign
pollution. The third part is the already mentioned optimal tariﬀ part. When
the product is imported, domestic production should be subsidized, when it
is exported, it should be taxed. The resulting tax (or subsidy) depends on
the strengths of these three eﬀects.
Krutilla (1991) analyzes a partial equilibrium model with only domes-
tic pollution. Besides discussing pollution as a production externality, he
also models the case where pollution is a consumption externality. Just as
Markusen, Krutilla discusses the use of both an environmental tax and a
tariﬀ on the export or import of the good. Not surprisingly Krutilla arrives
at the same conclusions as Markusen in the case of a production external-
ity. The optimum can be reached by use of a Pigouvian tax on pollution
and a tariﬀ on exports or imports. When the tariﬀ instrument cannot be
used, the environmental tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax when the good
is imported, while it is higher than the Pigouvian tax when the good is
exported.
Dijkstra (1998) develops a partial equilibrium model similar to Krutilla
(1991). Whereas in Markusen (1975) and Krutilla (1991) domestic pollution
is variable and only taxation is considered, in Dijkstra domestic emissions
are given, but governments can choose between several instruments of envi-
ronmental policy. Furthermore, in Dijkstra (1998) abatement technologies
are available, so that there no longer is a one on one relationship between
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production and pollution.
Dijkstra (1998) analyzes four cases: autarky, international trade without
pollution, international trade and domestic pollution and international trade
and global pollution. The model is a one-shot game of instrument choice
between governments, where the ﬁrst two cases are used as benchmarks.
Dijkstra (1998) shows that there is no diﬀerence between the instruments of
taxation, permit trading and ﬁrm-level emission ceilings. However, he does
ﬁnd a diﬀerence between these instruments and an emission standard per
unit of product. The main reason for this is that with a standard per unit
of product the producer will produce more than with the other instruments.
Hence, in cases where welfare can be increased by higher production, stan-
dards per product outperform taxes. Dijkstra (1998) ﬁnds two such cases.
Production is too low with emission taxes when a country imports the pol-
luting good. This result comes about irrespective whether pollution is local
or transboundary. A second case occurs only with transboundary pollution.
Dijkstra assumes that the foreign country does not have any environmental
policy. If the domestic country reduces emissions, domestic output declines
and foreign output increases. The latter eﬀect is unwanted because foreign
output is more polluting than domestic output. Therefore, it would be bet-
ter to have both low domestic emissions and high domestic output. This
can be achieved with relative standards.
The model presented in the next section builds on the models discussed
above, especially on Dijkstra (1998). The model extends previous work in
that credit trading has never been considered in this setting before. The
main contribution however is that international emissions trading, in alter-
native forms, permit trading and credit trading, is added to the analysis.
The setting makes it possible to analyze instrument choice at the national
and international level, and to determine whether it always is optimal for
governments to allow international emissions trading. Like Dijkstra, but un-
like Markusen and Krutilla I assume that the emission level in all relevant
countries is ﬁxed. In the context of climate change policy this assumption
is relevant since countries have committed themselves to emission ceilings.
Hence, there is no interplay between instrument choice and levels of emis-
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sions and we can concentrate on the choice of emissions trading scheme.
6.3 The Model
In this section, a model is presented with perfect competition in the goods
and emission quota market. The good is traded internationally with produc-
ers located both in the home country and abroad. Firms have no inﬂuence
on the price of the product or on the price of emission quotas. However, it
is assumed that the country’s output of the product is so large compared to
total world production that the government can aﬀect the product price by
the environmental policy it implements. In the model, it is assumed that
countries have no market power in the emissions quota market. The ratio-
nale for this is that international emissions trading will occur between ﬁrms
from several industries from various countries. Therefore, it is harder to gain
market power in the emissions quota market through the choice of instru-
ment in an industry that to obtain market power in the market for a good.
Essentially, the government has to make two choices: 1) which instrument
of environmental policy to choose, where we limit the analysis to permit
and credit trading, and 2) whether to restrict trading to national emission
sources, or to allow international emissions trading between sources. The
model is a two-stage model with the government moving ﬁrst by choosing
an instrument. In the second stage, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, while taking the
choice of instrument as given. As is usual with stage games, stage two is
analyzed before stage one.
There are n producers of a homogeneous good in the country, with n
being large. Each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts taking the price P as given.
Costs are represented by C(q, E), where q is production and E are emissions.
The cost function has the following properties
Cq > 0, CE < 0, Cqq ≥ 0, CEE > 0, CqE < 0 (6.1)
The government has set a limit on total emissions from the industry equal
to L. In the following, it is assumed that the government has perfect infor-
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mation about the behavior of the ﬁrms. It is therefore always able to set
the environmental policy such that the total limit on emissions is realized.
6.3.1 Stage Two: Firm behavior
In this section we analyze ﬁrm behavior. First, we deal with the case where
the government implements national policies, but does not allow interna-
tional emissions trading between private entities. Here we restrict the choice
of national instrument to permit trading and credit trading. Permit trad-
ing is based on an absolute cap on emissions, while credit trading is based
on relative standards that put a limit on emissions per unit of output. As
Dijkstra (1999) shows, the outcome under permit trading is identical to
that under taxes or absolute standards. Furthermore, the outcome under
credit trading is identical to the outcome under relative standards. Hence,
although the analysis is limited to only two instruments, results apply to
other instruments as well. In the following we will show that credit trading
leads to a higher output level and higher marginal abatement costs than
permit trading.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the ceiling that is placed on total
domestic emissions is divided among the ﬁrms in the form of emission per-
mits that give the right to emit a certain amount of the pollutant. The initial
distribution of permits can either be for free (grandfathering) or through an
auction, or a combination of the two. After the initial distribution, ﬁrms
are free to trade the permits. Here, we assume that the permits are grand-
fathered. With permit trading, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem becomes
max
q,E
Π = Pq − C(q, E)− t(E − E¯) (6.2)
Here t is the domestic permit price and E¯ is the initial allocation of permits,
with E¯ = L/n. The ﬁrst order conditions are
P = Cq (6.3)
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−CE = t (6.4)
These are the usual conditions under perfect competition; the ﬁrm equates
marginal costs of production to the price of the product and also equates
the marginal costs of emissions to the price of permits. The second order






is positive semideﬁnite (6.5)
This implies that the determinant is positive:
CEECqq − C2qE > 0 (6.6)
The eﬀect of a change in t on ﬁrm emissions can be found by diﬀerentiation







The sign of (6.7) follows from (6.1) and (6.6).
Credit Trading. With credit trading, the government sets a relative stan-
dard e¯ per unit of production, with e¯ = L/nq. Firms are allowed to sell




Π = Pq − C(q, E)− r(E − e¯q) (6.8)
where r is the price of credits. The ﬁrst order conditions are
P + re¯ = Cq (6.9)
−CE = r (6.10)
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Combining the two ﬁrst order conditions gives
P = Cq + e¯CE (6.11)
Comparing (6.11) with (6.3), it is clear that production will be higher with
relative targets than with permit trading at the same level of emissions. To
see this, recall that CE < 0 and e¯ > 0. Hence, the factor e¯CE is negative
and works as a subsidy on output (see Fischer (2001), Gielen et al. (2002)
and chapter 4). The result is that the product price is lower under rela-
tive standards than under permit trading. This can only be the case when
production is higher under relative standards than under permit trading.
Another result should also be noted. With relative standards, the mar-
ginal costs of abatement are higher than under permit trading. This result
follows from the fact that total emissions are equal under the two instru-
ments, while output is higher under relative standards. As given in (6.1),
the marginal abatement costs is increasing in output for the same level of
pollution. Hence, marginal costs of abatement will be higher with relative
standards than with permit trading.









− CE (qCqE + ECEE)
< 0 (6.12)
To determine the sign of (6.12) we need to impose the following condition:
qCqE + ECEE < 0 (6.13)
This condition ensures that under credit trading product price decreases
with emissions (see Dijkstra (1999), p. 83 for a discussion). The sign of
(6.12) then follows from (6.6) and (6.13).
International Emissions Trading As mentioned above, we assume that
neither ﬁrms nor governments have market power in the market for emission
quotas. This means that the international emission quota price is given for
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ﬁrms. Denote the international quota price by T . The only change in the
analysis for the two instruments then is that t and r are replaced by T .
6.3.2 Stage One: Choice of Emissions Trading Scheme
We now turn to the instrument choice of a country. The case analyzed is the
one where all relevant countries have committed to a certain emission goal.
The emission goal of the home country is given by Lh. The assumption that
all relevant countries have committed to an emission ceiling makes that the
emission levels are ﬁxed, and hence, that countries do not have an incentive
to manipulate the level of emissions.
Since now we turn to the level of the country and not the ﬁrm or industry,
we have to adapt the notation slightly. In the following, h denotes the
domestic country, while f denotes the remainder of the world. Then qi,
i = h, f denotes output of an individual ﬁrm and Qh =
∑
qh denotes total
domestic production. The home country is large enough to inﬂuence the
price of the product on the world market. This also implies that a change in
domestic production leads to a change in foreign production. Total foreign
production is denoted by Qf (P (y), If ), where If is the foreign policy choice.
It must hold that
−1 < ∂Qf/∂Qh < 0 ⇔ 0 < dy
dQh
< 1 (6.14)
where y is total world consumption, which is equal to total world output.
Equation (6.14) says that when domestic output increases, foreign producers
reduce their output, but not by as much as the original increase of output
by the home country. The overall result is that total output is increased
but by less than the initial increase in output. This condition is needed to
ensure stability of the Nash equilibrium.
In the following, all consumers and all ﬁrms in all countries are assumed
to be identical. We denote by µh the proportion of identical consumers in
the home country.
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No international emissions trading
We ﬁrst analyze the case where international emissions trading is not pos-
sible, neither between ﬁrms nor between governments. The welfare of the




P (y)dy − P (y)µhy + P (y)nhqh − nhC(qh, Eh) (6.15)
The ﬁrst two terms on the RHS of equation (6.15) give the domestic con-
sumers’ surplus. The last two terms give the producers’ surplus. Diﬀerenti-
ating equation (6.15) with respect to qh gives
∂W
∂qh
= nh (P − Cqh) + P ′
∂y
∂qh
(nhqh − µhy) = 0 (6.16)
The ﬁrst term gives the aggregate diﬀerence between product price and
marginal production costs, while the second term gives the trade balance in
the product times the eﬀect of a change in production on the product price.
As already mentioned in section 6.2, the optimal policy would normally
consist of an import tariﬀ or export tax combined with an emission tax
or national permit trading. However, here we assume that the government
cannot use an import tariﬀ or export tax. Therefore, it can only aﬀect
domestic welfare through the choice of environmental policy instrument.
In two special cases it is possible for the government to obtain maximum
welfare. A ﬁrst instance is when the implementation of permit trading leads
to autarky. This can be seen by setting the term for the domestic excess
supply, nhqh−µhy, equal to zero. The result is equivalent to equation (6.3),
which gives the proﬁt maximizing level of production in the case of permit
trading. The second case is when the use of credit trading leads to a trade
deﬁcit in the good equal to nhqh − µhy = −nhe¯hCEh/P ′ ∂y∂qh . This follows
from (6.11), which shows that P−Cqh = e¯hCEh < 0 with credit trading, and
inserting this in (6.16). The intuition here is that through the use of credit
trading the importing country succeeds in bringing down the world market
price, compared to the use of permit trading, by so much that it achieves
209
the optimal increase in consumer surplus minus producer surplus.
Suppose that permit trading does not lead to autarky in the product,
but to an export of the product. We now ﬁnd P = Cqh and nhqh > µhy.
Equation (6.16) now becomes negative and welfare would be higher with a
lower level of production. However, production should not be so low that
the country achieves autarky. With autarky, P > Cqh and nhqh = µhy and
welfare would be higher with a higher production level. This shows that
when permit trading leads to net exports of the product, optimal welfare
is reached with a lower production level, but the country should still be an
exporter. The reason for this result is that when the country is an exporter,
the producers’ surplus is more important for the welfare of the country than
the consumers’ surplus. By reducing output, the country can increase the
price of the product, increasing proﬁts for its own ﬁrms. In the case where
permit trading leads to a net export of the good, permit trading is not
optimal since output is too large. However, the only alternative is credit
trading, which leads to even higher output. Therefore, permit trading is the
best choice under the given circumstances.
We now turn to the case where the imposition of permit trading leads
to an import deﬁcit in the good. Then, nhqh < µhy and P = Cqh . Now
production is lower than optimal. Hence, the government would want to
increase production. This can be done by using credit trading. In that
case P < Cqh . However, credit trading may lead to higher than optimal
production. It may even overshoot optimal production by so much that the
government will still prefer the underproduction of permit trading.
To see when the use of credit trading is likely to cause too much produc-
tion, consider the impact of the strictness of regulation on the size of the
term P − Cqh . When the country uses credit trading, P − Cqh = e¯CE < 0.
When e¯ is very large, environmental policy is not binding, CE = 0 and
the output level under credit trading is equal to that under permit trad-
ing. Then, as environmental policy becomes binding, −CE rises and e¯ falls.
Initially, the term −e¯CE will increase, but at some level of environmental
policy it will reach a peak and will fall again with stricter environmental
policy. Finally, when e¯ = 0, output under the two forms for regulation is
210
identical again. Thus, credit trading reduces output price most relative to
the output price under permit trading with intermediate levels of environ-
mental policy. Consequently, the diﬀerence in output levels is largest in this
interval and credit trading is most likely to overshoot the mark by leading
to too much production compared to permit trading. Importing countries
are then more likely to implement credit trading when environmental policy
is either very weak or very strict.
We can summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 25 When international emissions trading is not possible, do-
mestic permit trading is the optimal instrument when it leads to a trade
surplus or a small trade deﬁcit in the good. When the use of domestic per-
mit trading leads to a large trade deﬁcit in the good, the government prefers
to use domestic credit trading.
International emissions trading.
We now turn to the situation where ﬁrms are allowed to trade emission
quotas internationally. As mentioned before, we assume that neither the
ﬁrms, nor the country have market power in the market for emission quotas.
With international emissions trading, welfare of a country consists of the









Diﬀerentiating with respect to qh yields
nh (P − Cq) + P ′ ∂y
∂qh
(nhqh − µhy) = 0 (6.17)
Hence, the optimization problem of the government is essentially the same
as when there is no international emissions trading. This implies that the
analysis for preference of instrument as given above also holds here when the
only choice is between international permit and international credit trading.
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Proposition 26 Suppose a country engages in international emissions trad-
ing. Then, international permit trading is the optimal instrument when it
leads to a trade surplus or a small trade deﬁcit in the good. When the use of
international permit trading leads to a large trade deﬁcit, the country prefers
to use international credit trading.
Proof The ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization with international
emissions trading, equation (6.17), is identical to (6.16), so that the propo-
sition follows from the analysis in section 6.3.2. 
There is however a diﬀerence between the situation with domestic trad-
ing and the one with international trading. With international trading, the
switch from permit to credit trading leads to a larger increase in output
than with domestic trading. This is because with credit trading, the coun-
try will buy more (or sell less) emission quotas in the international market
than with permit trading. We then ﬁnd that in the case where the (im-
porting) country wants to increase production but credit trading leads to
too much production, it would be less inclined to choose credit trading with
international emissions trading.
To analyze the shift to international emissions trading, we will make use
of the mean value theorem (see Sydsæter and Hammond (1995), p. 222 and
Brander and Spencer (1983)). In particular, let f(x) be a continuous and
diﬀerentiable function in the interval (a, b). Then there exists an interior
point α in (a, b) such that
∆f ≡ f(b)− f(a) = f ′(α)(b− a) (6.18)
where f ′(α) is the diﬀerential of f evaluated at α, with α = a+ β(b− a) for
some β ∈ (0, 1).
The shift from national emissions trading to international emissions trad-
ing can be viewed as a change in the price of emissions quotas. Using (6.18),




(T − τ) (6.19)
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where τ is the domestic emission quota price and dW/dτ is evaluated at













The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (6.20) gives the diﬀerence between the price
and the marginal production costs times the change in total output. The
second term gives the trade balance in the product times the change in the
product price due to a change in output. The third term gives revenue
from emissions trading. In the following, we will analyze whether a shift to
international emissions trading leads to higher or lower welfare for each of
the two instruments separately.








(T − τ) (6.21)
Note that because of the shift to international emissions trading, the balance
of trade in the good may change. This change is given by
d(nhqh − µhy)
dnhqh
= 1− µh dy
dnhqh
> 0
The inequality follows from (6.14) and µh < 1.
Basically, there are four possible cases depending on the balance of trade
in the product and on the world price of permits. An overview of these four
cases is given in Table 6.1. In the ﬁrst case, the country is an exporter of the
good and the world price of permits is higher than the domestic price. In




> 0. The higher
permit price will give a decrease in production and this will raise the price
of the product. The overall eﬀect is that equation (6.21) will be positive.
Hence, the shift to international emissions trading leads to a welfare gain. It
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has to be noted though that this only holds as long as the country remains a
net exporter of the good. If production is decreased so much because of the
rise in the permit price that the country becomes a net importer, welfare
may decrease.
In the second case, the country also exports the good, but the world price
of permits is lower than the domestic price. Being an exporter, there is an
incentive for the country to increase production and therefore the price of the
product decreases. Furthermore, because of the lower world permit price,
the country buys emission quotas. In this case, the ﬁrst term in square
brackets in (6.21) is positive, while the second term is negative. Welfare
decreases because the price of the product decreases, while an increase is
needed, but welfare increases because of the trade in emissions. If the gains
from emissions trading are low, the country may experience a loss in welfare
when it shifts to international emissions trading. However, the gain from
emissions trading can be so large as to outweigh the negative eﬀect from a
decrease in the product price. In all, the total eﬀect is ambiguous.
The third case consist of the country being an importer of the good
and a seller of permits. Also here, the sign of equation (6.21) becomes
ambiguous. The result of the higher world price of permits is a reduction
in production. However, an increase in production is wanted. On the other
hand, the country exports permits, which leads to higher welfare. This is
indicated by the positive sign of the second term. It now depends on the
size of the two eﬀects whether welfare is increased as a result of allowing
international emissions trading.
In the fourth case, the country is an importer of the good and T < t.
The country becomes an importer of emission quotas, which leads to an
increase in production and a decrease in the price of the good. Both terms in
(6.21) point in the direction of an increase in welfare. However, the increase
in production may be so large that the country becomes an exporter of the
good. In that case, welfare may decrease. However, since the country always
gains directly from emissions trading, the production eﬀect needs to be very
large indeed for welfare to decline.
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Table 6.1: Eﬀect of a shift from national to international permit trading
case T − t (nhqh − µhy) (Eh − E¯h) qh P Welfare
1 + + – ↓ ↑ Increase
2 – + + ↑ ↓ Ambiguous
3 + – – ↓ ↑ Ambiguous
4 – – + ↑ ↓ Increase
Credit Trading. With credit trading P − Cq = e¯CE < 0, and equation
(6.20) holds unchanged. Also with credit trading, there are four possible
cases, depending on the sign of (nhqh − µhy), and on whether T is larger or
smaller than r.
The only diﬀerence with the cases given under permit trading is that
the use of credit trading leads to a distortion given by P − Cq = e¯CE < 0.
When joining international emissions trading, output will be aﬀected and
so will the size of the distortion. When T < r, output will increase with
a shift to international emissions trading. In this case, the distortion will
increase, which has a negative impact on welfare. When T > r output and
the distortion will decrease, which has a positive impact on welfare. The
implication is that when T < r the shift to international emissions trading is
less likely to lead to a welfare increase, while the reverse is the case when T >
r. There is now only one case in which the shift to international emissions
trading leads to an unambiguous increase in welfare. This is in case 1 when
the country is an exporter of the good and T > r. However, it is unlikely
that the distortion is larger than the gain from emissions trading. Thus
we assume that in case 4 in Table 6.2, the shift to international emissions
trading will still lead to an increase in welfare.
We can summarize one of the results from this discussion as follows
Proposition 27 Given the instrument of environmental policy, a shift to
international emissions trading does not always lead to an increase in wel-
fare.
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Table 6.2: Eﬀect of a shift from national to international credit trading
case T − r (nhqh − µhy) (Eh − E¯h) qh P Welfare
1 + + – ↓ ↑ Increase
2 – + + ↑ ↓ Decrease (amb.)
3 + – – ↓ ↑ Increase (amb.)
4 – – + ↑ ↓ Increase
6.4 Instrument Choice with Two Countries
In this section we will derive the Nash equilibrium of instrument choice when
only two countries are involved in the production and consumption of the
good. The two countries are called the home (or domestic) country h and the
foreign country f . We uphold the assumption that there is an international
emissions market on which the two countries have no inﬂuence. Analyzing
the game for all possible equilibria under all possible circumstances leads to a
myriad of possible equilibria and makes the analysis intractable. Therefore,
we present some scenarios that should cover the most likely possibilities. In
all scenarios, it is assumed that the two countries are identical in all aspects,
except for two. First of all, we assume that the proportion of consumers
living in the home country µh is smaller than the proportion of consumers
living in the foreign country µf , with 0 ≤ µh, µf ≤ 1 and µh + µf = 1.
This ensures that with identical instrument choice and emission ceilings, the
home country exports the good, while the foreign country imports the good.
Furthermore, the emission ceilings in the two countries can be diﬀerent, so
that the domestic emission quota price in the two countries may diﬀer.
To make the analysis easier, we will use the following notation: ptd and
ctd stand for domestic permit and credit trading respectively, while pti and
cti stand for international permit and credit trading respectively.
6.4.1 Scenario 1: T < th(ptd, ptd) = tf (ptd, ptd)
In Scenario 1, we assume that the emission limit for the two countries is
identical. This implies that when the countries choose the same instrument,
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Foreign country
ptd pti ctd cti
ptd X X X X
Home pti X X X X
country ctd X X X
cti X X
Table 6.3: Nash Equilibria in Scenario 1
their marginal abatement costs are identical. Furthermore, we assume in
this case that T < th(ptd, ptd) = tf (ptd, ptd), so that both countries become
buyers of emission quotas when they shift to international emissions trading.
This shift will lead to an increase in production in both countries. In this
case, when both countries choose the same instrument, country h is always
the exporter, while country f is always the importer.
The possible Nash equilibria for Scenario 1 are shown in Table 6.3. Both
countries may use any of the possible instruments in a Nash equilibrium.
However, there are some combinations of instruments that do not constitute
a Nash equilibrium.
First, when country f chooses ptd, country h is always the exporter of
the good. It will then choose ptd or pti if the direct gain from international
emissions trading is larger than the negative eﬀect from the increase in
output.
When country f chooses international permit trading, it is no longer
certain that country h will be the exporter of the good. Since T < th = tf ,
a shift to international permit trading by the foreign country will increase
its output, which may lead to a trade surplus in the good. If country h still
is the exporter, it will still prefer ptd or pti. However, if it becomes the
importer, the home country may beneﬁt from a shift to credit trading. Note
ﬁrst that cti never can be an optimal choice, because this would make it an
exporter, and the country would beneﬁt from a shift to pti where output
is lower, but country h still is the exporter. Country h may however also
choose ctd. As long as this still leads to a large import of the good, this
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may be optimal. But at the same time, a shift to pti will make country h
the exporter.
When country f uses credit trading, output in the foreign country in-
creases and the country may become the exporter of the good. When this
is not the case, but country f remains the importer and country h the ex-
porter when h uses credit trading, the analysis given in Section 6.3.2 and
above shows that the home country will prefer ptd or pti. When country h
becomes an importer when it uses permit trading, it may now prefer some
form of credit trading when the import with permit trading is large. Note
that this switch to credit trading may make country h the exporter again.
However, even when it exports with credit trading, this instrument may be
the best choice. The reason is that a switch to permit trading will make
it the importer, but this is not optimal either, hence it is uncertain which
instrument gives highest welfare in this case.
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal instrument choice by country
f . When both countries use identical instruments, country f imports the
good. From Section 6.3.2 we know that the country then has an incentive
to increase production. However, switching to credit trading can lead to too
much production and even to a trade surplus in the good. Furthermore, a
shift to international emissions trading leads to a direct gain from trading,
and since T < tf also to an increase in output.
Using the analysis of section 6.3.2, we can however draw a rather clear
picture of when country f will use which instrument. Recall from section
6.3.2 that a country will use credit trading only when it is a large importer
of the good. If it is a small importer, or even an exporter, it will prefer
permit trading. This implies that if it is a large importer of the good, the
country will prefer either domestic or international credit trading. The shift
to international credit trading has both positive and negative eﬀects. It will
lead to a direct gain from emissions trading and an increase in production.
The latter eﬀect causes an increase in the distortion caused by credit trading
(given by e¯CE), but also an increase in output as is wanted. However,
since T < tf the shift to international credit trading may lead to a too
large increase in output. So international credit trading will only be welfare
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Foreign country
ptd pti ctd cti
ptd X X X
Home pti X X X X
country ctd X X
cti X X X
Table 6.4: Nash Equilibria in Scenario 2
improving if output does not increase by too much and when the production
distortion does not become too big.
6.4.2 Scenario 2: T > rh(ctd, ctd) = rf (ctd, ctd)
In the second scenario, we still assume that the emission limit for the two
countries is identical, so that when the countries choose the same instru-
ment, their marginal abatement costs are identical. However, in this case
we assume that T > rh(ctd, ctd) = rf (ctd, ctd), so that both countries be-
come sellers of emission quotas when they shift to international emissions
trading. This shift will lead to a decrease in production in both countries.
Again, when both countries choose the same instrument, country h is al-
ways the exporter, while country f is always the importer. The possible
Nash equilibria for this scenario are given in Table 6.4.
We start with the optimal instrument choice of country h. When country
f uses pti, country h is always the exporter. In this case, it is optimal for
h to choose pti, because this leads to the smallest possible output, but h
still exports. When country f chooses ptd, the outcome is less clear. If
country h chooses ptd or ctd it will be the exporter, in which case h will
prefer ptd. However, it may be better for country h to choose pti since this
gives a direct gain from trading and lower production. Even when this shift
makes h the importer it may increase its welfare when the gain from trading
is large enough. It is even conceivable that h will choose cti if it has a large
trade deﬁcit with pti. This choice would be optimal if the direct gain from
emissions trading is very large, but the shift to international trading leads
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Foreign country
ptd pti ctd cti
ptd X X X X
Home pti X X X X
country ctd X X X X
cti X X X
Table 6.5: Nash Equilibria in Scenario 3
to a large trade deﬁcit in the good. In that case pti would lead to too large
a deﬁcit and cti would be better.
When country f chooses some form of credit trading, we can use the
same arguments as used in Scenario 1 to show that country h may choose
permit or credit trading, dependent on the situation. Since country f can
be an importer with every instrument choice, the analysis under Scenario 1
still holds for this country.
6.4.3 Scenario 3: th(ptd, ctd) > T > rf (ptd, ctd)
In this scenario, we assume that the emission ceilings are set such that
th(ptd, ctd) > T > rf (ptd, ctd). This implies that no matter which domestic
instrument the two countries set, the home country is a buyer of emission
quotas, while the foreign country is a seller. For the home country, a shift
to international emissions trading results in an increase in production and,
ceteris paribus, an increase in exports. For the foreign country, such a shift
will lead to a decrease in production and an increase in imports.
The possible Nash equilibria for scenario 1 are given in Table 6.5. Basi-
cally, both countries can choose all instruments in equilibrium.
In this case, country h will always be the exporter when both countries
choose pti or cti or when h chooses cti and f chooses pti. In all other cases,
country h may become the importer of the good. To see this, suppose that
µh is not much lower than µf , while environmental policy is much more strict
in country h than in country f . Then production in country h may become
so low that it becomes an importer, even if it uses domestic credit trading or
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Foreign country
ptd pti ctd cti
ptd X X
Home pti X X X X
country ctd X X
cti X X
Table 6.6: Nash Equilibria in Scenario 4
international permit trading. In these cases, we can use the analysis given
under Scenario 1 for country f to show that country h will prefer permit
trading when this leads to a small import or export of the good, while it
will prefer credit trading when the use of permit trading (international or
domestic) leads to large imports. This may imply that the country becomes
an exporter of the good again. Although credit trading is not the optimal
choice for an exporter, it may still be a best choice since a shift to permit
trading will make it an importer, which is not optimal either. However,
the outcome (ctih, ptif ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, note
that when (ptih, ptif ) is used, country h is the exporter of the good. Then
it wants to lower its output, but cti would lead to an increase in output.
Thus, country h prefers pti to cti when country f uses pti.
Country f can be the importer under any choice of instrument. There-
fore, we can apply the analysis as given under Scenario 1 to show that it
can choose any of the available instruments in equilibrium.
6.4.4 Scenario 4: rh(ctd, ptd) < T < tf (ctd, ptd)
In the fourth scenario we assume that the emission limits are such that
rh(ctd, ptd) < T < tf (ctd, ptd) so that country h becomes a seller and coun-
try f a buyer of emission quotas when they shift to international emissions
trading. Such a shift will then cause a reduction in output in the home
country and an increase in production in the foreign country.
The possible Nash equilibria for this scenario are given in Table 6.6.
The home country is an exporter when both countries use some form of
221
permit trading, and when the home country uses some form of credit trading.
However, when country f uses some form of credit trading, it may become
the exporter when country h uses some form of permit trading. To see this,
note ﬁrst that credit trading leads to higher production than permit trading.
Hence, even though the permit price in country h is lower than the credit
price in country f , country f may still produce more than country h. Then,
if µh is close enough to µf , country fmay become the exporter. This holds
even stronger under international than under domestic credit trading, since
in the latter case, output in country f will be larger.
The analysis is then rather straightforward for country h. When country
f chooses international or domestic permit trading, country h will choose
pti. By choosing pti, country h has the lowest possible output, but is still
the exporter. However, when country f chooses some form of credit trading,
country h may choose any of the available instruments. If it exports when it
uses domestic or international permit trading, then this will be the optimal
choice for h. However, if it imports when it uses permit trading, a shift to
credit trading may be optimal, even if this shift makes it an exporter of the
good again.
Since country f may be the importer under all choices of instrument,
we can use the analysis given under Scenario 1 to show that all possible
instruments may be an equilibrium choice.
In the previous sections, we have shown that when a country exports
the good, it can increase its welfare by increasing the producer surplus,
even though that diminishes the consumer surplus somewhat. Since permit
trading leads to lower output than credit trading, one would expect that an
exporter always prefers to use permit trading. For the importer, a somewhat
similar reasoning holds. It would like to increase the consumer surplus, even
if that diminishes the producer surplus. However, instrument choice for an
importer is more complex than for an exporter. Credit trading leads to more
production than permit trading and therefore seems the logical choice for
an importer. But credit trading may lead to too much production, giving
lower welfare. Hence the importer will prefer permit trading when it is a
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small importer.
The scenarios given in the current section partially conﬁrm these ex-
pectations. In many cases, the exporter chooses domestic or international
permit trading, while for an importer the choice depends on the size of the
imports of the good. But it also possible that the exporter of the good
chooses credit trading in the Nash equilibrium. This can happen when the
country would become a large importer if it used another instrument. Nor-
mally in this case the other country also uses some form of credit trading.
Hence, a Nash equilibrium where both the importer and the exporter use
credit trading is possible.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, a model of strategic choice of emissions trading scheme was
presented with the assumption that the countries involved have committed
to a certain overall emission target. Countries can either choose to imple-
ment permit trading, which is based on a cap on emissions per ﬁrm, or credit
trading, which is based on relative standards per unit of output. The two
schemes have a diﬀerent impact on the regulated industry, with credit trad-
ing leading to a higher output level and higher marginal abatement costs.
Furthermore, the countries must choose whether or not to allow their ﬁrms
to participate in international emissions trading.
The main conclusions are that countries that can inﬂuence the world
market price of a good and aim at maximization of national welfare have an
incentive to choose their emissions trading scheme strategically and that in
some cases, countries are better oﬀ when they do not participate in inter-
national emissions trading. The outcome depends on whether the country
is an importer of the good, whether the world price for emission quotas is
lower or higher than the domestic price and on how large the gain from
international emissions trading is.
In general, when a country exports the good, the country’s welfare is
maximized by increasing the producer surplus even though that diminishes
the consumer surplus somewhat. Therefore, the government wants to reduce
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output to raise the world price of the good and thereby increase ﬁrm proﬁts.
The best choice of a national instrument to realize the emission target and
maximize welfare in this case is permit trading since it leads to a lower
production level than credit trading. When the country imports the good,
welfare can be maximized by increasing the country’s consumer surplus even
though some producer surplus has to be sacriﬁced. This can be achieved by
lowering the world price of the product. Since credit trading cause a lower
rise in product prices than permit trading, the country will often prefer a
national credit scheme. However, credit trading can also lead to a too large
increase in output, turning the importer into an exporter. In those cases,
the importer will prefer to uses permit trading.
It should be noted that strategic choice of permit trading is equal to
the non-strategic optimal choice of instrument. That is, a choice of permit
trading by all countries leads to the global optimal outcome. In contrast,
strategic choice of credit trading by an importer decreases world prices for
price taking export countries that apply permit trading. The fall in world
prices created by the importing country decreases the producer surplus and
welfare in exporting countries. The introduction of credit trading for strate-
gic reasons by an import country therefore is an example of a ’beggar my
neighbor’ policy.
Whether or not a country wants to allow international emissions trad-
ing for its ﬁrms depends mainly on two things: the world price of emission
quotas relative to the domestic price and the size of the gain from emis-
sions trading. When the country becomes a seller of emission quotas, either
permits or credits, it will have to increase its abatement eﬀorts, which will
raise the marginal cost of output and consequently the price of output. The
quantity produced and sold thereby decreases. This increases welfare when
the country is an exporter of the good. It has a double beneﬁt: from selling
emission quotas and from having higher proﬁts from exporting output.
One can conclude that an exporting country normally prefers domestic
permit trading for strategic reasons and is willing to participate in inter-
national emissions trading if it expects to be a seller on the international
market. However, if the exporting country is going to be a buyer on the
224
international permit market, the result will be a decrease in product price
which is not in its interest. The choice then depends on whether the gain
from international emissions trading exceeds the fall in monopolistic proﬁt
on the product market. If not, the exporting country prefers not to partici-
pate in international emissions trading as a buyer.
The same type of reasoning leads to the conclusion that an importing
country for strategic reasons will participate in international emissions trad-
ing when it expects to be a buyer of credits. When it becomes a seller, it will
participate only when the gain from international emissions trading exceeds
the decrease of consumer surplus due to higher product prices.
So in general it holds that an exporting country wants to use permit
trading, while an importing country will want to use credit trading when it
is a large importer and permit trading when it is a small importer. However,
it is possible that both countries simultaneously choose credit trading. This
happens when the exporting country would become a large importer if it
chose another instrument.
Chapter 7
Strategic Choice of Domestic
Environmental Policy
Instrument and International
Emissions Trading Scheme in
an Open Economy with
Imperfect Competition
7.1 Introduction
Many countries are currently implementing measures to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases. This may either be to comply with the Kyoto Protocol,
or for those outside the agreement to reduce emissions as domestic policy.
One of the central questions here is how to reduce emissions, i.e., which
instrument to choose. This choice is further complicated by the possibility of
international emissions trading. When all markets are perfectly competitive
and governments have no market power either, the choice of instrument is
rather easy. International emissions trading based on emission ceilings will
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maximize welfare for all countries involved. However, when countries or
ﬁrms have market power in some markets, the choice of instrument becomes
less straightforward.
The previous chapter analyzed the strategic choice of emissions trading
scheme for the case of perfect international competition when countries have
market power. Here it was found that the preference for emissions trading
scheme depends on whether a country is an importer or an exporter of the
good. An exporter wants to lower domestic production, while an importer
wants to expand production. Since permit trading leads to a lower produc-
tion level than credit trading, exporting countries generally prefer permit
trading, while importers prefer credit trading. Whether or not a country
wants to engage in international emissions trading depends on whether it
becomes a seller or buyer of emission quotas. A country that sells quotas will
contract domestic production, while a buyer will expand production. De-
pending on which is compatible with domestic preferences, a country may
prefer to allow private international emissions trading. However, it may also
be the case that the country prefers not to engage in international emissions
trading.
With imperfect competition in the goods market, other forces come into
play. Now the ﬁrms are engaged in a strategic game where market share is an
important factor in determining proﬁts. Furthermore, imperfect competition
leads to lower output than perfect competition. If the country also consumes
the good, it may therefore have an incentive to increase production. These
factors make that preferences for both national instrument and international
emissions trading scheme may be diﬀerent with imperfect from what they
are with perfect competition.
Other papers have discussed strategic choice of environmental policy
and instrument choice in an international setting (see next section for an
overview). However, only a few discuss relative standards and almost none
discuss credit trading. Furthermore, when these instruments are considered,
only the case of perfect competition is discussed.
In this chapter I will analyze the optimal choice of national instrument
and international emissions trading scheme by governments when there is
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imperfect and international competition in the market for the output. More
precisely, I present a partial equilibrium model of a market with two ﬁrms,
producing a homogeneous good, each located in a diﬀerent country. At
the national level, governments can choose between emission ceilings and
relative standards, while at the international level they can choose between
permit and credit trading and no international emissions trading.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, an overview
of related literature is given. The model is discussed in section 7.3. First
I will analyze the case without international emissions trading. Here the
government can choose between emission ceilings and relative standards.
It will be shown that the government always wants to increase production
above the level reached with emission ceilings. After that, in subsection
7.3.2, the choice of international emissions trading scheme is discussed. The
choice between schemes is more or less the same as that between national
instruments, but with a change in the (shadow) price of emissions. However,
it is shown that in certain cases, especially when the country becomes a
seller of emission quotas, countries may prefer not to engage in international
emissions trading. Conclusions are given in section 7.4.
7.2 Overview of the literature
The literature on strategic environmental policy in models with international
trade is mostly based on three seminal articles by Brander and Spencer
(Brander and Spencer 1983, Spencer and Brander 1983, and Brander and
Spencer 1985) on international duopoly with investment in R&D and gov-
ernment policy in the form of R&D subsidies or an export subsidy. In all
the models there are two ﬁrms, each in a diﬀerent country, who are com-
petitors, but do not necessarily produce a homogeneous good. In the basic
model (Brander and Spencer 1983) the ﬁrms can invest in R&D, which leads
to lower marginal production costs and thereby to higher output. As Bran-
der and Spencer show, ﬁrms will invest more in R&D when they can do so
before they decide on the level of output than when R&D and output are set
simultaneously. This is because R&D leads to an outward shift in the ﬁrm’s
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reaction curve, forcing the rival’s output down. Since both ﬁrms behave in
the same way, they are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma; proﬁts would be
higher if both ﬁrms would reduce their output, but both ﬁrms have an in-
dividual incentive to increase their own output. National governments have
an incentive to provide subsidies for R&D (Spencer and Brander 1983) and
export subsidies (Brander and Spencer 1985), pushing their ﬁrm’s output
even further up.
The ﬁrst use of these models in the ﬁeld of international environmental
problems was to analyze the strategic choice of level of environmental policy.
Some examples are Barrett (1994), Ulph (1994, 1996a,b, 1999, 2000), Con-
rad (1994, 1996ab) and Rauscher (1997). As Brander and Spencer already
noted, strategic considerations lead a government to stimulate its ﬁrm’s
production, which in this case happens through a more lenient environmen-
tal policy. However, as Barrett (1994), Ulph (1996c), Conrad (1996a) and
Rauscher (1997) have pointed out, the behavior of the government is depen-
dent on market conduct. The above mentioned conclusion only holds when
ﬁrms compete with quantities (Cournot competition). When ﬁrms engage
in price, or Bertrand, competition governments will want to impose overly
strict environmental policies. This was already pointed out by Eaton and
Grossman (1986) in the context of Brander and Spencer’s original model.
A second use of the models by Brander and Spencer is in the mod-
elling of instrument choice when there is international trade. Ulph (1992)
uses a duopoly model where the two ﬁrms are located in diﬀerent countries.
The governments want to limit emissions from their ﬁrm to a certain level
and can choose between taxes and emission ceilings as their policy instru-
ment. Production costs depend on two inputs: one denoted as energy, which
is an input that causes pollution, the other is a non-polluting production
factor which is referred to as capital. Ulph then considers three cases: a
single-stage Cournot model, a two-stage Stackelberg model and a two-stage
Cournot model. In the one-stage Cournot model, the ﬁrms, knowing which
instrument the governments have chosen, set their capital level and out-
put simultaneously. The conclusion from this model is that in a one-shot
Cournot model, countries are indiﬀerent between ceilings and taxes. The
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reason for this is that in a one-shot game there is no strategic interaction
and all instruments discussed give the same output. The choice of instru-
ment is then a purely domestic decision.
In the two other cases, ﬁrms can invest strategically in capital, thereby
changing their production capacity. The driving force behind the results
that follow is that ﬁrms will invest more in capital when they are regulated
through taxes than when they are facing emission ceilings. The reason for
this is that the reaction function of a ﬁrm is steeper when a tax is imposed
than when a ceiling is imposed on the ﬁrm. This implies that a ﬁrm will
react with a larger output change to a given change in foreign output under
taxes than under ceilings. The second case discussed by Ulph (1992) is a
Stackelberg model where one country acts as a leader and the other as a
follower. The outcome is that the Stackelberg follower will prefer ceilings,
while the leader is indiﬀerent between taxes and ceilings. This outcome
ensures the lowest total output and thereby the highest industry proﬁts.
The third case given by Ulph is the two-stage Cournot model. In this
model, ﬁrms ﬁrst simultaneously choose their level of capital, and thereafter
simultaneously choose their level of output and energy. In this case, the use
of ceilings by both countries is the unique Nash equilibrium in the choice of
instruments as long as the share of the two countries’ consumption in world
consumption is small enough. The reason for this is that under taxes the
ﬁrms overinvest in capital and thereby increase production. This increases
revenues, but also costs. Ulph argues, but does not formally show, that since
the ﬁrms overexpand output and do not minimize costs at the chosen output
level, total ﬁrm proﬁts will decrease, even if the other ﬁrm uses ceilings. Each
country then has an incentive to shift to ceilings, which lowers the incentive
to overinvest. The model used by Ulph does not contain any speciﬁcation
for consumers’ surplus, but in general the conclusions will hold as long as
the consumption of the good in the two countries only represents a small
share of world consumption.
In a more recent paper, Ulph (1996b) generalizes the Cournot model
described above. Instead of using only two inputs, energy and capital, a
more general speciﬁcation of the cost function is given. Furthermore, Ulph
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(1996b) allows for both production and consumption in the two countries.
The more general model of technology makes that the use of emission ceilings
is no longer always the dominant strategy.
Also in Ulph (1996a) the use of ceilings induces less strategic behavior
by the ﬁrms than does the use of taxes. However, it is now not always
optimal to use ceilings, because there are also consumers living in the two
producer countries. With a relatively large producer surplus government
prefers ceilings, while with a relative large consumer surplus it prefers taxes.
Feenstra et al. (1996) and Feenstra (1998, Ch.2) extend the model of
Ulph (1992) to a fully dynamic analysis. In doing so they use a diﬀerential
game approach where ﬁrms use open-loop investment strategies and feedback
strategies for the choice of the polluting input. Their model conﬁrms the
conclusions of Ulph (1992) that investment is lower when both countries use
ceilings. Furthermore, the situation in which both countries choose ceilings
is the unique Nash equilibrium with Feenstra et al. (1996) as well.
A further development is given in Feenstra (1998, Ch.3) where both
investments and level of the polluting input are determined by feedback
strategies. Now it is not always true that investment is larger under taxes
than under ceilings. In the feedback model the substitutability of production
factors is important: if the substitution eﬀects are large enough, investment
is larger under ceilings than under taxes, and hence governments will prefer
taxes.
Both Feenstra et al. (1996) and Feenstra (1998, Ch. 2,3) assume that the
product is not consumed in the countries where it is produced. As with Ulph
(1992), the results of both models will hold as long as consumption in the
two countries only represents a small part of world consumption. However,
if consumption is large, governments might prefer taxes to ceilings.
The model used in the remainder of this chapter is a two-stage game
where governments ﬁrst set the instrument, whereafter ﬁrms decide on their
output level. Thus there is no strategic investment in the model. This
resembles the ﬁrst case in Ulph (1992). However, the instruments that I
analyze are diﬀerent from those in Ulph. We focus on relative standards
(or performance standards) complemented with credit trading and on trad-
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able permits. Although the impact of tradable permits resemble those of
well calibrated taxes, relative standards diﬀer from the ﬁrm emission ceil-
ings analyzed by Ulph. Next to that, we discuss the impact of going from
domestically applied instruments to participation in an international emis-
sions trading scheme. We also discuss the incentives for participating in an
international emissions trading scheme or sticking to national instruments.
7.3 The Model
There are two producers of a homogeneous good each located in a diﬀerent
country. These producers are the sole producers of the good in the world.
Revenues for each producer are represented by Ri(qi, qj), where qi is the
output of ﬁrm i. The revenue function has the following properties:
Rii > 0, R
i




ij < 0 (7.1)
where subscripts denote derivatives. Costs for each producer are represented
by Ci(qi, Ei), where Ei is emissions of a pollutant. It is assumed that:
Ciq > 0, C
i
E < 0, C
i
qq > 0, C
i
EE > 0, C
i
qE < 0 (7.2)
The governments of both countries have committed themselves to a cer-
tain emission level for their ﬁrm that is lower than the business-as-usual
level. This assumption makes it possible to focus on the choice of policy
instrument without interference from a possible strategic choice of emission
level. We limit the choice of instruments at the national level to relative
standards and emission ceilings because these two instruments can form the
basis for emissions trading. However, it can easily be shown that within
this model taxes and tradable permits lead to the same production level as
emission ceilings and the analysis for the latter is basically the same as for
these other instruments.
In the model, it is assumed that the ﬁrms and countries have no market
power in the emissions quota market. The rationale for this is that the
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international emission quota market is likely to be large and ﬁrms from
several industries will be engaged in emissions trading. Therefore, it is less
likely for a ﬁrm to have market power in the emission quota market than in
the product market.
There are three stages in the game. In the ﬁrst stage, governments
choose between relative standards, emission ceilings, permit trading and
credit trading. In the second stage, governments set their instruments such
that the overall emission goal E¯i is realized. With emission ceilings and
permit trading, the government simply distributes E¯i to the ﬁrm. In case
government i has chosen relative standards or credit trading, it sets the
standard e¯i such that its ﬁrm emits E¯i (before buying or selling permits
internationally) in the equilibrium of stage 3. In the third stage, ﬁrms
choose their output and emission levels.
In the following, we will ﬁrst analyze instrument choice by the govern-
ment when international emissions trading is not allowed. After that, we
discuss the case where international emissions trading is possible. In both
cases, backward induction requires that we ﬁrst analyze ﬁrm behavior and
then government behavior.
7.3.1 No International Emissions Trading
We begin by analyzing the case where the two countries do not allow their
ﬁrms to trade emissions internationally. This means that only domestic
instruments are relevant for the model. Since the ultimate goal of this paper
is to analyze the preference for international emissions trading scheme, only
emission ceilings and relative standards are discussed, since these can form
the basis for emissions trading. In the following, we will ﬁrst analyze the
second stage in which the ﬁrms set their production level. After that, the
choice of instrument by the government is discussed.
Stage Three: Firm Behavior
The government can choose between two instruments of environmental pol-
icy: emission ceilings and relative standards. With emission ceilings, a cap
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equal to E¯i is placed on the emissions of the ﬁrm. Under relative standards,
a standard equal to e¯i is placed on emissions per unit of output. Total al-
lowed emissions with this instrument are then given by e¯iqi, i.e., the relative
standard times output.
In the following, each ﬁrm takes the output of the other ﬁrm as given
when deciding on its own output level. That is, the ﬁrms are engaged in
Cournot competition.




Πi = Ri(qi, qj)− Ci(qi, Ei)
s.t. Ei ≤ E¯i
(7.3)





Here, λi is the shadow price of emissions. The ﬁrst order conditions are the
usual ones, showing that the ﬁrms sets marginal revenue equal to marginal
production costs and equates marginal abatement costs with the shadow
price of emissions.
Relative Standards. Under a relative standard, the government sets an emis-
sion ceiling e¯i per unit of production. The ﬁrm is then allowed to emit e¯iqi
in total. Since the government is perfectly informed, it sets the relative
standard equal to E¯iqi . The optimization problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
qi,Ei
Πi = Ri(qi, qj)− Ci(qi, Ei)
s.t. Ei ≤ e¯iqi
(7.5)
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Comparing (7.4) with (7.6), it is clear that (7.6) contains the additional
term CiEi e¯i. This term is negative, implying that under relative standards
P < Ciq and that production is larger under relative standards than under
emission ceilings (see also Helfand 1991, Ebert 1998 and Dijkstra 1999).
The additional term can be seen as an output subsidy (see Gielen et al.
(2002) and Fischer 2001)). With relative standards, a ﬁrm is rewarded for
additional output by additional allowed total emissions. Marginal abatement
costs however are larger with relative standards than with emission ceilings
when total emissions are the same under the two schemes. To see this, note
that output is larger with relative standards, while emissions are the same
and CiEq < 0.
Stages One and Two: Government Choice of Instrument
As mentioned above, it is assumed that the governments involved have
signed an international agreement committing them to keep emissions from
their ﬁrm below a certain threshold. Hence, total and country emissions are
ﬁxed. When there is both consumption and production of the good in the
domestic country, the welfare function becomes
W h(qh, qf ) = µh
∫ y
0
P (Q)dQ− P (y)µhy + Rh(qh, qf )− C(qh, Eh)
where h stands for home country, f for the foreign country, y = qh + qf is
total production and µh is the proportion of identical consumers living in
country h. The ﬁrst two terms in the welfare equation give the consumers’
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surplus, while the last two terms give the producer’s surplus.

















The ﬁrst term gives the diﬀerence between marginal revenue and costs of
production. Under emission ceilings, this term is zero (from (7.4)), while
under relative standards this term is negative (from (7.6)). The second term
gives the increase in revenue as a result of the decrease in foreign output.
This term is positive. The last term gives the total eﬀect of an increase in
domestic production on the consumers’ surplus. The eﬀect is positive, and
hence indicates that production should be higher when there is domestic
consumption.
The term dqf/dqh gives the slope of the reaction function of the foreign
country. It gives the change in foreign output as a result of a change in
domestic output. The sign and size of this term can be derived from the
ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization and diﬀers between instruments.
For emission ceilings, the slope of the reaction function is given by im-






, with − 1 < dqf
dqh
< 0 (7.8)
That −1 < dqfdqh < 0 follows from (7.1) and (7.2). This ensures that the Nash
equilibrium will be stable.
With relative standards, the government will alter the standard when
the domestic ﬁrm changes its output level. This has an eﬀect on the slope of
the reaction function. This can now be found by by implicit diﬀerentiation
















That −1 < dqf/dqh < 0 follows from (7.43). In Appendix B, we show that
at the point of intersection:
|dqf/dqh|rs > |dqf/dqh|ec (7.10)
where the superscripts rs and ec stand for relative standards and emission
ceilings respectively. In the following, we assume that (7.10) holds every-
where. Equation (7.10) says that a foreign ﬁrm regulated through relative
standards is more responsive to a change in output by the home ﬁrm than
a ﬁrm regulated through emission ceilings. Suppose the domestic ﬁrm de-
creases production, so that the foreign ﬁrm wants to increase production.
With relative standards, the ﬁrm receives an implicit subsidy on output
leading to a larger response to a change in output by the other ﬁrm.
A comparison of (7.7) with (7.4) shows that the government will want to
increase production above the level attained with emission ceilings. Deﬁne










with I = ec, rs for emission ceilings and relative standards respectively. For
the choice of instrument we then ﬁnd
Proposition 28 Country i will prefer relative standards to emission ceil-
ings when −CiE e¯i is close enough to V rsi . Otherwise, the country will prefer
emission ceilings.
Proof From (7.6) and (7.7), it is clear than when −CiE e¯i = V rsi the op-
timum is achieved with relative standards. The country will also prefer
relative standards to emission ceilings for values of −CiE e¯i close enough to
V rsi since V
ec
i > 0 and hence, emission ceilings do not attain the optimum.

Note that the government wants to increase home production, no matter
whether the foreign country uses emission ceilings or relative standards.
However, since dqf/dqh is larger in absolute terms under relative standards
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than under emission ceilings, the home country will want to increase output
more when the foreign country uses relative standards. In that case, the
home country is more likely to use relative standards as well.
One of the problems with relative standards is that they can increase
production by too much. This is more likely to be the case with intermediate
environmental policy, i.e., with environmental policy that is neither very lax
nor very stringent. If environmental policy is so lax that it is not binding,
then CE = 0. If environmental policy is so strict that it prohibits pollution,
e¯ = 0. In both cases, CE e¯ = 0 and there is no diﬀerence between absolute
and relative standards. However, as policy becomes more strict from a non-
binding level onward, −CE e¯ increases to a maximum, to return to zero again
as e¯ becomes zero. Hence, for intermediate levels of environmental policy,
it may happen that relative standards stimulate output by so much that
welfare with relative standards is lower than with emission ceilings. The
government is then more likely to prefer relative standards when policy is
either rather lax (but binding) or rather stringent.
We can be a bit more speciﬁc on how much more production the govern-









− Chq = 0 (7.12)
This is identical to the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization for a
Stackelberg leader. A comparison with (7.7) then shows that when the
country consumes the good, the optimum production level is higher than the
Stackelberg leader production level. Furthermore, we can rewrite revenue
for a ﬁrm as Ri(qh, qf ) = P (qh, qf )qi. Using this, (7.7) can be written as
dW h
dqh






(qh − µhy) = 0 (7.13)
The ﬁrst order condition for welfare optimization is for the ﬁrst term to
equal zero if the ﬁrm and the country have no inﬂuence on the product
price (P ′(y) = 0) or in the case of autarky (qh = µhy). In those cases, the
country will prefer the output level reached by perfect competition in the
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market, combined with emission ceilings. The second term gives the eﬀect
of a change in production on revenue times the trade balance in the product.
Hence, to determine the optimal production level, it is important to know
whether the country imports or exports the product.
When the country imports the product, qh < µhy, and the last term in
(7.13) becomes positive. To optimize welfare, the country should increase
production beyond the perfectly competitive level. When the country ex-
ports the product, qh > µhy, and the country should have a lower production
level than the one realized with perfect competition. Hence, when the coun-
try consumes the good, the optimum production level is higher than the
Stackelberg leader production level. Depending on whether the country im-
ports or exports the good, optimum production is higher or lower than the
full competitive output level respectively.
If countries are identical, we can establish the choice of instrument in
equilibrium:
Proposition 29 If the two countries are identical, there are two Nash equi-
libria given by (rsh, rsf ) and (ech, ecf ). That is, either both countries use
relative standards, or both use emission ceilings.
Proof It is immediately clear from (7.7) that (rsh, rsf ) and (ech, ecf ) are
Nash equilibria for identical countries. First, if −CiE e¯i = V rsi with relative
standards for both countries, then both countries maximize their individual
welfare, so that (rsh, rsf ) constitutes a possible Nash equilibrium. Further-
more, as long as −CiE e¯i is close enough to V rsi relative standards are the
optimal choice for each country. Then suppose that the foreign country
chooses emission ceilings. From (7.8), (7.9), using (7.43) it then follows that
dqf/dqh decreases. There are now two possibilities. First, it may now be
that −ChE e¯ is too large, so that the home country switches to emission ceil-
ings. Note that now dqh/dqf also decreases, so that a shift back to relative
standards cannot be optimal for the foreign country. Hence, (ech, ecf ) is a
possible Nash equilibrium. The second possibility is that even though the
foreign country switches to emission ceilings, the optimal choice for the home
country is still relative standards. But, since the countries are identical, this
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must mean that relative standards are now optimal for the foreign country
too. Hence (rsh, rsf ) and (ech, ecf ) are the only possible Nash equilibria
when the countries are identical. 
7.3.2 International Emissions Trading
We now turn to the case where the domestic ﬁrm is allowed to trade emis-
sions on the international emission quota market. Again, we will ﬁrst analyze
ﬁrm behavior and thereafter government choice of instrument. We will also
determine whether allowing international emissions trading leads to higher
or lower welfare for the country.
Stage Three: Firm Behavior
In this part, the behavior of the ﬁrms is analyzed when international emis-
sions trading is allowed. There are basically two forms of emissions trading,
each based on one of the instruments discussed above. Emissions trading
based on emissions ceilings will be denoted as permit trading, while emis-
sions trading based on relative standards will be denoted as credit trading.
In the following, it is assumed that there is an international emissions trad-
ing market on which neither the ﬁrms, nor their governments have market
power. This implies that ﬁrms and governments take the emission quota
price as given.
Permit Trading. Taking the initial distribution of permits, E¯i and the price
of permits, T as given, the ﬁrm’s objective becomes:
max
qi,Ei
Πi = Ri(qi, qj)− Ci(qi, Ei)− T (Ei − E¯i) (7.14)




−CiE = T (7.16)
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The ﬁrst order conditions are basically the same as those for an emission
ceiling, with T replacing λi. However, diﬀerent from emission ceilings, ﬁrm
emissions can now change with a change in output.
Credit Trading. With credit trading, ﬁrms are regulated through relative
standards, and are then allowed to sell credits if they can stay below the
standard. The objective function of the ﬁrm regulated in this way becomes
max
qi,Ei
Πi = Ri(qi, qj)− Ci(qi, Ei)− T (Ei − e¯iqi)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
Rii + T e¯i = C
i
q (7.17)
−CiE = T (7.18)






This is identical to (7.6), the same condition for relative standards.
Stages One and Two: Government Policy
With international emissions trading, the government has two choices to
make. First of all, which domestic instrument to choose and secondly,
whether or not to allow international emissions trading. In this section,
these issues are dealt with. Furthermore, we show how a shift to interna-
tional emissions trading aﬀects ﬁrm proﬁts.
In the analysis below, we need to know the sign and relative size of
the slope of the reaction function, given by dqi/dqj , of the country under
diﬀerent instruments. When the country uses permit trading, the slope of













The fact that −1 < dqidqj < 0 follows from (7.1), (7.2) and (7.32) given in
Appendix A.
With credit trading, the government will adjust the relative standard
when the ﬁrm changes its output level. The reason is that the govern-
ment wants to commit to the domestic emission target given. The relative
standard is therefore given by E¯i/qi. Suppose that the ﬁrm buys emission
quotas internationally and that the government does not adjust the stan-
dard. Because the ﬁrm now can emit more, it will also produce more. If
the government did not adjust the relative standard, the ﬁrm would be al-
lowed increase emissions by even more than the amount it had bought on
the international market. So in deriving the slope of the reaction function
under credit trading, we have to take into account that the government will
adjust the relative standard when the ﬁrm changes output. The slope of
the reaction function under credit trading can then be derived from total








, −1 < dqi
dqj
< 0 (7.21)
The fact that −1 < dqidqj < 0 follows from (7.1), (7.2) and (7.37) given in
Appendix A. In Appendix B we show that at the point of intersection, the
slope of the reaction function under credit trading is less steep than under








We will assume that this inequality holds throughout. This result is the
reverse of what we found under domestic instruments. The reason for this
result is as follows. When a ﬁrm increases its output, it will buy emission
quotas on the international market at the ﬁxed price T . However, under
credit trading, the government will react to an increase in production by
tightening the relative standard, thereby putting an implicit tax on the
purchase of credits. This implies that the cost of buying emission quotas in
the market is higher under credit trading than under permit trading.
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Comparing the slopes of the reaction functions of all instruments (see

















We will assume that these inequalities hold throughout. Equation (7.23)
shows that with international permit trading, a country will adjust its output
more as a reaction to an output change by the foreign ﬁrm than under
absolute standards. The reason for this is that the ﬁrm can now trade
permits on the international emissions market. This implies that when it
wants to increase production, it can keep marginal production costs lower
by buying permits. On the other hand, when it wants to decrease output,
it can sell permit on the market, giving an additional incentive to decrease
production. For the same reason, it holds that |dqi/dqj |ct > |dqi/dqj |rs.
The next issue to be addressed is how the shift to international emissions
trading aﬀects ﬁrm proﬁts. To do so, we will make use of the mean value
theorem (see Sydsæter and Hammond 1995, p. 222 and Brander and Spencer
1983). In particular, let f(x) be continuous and diﬀerentiable in the interval
(a, b). Then there exists an interior point α in (a, b) such that
∆f ≡ f(b)− f(a) = f ′(α)(b− a)
where f ′(α) is the diﬀerential of f evaluated at α with α = a+ β(b− a) for
some β ∈ (0, 1).
Using the mean value theorem the eﬀect of the shift to international




























where λnti gives the shadow price of emissions with domestic regulation and
λi lies somewhere between λnti and T . With either instrument, the ﬁrm sets




























In both cases, the ﬁrst term within square brackets gives the change in rev-
enue because of the change in foreign production. This change is caused by
the change in domestic production from the shift to international emissions
trading. This eﬀect only reﬂects the shift to international emissions trading
by the home country, while the foreign country is assumed not to change its
policy, with foreign policy either being domestic regulation or international
emissions trading. It is shown in Appendix C that dqi/dλi is negative for all
cases, so that the ﬁrst term in both (7.25) and (7.26) has a negative sign.
The second term reﬂects the proceeds from emissions trading. This term is
positive when the ﬁrm is a buyer of emission quotas and negative when it is
a seller of quotas.
We can then see how the shift to emissions trading aﬀects proﬁts of the
ﬁrms.
Proposition 30 Firm proﬁts will always increase with a shift to interna-
tional emissions trading when the ﬁrm becomes a buyer of emission quotas.
When the ﬁrm becomes a seller of quotas, proﬁts will increase from the shift













is negative. Furthermore, (Ei − E¯i)
is positive (negative) when the ﬁrm is a buyer (seller) of emissions quotas,
which will be the case when T < λnti (T > λ
nt
i ). It then follows that
(7.25) and (7.26) are always positive when T < λnti and are only positive for
T > λnti when −Rij ∂qj∂qi
∂qi
∂λi
< (E¯i − Ei). 
Proposition 30 implies that a ﬁrm’s proﬁts may decrease as a result of
a shift to international emissions trading. This will happen when the ﬁrm
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becomes a seller of emission quotas and the negative eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s
revenue in the goods market is larger than the positive revenue from emis-
sions trading. In this case, the ﬁrm may resist the transition to international
emissions trading.
W now turn to the optimal instrument choice by the government. Wel-
fare of the home country, with domestic consumption and international emis-
sions trading, is given by
W h = µh
∫ y
0





Diﬀerentiating with respect to qh yields
dW h
dqh










Equation (7.28) is identical to the ﬁrst order condition for welfare max-
imization without international emissions trading. The implication is that
the optimization problem of the government is basically the same in the two
cases. However, there is a diﬀerence in that international emissions trading
changes the price of emissions and thereby the actual emission level of the
country. This in turn will aﬀect welfare, and the eﬀect may be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent instruments. The ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization
does show that permit trading always leads to too little output. Credit trad-
ing may then improve welfare as it leads to higher output. Output under
credit trading may however be too large so that permit trading would be
preferable.
Proposition 31 Suppose a country engages in international emissions trad-
ing. Then the country will prefer credit trading to permit trading when T e¯i
is close enough to V cti . Otherwise, the country will prefer permit trading.
Proof The proposition is similar to Proposition 28 and so is the proof,
which is therefore omitted. 
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With international emissions trading we can show the following for the
possible Nash equilibria
Proposition 32 Given that the two countries are identical, that both engage
in international emissions trading and that µi is small, the possible Nash
equilibria in instrument choice are given by (pth, ptf ), (cth, ctf ), (pth, ctf ),
and (cth, ptf ).
Proof Suppose that both countries have adopted permit trading and that
the initial limit on emissions is such that both countries are indiﬀerent be-
tween permit and credit trading, given that the other country chooses per-
mit trading. Then suppose that f chooses credit trading. By assumption,
this does not aﬀect f ’s welfare. However, for country h, (7.28) changes.





∣∣∣pt > ∣∣∣ dqidqj
∣∣∣ct from (7.22).
This implies that h now wants to increase output by less than it did when
country f used permit trading. However, given the choice of international
emissions trading, the instrument that gives least production is permit trad-
ing, and so h will stick to permit trading. This shows that (pth, ctf ) is a
Nash equilibrium. Since countries are identical, a similar reasoning shows
that (cth, ptf ) is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, it is clear that (pth, ptf )
is a Nash equilibrium for T e¯i much smaller, or much larger than V cti and
that (cth, ctf ) is an Nash equilibria for T e¯i close enough to V cti . 
We see that, whereas with domestic instruments identical countries al-
ways choose identical instruments, with international emissions trading,
identical countries may choose diﬀerent instruments. The reason for this
is as follows. With domestic instruments, a shift by the foreign country
from emission ceilings to relative standards increases the incentive for the
home country to increase its production. When it uses relative standards,
the foreign country will reduce its production more as a response to a do-
mestic increase in output than it would do with emission ceilings. Hence,
it pays more for the domestic country to shift from emission ceilings to rel-
ative standards. However under international emissions trading, a shift by
the foreign country to credit trading makes its ﬁrm’s reaction function more
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elastic (see equation (7.23)). This reduces the domestic country’s incentive
to increase its production. Hence, it will be reinforced in its choice of permit
trading. This result will only hold when µh is small. If µh is large, the con-
sumers’ surplus is more important than the producers’ surplus, and hence
the country will prefer higher total output. In that case, a shift to credit
trading by the foreign country will increase the incentive for the domestic
country to make a similar shift since now, its own increase in output will
not be outdone by a large decrease in output in the foreign country.
Using the mean value theorem the eﬀect of a change in welfare as a result








In (7.29), dW h/dλh is evaluated at a value of λ between λnth and T, where
W h = µh
∫ y
0


















+ (E¯h − Eh)









The ﬁrst term in square brackets gives the diﬀerence between marginal rev-
enue and marginal cost. The sign of this term depends on whether the




term becomes positive, while with permit trading the term vanishes as can
be seen from (7.15). The second term in square brackets reﬂects the reac-
tion by the foreign country to a domestic change in production. This term is
negative. The third term in the square brackets reﬂects the volume of trade
and is positive when the country exports emission quotas and negative when
it imports them. Finally, the fourth term within square brackets gives the
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overall change in price times the amount consumed in the home country and
is thereby an indicator of consumer welfare. This term is positive.
In the following we will analyze for both instruments separately whether
a shift to international emissions trading leads to an increase in welfare
or not. With both instruments, there are two cases to consider since the
country can become an importer or an exporter of emission quotas.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the ﬁrst term in (7.30) vanishes
since Rhqh = C
h
qh
from (7.15) When T > λech , the country becomes a seller
of permits and (E¯h − Eh) becomes positive. This results in lower domestic
production, higher foreign production, and lower total production. It follows
that ﬁrm proﬁts from production and the consumers’ surplus decrease. We
can then see from (7.30) that the shift to international emissions trading will
only increase welfare when the direct gain from emissions trading is larger
than the combined loss in ﬁrm proﬁts and consumers’ surplus.
When T < λech the country becomes a buyer of emission quotas and
(E¯h − Eh) becomes negative. It is then immediately clear from (7.30) that
welfare increases in this case. Now, the lower world price of permits leads
to an increase in domestic and world production, leading to an increase
in both domestic ﬁrm proﬁts and consumers surplus. This implies that
when T < λech , the country will never use emission ceilings and prefers
international emissions trading.
Credit Trading. The only diﬀerence with permit trading is that with credit
trading, the ﬁrst term in (7.30) becomes positive from (7.19), showing that
there is a production distortion compared to the case with permit trading.
We start the analysis with the case where, T > λrsh and the country becomes
an exporter of credits so that (E¯h − Eh) becomes positive. Again we ﬁnd
that ﬁrm proﬁts from production and the consumers’ surplus decrease. The
arguments are the same as under permit trading, but now the use of credit
trading leads to a distortion since marginal revenue is not equal to marginal
costs. The higher world price of credits leads to a decrease in production and
thereby to a decrease in this distortion. Therefore in this case, this eﬀect
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leads to a welfare increase. There are now two eﬀects, the direct gain from
emissions trading and the reduction in the production distortion, pointing
to a welfare increase. However, there are also two factors, the decrease in
proﬁts from production and the decrease in consumers’ surplus, that point
to a welfare decrease. Hence, the total eﬀect is ambiguous.
When T < λrsh , the country becomes an importer of emission quotas and
(E¯h−Eh) becomes negative. This results in an increase in domestic produc-
tion and a decrease in foreign production, however, total world production
will increase and the world price of the product will decrease. Three factors
now point to an increase in welfare, while one points to a decrease. The de-
crease in welfare comes from a larger distortion of production compared to
the optimal as shown by the ﬁrst term in (7.30). However, foreign produc-
tion is decreased, the country has lower costs from emissions and consumers
gain from lower world prices. Hence, as long as the eﬀect of the production
distortion is not too large, allowing international emissions trading leads to
an increase in welfare in this case.
We can summarize one of the results in the following proposition
Proposition 33 Given the instrument of environmental policy, a shift to
international emissions trading does not always lead to an increase in wel-
fare.
In the following, we will analyze which combinations of instruments consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium. It is assumed that there are two identical countries
that produce the good and that the producing countries are small consumers
of the good (µ is small). We will ﬁrst analyze the case where T < λnti and
thereafter the case where T > λnti .
Case 1: T < λnti . The analysis above shows that in this case, the country
will never choose emission ceilings as its instruments, because a shift to
permit trading will always increase welfare. Therefore the instruments the
countries will choose between are relative standards and permit and credit
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i . However, it is not clear
whether qpti is larger or smaller than q
rs
i .




i . From (7.28) we know
that the country prefers a higher output than under permit trading. Thus
if qpti > q
rs
i , the countries will never use relative standards and (pth, ptf ),
(cth, ctf ), (pth, ctf ), and (cth, ptf ) are the only possible Nash equilibria.




i . In this case, the
combinations (pth, ptf ), (cth, ctf ), and (rsh, rsf ) are Nash equilibria when
these instruments are the optimal choice for both countries. The question is
whether it is possible that the countries choose diﬀerent instruments. Sup-
pose the limit on emissions and the international emissions quota price are
such that a country is indiﬀerent between relative standards and credit trad-
ing given that the other country chooses relative standards and furthermore
suppose that both countries have chosen relative standards. Then let coun-
try f shift to credit trading. From (7.23) it is clear that (7.28) now changes
so that country h has a larger incentive to increase production. This means
that credit trading now has become the optimal choice of instrument for
country h. As country h shifts to credit trading, country f now also prefers
credit trading to relative standards. In this case, (rsh, ctf ) and (cth, rsf )
are not Nash equilibria.
Now suppose that the limit on emissions in each country and the in-
ternational emission quota price are such that the countries are indiﬀerent
between permit trading and relative standards, given that both choose per-
mit trading and let both countries use permit trading. Then country f
shifts to relative standards. This aﬀects (7.28) for country h such that it
now wants to increase output less than before, so that it will stick with
permit trading. Hence, (pth, rsf ) and (rsh, ptf ) are possible Nash equilib-
ria. Also (pth, ctf ), and (cth, ptf ) can be Nash equilibria in this case when
the gains from international emissions trading are such that the countries
always prefer credit trading to permit trading.
So in Case 1, only emission ceilings will never be used. All other instru-
ments, permit trading, credit trading and relative standards, can be used
by the two countries and all combinations between any two of these three
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remaining instruments can constitute Nash equilibria.
Case 2: T ≥ λnti . From Propositions 29 and 32 it is clear that (cth, ctf ),
and (rsh, rsf ) are possible Nash equilibria when the gains to international
emissions trading are negative and that (pth, ptf ), (cth, ctf ), (pth, ctf ), and
(cth, ptf ) are possible Nash equilibria when the gains to international emis-
sions trading are always positive. The question then is whether combinations
of domestic and international instruments can constitute Nash equilibria.










i and also here permit trading
and emission ceilings lead to lower than optimal output. However, a switch
to relative standards or credit trading may lead to too high output. In
this case, it is uncertain whether qcti is smaller or larger than q
ec
i . First
assume that qcti > q
ec








i . Suppose then that
T = λrsi , so that the countries are indiﬀerent between relative standards and
credit trading. Furthermore, assume that both countries have chosen relative
standards. Then suppose that country f shifts to ct. This alters (7.28) for h
such that it now has an even larger incentive to increase output. However,
it cannot increase output more than by choosing rs. Hence, (rsh, ctf ) and
(cth, rsf ) are possible Nash equilibria. Next suppose that T > λrsi and that
the national limits on emissions are such that the countries are indiﬀerent
between emission ceilings and credit trading and that both have chosen
emissions ceilings. Let f shift to ct. This changes (7.28) for h, so that it
now has a greater incentive to increase output. Country h then no longer
chooses ec, but will shift to ct. Hence, (ech, ctf ) and (cth, ecf ) are not Nash
equilibria in this case. Now suppose that T ≥ λrsi and that the national
limits on emissions are such that both countries are indiﬀerent between
permit trading and emissions ceilings and that both have chosen emission
ceilings. Let f shift to pt. This changes (7.28) for h so that it now has an
incentive to increase output. Depending how strong this eﬀect is and how
much rs and ct increase production, country h may now either stick with ec
or shift to rs or ct. If it sticks with ec, we have a new equilibrium. Hence
(ech, ptf ) and (pth, ecf ) are possible Nash equilibria in this case. If h shifts
to rs or ct, country f has an incentive to increase output. However, it may
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be that this incentive is not very large and that f is better oﬀ with pt. So
also (rsh, ptf ) and (pth, rsf ) are possible Nash equilibria in this case.
Now assume that qcti < q
ec








i . Again assume
that T and the national limits on emissions are such that the countries are
indiﬀerent between emission ceilings and credit trading and that both have
chosen emissions ceilings. Let f shift to ct. This changes (7.28) for h, so
that it now has a greater incentive to increase output. Country h will then
have an incentive to increase output even more. It may then be optimal to
stick with ec or to shift to rs. In the latter case, country f ’s incentive to
increase output increases, so that it will shift back to ec. However, from
Proposition (29) we know that (ec, rs) is not an equilibrium. Hence, in this
case, (ech, ctf ) and (cth, ecf ) are possible Nash equilibria.
Hence, in Case 2, all instruments can be used by the two countries and
all possible combinations between any two of the four instruments can be
Nash equilibria.
The two cases then show that two identical countries can choose diﬀerent
instruments in a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we have now shown that it is
possible for one country to choose a form of international emissions trading,
while the other country chooses not to participate in international emissions
trading.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have presented a model of duopolistic international trade
with the two competitors situated in diﬀerent countries. It is assumed that
the country has committed itself to a certain emission target for the industry
under analysis. Within this setting, I have analyzed government preferences
for instruments of environmental policy and for whether or not the govern-
ment should let the domestic ﬁrm participate in an international emissions
trading scheme. At the national level, countries can either choose an emis-
sion ceiling or relative standards for their ﬁrm. The two instruments have a
diﬀerent impact on the regulated industry, with relative standards leading
to higher output and higher marginal abatement costs. If the country al-
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lows international emissions trading, the two instruments are transformed to
permit and credit trading respectively, with credit trading leading to higher
output and marginal abatement costs than permit trading.
The analysis leads to two main conclusions. With imperfect competition,
governments have an incentive to increase production, which is strengthened
further when there is domestic consumption. The reason is that increasing
output of the domestic ﬁrm leads to higher proﬁts because the foreign ﬁrm
will decrease its output. If there is domestic consumption, there is an addi-
tional gain since total production will increase with an increase in domestic
output, so that domestic consumer surplus will increase.
Since relative standards and credit trading lead to higher production lev-
els than other instruments, countries may prefer these instruments. More
precisely, as long as these two instruments do not lead to too large an in-
crease in production, governments will prefer them over emission ceilings
and permit trading respectively. If both governments then choose relative
standards or credit trading, ﬁrm proﬁts will actually decrease, since now
both ﬁrms increase production. However, as long as domestic consumption
is large enough, this will lead to an increase in domestic welfare.
The second main result is that international emissions trading may not
always be welfare improving. This is especially the case when the country
becomes a seller of emission quotas. In this case, domestic and global output
will decrease and the world price of the product will increase. This leads to
lower ﬁrm proﬁts and lower consumers’ surplus. Although emissions trading
per se leads to an increase in proﬁts for the ﬁrm, the other eﬀects can be so
large as to outweigh this direct proﬁt from emissions trading.
Another result is that with international emissions trading, two identical
countries may use diﬀerent instruments in equilibrium. The choice of instru-
ment by the domestic country aﬀects how its ﬁrm will react to a change in
production by the foreign country. We ﬁnd that when one ﬁrm increases it
output, the other ﬁrm will reduce its output most under permit trading and
least under emission ceilings. Because of this diﬀerence in reaction under
diﬀerent instruments, countries have an incentive to react strategically to
the instrument choice of the other country. Here all possible combinations
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between any two instruments are possible Nash equilibria. However, when
both countries become buyers of quotas on the international market they
will never choose emission ceilings.
Appendix A: Second order conditions
International Permit Trading With international permit trading, the
second order condition for proﬁt maximization by the ﬁrm is given by
Πxx ≡
(
Riii − Ciqq −CiqE
−CiqE −CiEE
)
is negative semideﬁnite (7.31)
From this, we can derive several conditions on the cost function. The deter-
minant of (7.31) must be positive and is given by
Πiii(pt) ≡ −RiiiCEE + CqqCEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (7.32)
Furthermore, it must hold that hCxxh′ ≤ 0 for any vector h. Letting
h = (q E) then gives
q2Riii − q2Cqq − 2qECqE − E2CEE ≤ 0 (7.33)
Other conditions needed are
qCqE + ECEE < 0 (7.34)
CqqCEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (7.35)
Condition (7.34) ensures that under credit trading marginal revenue de-
creases with emissions. Condition (7.35) is the determinant of the second
order condition for cost minimization. The latter is equal to (7.31) but with
the term Riii deleted.
International Credit Trading In this case, the government will adjust the
relative standard when the ﬁrm changes output. The second order condition
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for proﬁt maximization by the ﬁrm is then given by
Πxx ≡
(





The determinant of (7.36) must be positive and is given by
Πiii(ct; E¯) ≡ −RiiiCEE + CqqCEE −
E¯
q2
CECEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (7.37)
Another condition needed is
CqqCEE − E¯
q2
CECEE − C2qE ≥ 0 (7.38)
This condition is the determinant of the second order condition for cost
minimization. The latter is equal to (7.36) but with the term Riii deleted.
Appendix B: Slopes of the Reaction Functions
The slopes of the reaction function are given by (7.8) for emission ceilings,
(7.9) for relative standards, (7.20) for permit trading, and (7.21) for credit
trading.




































We will assume that1
−qiCiqE + CiE > 0 (7.43)
















For a comparison of credit trading and relative standards we ﬁnd from













For a comparison of relative standards and emission ceilings we ﬁnd from
























1For example, with a quadratic cost function given by C(q, E) = aq2 + b(q − E)2 + k
we find that −qiCiqE + CiE = 2bE > 0.
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Appendix C: Comparative Statics
In this appendix, we give the eﬀect of a change in the permit price on
ﬁrm output. These eﬀects depend on both domestic and foreign instrument
choice. The comparative statics are found by diﬀerentiating the relevant
ﬁrst order conditions with respect to T and inserting the relevant foreign
reaction function.
We will assume that own eﬀects of output on marginal proﬁt dominate
cross eﬀects. This gives rise to the following condition.
Πiii(Ii)Π
j




ij > 0 (7.45)





ij > 0 (7.46)
for international permit and credit trading. Furthermore,
Πiii(ec) = −Riii + Ciqq ≥ 0 (7.47)






CiE ≥ 0 (7.48)
We then ﬁnd the following. When country i uses international permit
trading and country j uses domestic instruments we ﬁnd by diﬀerentiating
(7.15) and (7.16) with respect to T and using (7.8) for emission ceiling or











The sign follows from (7.2), (7.32), (7.44), (7.47) and (7.48).
When country i uses international credit trading and country j uses do-
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mestic instruments we ﬁnd by diﬀerentiating (7.19) and (7.18) with respect
















The sign follows from (7.37), (7.34), (7.44), (7.47) and (7.48).
When both countries use permit trading, we ﬁnd by diﬀerentiating (7.15)

















The sign follows from (7.2), (7.32), (7.35) and (7.44) and holds when the
two ﬁrms are similar enough.
When both countries use credit trading we ﬁnd by diﬀerentiating (7.19)























The sign follows from (7.2), (7.37), (7.38) and (7.44) and holds when the
two ﬁrms are similar enough.
When country i uses permit trading and country j uses credit trading we




















The sign follows from (7.2), (7.32), (7.37), (7.38) and (7.44) and holds when
the two ﬁrms are similar enough.
When country i uses credit trading and country j uses permit trading we
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The sign follows from (7.2), (7.32), (7.37), (7.35) and (7.44) and holds when







In environmental politics, two things have to be decided: the level of abate-
ment and the method of implementation. Economists have tried to shed
light on both issues. The standard economic answer to the ﬁrst question is:
one should abate up to the level where marginal social costs are equal to
marginal social beneﬁts. However, this answer is not always of much help,
mainly because the marginal beneﬁts are unknown. But economists have
also taken up this challenge by trying to measure the value of what was
previously immeasurable (see Hanemann 1994).
So far, economists seem to have contributed more to answering the sec-
ond question. Already more than a century ago, Sidgwick (1883) proposed
using taxes to correct for negative externalities. This concept was later
worked out by Pigou (1920), hence the name Pigouvian taxes. In the 1960s
259
260
another instrument was added to the economist’s toolbox: tradable permits,
a concept proposed by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968a,b) and formalized
by Montgomery (1972). Since the rise of environmental policy in the 1960s
and 1970s, economists have advocated, dare one say lobbied for, these in-
struments. Despite their eﬀorts, not much has been gained. True, both taxes
and tradable permit systems have been implemented (see Stavins (2000)).
However, taxes have often been set at such a low level that they have had
no eﬀect other than supplying government with revenue. Tradable permit
systems are being used more and more, but in comparison to forms of direct
regulation, their use has been limited (OECD 1994).
The natural question to ask then is why certain instruments are imple-
mented and others not. As will be clear from the above, the main riddle for
the economist is why direct regulation is so popular. The case for taxes and
tradable permits seems clear; they are eﬃcient and hence maximize welfare.
Direct regulation on the other hand tends to be very crude and will create
diﬀerences in marginal abatement costs between sources.
Positive political economic theory tries to give an answer to this. In
essence, it says that economic agents will try to capture the rents created,
deliberately or accidentally, by government action (Tullock 1967; Krueger
1974). This will also be the case in environmental policy. Every instrument
has certain characteristics that make it more or less advantageous to diﬀerent
groups. Hence, every group will have its preferred instrument and will be
willing to spend time and money to have it implemented.
But how do we know which instrument will be preferred by which group?
To answer that question, we need to know what motivates the members
of the groups, and if they are represented by interest groups, what the
motives of the management of these interest groups are. This seems to be
an often forgotten part of the public choice literature on instrument choice.
Assumptions about interest group motivation are made in a rather ad hoc
way, without much reference to the literature in this ﬁeld.
In this survey, we will give an overview of both the motives and the pref-
erences for policy instrument of the interest groups involved in and aﬀected
by environmental policy. We will then assess whether the public choice liter-
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ature on interest group preference for environmental policy instrument takes
the motives fully into account. As this is not always the case, we will also
discuss how the results may change when all motives are taken into account.
This chapter only deals with instrument choice at the national level; we
analyze the preferences of interest groups for international emissions trading
schemes in the next chapter. However, the current survey has considerable
relevance for the analysis of preferences for international instruments. First
of all, the motives behind the preferences of the various interest groups
will be the same, whether they have to make a choice between national or
international instruments. The discussion in this chapter therefore forms
the basis for the analysis in the next chapter. Furthermore, as will become
clear later, the choice of international emissions trading scheme is related to
the choice of national instrument. A discussion of preferences for national
instruments is therefore necessary before proceeding with a discussion of
preferences for international emissions trading schemes.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 8.2, we give a short
description of the main instruments of environmental policy, which fall into
two groups: economic instruments and direct regulation instruments. The
next step is to identify the main actors in the rent-seeking game (section
8.3). Having identiﬁed the main actors, we continue by discussing their
motivations (section 8.4). A large part of this literature stems from the 1960s
and 1970s. Especially important in this respect is the paper by Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), who model the relationship between the owners or donors of
an organization and its management as a principle-agent problem. In section
8.5, we give an overview of the political economy literature on environmental
policy instrument choice. An assessment of this literature is given in section
8.6. Here special emphasis is given to the assumptions about the motivations
of the diﬀerent interest groups. Finally, in section 8.7 some conclusions are
given.
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8.2 Environmental Policy Instruments
Environmental policy instruments are normally divided into two broad cate-
gories (Bohm and Russell 1985; Barde 1995; Russell and Powell 1999): direct
regulation instruments and market-based instruments. Direct regulation
consists of the implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations pre-
scribing objectives, standards and technologies polluters must comply with
(Barde 1995). Various direct regulation instruments exist, mostly in the
form of standards. Examples are technology standards, emission standards,
process standards and product standards. Technology standards specify the
use of a certain technology in the production process. Hence, they specify
how emissions should be abated, but not by how much. Emission standards
can be absolute, specifying a maximum level of emissions for the plant or
ﬁrm, or relative, where the total level of emissions is allowed to vary with
some variable, mostly an input such as fossil fuel, sometimes production.
Voluntary agreements can also be counted as direct regulation. Here, the
environmental goal is negotiated between government and industry. The
industry can then negotiate internally on the distribution of the abatement
burden over the individual ﬁrms. Since industry is better informed about its
abatement costs, voluntary agreements can lead to lower compliance costs
than other forms of direct regulation. Although the industry could decide to
implement market-based instruments, this has not happened so far. Hence,
in most cases, voluntary agreements result in diﬀerentiated standards, often
a relative standards, for the individual ﬁrms. In all, the term direct regula-
tion covers a motley collection of instruments with widely diﬀerent impact
on the regulated industry. Its is therefore important, as Dijkstra (1999)
notes, to specify which instrument of direct regulation is analyzed. In the
following, we will do so as much as possible. Market-based, or economic, in-
struments use ﬁnancial incentives to induce abatement by polluters. Exam-
ples are taxes, charges, subsidies, tradable permits, deposit refund systems
and liability provisions.
Economists often argue that market-based instruments are more eﬃcient
than other instruments (see Baumol and Oates 1988). However, Russell and
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Powell (1999) state that this only holds for greenhouse gases and ozone de-
pleting substances, and other fully mixing pollutants. In all other cases, di-
rect regulation may be more eﬃcient than market-based instruments. How-
ever, analysis shows that emissions trading can lead to large cost reductions,
while not aﬀecting environmental quality, even when the pollution regulated
is of a non-uniformly mixing kind (see Klaassen 1996 for an overview).
8.3 Actors
The literature describes many actors and their interest groups that are in-
volved in, or aﬀected by environmental policy. An important group is formed
by regulators. This group in turn can be subdivided into politicians and bu-
reaucrats. Another group is formed by those who are regulated. In much of
the literature, it is assumed that it is industry that is regulated. Industry,
however, is not a unitary actor. It consists of the providers of risk-bearing
capital (the owners), the managers and the workers. Besides regulators and
industry, a third group is aﬀected by environmental policy: consumers.
To have some inﬂuence on policy, aﬀected actors combine in interest
groups. The more eﬀective a group is in organizing, the more inﬂuence it
will have on policy. Here groups consisting of many individual actors with
diverging interests are at a disadvantage, since it will be harder for such a
group to organize than for a small and homogeneous group (Olson 1965).
This tendency is also visible in the groups mentioned above.
Although industry consists of many individual units, it is usually well
organized. One reason for this is that it is a rather homogeneous group.
Furthermore, government regulation often makes it compulsory for ﬁrms
within a sector of industry to organize in branch organizations.
Organizations of shareholders do exist, but are often not present in the
debate on environmental policy. Shareholder organizations organize share-
holders from many diﬀerent branches. These are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways
by environmental policy. However, through their inﬂuence on ﬁrm policy,
they do aﬀect the behavior of ﬁrms. Workers are organized in labor unions.
The degree of organization, however, varies considerably between countries
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and between sectors within a country. Diﬀerences in organization between
countries are often caused by diﬀerences in government policy.
Because of their large number and divergence in interests, consumers
are hard to organize. Most policy aﬀects the average consumer only very
little. Therefore, the individual beneﬁt of lobbying for a speciﬁc policy
instrument is too small compared with the costs. However, environmentally
concerned consumers are organized in environmental organizations. These
organizations are highly present in the environmental debate. This is not
to say that consumers as such have no inﬂuence on government policy. As
voters they can aﬀect who is in power and thereby which policies will be
implemented. However, in the literature on environmental policy, voters
and their behavior are seen more as a limit to the discretionary powers
of politicians than as a direct inﬂuence on policy outcomes. Hereby, it
is assumed that shifts in government happen mostly as a consequence of
bad economic tides. Hence, politicians will take the eﬀect of policies on
employment and inﬂation into account.
So we end up with a number of actors that are important in the environ-
mental policy game. On the side of the regulators, both politicians and the
environmental bureaucracy will have an inﬂuence. Industry will be directly
aﬀected and will therefore try to inﬂuence environmental policy. Within
industry, three groups can be identiﬁed, each with diﬀerent motives: share-
holders, managers and labor unions. Finally, there is a large and diverse
group of consumers. However, there are to many with too little individual
interest to organize eﬀectively. Therefore, only the environmentally con-
cerned consumers will be represented by environmental organizations.
8.4 Motivations
Before one can analyze the preferences of the diﬀerent actors involved in and
aﬀected by environmental policy, it is necessary to know their motivations.
As we will see, the motives of the various individual actors are not that
diﬀerent. After all, they are all just versions of economic man. Besides mo-
tives, it is also important to analyze the constraints placed on the behavior
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of the individual actors within the organizations that aﬀect environmental




There are two basic assumptions in the literature about the motivation of
politicians (Persson and Tabellini 2000). In the public choice literature, the
standard assumption is that politicians are opportunistic, i.e., they behave
in purely self-interested way. In this kind of model, politicians do not derive
utility from the policy outcomes, but only from being in oﬃce. One version
of opportunistic behavior is that politicians are only interested in winning
elections (Downs 1957). Such an assumption implies that candidates con-
verge to the same policies.
Another version of opportunistic behavior is that politicians are rent
seekers. They try to exploit their political power to receive rents at the
expense of the voters (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). In essence, this means
that there is a principal-agent problem between the voters (principals) and
the politicians (agents). Wittman (1989, 1995) however shows that political
competition will bring out an optimal outcome for voters, an idea already
voiced by Stigler (1972) and Becker (1983). Hence, as long as there is
competition between politicians, the principal-agent problem will not be
very large.
The other basic assumption is that politicians have certain ideological
preferences. That is, they derive utility directly from policy outcomes (see
Wittman 1977, 1983 and Calvert 1985). In this kind of model, the prefer-
ences of the politicians determine the outcome. As we will discuss later on,
conservative, liberal and socialist ideologies may aﬀect politician gut feel-
ing and rationalization of certain types of market instruments and direct
regulation.
In all the above models, lobbying by interest groups can alter the out-
come. By providing funds to a candidate, interest groups can increase that
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candidate’s chance of winning. In return they will demand regulation that
provides them with rents.
It is quite likely that politicians are risk-averse. In environmental policy,
they set certain goals. If these goals are realized, the politicians can expect
to beneﬁt from this. However, when the objectives are not met, they may
be punished by the voters. For this reason, politicians have an incentive
to delegate decisions to agencies, i.e. the bureaucracy, when the expected
damage from not realizing the objective is larger than the expected gain from
realizing them (Fiorina 1982a,b). It implies that politicians would rather
delegate instrument choice to the environmental agency if they consider
such decisions as politically risky. Legally that will not be feasible if the
introduction of a new type of instrument requires adjustment of existing
laws.
The economic literature is in general not very kind to politicians. They
are seen as risk-averse opportunists whose main objective is to be re-elected.
In some cases however, they are endowed with a conscience in the form
of ideology. Often, not even these assumptions are made, and the policy
outcome is decided by the relative strength of the interest groups. In that
case, the politician is at best seen as the mouthpiece of the winning interest
group.
Environmental Bureaucracy
The most inﬂuential study of bureaucracies is without doubt Niskanen’s Bu-
reaucracy and Representative Government (Niskanen 1971). Although there
had been analyses of bureaucratic behavior before, notably Simon (1947),
March and Simon (1957), Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967), Niskanen was
the ﬁrst to provide a formal model of bureaucracies on which future work
could be based. Niskanen’s main assumption is that bureaucrats are bud-
get maximizers. The reason for this is that income, prestige, power and
perquisites of the oﬃce, which are items entering the bureaucrat’s utility
function, are positively related to the size of the bureau’s budget. In his
model, Niskanen assumes that there are only two actors, the (head of the)
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bureau and the sponsor. In the relationship, the bureau has some distinct
advantages over the sponsor in that it has a monopoly of information on
production costs and because it can control the agenda. Furthermore, it
knows the value the sponsor attaches to every level of output. The result
is that the bureaucracy has enormous powers and can force the sponsor to
accept a large budget.
If one were to apply Niskanen’s theory to environmental policy, bud-
get maximization may be translated as the urge to expand the domain of
environment related problems where the bureaucracy can be active. Since
budget maximization refers to input, not to output, Niskanen’s view implies
that the bureaucracy would prefer the instrument that is most bureacratic
input intensive.
Niskanen’s analysis has been criticized on many grounds. Much of it
has centered on the power of bureaucracies. The ability of bureaucrats to
control the agenda has been questioned (see Romer and Rosenthal 1978 and
Miller and Moe 1983). Another critique centered around the assumption
that the bureau had a monopoly on information. In later analyses, the re-
lationship between sponsor and bureau was modeled as a principal-agent
problem, where the sponsor as principal has several methods of monitoring
and controlling the bureau, either ex post or ex ante (see Breton and Win-
trobe 1975, Bendor et al. 1985, 1987 , Banks 1989 and Banks and Weingast
1992).
Johnson and Libecap (1989) test empirically whether the salary of the
incumbent personnel at government bureaux increases with an increase in
the total number of employees. They found that there was no such relation-
ship. Hence, the quest for a larger bureaucracy does not give higher salary
to the incumbent bureaucrats. It is still possible that the utility of the bu-
reau management increases with the bureau size, but then mainly because
it gives more prestige and status.
Migue´ and Belange´r (1974) argue that bureaucrats’ preferences are not
one-dimensional (budget maximization) but have two dimensions: they max-
imize a utility function with bureaucratic output and discretionary budget
as its elements. The discretionary budget is deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
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tween the total budget and the minimum costs of production. The discre-
tionary budget is available for personal consumption within the organization.
There is a trade-oﬀ between performing the public task of producing output
and personal consumption as given by the discretionary budget (see also
Duizendstraal 1999). Niskanen has accepted this critique (Niskanen 1975,
1991). Both Migue´ and Belange´r (1974) and Niskanen (1991) argue that
bureaucrats can have a decided preference for the output of their depart-
ment. The type of bureaucrat that does so has been dubbed ’zealot’ by
Downs (1967). Frey (1983) gives an overview of a large number of studies
that empirically test the diﬀerence in cost eﬃciency between private and
public production. In general, the studies show that public production of
a good is more costly than private production of the same good. This can
be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that bureaucrats can secure
discretionary budgets for themselves.
For environmental policy Migue´ and Be´langer’s (1974) view on bureau-
cratic motives implies that the public task of developing and implementing
eﬀcetive reduction of pollution is one motive, but next to that the bureau-
cratic requisites which may be manifold, running from a large staﬀ to good
relations with the regulated industry. In sections 8.5 and 8.6 we shall see
how such motives work out in terms of preferences for instruments.
Another view on bureaucracy is oﬀered by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman
(1976), which builds on the work by Olson (1965). Stigler and Peltzman
argue that interest groups and politicians stand to gain from each other.
Politicians want to be re-elected. To be re-elected, they need to maximize
support. Interest groups will be willing to provide such support in return
for favorable legislation. The result, according to Stigler and Peltzman, is
that politicians set up bureaux to serve the interest groups. Hence, the
bureaucracy is ’captured’ by interest groups by design in order to serve
the interest of the regulated parties. For environmental policy the theory
implies that the environmental bureaucracy is captured by the industry
it is supposed to regulate and therefore would design and implement the
instrument favored by industry. That goes much further than Migue´ and
Belange´r (1974) whose theory only suggests that the bureaucracy would try
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to come to an agreement with industry on an instrument acceptable to both
parties. Elaborations on this theory are given by Becker (1983) and Wilson
(1980). They show that capture of bureaucracies is only a special case with
many other outcomes possible. Furthermore, other groups such as voters
have more inﬂuence than Stigler gives them.
Kelman (1981) asserts that the environmental bureaucracy is averse to
a new instrument, because it would have to bear the brunt of the organiza-
tional learning that a switch to a new system would imply. Rees (1988) also
stresses this point. He states that agency resistance to change cannot only
be explained by conservatism or management self-interest. There are, often
considerable, transitional costs, such as information collection, staﬀ retrain-
ing or recruitment and departmental reorganization. These learning costs
explain at least partly why there is bureaucratic inertia (see Hanley et al.
1990). Another factor that can be connected with learning costs is that
the preferences of bureaucrats may diﬀer according to their training back-
ground. It is argued that those with a legal or technical background have
a predisposition to command and control instruments, while those with an
economic background favor market-based instruments. Both groups would
incur learning costs if the instrument implemented is diﬀerent from the one
they were taught about. The theory of bureaucratic conservatism implies
that the environmental bureaucracy clings to the policy instruments that are
presently in use, that is notably direct regulation through relative standards,
and resists new instruments. Woerdman (2002) has elaborated on this di-
mension for environmental policy instruments in his theory of institutional
lock-in.
Another problem is that the management of a bureaucracy has several
objectives. Rees (1988) mentions a large number of objectives. Most of these
can be categorized either as part of supplying the service the bureau is set
up to deliver, as maximizing discretionary spending or as diminishing the
interference of the outside world (politicians and interest groups) with the
daily business of the bureau. Any policy instrument fulﬁlls these objectives
to a diﬀerent degree. Changing instruments will therefore produce conﬂicts
with the organizational goals. Furthermore, change increases the visibility
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of the bureau and the amount of public ﬂack it receives (see also De Savornin
Lohman 1994). Rees (1988) asserts that the losers under the status quo are
only imperfectly aware of their disadvantage and of the beneﬁts they could
derive under a diﬀerent system. Those whose relative position is aﬀected
negatively by change are clearly much more aware of it. This implies that the
bureau takes the eﬀect of a change in regulation on the regulated industry
into account. For environmental policy these considerations imply the same
conclusion as the theory of bureaucratic conservatism: stick to the ‘tried and
trusted’ instruments and avoid experiments with new types of instruments.
Several authors argue that the environmental bureaucracy is risk-averse
(Nentjes and Dijkstra 1994 and De Savornin Lohman 1994). De Savornin
Lohman (1994) argues that environmental regulators are averse to the en-
vironmental eﬀectiveness risk because society has given them the job of
obtaining physical environmental results. If the goals are not realized, the
bureaucracy will be heavily criticized for being ineﬀective. In the worst case,
this could result in the dismissal of the bureaucrats involved. Also, an over-
realization of the goals can aﬀect the bureaucracy negatively. The adversely
aﬀected parties will in that case demand compensation. Such risk aversion
may make bureaucrats averse to new untried instruments, which have not
yet proven to be environmentally eﬀective. It implies even more aversion to
relatively new instruments, such as environmental taxes, of which a priori
the environmental eﬀectiveness is uncertain.
To conclude, bureaucrats may be dedicated to their public task of clean-
ing up the environment, but they also have their own agenda. Although
there are several checks on the self-interested behavior of bureaucrats, it is
likely that they will be able to pursue their goal of discretionary budget max-
imization to some degree. It is also likely that bureaucrats take the eﬀects
of regulation on the regulated industry into account, either because they are
captured by the industry or because they want to minimize ﬂack. Further-
more, the bureaucracy has an incentive to stick to the policy instruments
currently in use, although the background of the bureaucrats may give them
a preference for a certain instrument. Last but not least, bureaucrats will
be risk-averse because both not realizing and over-realizing the goals set will
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result in criticisms from interest groups. All these motives may play a role
in bureaucrats’ assessment of which instrument to choose and implement.
8.4.2 Industry
Often, industry is taken as a unitary actor. However, within industry, several
actors with diverging objectives can be distinguished. Here we will discuss
three actors: owners, managers, and labor unions.
Owners
Owners provide the ﬁrm with risk-bearing capital and expect a return on
their investment. More speciﬁcally, they will want to maximize proﬁts. If
the return is too low, they can withdraw their money and invest it in another
way which gives higher proﬁts. Alternatively, they can replace the managers
of the ﬁrm with some new managers.
Under two circumstances, the owners of the ﬁrm may not want to max-
imize proﬁts (Tirole 1988 and Mas-Colell et al. 1995). When proﬁts are
uncertain and the owners are risk-averse, they may prefer not to maximize
expected proﬁt. Production plans that are risky may now not be imple-
mented although their expected proﬁt is positive. Another factor that may
aﬀect the preference of the owners is that the ﬁrm may have an inﬂuence
on the price and the owners are consumers of the good. In this case, the
owners may have an incentive to overproduce to lower the price of the good.
These two circumstances will often play a minor role. First of all, it is
easier to insure against risks by diversifying the portfolio than by letting
every ﬁrm abstain from risk-bearing investments. Secondly, it is unlikely
that the owner of (a share of) the ﬁrm consumes so much of the good
produced that he wants to lower its price. Therefore, in the following, we
assume that owners want the ﬁrm to maximize proﬁts.
Managers
In many cases, the owners of the ﬁrm will not form the management. The
shareholders will still be interested in maximum proﬁt, but it might be that
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the managers have other objectives. Although some parts of the manage-
ment eﬀort, such as number of hours worked, can be monitored with relative
ease, it is less easy to ascertain whether the eﬀorts of the management have
been directed to proﬁt maximization. Hence, a principal-agent problem
arises where the manager (the agent) has some opportunities to realize his
own objectives at the expense of the shareholders (the principals). However,
there are some disciplining factors that restrict the managers in their pursuit
of pure self-realization.
Several models of managerial behavior have been put forward. A part of
the literature endows the manager with a single objective, often under the
constraint of a minimum level of proﬁt. In other studies, several objectives
enter the utility function of the managers (see also Marris and Mueller 1980
for an overview).
If the compensation of the managers is more dependent on sales vol-
ume than on proﬁts, a manager may try to maximize the sales level at the
expense of proﬁts (Baumol 1962, 1966). Later, Baumol changed the hy-
pothesis of sales maximization to maximization of the growth rate of sales.
Empirical work by McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (1962) lends some support to
the hypothesis that managers’ incomes are more closely correlated to sales
than to proﬁts. Werden and Hirschey (1980) show that management income
is related to both sales and proﬁts. However, other empirical work is less
supportive (see Bevars and Siders 1967; Hall 1967 and Baker 1969).
Another hypothesis is that managers maximize the rate of growth of sales
revenues (Marris 1963, 1972). Mueller (1972) has put forward an amended
version of this thesis. He states that only mature ﬁrms are aﬀected by a
growth maximization objective of the management.
Managers may also be interested in increasing the number of staﬀ beyond
the proﬁt maximizing level. Several reasons can exist for this. First, an
increase in the number of staﬀ may increase the chances of promotion for
the incumbent staﬀ (Williamson 1963). Second, the management can spread
the workload over more people, leading to a lower workload per manager.
One could also expect that managers want to maximize organizational
slack. With this is meant that managers are interested in maximizing the
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means that they can use in a discretionary way (Williamson 1963).
The previous models replace proﬁt in the objectives of managers by an-
other single variable. Another approach is to include a number of arguments
in the objective. Williamson (1963) gives an exact speciﬁcation of the utility
function. The items entering the utility function are salary, security, domi-
nance and professional excellence. Dominance consists of three sub-motives:
status, power and prestige. He argues that managers have a preference for
some types of expense that enhance the objectives of the managers; these
expense preferences do not have to be productive. From the utility function,
Williamson derives assumptions on the maximizing behavior of managers.
First of all, he assumes that managers have a positive preference for staﬀ for
the reasons mentioned above. Williamson also assumes that managers have
a preference for emoluments. Finally, managers have a positive preference
for discretionary proﬁt. With this is meant the proﬁt above the minimum
performance constraint set by the market and stockholders. Managers can
use this part of the proﬁts in a rather discretionary way.
Does the above mean that management will have its way, and pursue its
own goals at the expense of the owners? If the management is not restricted
in any way, the answer is yes. However, there are several factors external
to the ﬁrm that restrict the management in its actions. Holmstrom and
Tirole (1989) mention three external disciplining factors: the labor market,
the product market and capital markets. The ﬁrst factor works through the
reputation of the management. If proﬁts are consistently low, the reputation
of the management will also be low and their value in the labor market will
then decrease. The second factor is concerned with the level of competition
in the product market. When the product market the ﬁrm is operating in
is highly competitive, the possibilities for non-proﬁt maximizing behavior
are few. In that case, the management has to strive for proﬁt maximization
purely to survive. Only when the ﬁrm has a certain monopoly power, can
management pursue goals other than proﬁt maximization. However, this
only holds for individual ﬁrms in a sector. With environmental policy, the
whole sector is typically regulated with the same instrument. Here, the sec-
tor may collectively lobby for an instrument that is not proﬁt-maximizing.
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The third disciplining factor is the threat of take-over in which the incum-
bent management would be replaced (Marris 1963,1964). Furthermore, the
owners can devise incentive schemes to keep management on the track of
proﬁt maximization. The income of the managers could, for example, be
made dependent on the proﬁt earned.
In all, managers seem to have incentives to pursue goals other than
proﬁt maximization. However, several constraints, external and internal,
will prevent the management from wandering too far astray. There is still
reason to believe that the objectives of managers are reﬂected in the behavior
of ﬁrms. Clarkson and Miller (1982), for example, conclude from a large
body of literature that both proﬁts and ﬁrm size are important explanatory
variables of ﬁrm behavior.
Labor Unions
Workers can be aﬀected in several ways by environmental policy. On the pos-
itive side, environmental regulation can improve working conditions. How-
ever, environmental regulation can also result in plant closures and lower
wages. The representatives of workers, the labor unions, can be expected to
oppose measures that aﬀect workers negatively. One major question here,
is what the objectives of unions are.
Within the literature, the goals of the unions have been a hotly debated
issue. A debate already existed in the 1940s on whether unions could be seen
as the maximizers of some objective, as Dunlop (1944) asserted, or whether
they could not, but should be seen as political organizations, as put forward
by Ross (1948).
Building on Dunlop, several maximizing models have been proposed
(see Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993; Pencavel 1991 and Booth 1995 for an
overview). Early studies assumed a single maximand such as wages, em-
ployment, union membership or rents. However, these models invariably
ran into problems, always leaving the labor union with only one member.
More recent theoretical studies endow the labor union with a utility
function. A common speciﬁcation of the union utility function is that it
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contains both wages and employment. This speciﬁcation makes it possible
to model wage maximization and employment maximization as special cases.
Diﬀerent kind of unions can emphasize one of the objectives more than the
other. The result is an intermediary outcome between maximum wage and
maximum employment. Alternatively, union utility can be modelled as the
sum of the utilities of the individual members (Oswald 1982; Mayhew and
Turnbull 1989).
Following Ross (1948), unions can also be viewed as political organiza-
tions. The leadership of unions is elected and the results of the negotia-
tions with employers are subject to approval by the members of the union.
Therefore, it might be appropriate to model the union in the same way as
a political party. Booth (1984) presents a model in which the union man-
agers are concerned with maximizing the probability of re-election as well
as wage and employment levels. Union members are only concerned about
wages and employment. Booth uses a median voter model to describe the
behavior of the management. In this kind of model, under certain condi-
tions, the management will maximize the utility of the median voter (see
also Grossman 1983 and Booth and Chatterji 1993).
The leadership of the union may have objectives of their own. Pemberton
(1988) includes the preferences of the management in the union’s utility
function. He argues that the union management has a preference for a
large membership because this gives the leadership greater inﬂuence and/or
wealth. The union leader may also be concerned with his or her tenure, being
an elected oﬃcial (Pencavel (1991)). As in any organization where there is a
division between donors and management, a principal-agent problem exists
within unions. This allows the management to pursue their own agenda. In
comparison with ﬁrms, the principal-agent problem in unions will be bigger.
It is very hard to monitor whether the output of the union is the maximum
output possible. Therefore, there should be ample possibilities for managers
to pursue their own objectives.
Burton (1984) presents a model in which the utility of the union leader-
ship is a function of power, social status, income and job security. The ﬁrst
three items are in turn a function of the membership of the union, while the
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last item is a function of the wages of the union members.
There are only a few empirical studies on union objectives. Farber
(1978a, b) analyzes the objectives of the United Mineworkers’ Union in the
US, while Carruth and Oswald (1985) do the same for the British National
Union of Mineworkers. Other studies are by Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981)
and Pencavel (1984), who examine the objectives of the International Typo-
graphical Union. In the two industries covered, both employment and wages
matter to labor unions. There is, however, a large diﬀerence in preferences
within these industries.
The above shows that labor unions have at least a dual objective. It
seems reasonable to assume that unions are not only interested in high wages
for their members, but also in a high level of employment. Since managers
are diﬃcult to monitor, their preferences will be reﬂected in the behavior
of the union. Hence, it is likely that management will try to increase the
membership of the union. As Bain and Elsheikh (1976) and Ashenfelter and
Pencavel (1969) show, union membership rises with employment. We would
therefore expect that union management is more interested in a high level
of employment than in a high wage level for their members.
8.4.3 Environmental Organizations
Not much has been written in the scientiﬁc literature on the behavioral as-
sumptions of environmental organizations. Most studies go no further than
to remark that environmental organizations want to improve environmental
quality. Undoubtedly, provision of environmental quality is the main objec-
tive of environmental organizations, but how is this done and do they have
other objectives?
In most cases, environmental protection is not provided directly by envi-
ronmental organizations, but indirectly. They try to induce others, mainly
the government, to improve the quality of the environment. Environmental
organizations can lobby either through spending money to inﬂuence policy
makers, or by convincing politicians that taking measures to improve the
environment will lead to more votes. The latter will be easier, the higher
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the membership of the environmental organization (Svendsen 1998b). To
raise the level of contributions per member and to raise the level of mem-
bership, the environmental organization has essentially two strategies. Or-
ganizations that are successful, i.e. organizations that provide a high level
of environmental quality, will see their membership and contributions in-
crease. Furthermore, direct fundraising will also increase both factors. If
the management of the environmental organization only has the interests of
the donors at heart, it will engage in fundraising up to the point where the
marginal beneﬁts equal the marginal costs.
However, managers may have their own objectives, although it is likely
that they do have a preference for high environmental quality. The question
is whether managers of environmental organizations have opportunities to
realize their own objectives, and what those objectives are.
Most, if not all, environmental organizations are non-proﬁt organiza-
tions. There are three main reasons for organizing in this way (Rose-
Ackerman 1996). First of all, by choosing the form of a non-proﬁt orga-
nization, gifts cannot be converted into proﬁts for the owners. In this way,
the donors are assured that it is their interests that are being served with
the donated funds (Hewitt and Brown 2000). Secondly, non-proﬁt organi-
zations may have less incentive to misrepresent the quality of the service
provided than for-proﬁt organizations do. Thirdly, non-proﬁt organizations
may foster experimentation and provide the possibility of putting into prac-
tice unpopular or extreme ideologies. The ﬁrst factor means that non-proﬁt
organizations are better at competing for gifts than for-proﬁt organizations.
The second and third factors are important in the case of environmental
organizations, because the product provided by them can to a large degree
be characterized as a public good. Moreover, it is a public good of which it
is hard to determine both quantity and quality.
Although their organizational form should lead people to trust environ-
mental organizations, it also leads to some problems. Non-proﬁt managers
have little incentive to manage their organizations in an eﬃcient manner
since no one has a claim on the proﬁts. Hence we can expect that shirking
is more likely to occur in non-proﬁt organizations than in for-proﬁt organi-
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zations (Alchian and Demsetz 1972 and Rose-Ackerman 1996). In general,
we can expect the principal-agent problem to be highly acute. Not only are
there few methods for disciplining the managers, but as mentioned before,
the output of environmental organizations is hard to monitor.
As with bureaucrats, it is very likely that the utility functions that
managers of environmental organizations will maximize contains the dis-
cretionary budget as one of its components (Niskanen 1971 and Migue´ and
Belange´r 1974). Furthermore, as with labor unions, it is likely that the
managers of environmental organizations have a preference for a high level
of membership. This will give them status and more inﬂuence in the political
arena.
If the management is only interested in discretionary spending, fundrais-
ing will occur up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt of fundraising is
equal to zero (Hewitt and Brown 2000). However, it is also likely that many
of the managers themselves have a preference for the output of their orga-
nization; they are so called ‘zealots’. In that case, fundraising may be done
beyond the point where the marginal beneﬁt is equal to the marginal costs,
but not to the point where it is zero. Hewitt and Brown (2000) have tested
whether managers of environmental organization are only interested in dis-
cretionary spending, or whether they also derive utility from the output of
the organization. They ﬁnd that managers of environmental organizations
derive positive marginal utility from discretionary spending. Although they
do not go so far as to conclude that the managers maximize discretionary
spending, they mention that their results could be explained as such.
Environmental organizations always press for lower levels of pollution.
Indeed, they have always maintained a symbolic goal of zero pollution
(Svendsen 1998b). This implies that any emission level above the policy
goal will be unacceptable to environmental organizations. The result is that
they are risk-averse (Nentjes and Dijkstra 1994). To be more speciﬁc, they
are downward risk-averse, since an emission level below the goal can be
explained as a success for the environmental organization.
To be eﬀective at lobbying for environmental protection, environmental
organizations need a large number of donors and a high level of income.
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The organization can attract donors by being successful and by engaging
in fundraising. Since environmental organizations can expect to be con-
fronted by industry, they may have more success by supporting the same
policy instrument as industry does (Svendsen 1998b). If the management
has a preference for discretionary spending, it will show up in excessive ex-
penditure on fundraising. This will increase membership, but will decrease
the level of services provided. To conclude, the objectives of the environ-
mental organization are to provide environmental quality and to increase
membership. On top of this, they are risk-averse.
The literature discussed in this section shows some clear tendencies, which
run through almost all interest groups. First of all, managers have a prefer-
ence for discretionary spending and for the size of the organization they work
for. Second, there is a principal-agent problem in all organizations. The level
of manager discretion then depends on how well the principals, i.e. owners
or donors of the organization, can monitor and control the manager. Hence,
managers will have a large inﬂuence on the policy of the organization in
labor unions and environmental organizations and least in ﬁrms operating
in perfectly competitive markets.
8.5 Preferences
We described above the behavioral assumptions of the diﬀerent actors in the
environmental rent-seeking game. In this section, we give an overview of the
literature that discusses the preferences of interest groups for environmental
policy instruments. The aim of this literature is to explain which instruments
are used, as opposed to much of the environmental economics literature, that




In most analyses of instrument choice, the preferences of politicians are not
taken into account. The implicit assumption is that the policy is determined
in a contest between interest groups. The interest group that is best at rent
seeking wins the contest and will see its preferred instrument implemented.
However, there are a few studies that do analyze the preferences of politicians
and how these preferences aﬀect the outcome.
Verbruggen (1991) assumes that the main interest of politicians is to
maximize public support in order to be re-elected. Since environmental is-
sues are of high concern to the public, politicians will wish to attain certain
environmental goals. However, in doing this they are constrained by two
conditions. First, the policy should have no harmful adverse eﬀects on in-
come distribution and employment. Second, the international competitive-
ness of domestic industry should not be adversely aﬀected. Furthermore,
to set environmental policy, the government will need information that can
only be provided by the polluters. This creates a discussion and negotiation
platform. Therefore, Verbruggen argues that the industry lobby will be very
eﬀective. The result is that politicians will choose direct regulation or vol-
untary agreements with industry. If emission charges are used, the revenue
is often recycled to the regulated industry.
Hochman and Zilberman (1978) conclude that because relative standards
result in higher output and lower prices, they contribute less to unemploy-
ment and inﬂation while achieving an acceptable environmental threshold.
For these reasons, politicians may prefer relative standards to emissions
charges.
In their analysis, Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994) split the group of politi-
cians into Members of Parliament and the minister. The description of the
political process in their study relates strongly to the situation in the Nether-
lands, although it is also applicable to other countries with similar political
systems. Since in the Netherlands, voters vote for a party and not a single
candidate, Nentjes and Dijkstra do not take the single candidate, but the
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political party as the decision-making unit. The assumption is that political
parties want to maximize the number of parliamentary seats. Besides this,
Nentjes and Dijkstra also assume that ideology is important in politicians’
preference of environmental policy instruments. They identify four political
blocks with diﬀerent emphases on the welfare of workers, wealth holders and
the environment. The ﬁnal ordering of instruments of a party is then equal
to the preference of the interest group that comes ﬁrst in the political party’s
ordering. This is a rather crude method of assigning a preference for en-
vironmental policy instruments to political parties. Furthermore, although
Nentjes and Dijkstra explicitly mention that parties aim to maximize seats
in parliament, they assign preferences purely with regard to ideology.
Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994) endow the minister with only one objec-
tive: to translate the government policy programme into concrete propos-
als. Government in the Netherlands always consists of a coalition of parties.
Therefore, Nentjes and Dijkstra construct from the preferences of the par-
ties, preferences of possible coalitions. Furthermore, they argue that the
environmental bureaucracy has considerable power in a system such as the
Dutch one. In this way, Nentjes and Dijkstra show that it is very likely that
industry will be regulated through direct regulation.
An extensive overview of the preferences of legislators is given by Keo-
hane et al. (1997). However, they do not always distinguish between politi-
cians and bureaucrats. A ﬁrst argument given by Keohane et al. is that
legislators and their staﬀ are predisposed to favor direct regulation by their
predominantly legal training. Furthermore, unfamiliar instruments require
legislators to invest time in learning about them. This gives a bias in favor of
existing instruments, which are mostly command and control instruments.
Another factor important for the preference of politicians is uncertainty.
Here, we not only refer to uncertainty about the level of emissions, but
also about the distribution of costs and beneﬁts among the aﬀected parties.
Here the ﬂexibility of market-based instruments is a disadvantage, since
they give uncertainty about the distributional eﬀects and may create hot
spots (McCubbins and Page 1986). Especially in countries where politicians
represent a certain geographical area, they may be more concerned with
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the distribution of costs and beneﬁts than with overall eﬃciency (Hahn
and Stavins 1991). The costs also include the possibility of closure and
relocation of ﬁrms and the local unemployment associated with it (Hahn
and Noll 1990). If legislators want a certain distribution of beneﬁts and
costs, they will have greater opportunity to do so with direct regulation.
This after all gives them the possibility of prescribing rules and procedures
that favor one group over another (McCubbins et al. 1987 and Keohane
et al. 1997).
A divergence from current policies creates both winners and losers. How-
ever, the losers will be more aware of their loss than the winners of their
gain. Moreover, it is not the real costs and beneﬁts that are important, but
the perceived costs and beneﬁts (Hahn 1987). For this reason, politicians
are likely to prefer direct regulation because they tend to hide the costs of
regulation, whereas market-based instruments tend to give a focus on the
costs (Keohane et al. 1997).
Keohane et al. (1997) also stress the importance of ideology. Here
they cite Kelman (1981), who ﬁnds that Republicans support the concept
of charges, perhaps not so much for their eﬃciency, but more because they
use markets and give less intervention from government. Democrats on the
other hand, did not support charges, again largely on ideological grounds.
In most analyses, politicians are non-existent. Which policy instrument
is implemented is then determined in a contest between interest groups. If
politicians are present in the analysis, they are mostly depicted as support-
maximizing and risk-averse. On the basis of these assumptions, most authors
conclude that politicians will prefer direct regulation. Endowing politicians
with an ideology can either reinforce this conclusion, or weaken it.
Environmental Bureaucracy
We concluded above that the environmental bureaucracy has preferences
concerning its budget and discretionary costs. Furthermore, it is likely that
at least some of the bureaucrats have a preference for environmental quality,
but at the same time take the eﬀect of the regulation on the polluters into
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account. The background of the bureaucrat, legal or technical on the one
side or economic on the other, may have an inﬂuence on the bureaucrat’s
preference of instruments. Last but not least, bureaucrats are risk-averse.
Several of these preferences are mentioned in the literature on the choice of
environmental policy instrument.
From several Dutch government reports, Nentjes (1988) concludes that
the main objective of the environmental bureaucracy is certainty of eﬀec-
tiveness. This objective can be seen as a result of the risk-aversion of the
bureaucrats. Direct regulation gives a clear prescription of either the mea-
sures to take or the level of abatement to attain and furthermore gives the
bureaucracy a high level of control over the regulated industry. Therefore,
the environmental bureaucracy will prefer direct regulation (see also Frey
1992 and DeClerq 1996).
Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994) give the most comprehensive analysis of en-
vironmental bureaucrats’ preferences. They assume that the main objective
of the bureaucrats is the certainty of realizing the environmental target.
Next to this, two secondary objectives are identiﬁed. Nentjes and Dijkstra
argue that the bureau cannot be ignorant of the costs of the regulation to
polluters. Furthermore, bureaucrats may have internal goals such as or-
ganizational slack, which is reﬂected in a preference for a large input of
bureaucratic labor.
For each of the objectives, they rank the instruments. They argue that
direct regulation gives the bureau the largest level of control, with grandfa-
thered tradable permits taking second place. Although tradable permits give
certainty of realizing the overall objective, they do not give the bureaucracy
control over the pollution per ﬁrm. With regard to cost for the regulated
industry, Nentjes and Dijkstra take the reduction in number of ﬁrms due
to environmental policy as the relevant indicator for the bureaucracy’s view
of cost to industry. The eﬀect is the same for all market-based instruments
and is more negative than the impact of direct regulation. Finally, on the
issue of labor input, charges and grandfathered tradable permits are ranked
highest for being the most labor intensive instruments. Overall, they con-
clude that the environmental bureaucracy will prefer direct regulation to all
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other instruments.
Keohane et al. (1997) also arrive at the conclusion that the environ-
mental bureaucracy will prefer direct regulation. As reasons they state that
the bureau will be familiar with this form of regulation, and shifting to an-
other instrument will require them to gather much new information about
the working of these instruments. Moreover, their current knowledge may
become obsolete when a new instrument is chosen, which leads to job insecu-
rity. Finally, market-based instruments imply a scale down in the role of the
agency by shifting decision making from the bureau to the ﬁrms. This un-
dermines the prestige of the agency and the job security of the bureaucrats
(see also Hahn and Stavins 1991).
Liroﬀ (1986) ﬁnds that the environmental bureaucracy is not a homo-
geneous group. Instead, two groups can be distinguished: the command
minimalists and the command expansionists. Command minimalists will
support economic instruments because they give most freedom to industry,
both in determining how much to abate and how to abate. Command expan-
sionists on the other hand want to have as much control over the polluters
as possible. Therefore, they will support direct regulation. Note that the
same disposition was found among politicians.
Christoﬀersen and Svendsen (2000) argue that bureaux have inﬂuence
on the spending of the taxes that are collected by the bureau. If this is the
case, bureaucrats may be more inclined to use revenue-raising instruments
such as taxes and auctioned tradable permits.
Dijkstra (1999) presents empirical evidence on the preferences of Dutch
environmental bureaucrats. He notes that there is considerable disagree-
ment within the bureaucracy on the issue of instrument choice. A general
tendency seems to be that the bureaux see no need for large changes in
the use of instruments, which predominantly are direct regulation through
environmental standards and covenants. At most, the current instruments
can be made more ﬂexible. However, there is a large division between the
two groups within the bureaux. The main issue is how much responsibility
industry can handle in reducing emissions. One group only wants to set
emission levels and leave the implementation to industry, while the other
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group stresses that this responsibility cannot be left to industry. It is not
certain whether these diﬀerences in opinion are correlated with educational
background. The level of contact with the regulated industry may also play
a role. The closer the contacts, the more ’captured’ the bureaucrat is.
The literature that discusses bureaucratic preferences sees bureaux as
important in the setting of environmental policy. They are however, mostly
seen as conservative in that they have a preference for the status quo. Be-
cause of the high costs of adapting to new instruments and the uncertainty
connected to economic instruments, bureaucrats prefer direct regulation.
The survey of Dijkstra (1999) however, shows that there may be diverg-
ing opinions within the bureaucracy, with one group supporting economic
instruments and the other direct regulation.
8.5.2 Industry
Industry is usually assumed to be one entity with one uniﬁed goal: proﬁt
maximization. In some cases, workers are treated separately. However to
our knowledge, the distinction between shareholders and management has
never been made explicitly.
Shareholders
If one assumes that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, the positive political economy
explanations of the demand for regulation by industry can be divided into
three categories (Keohane et al. 1997): (1) preference for an instrument
can arise from lower aggregate costs to industry, (2) the instrument awards
industry with rents and places a barrier to entry, and (3) there are diﬀerences
in the costs of compliance across ﬁrms within the industry.
In general, industry will prefer instruments that have low aggregate costs.
Although market-based instruments are most cost-eﬀective, it is not certain
that they will be preferred by industry (Keohane et al. 1997). Taxes and
auctioned tradable permits give high costs to industry because with both
instruments a price is paid for residual emissions, which can easily exceed
cost savings arising from more eﬃcient allocation of abatement. This is not
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the case with grandfathered tradable permits and direct regulation, which
is why industry will prefer these instruments.
Another factor may also make industry prefer direct regulation. It is of-
ten argued that industry has more inﬂuence on policy with direct regulation
than with other instruments. According to Bohm and Russell (1985), di-
rect regulation is more uncompromising. Therefore, the government is more
inclined to listen to the views of the polluters before any action is taken. In-
dustry inﬂuence will be especially large when information about abatement
costs is needed by the government. This would be the case when regulation
is ﬁrm-speciﬁc or when an aggregate emission target has to be translated
into a tax. A ﬁrm then has a certain bargaining power, which it can use to
obtain a more lenient standard or tax. However, since the precise setting
of a tax requires a large amount of information, this is never done. Mostly,
the level of a tax is based on rather crude calculations. This is not to say
that ﬁrms will have no inﬂuence on an environmental tax. As is shown by
Andersen (1996), DeClerq (1996) and Svendsen (1998a), industry often has
a large inﬂuence on the design and level of a tax.
The above suggests that industry will prefer direct regulation and per-
haps grandfathered tradable permits. The advantage of the latter is that
they are eﬃcient, give industry a free choice in how to abate and do not
give ﬁrms the cost of residual emissions. Although direct regulation is not
eﬃcient, and in many cases does not give ﬁrms a free choice of abatement
technology, it gives low costs to industry and may be prone to industry
inﬂuence.
Several studies have addressed the question of preference for environ-
mental policy instrument directly. The ﬁrst to do so were Buchanan and
Tullock (1975). They showed that, in a partial equilibrium model with per-
fect competition, the proﬁts of the polluting industry are higher with direct
regulation than with an emission tax. The form of direct regulation used
in their model is a cap on ﬁrm emissions. Since they assume that there
is no technology to remove the pollution, the cap on emissions eﬀectively
becomes a cap on production. In this way, the price of the good produced
is increased. In the short run, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ with the cap than with
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taxes, because with taxes it has to pay for the residual emissions. The ﬁrm
may even make a proﬁt with emission ceilings, both in the short run and
in the long run. This occurs when the reduction in production causes a
proportionally higher rise in the price of the good. Without entry, the ﬁrm
may even experience proﬁts in the long run.
Dewees (1983) provides another comparison of instruments. Contrary to
Buchanan and Tullock (1975), Dewees allows for the possibility that emis-
sions can be reduced per unit of output. His analysis is somewhat out of
line with the main body of the literature in that he assumes that the aim
of government policy is to reduce emissions per unit of output. Dewees
considers three instruments: an emission charge per unit of emissions, trad-
able permits, and a relative standard. He shows that when capital can be
transferred without cost, shareholders will never lose. Moreover, with grand-
fathered tradable permits, the rent received at the initial distribution of the
permits increases the proﬁts. Hence, in this case, shareholders prefer grand-
fathered tradable permits. Also when capital is immobile, shareholders may
prefer grandfathered tradable permits. However, relative standards may
perform equally well. The preference for grandfathered tradable permits is
based, as in Buchanan and Tullock (1975), on the fact that the ﬁrm receives
rents from the initial distribution of permits. Although Dewees (1983) is in
many regards a step forward in comparison to Buchanan and Tullock (1975),
Dijkstra (1999) shows that Dewees’s analysis is ﬂawed on many points.
The most comprehensive treatment of preferences for environmental pol-
icy instrument is given by Dijkstra (1999). In a partial equilibrium model
with perfect competition, he discusses the eﬀects of four instruments: rel-
ative standards, emission ceilings, emissions charges and tradable permits
(both grandfathered and auctioned). In the model, it is assumed that there
are no barriers to entry. Dijkstra ﬁnds that in the short run, emission
ceilings, charges and tradable permits have the same eﬀect on production
and product price. Only relative standards give a diﬀerent outcome. More
speciﬁcally, with the same level of pollution, a relative standard gives a
higher level of production and consequently a lower product price (see also
Hochman and Zilberman 1978; Helfand 1991 and Ebert 1998,1999). In the
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long run, market-based instruments give the highest welfare. Dijkstra also
arrives at the conclusion that shareholders should prefer grandfathered trad-
able permits because they present a rent, which is given free.
The conclusion of the formal models is clear. When the goods market
is fully competitive and entrance is restricted, both direct regulation and
grandfathered tradable permits create a rent, which is awarded free to the
shareholders. Therefore, they have a preference for these instruments. With
free entry, only grandfathered tradable permits create a rent. Shareholders
therefore prefer grandfathered tradable permits to all other instruments.
The next instruments in the preference listing are emission ceilings and rel-
ative standards. At least in the short run, these create rents. Furthermore,
with emission charges and auctioned tradable permits, a price is paid for
the residual emissions, while this is not the case with ceilings and relative
standards.
The analysis by Dijkstra (1999) clearly shows that with free entry, ﬁrms
subjected to direct regulation will not receive rents in the long run. Only
if the instrument creates a barrier to entry will such rents persist. Such a
barrier could exist if new plants were subjected to stricter environmental
standards than existing ones. Stricter standards for new plants may be
eﬃcient if the cost of abatement for such plants is lower than for existing
plants. However, when the standards are very tight for new plants, a real
barrier to entry exists. Tietenberg (1985) describes how under the Clean
Air Act, new or modiﬁed sources are subject to stricter standards than
existing ones (see also Maloney and McCormick 1982 and Svendsen 1998b).
It is however, not clear whether existing diﬀerences in standards between
existing and new ﬁrms comprise a barrier to entry, or whether they only
reﬂect diﬀerences in costs of abatement.
There is some diﬀerence in opinion in the literature on whether grand-
fathered tradable permits create a barrier to entry. With grandfathering,
existing ﬁrms receive permits for free while new ﬁrms have to pay for them.
Hence, incumbent ﬁrms do not have to pay for (all) their residual emissions,
while new ﬁrms do. This would then be an entrance barrier (Keohane et
al. (1997) and Svendsen (1998b)). However, Koutstaal (1997) and Dijkstra
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(1999) argue that this in itself does not form a barrier to entry. The grand-
fathered permits constitute an opportunity cost to the recipient because it
could have sold them on the market. Koutstaal and Dijkstra mention that
grandfathering will result in an entry barrier when new ﬁrms have to incur
transaction costs to purchase the permits or when the capital markets work
imperfectly.
With tradable permits, existing ﬁrms can raise a barrier to entry them-
selves by colluding. They could agree not to sell permits to new ﬁrms or to
raise the market price (Tietenberg (1985) and Misiolek and Elder (1989)).
When there are many ﬁrms in the market however, this is unlikely to hap-
pen. Furthermore, the government can deter this kind of behavior by selling
a certain portion of the permits available each year, as is done in the US
sulfur trading program. But above all, the national anti-trust authority has
the task to detect, punish and prevent such collusion.
Maloney and McCormick (1982) argue that environmental regulation
can increase the value of some ﬁrms in the regulated industry, while low-
ering the value of other ﬁrms. In general, the value of low-cost ﬁrms is
expected to increase, while that of high-cost ﬁrms will decline. They also
provide some empirical evidence showing that this occurred in several cases
of environmental regulation.
Because of the diﬀerences in costs of abatement, ﬁrms that are aﬀected
less than average by a particular policy instrument may support it because
it gives them a competitive advantage (Leone and Jackson (1981) and Oster
(1982)). There is some empirical support for this suggestion (see Keohane et
al. (1997) for an overview and Maloney and McCormick (1982)). However,
Leone and Jackson (1981) found that the intra-industry transfer argument
is not very important.
The theoretical literature on industry preferences for environmental pol-
icy instrument is not conclusive. It points to both direct regulation and
grandfathered tradable permits as the favored instruments of industry. Rea-
sons to prefer direct regulation are: (1) direct regulation leads to lower costs
for the polluters. The reason is that with taxes and tradable permits, a price
is paid for the residual emissions, possibly exceeding the eﬃciency gains,
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which is not the case with direct regulation; (2) industry has more inﬂuence
on policy with direct regulation than with market-based instruments; (3)
direct regulation creates rents that are distributed free to the industry; and
(4) because abatement demands are usually less stringent for existing plants
than for new ones, direct regulation can lead to a barrier to entry, beneﬁting
the incumbent ﬁrms.
Reasons to prefer grandfathered tradable permits are: (1) tradable per-
mits are eﬃcient and hence lead to low costs for the industry as a whole; (2)
grandfathered tradable permits create a rent; and (3) they also could create
a barrier to entry (although this is debatable).
When maximizing proﬁts is the objective, the conclusion derived from
formal models is that industry should prefer direct regulation or grand-
fathered tradable permits, because both create a rent. However, several
qualiﬁcations should be made. First, the result that direct regulation leads
to rents will only hold in the long run if there are barriers to entry. If this is
not the case, new entrants to the market will compete the rents away. Sec-
ond, what is direct regulation? Buchanan and Tullock (1975) and Leidy and
Hoekman (1994) take emission ceilings, while Dewees (1983) uses relative
standards. Only Dijkstra (1999) analyzes the eﬀect of both forms of direct
regulation. Dijkstra (1999) shows that in the long run there is no diﬀerence
in proﬁtability between ceilings and relative standards. Third, only Dewees
(1983) and Dijkstra (1999) analyze some forms of both direct regulation
and tradable permits. Both authors conclude that industry should prefer
grandfathered tradable permits to direct regulation.
A few surveys exist that try to shed light on interest group preferences for
environmental policy instruments. Kelman (1981) was the ﬁrst to conduct
such a survey. In the survey, respondents only had a choice between direct
regulation and charges. Kelman found that industry was clearly opposed to
charges; 85% of the respondents were against them. At the same time, it
showed that industry was not very well informed about charges.
Wallart and Bu¨rgenmeier (1996) conducted a survey among major Swiss
ﬁrms, which also concentrated on emissions charges. They found a sur-
prisingly large acceptance of charges by industry. In all, two-thirds of the
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polluting ﬁrms were in favor of charges. However, Dijkstra (1999) conjec-
tures that the survey by Wallart and Bu¨rgenmeier (1996) may have been
wrongly designed, leading to the high acceptance of charges.
In a survey of American and Danish interest groups, Svendsen (1998b)
ﬁnds some diﬀerences between the industrial sectors in the two countries. In
the US, both industry and public electricity companies favor grandfathered
tradable permits because they perceive this instrument as both eﬃcient and
ﬂexible. Danish industry on the other hand prefers voluntary agreements;
the industry wants to take voluntary action to prevent state intervention.
Taxes are rejected because they will bring higher production costs. Grand-
fathered tradable permits are seen as a compromise solution. In contrast to
industry, Danish public electric utilities prefer taxes. In general they prefer
market-based instruments, but assess that Denmark is too small to have a
viable market in permits. The reason for this diﬀerence between industry
and public electric utilities is, according to Svendsen, that the utilities, being
heavily regulated, share interests with the state.
Dijkstra (1999) conducted a survey among Dutch interest groups in
which industry shows a preference for relative targets as opposed to absolute
ones. However, in general there is doubt in industry about market-based
instruments. Taxes especially are seen as detrimental to international com-
petitiveness. Industry also expects problems with the initial distribution of
tradable permits. The only industrial organization giving a direct preference
ordering preferred relative standards. Grandfathered tradable permits come
in second place; charges and auctioned tradable permits command very little
support. In comments given to the survey, several industrial organizations
express a preference for covenants or voluntary agreements because they are
ﬂexible and give a minimum of government interference. Tradable permits
are seen as a complement to voluntary agreements.
The outcome of the surveys is that American industry prefers grandfa-
thered tradable permits, while European industry prefers voluntary agree-
ments. Although more attention has been given to voluntary agreements
in the economic literature lately, the positive literature on environmental
policy choice has mostly ignored them. Voluntary agreements are however
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very attractive to industry. Through voluntary agreements with the gov-
ernment, industry can inﬂuence both the level of emissions and the policy
instrument used (Dietz and Van Der Straaten (1992)). Hence, voluntary
agreements provide industry with ample opportunities for rent-seeking (Ver-
bruggen (1991)).
In all, the theoretical studies seem to be supported by the surveys. Ac-
cording to the theoretical studies, shareholders should prefer direct regula-
tion or grandfathered tradable permits. The surveys shows that these are
the preferred instruments of industry. However, neither the theoretical, nor
the empirical analyses give a unanimous result.
Labor Unions
The preferences of workers are not often analyzed. One reason for this
is that labor unions are not seen as very inﬂuential in the environmental
debate. Environmental policy is not the core interest of unions, and hence,
they often have no policy on this issue. When the preferences of unions
are discussed in the literature on environmental policy choice, it is almost
always assumed that unions maximize employment.
Hochman and Zilberman (1978) make a connection between output and
employment. They examine the impact of taxes and relative standards and
conclude that the latter result in higher output and lower prices. Therefore,
workers will prefer relative standards.
Another analysis is oﬀered by Dewees (1983). He assumes that the gov-
ernment wants to reduce emissions per unit of production. Hence, total
production and thereby total emissions can vary per instrument. When
capital is ﬂexible, Dewees ﬁnds that employment will be highest when rela-
tive standards are used and lowest when market-based instruments are used.
The reason for this is that in the model, a ﬁxed portion of operating costs
goes to labor. With market instruments, a part of the ﬁrm’s revenue is for-
warded to the government with taxes, or to the shareholders with tradable
permits. With non-ﬂexible capital, there is no diﬀerence in the eﬀect on
employment between the instruments.
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In a model that is essentially the same as that of Buchanan and Tullock
(1975), Leidy and Hoekman (1994) include an analysis of the preferences
of workers. They argue that workers will prefer emission ceilings. Since
output is ineﬃciently high in the long run under emission ceilings, industry
employment will be higher with this instrument. Furthermore, industry
proﬁts are highest under emission ceilings. Workers will try to capture a
part of these proﬁts in the form of higher wages. Finally, under direct
emission ceilings, possible lay-oﬀs will occur at all ﬁrms, while with charges,
job losses only occur in connection with ﬁrm closures. The former option is
seen as more equitable.
Dijkstra (1999) analyzes the preferences of workers in a partial equi-
librium model. His assumption about worker preferences is that they are
mostly interested in employment. Dijkstra argues that in the short run,
employment will be highest with relative standards and lowest with market-
based instruments. This follows from the level of production, which is high-
est under relative standards and lowest under market-based instruments.
To compare employment levels in the long run, Dijkstra assumes that la-
bor costs are a ﬁxed percentage of operating costs, hereby following Dewees
(1983). The result is that employment will be lowest with market-based
instruments. Depending on the elasticity of demand for the produced good,
relative standards or emission ceilings give the highest employment in the
long run.
Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994) assume that workers prefer the policy in-
strument that maximizes employment in the regulated industry and the
stability of jobs within ﬁrms. They furthermore assume that the industry is
fully competitive and that there is a constant capital/labor ratio. Nentjes
and Dijkstra argue that workers prefer direct regulation to market-based
instruments. With direct regulation, total employment in the industry is
higher than with market-based instruments and more ﬁrms stay in the in-
dustry, meaning that fewer workers have to shift ﬁrm.
Keohane et al. (1997) use essentially the same assumptions as Nentjes
and Dijkstra (1994); unions seek to protect jobs and are therefore opposed to
instruments that lead to plant closures or industrial dislocations. Keohane
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et al. (1997) mention that direct regulation standards have generally been
tailored to protect aging plants, which would not be easy with market-based
instruments. Hence, they conclude that labor will prefer direct regulation
to market-based instruments.
Only Dijkstra (1999) gives empirical evidence on workers unions’ prefer-
ences for environmental policy instruments. The two Dutch unions included
in his survey do not give a unanimous preference ordering. One union (CNV)
prefers emission ceilings, with charges taking second place. Tradable per-
mits, whether auctioned or grandfathered are least preferred. The other
union (FNV) states a general preference for market-based instruments, al-
though it has some doubts about their practicability. Furthermore, the FNV
states that a combination of instruments often works best in practice.
The theoretical studies lead to a clear conclusion. Workers prefer direct
regulation because this gives the highest level of employment. The empirical
evidence, however, is less conclusive.
8.5.3 Environmental Organizations
In the literature, environmental organizations are thought of as guardians of
the environment. Their main, if not only, objective is to reduce emissions.
In the model by Dewees (1983), the government sets a standard per unit
of production. As a result, the instrument that gives the highest output also
gives the highest total level of pollution. Since market-based instruments
give the lowest output, Dewees argues that environmentalists should prefer
these to direct regulation.
Other arguments related to the level of emissions are given by Dijkstra
(1999). Environmentalists will be against tradable permits, because they
give ﬁrms the possibility of selling permits when the ﬁrm was going to reduce
emissions anyway. This could be in connection with the start of a new plant
replacing an older more polluting one, or when the ﬁrm goes out of business.
In these cases, the environmental movement would argue that total emissions
should be reduced.
Most models of environmental policy instrument choice take the target
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of emissions to be an absolute one. In that case, environmental organi-
zations should be indiﬀerent between instruments. However, if they are
risk-averse, they may have a preference ordering for the instruments. Leidy
and Hoekman (1994), for example, argue that environmental organizations
will prefer emission ceilings. Like Buchanan and Tullock (1975), they as-
sume that emissions can only be reduced by reducing output. In the model,
ﬁrms will have an incentive to produce more than their ceiling. However,
perfect monitoring ensures that they will not. Furthermore, the ﬁrms in the
industry will receive a rent from regulation, which will increase their proﬁts.
Therefore, they will be able to pay for an eventual clean up if they violate
the regulation. Contributing to this is that no ﬁrm will leave the market as
a result of the regulation.
Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994) also assume that environmental organiza-
tions are risk-averse. They argue that only emission charges give uncer-
tainty about the aggregate emission level. Nentjes and Dijkstra therefore
use another criterion to come to a preference ordering. They argue that if
environmental organizations assess that they are rather strong at lobbying,
they may have a preference for instruments that give revenue. Therefore,
Nentjes and Dijkstra conclude that environmental organizations prefer auc-
tioned tradable permits, since these give both a revenue and a high certainty
of realizing the objective.
Besides arguments based on the emission level or risk aversion, many
of the arguments used by environmental organizations are moral or ethi-
cal. These arguments are always directed against the use of market-based
instruments.
One of these arguments is that it is wrong to use market-based instru-
ments because the environmental problem is caused by a failure of the mar-
ket (Nentjes (1988)). It is furthermore said that marked-based instruments
give polluters a license to pollute (Kelman (1981)). After all, with tradable
permits or taxes, ﬁrms can emit as long as they are willing to pay for it.
Worst is the situation with grandfathered tradable permits, where the gov-
ernment gives polluters a right to emit for free. Environmental organizations
argue that the right to environmental quality belongs to the public and not
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to the polluters. Furthermore, ﬁrms should reduce emissions because it is
wrong to pollute, not because they can earn money (or save costs) doing so
(Dijkstra (1999)). Finally, environmentalists see the environment as price-
less. Therefore it is morally wrong to put a price on it through marked-based
instruments (Kelman (1981)).
Environmental organizations may also oppose market-based instruments
for strategic reasons (Keohane et al. 1997 and Dijkstra 1999). When per-
mits are given the status of property rights, it will be very hard to reduce
emissions to a lower level in the future without giving compensation to the
polluters (Hahn and Noll 1990). This can be remedied by explicitly stating
that the permits do not represent a property right, or by making the permits
only valid for a speciﬁc period of time (Keohane et al. 1997). Taxes will
also be hard to increase, since this instrument raises strong resistance from
industry.
One reason for environmental organizations to support market-based in-
struments is that they lower overall costs of compliance. Therefore, it could
be easier to reduce emissions to a lower level than with direct regulation.
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, taxes and auctioned tradable per-
mits yield a revenue. This could be earmarked for environmental protection
(Dijkstra 1999).
Keohane et al. (1997) make a connection between the preference of
instrument by environmental organizations and the level of membership and
thereby the budgetary resources of the organization. If the support for a
particular instrument attracts members, increases donations or increases
the visibility and prestige of the organization, it may aﬀect its preference of
instrument. Hence, if an environmental organization can distinguish itself
by supporting a certain instrument, it may be proﬁtable to do so. Keohane
et al. (1997) give the example of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),
which in contrast to other environmental organizations, supports tradable
permits.
Three surveys exist in which the attitudes of environmental organizations
toward environmental policy instruments are described. The ﬁrst one was
conducted by Kelman (1981). He ﬁnds that environmentalists are far from
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unanimous on the issue of charges. Of the 19 environmentalists interviewed,
32% supported charges, 16% favored experiments with taxes, while 37%
were against charges.
Svendsen (1998b) ﬁnds that US environmental organizations support
tradable permits. He argues that they have abandoned their philosophical
objections to market-based instruments because they need success. Envi-
ronmental organizations have realized that environmental improvement can
only come about with the cooperation of the polluters. Since the (US) pol-
luters prefer tradable permits, so do the environmental organizations (see
also Svendsen 1999). Svendsen (1998b) ﬁnds that Danish environmental
organizations support environmental taxes. However, they remain skeptical
about tradable permits. Svendsen attributes this to a lack of knowledge.
In a survey of Dutch interest groups, Dijkstra (1999) ﬁnds some support
for market-based instruments by environmental organizations. However, as
in the survey by Kelman (1981) there is considerable disagreement among
environmentalists as to which instrument is best. Furthermore, a mix of
instruments is often proposed. However, there is much agreement among
environmental organizations that the target of policy should be stated in
absolute terms and not in relative ones. This would imply emission ceilings
or tradable permits.
The above shows that environmental organizations should either prefer
emission ceilings or auctioned tradable permits. Both instruments give a
high certainty of realizing the abatement goal set. However, from the point
of view of environmental organizations, there are some important diﬀerences
between them. Tradable permits are less preferred for moral and ethical rea-
sons. On the other hand, auctioned tradable permits give a revenue that
could be used for further environmental improvements and grandfathered
tradable permits may make it easier to come to an agreement with industry.
In contrast to tradable permits, emissions ceilings allow control of individ-
ual polluters. The empirical evidence is as inconclusive as the theoretical
literature.
The literature discussed in this section gives some indications as to why
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market-based instruments are not used very much in environmental pol-
icy. First of all, none of the groups mentioned has a preference for taxes.
Actually, this lack of support for taxes is rather surprising. They are an
important source of revenue for the government and it can be expected that
politicians and bureaucrats have a large inﬂuence on how these revenues are
spent. Hence, one would expect them to have a preference for this instru-
ment. Also other interest groups could have an interest in taxes. Labor
unions, for example, could argue that the revenue of environmental taxes
should be used to lower distortionary taxes on labor. Environmental orga-
nizations could try to have the proceeds of environmental taxes earmarked
for further environmental improvements. However, such arguments are not
put forward in the literature. What is emphasized is that taxes give high
uncertainty about the realization of the policy objectives. It is mainly for
this reason that taxes are rejected by the groups mentioned.
Tradable permits only receive support from owners of ﬁrms and partly
from environmental organizations. It must be noted though that owners
support grandfathering of permits, while environmental organizations pre-
fer auctioning of permits. The other interest groups reject tradable permits
for several reasons. A prime problem is that tradable permits are a new in-
strument. Hence, all actors would incur learning costs when this instrument
is implemented. Furthermore, tradable permits give almost no possibility
for government inﬂuence on the polluter. Although this is seen as a blessing
by ﬁrms, politicians and bureaucrats would prefer to have inﬂuence on the
level of emissions and the abatement techniques used by individual ﬁrms.
Although environmental organizations should prefer tradable permits on ra-
tional grounds, several moral and ethical objections cause them to resent
this instrument. Hence, of all interest groups, only the owners of ﬁrms
are warm supporters of grandfathered tradable permits. All other interest
groups prefer some form of direct regulation.
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8.6 Assessment
The diﬀerent motives for the interest groups discussed in Section 4 are not
all taken into account in the public choice literature on preference for envi-
ronmental policy instruments, which was summarized in section 8.5. More
speciﬁcally, the motives of the interest groups are almost always equated
with the motives of the owners and donors. Managers are virtually non-
existent in this literature. In this section, we will assess whether taking all
motives into account, including those of managers, as discussed in section
8.3, will change the preferences of the interest groups reviewed in section
8.5 and whether this will aﬀect the outcome of the rent-seeking game. Fur-
thermore, some other factors are discussed that may aﬀect the choice of
instrument and some suggestions for further research are given.
Politicians are not often taken into consideration when the choice of envi-
ronmental policy instrument is analyzed. However, as discussed above, they
will have certain preferences, which may alter the outcome of the analy-
sis. Although they are not discussed often, all the motives mentioned in
Section 4.1.1 are discussed in the literature on environmental instrument
choice. Hence, we can conclude that politicians will mostly support direct
regulation.
Most of the motives of bureaucrats as mentioned in Section 4.1.2 are also
mentioned in the public choice literature on choice of instrument. A factor
that has not received much attention is that environmental bureaucrats may
have a preference for the output of their bureau, although it is implicit in
Nentjes and Dijkstra (1994).
Casual evidence from the Netherlands (Volkskrant 1999) shows that en-
vironmental bureaucrats see themselves as the guardians of the environment,
and not as the executors of ministerial decisions. Hence, the preferences of
the environmental bureaucracy may resemble those of environmental orga-
nizations to a large degree. Whether this resemblance is a result of capture
of the bureau by the environmental organizations, or of self-selection of en-
vironmental bureaucrats is not certain. As the discussion in the previous
section about environmental organizations shows, this will not lead to a
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unanimous preference of policy instrument. However, it may be that the
environmental bureaucrats share the moral and ethical objections against
economic instruments. This would imply that environmental bureaucrats
are mostly command expansionists, and therefore prefer direct regulation.
In the literature discussed above, the only objective of industry is to
maximize proﬁts. However, as we have seen in Section 4.2, this is the ob-
jective of the shareholders. Only a few authors mention this (e.g. Nentjes
and Dijkstra 1994 and Dijkstra 1999). When doing so, however, they do not
mention that there may be a conﬂict of interest between shareholders and
management.
The question is whether the objectives of managers will change the pref-
erence for environmental policy instrument. This could be when managers
have a preference for ﬁrm size, and more speciﬁcally for high levels of pro-
duction. Section 4.2.2 showed that ﬁrm managers will have such preferences.
However, it is highly implausible that such output preferences are absolute.
The manager will have to ﬁnd a compromise between the proﬁt and output
objectives. It can be modeled as a managerial utility function with proﬁts
and output as its components. It is also probable that for managers short
run outcomes count for more than long run results.
As Dijkstra (1999) shows, relative standards will result in a higher level
of production than all other instruments. In the short run then, when the
number of ﬁrms does not change, or if there is no entry even in the long run,
ﬁrm output will also be larger with relative standards than with any other
instruments. Managers would then prefer this instruments. However, in the
long run, with entry, Dijkstra (1999) shows that ﬁrm output is highest under
taxes and tradable permits, although the number of ﬁrms is lower than with
any other instrument. Managers may then prefer grandfathered tradable
permits, which is in perfect alignment with the preferences of shareholders.
However, the fact that market instruments leads to more exit of ﬁrms from
the industry will dampen the enthusiasm of managers for these instruments.
Therefore, which instrument managers prefer depends on the situation and
on whether or not they expect entry in the industry.
It is, however, not certain that managers can lobby for their own prefer-
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ences. If the inﬂuence of shareholders is large, managers will have to choose
the proﬁt-maximizing instrument, i.e. grandfathered tradable permits. If
on the other hand, shareholders have little inﬂuence, managers will be able
to push for relative standards. This may explain the apparent diﬀerences
between the US and Europe in preference for instrument by industry. In the
US, shareholder inﬂuence on management seems to be rather large. At the
same time, US industry prefers grandfathered tradable permits. In Europe
on the other hand, shareholder inﬂuence is not so large. As a consequence,
managers are able to lobby for their preferred instrument.
The most used assumption about the objective of labor unions is that
they maximize employment. Even though as we have seen above, labor
unions are more interested in maximizing employment than in maximiz-
ing wages, high wages are an important factor in labor union preferences.
Only Leidy and Hoekman (1994) mention that unions may prefer instru-
ments which maximize proﬁt, because the union hopes to capture part of
the proﬁts as higher wages. If we assume that employment is increasing
with production and wages are increasing with proﬁts, labor unions are
put in a dilemma. Relative standards cause the highest production level,
and thereby the highest level of employment. On the other hand, proﬁts
are highest with grandfathered tradable permits. Similar to ﬁrm managers,
one could model labor unions as maximizing a utility function with aspired
proﬁt share and employment (with sector output as its indicator). Again,
the union’s choice would depend on its priorities and the diﬀerences in im-
pact instruments have on union preferences. It is plausible that in times of
high unemployment priorities and choices would diﬀer from those in times
of labor shortage.
As was mentioned in Section 4, the leadership of labor unions will have
a preference for a large membership of their organizations. Since there
is a positive relationship between employment and membership, the union
leadership has an incentive to strive for maximum employment. Since most
studies take employment maximization as the objective of labor unions,
assuming that the leadership has an inﬂuence on the policy of the union will
not change the outcome. However, it must be noted that the assumption
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that unions maximize employment is never based on the preferences of the
union leadership.
The general assumption about environmental organizations in the pub-
lic choice literature discussed above is that they are risk-averse and want to
maximize environmental quality. Furthermore, they have an anti-economic
instrument bias because of moral and ethical reasons. From this it is con-
cluded that environmental organizations prefer direct regulation. The man-
agement of environmental organizations, on the other hand, prefers a large
membership. One main way of achieving this is by providing environmen-
tal quality, i.e. by having success. To realize this, the management may
be more willing to compromise with industry. Therefore, they may sup-
port grandfathered tradable permits. It should also be taken into account
that within environmental organizations the anti-market sentiments seems
to have lost in strength, similar to the development within the environmental
bureaucracy.
A factor that is almost never mentioned in the literature is that govern-
ments provide a large part of the funding for non-proﬁt organizations (Rose-
Ackerman 1996). The possibility of receiving state funding may change the
preferences of environmental organizations. State funding will most likely
ﬂow to environmental organizations that are willing to negotiate and com-
promise; those with extreme and uncompromising opinions will not easily
attract state funding. There are two advantages of state funding for the
management of environmental organizations. Firstly, it provides them with
additional funding, which can be used to improve environmental quality, but
also partly as discretionary spending by the management. Secondly, the gov-
ernment is less likely to hold the management accountable for the way the
funds are spent than private donors are. Hence, state funds give a greater
possibility for discretionary spending than private donations. For these rea-
sons, the management of environmental organizations may be willing to
compromise on some of their more extreme positions. A likely candidate is
their resistance to tradable permits. Hence, we expect that the possibility
of state funding will make the management of environmental organizations
more willing to support tradable permits.
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Taking into account the motives as discussed in Section 4 can make
some diﬀerence to the analysis. The clearest alteration in preferences occurs
within ﬁrms. When the motives of managers are taken to be dominant,
instead of those of the owners, the preference of industry shifts from grand-
fathered tradable permits to relative standards. Hence, now even industry is
opposed to market-based instruments. The result would be that all interest
groups have a preference for some form of direct regulation, which could
explain why market-based instruments are so little used.
Taking more motives into account with bureaucrats and labor unions
does not alter the analysis dramatically. Environmental bureaucrats may
share some of the moral objections to market-based instruments with envi-
ronmental organizations. This will make them prefer direct regulation even
more. In labor unions, the preference for higher wage by the members is not
often taken into account. Such a preference would lead to a greater support
for grandfathered tradable permits. However, the preference of the union
leadership for a large membership counters this factor. In the end, labor
unions are most likely to stress the eﬀects on employment than on wages.
There are several gaps in the literature. One point is the cost savings that
can be brought about by emissions trading. In many studies, the cost savings
of emissions trading, even in less than perfect forms, are given to be in the
range of 20 to 60 % (Klaassen 1996; Boom et al. 1998; Schmalensee et al.
1998). To industry, costs of environmental regulation are one of the most
important factors to object it. Hence, they should embrace emissions trading
when regulation is inevitable. Furthermore, the costs saving, together with
the rents given to shareholders when permits are grandfathered, should make
it possible to compensate other groups that resist emissions trading. With
emissions trading, environmental policy can be stricter, while still leading
to lower costs to industry. Lower emissions are in the interest of both the
environmental bureaucracy and environmental organizations. Hence, they
should also be supporters of emissions trading.
A shift in attitude towards tradable permits is therefore also visible.
Other factors also work in favor of the implementation of grandfathered
tradable permits. There is a general decline in the anti-market sentiment.
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This aﬀects the attitudes of environmental organizations, the environmen-
tal bureaucracy and politicians. Furthermore, experience with SO2 permit
trading in the USA has shown that this is a very eﬀective and eﬃcient instru-
ment. Earlier forms of emissions trading in the USA had already shown that
large cost improvements could be gained from emissions trading. However,
these schemes were often rather cumbersome and overtly bureaucratic. The
SO2 scheme in the US and the recently introduced CO2 emissions trading
scheme in the EU are however much better designed and are projected to
lead to high cost savings. The introduction of the CO2 trading scheme in the
EU has also forced Member States to change their legislation to make such
trade legally feasible. This should open the door to the use of grandfathered
tradable permits in other ﬁelds too.
Many analyses include direct regulation, but often it is not speciﬁed
which type of direct regulation is meant. This is a problem since the diﬀerent
forms of direct regulation have a rather diﬀerent impact on the regulated
industry. In many cases, direct regulation is taken to be synonymous with
emission ceilings. However, this is not an often used instrument in practice.
Here, voluntary agreements, technological standards and relative standards
are the most popular instruments.
Especially problematic is the lack of interest in voluntary agreements.
As we mentioned, voluntary agreements can be seen as a type of direct regu-
lation since they specify the tasks for the involved sources, often in the form
of relative standards. But there are also some important diﬀerences with
direct regulation in general. In the ﬁrst place, the exchange of information
between bureaucrats and ﬁrm representatives and between the latter them-
selves make it possible to diﬀerentiate standards between ﬁrms on the on
the basis of diﬀerences in abatement costs, whereas with conventional reg-
ulation standards tend to rather uniform. Therefore, voluntary agreements
deliver cost savings compared to direct regulation, which makes them more
eﬃcient. Next to that, enforcement of compliance is more complicated than
with direct regulation. Firms therefore could strategically use voluntary
agreements to delay full compliance. Furthermore, the negotiations with
the regulating agency brings ﬁrms in a position where they can try to bring
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down the total emission reduction proposed by the environmental bureau-
cracy. All three characteristics, which distinguish standard setting under
voluntary agreements from standards under regulation, make that indus-
try will prefer voluntary agreements over direct regulation through relative
standards.
Another instrument not often discussed is credit trading. Here, the in-
dustry is regulated through relative standards. These standards are often
rather uniform, so that marginal abatement costs may vary between ﬁrms.
However ﬁrms are allowed to sell emission reduction credits when they can
stay below the emission target deﬁned by the standard. Other ﬁrms can
buy credits so that they can emit more than the standard. This introduces
ﬂexibility in several ways. Because of the relative standard, ﬁrms can in-
crease emissions when they want to increase output. Furthermore, marginal
abatement costs can be equalized between ﬁrms. Firms should prefer credit
trading to regulation through relative standards because of the added ﬂexi-
bility.
As mentioned, credit trading requires uniform relative standards in order
to keep administrative costs, including monitoring and enforcement costs,
low and credit trade transparent. The Dutch NOx credit trading program
is a good illustration. Consequently, voluntary agreements with their dif-
ferentiated standards are not a good basis for credit trading. Therefore, it
makes sense to see voluntary agreements and credit trading as alternatives
for making direct regulation through relative standards more ﬂexible. Both
alternatives bring cost savings but with credit trading these are highest since
it makes equalization of marginal abatement costs possible. With voluntary
agreements this will only be the case if ﬁrms have identical abatement cost
functions.
Besides industry, other interest organizations also support voluntary
agreements and credit trading. The lower costs mean that output can stay
higher, implying higher employment in the industry, so that labor unions
will favor these two instruments. The lower compliance costs also make it
easier for industry to comply with the national emission target, which is in
the interest of the environmental bureaucracy. Furthermore, the cost savings
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may make it possible to induce industry to abate more. This would be in the
interest of both the environmental bureaucracy and environmental organi-
zations. Voluntary agreements also require large input of bureaucratic labor
in the negotiation phase and in monitoring and enforcement. Furthermore,
they give the bureaucracy a certain level of control with the industry.
Based on the overview of the literature and our assessment, we present
the following preferences of the diﬀerent interest groups, summarized in Ta-
ble 8.1. Industry will have a preference for voluntary agreements or credit
trading, especially when the interest of managers dominates shareholders’
interests. In the reverse case, industry will prefer auctioned tradable permits
since this gives the highest rents to shareholders. Labor unions will prefer
credit trading since these give the highest level of output. They will also
support voluntary agreements, especially when these specify diﬀerentiated
relative standards for individual ﬁrms. Environmental organizations prefer
tradable permits, since this gives them a high certainty that the overall tar-
get is realized and makes it possible to set a more stringent policy because
of the costs saving to industry. However, environmental organizations will
prefer permits to be auctioned, so that the right to pollute is not given away
for free. The environmental bureaucracy will prefer voluntary agreements
because they give lower compliance costs which should result in better com-
pliance. Furthermore they give the bureaucracy a measure of control with
industry and require high input of bureaucratic labor. Next is credit trading
because this also gives lower costs to industry and is not a large departure
from current policy. Finally, command minimalists within the bureaucracy
may prefer grandfathered tradable permits because they give a high cer-
tainty of achieving the emission target, while leaving the industry free in
the choice of abatement method.
8.7 Conclusions
To understand why certain policy instruments are implemented and others
not, insight is needed into the motivations of the agents involved. First
of all, the actors that are involved in the process of policy making need
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Table 8.1: Preferences of Interest Groups
Industry Labor Unions Environmental Environmental
organizations bureaucracy
1
Voluntary Credit Auctioned Voluntary








to be properly deﬁned. In all instances, managers play an important role.
They steer the organization and they lobby for a certain instrument. The
preferences of the owners or donors of the organization are important. But
these should not be equated with the preferences of the organizations. In all
organizations, the managers will have opportunities to act at least partly so
as to fulﬁll their own objectives.
The public choice literature on environmental policy instrument choice
most often does not take this aspect into account. This is most problematic
in the analysis of ﬁrms. Shareholders will want the ﬁrm to maximize proﬁts.
The instrument that does this is a system of grandfathered tradable permits.
The managers of the ﬁrm, however, also have a preference for a large scale
of production. They may therefore lobby for relative standards, which al-
low the largest production level. In other organizations, the preferences of
managers do matter, but do not always have a decisive inﬂuence on the pref-
erence for instrument. The preference of managers for relative standards can
partly explain why market-based instruments are seldom used. Not only the
regulator, but also the regulated party, opposes such instruments.
Also, other aspects are sometimes forgotten. Workers will prefer both
high employment and high wages. The literature on instrument choice how-
ever, almost unanimously connects labor unions with the goal of maximizing
employment. Environmental organizations may compromise on their moral
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objections to tradable permits to receive state funding and to achieve success
in supplying environmental quality.
Taking the motivations of managers into account does not in general
lead to more unequivocal results. When politicians are allowed to have an
ideology, the group falls apart in two sub-groups: those that want to reduce
government control over ﬁrms and those that want to expand it. The same
division is apparent in the environmental bureaucracy. In explaining the
outcome of environmental policy, one should therefore investigate which of
the two groups was dominant within both politics and the environmental
bureaucracy.
This is not to say that the literature on the choice of environmental
policy instrument so far has not made any contribution to explaining the
dominance of direct regulation. It shows that most organizations have a pref-
erence for direct regulation, although for diﬀerent reasons. The literature is
rather unanimous in its conclusion that the dominance of direct regulation,
speciﬁcally the practice of setting relative standards, can be explained by
the support it has from about all major interest groups. The literature even
suggests that other instruments hardly have a chance of being introduced.
However, one sees change and perhaps even the beginning of the rise
of market instruments. These facts point to a weakness in the literature:
interest group preferences for instruments are ranked and those rankings
are presented as if they are absolute, neglecting the fact that losses from
accepting a less preferred instrument could be compensated. In particular,
it is overlooked that grandfathered permits, compared to direct regulation,
often promise huge savings in abatement costs, exceeding the rather mod-
est increase in administrative costs. Cost savings from 30 to 50% are no
exception. Next to that, grandfathered tradable permits promise additional
wealth to capital owners. Together, the cost savings and the wealth transfer
to capital owners constitute a rent that can be used to compensate interest
groups for the loss of accepting grandfathered tradable permits and sacri-
ﬁcing their favorite instrument. In the US, the sulfur allowance program
for power stations could be introduced instead of the originally planned sys-
tem of stringent SO2 emission standards. The deal made here was more
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emission reduction than in the original program to satisfy environmental
organizations while abatement costs were still lower for industry. At the
same time, regions where negative employment impacts in mines winning
high sulfur coal could be expected received large compensations. In the
end almost all parties accepted the permit program and the law introducing
the scheme passed Congress and the Senate with almost unanimous sup-
port. It seems astonishing that economists who have stressed the eﬃciency
of market instruments from the beginning have been blind for the potential
the rent thus created oﬀers to negotiate a political solution to make these
instruments acceptable to all major interest groups.
A further gap in the literature is its neglect of credit trading. Credit
trading basically is a scheme of relative standards made ﬂexible by allow-
ing trade between sources with emission above and below the level deﬁned
by the standard. It promises industry savings in abatement costs, similar
to permit trading, without the limits on total emissions set by the permit
scheme. Evidently, industry will prefer relative standards with the ﬂexibility
of credit trading above emission standards without trade. The same holds
true for labor unions. The rent created by the cost savings also oﬀers scope
for compensating the loss of environmental organizations and the environ-
mental bureaucracy, which may be suspicious of allowance trade in pollu-
tion. Compensation could take the form of more stringent relative standards
while leaving suﬃciently lower abatement costs compared to direct regula-
tion without credit trade. These considerations suggest that credit trading
can expect broad political support of interest groups in all those domains
where it is feasible and promises considerable cost savings.
Another gap in the literature is the scant attention given to voluntary
agreements. With voluntary agreements, the emission target for the sector
under consideration is negotiated between the sector and the government.
Thereafter, ﬁrms within the sector can negotiate how to distribute the over-
all target over the individual ﬁrms. This often leads to considerable cost
savings to industry compared to standards that are set by the environ-
mental agency, even when the overall target is identical in the two cases.
Considering the advantages of voluntary agreements for industry, it may
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even be preferred to credit trading. To illustrate this point, it should be
mentioned that in the Netherlands thinking about and preparation of credit
trading for NOx emissions only started after prolonged eﬀorts to conclude a
covenant, which failed. The bottleneck was that the ﬁrms to be regulated
were too many and too heterogeneous to strike a deal on diﬀerentiated stan-
dards. Voluntary agreements also ask for high labor input for negotiations,
monitoring and enforcement. This may make it an attractive option for the
environmental bureaucracy. It also scores on two other dimensions cared for
by environmental bureaucrats: lowering abatement costs and keeping con-
trol over the industry. Consequently, industry as well as the environmental
bureaucracy may prefer voluntary agreements as a way to make regulation
more ﬂexible. The conclusion is that voluntary agreements compete with
credit trading and may develop side by side in the future to overcome the






To reduce the overall costs of committing to the national abatement obliga-
tions the Kyoto Protocol contains three ﬂexibility instruments: Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) (Art. 6), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Art.
12) and International Emissions Trading (IET) (article 17). JI and CDM
are both project-based instruments, where a baseline of emissions has to
be estimated per project and emission reductions are measured against this
baseline. The main diﬀerence between JI and CDM is that JI can only take
place between Annex B countries which have committed to an emission ceil-
ing in the period 2008-12, while with CDM the host country is a non-Annex
B country. IET can only take place between Annex B countries and amounts
to a transfer of greenhouse gas quotas between countries.
The basic design of JI and CDM is rather clear, however the Kyoto Pro-
tocol does not specify how international emissions trading should be con-
ducted. Basically, there are three possible schemes of international emissions
trading: government trading, permit trading and credit trading.
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The description of emissions trading in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
clearly refers to trade between governments, although private trading has
not been dismissed. In the case of government trading, trading can be seen
as a bilateral renegotiation of the abatement commitments of the trading
countries. After the trade is concluded, the countries involved will have to
change the stringency of domestic policies to comply with their new commit-
ment. It will be clear that government trading does not require a speciﬁc
domestic instrument. Hence, government trading is compatible with any
instrument applied at the national level.
Permit trading and credit trading are both private trading schemes. This
means that under both schemes, individual emission sources will be able to
trade directly with each other. International permit trading means that
emissions sources are regulated through a system of tradable permits at
the national level. International permit trading can then be conducted by
linking the national trading schemes. With credit trading, the sources are
regulated at the national level through some other instrument, most likely a
relative standard, and sources that perform better than the standard can sell
emission reduction credits to sources with emissions above the the standard
set.
With joint implementation and CDM, it is not necessary that domes-
tic policy has been implemented. Both instruments are based on emission
reduction projects where for each project an estimate is made about the
expected emissions in a business as usual scenario over the projects period.
The project will then deliver emission reduction credits if real emissions are
below business as usual emissions. Since the credits created by JI and CDM
represent a certain amount of emission reductions, they can be traded on
an international emissions market just as the permits and credits created
through permit and credit trading. This then makes it possible to con-
nect countries to the international emissions market even when they are not
linked to such a market though a national permit or credit trading scheme.
The emissions trading schemes mentioned above have diﬀerent character-
istics; they have a diﬀerent impact on factors such as proﬁts, environmental
eﬀectiveness, compatibility with domestic instruments etc. For a review of
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the literature on this subject, the reader is referred to chapter 3. Because of
the diﬀerence in characteristics between schemes, it is likely that diﬀerent
interest groups will have diﬀerent preferences, and will be willing to sacri-
ﬁce resources to ensure that their most preferred instrument is implemented.
One has to note though that what is traded on the international emissions
market are emission reductions. It does not matter whether these are cred-
its, permits, Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from government trading, or
emission reduction units from JI or CDM. What matters is the manner in
which domestic industry is regulated and subsequently connected to the
international emissions market.
In this chapter, we present both a theoretical analysis and empirical ev-
idence of the preferences of interest groups for an international emissions
trading scheme and building on the results of chapter 8 on preferences for
national instrument. We analyze the preferences of industry, labor unions,
environmental organizations and the environmental bureaucracy in the the-
oretical part of the chapter. However, in the empirical part, we only discuss
industry and environmental organizations. The reason for this is that these
two groups are most visible.
Since there are no surveys available on the preference of interest groups
for an international trading regime, we have chosen to gather information on
the Internet. This was done in the year 2000, which is why newer information
is not taken into account. Because interest groups are also interested in
the support of the general public, we expected that they would provide
information on their opinions on this medium. In general this was right,
although environmental organizations use the Internet more as a platform
for distributing information than industry does.
Gathering information in this way may cause some problems. The or-
ganizations that present themselves on the Internet may only be a selection
of the total number of organizations involved. Although this may be true,
it is also an advantage. Only organizations that have formed an opinion
and want to inﬂuence policy makers and public opinion are present on the
Internet. Other groups may be aﬀected, but as long as they do not form an
opinion themselves, they will not aﬀect the decision making process and are
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therefore irrelevant to this study.
Three problems arise when analyzing interest group preferences for an
international emissions trading scheme. First of all, there is an interde-
pendence between the choice of national instrument and the choice of in-
ternational trading scheme. International permit trading is, in essence, an
international linkage of national tradable permit schemes. Hence tradable
permit schemes are a prerequisite for international permit trading. Similarly,
national credit trading is a prerequisite for international credit trading. On
the other hand, government trading and JI can be combined with any na-
tional instrument. The consequence of this is that if an interest group prefers
permit or credit trading at the national level, it cannot logically choose an-
other trading scheme at the international level. The preferences for national
instrument by the diﬀerent interest groups has been discussed in chapter 8.
In this chapter, we take the conclusions from chapter 8 as a starting point
for our analysis on preferences for international trading scheme.
A second problem is the existence of ‘hot air’. By ‘hot air’ we mean
that some countries have received a higher emission ceiling in the Kyoto
Protocol than their real emissions will be. These countries can therefore
sell emission quotas without reducing emissions. Although this in itself is
seen as a problem by some, it also expands the discussion on the choice
of international trading scheme. If one can stop the trade in hot air, total
emissions will be lower than with hot air trading. Since the three trading
schemes and JI give diﬀerent opportunities to limit the trade in hot air, the
preference of trading scheme now becomes dependent on the preference for
emission level.
The third problem is that some groups have the view that Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol should do their utmost to achieve the emission target in
the Kyoto Protocol solely through domestic measures. Several arguments
for this are mentioned. The most important one is that it adds pressure
on politicians and industry to invest in research and development leading
to new, low-cost abatement options. This would set the stage for further
emission reductions in a next commitment period after the ﬁrst period from
2008 to 2012. Groups adhering to this view would rather have no interna-
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tional emissions trading at all. Seeing that this is not possible, since the
Kyoto Protocol already allows it, they would like to limit trade in emissions
as much as possible. In this respect, they are even more radical than the
groups that want to eliminate hot air (although there is a certain overlap
between these groups). Similar to both is that their resentment of inter-
national emissions trading will aﬀect their preference for the three types of
international emissions trading.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical
analysis of interest group preferences is given in section 9.2 and the empirical
evidence is discussed in section 9.3. Finally, in section 9.4 we give some
conclusions.
9.2 Interest Group Preferences: Theory
In this section, we will give an analysis of the preferences of interest groups
for an international emissions trading scheme. The three possible schemes
are permit trading, credit trading and government trading. Furthermore,
we will discuss the position of the interest groups with respect to limits on
trading.
Industry In chapter 8, we concluded that industry’s ﬁrst preference for
national instrument is voluntary agreements. Industry’s second and third
choice are credit and permit trading.
As we have seen in chapter 8, voluntary agreements are high in the pref-
erence ranking of industry. This instrument is more ﬂexible than uniform
performance standards or emission ceilings and will help to lower abate-
ment costs. However, when voluntary agreements (or direct regulation)
are implemented at the national level, the national market institutions for
international permit or credit trading are lacking. The only instruments
for international emissions trading that remain are government trading and
joint implementation. The question then is whether it is in the interest of
industry to have government trading as a complement to national voluntary
agreements. The answer to that question depends on whether the country is
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a seller or buyer of emission quotas. By buying emission quotas on the inter-
national market, there is scope to relax the emission targets for voluntary
agreements and direct regulation. In this case industry will support gov-
ernment trading since this will lead to lower costs for industry. In case the
country is a potential seller, industry will not always support government
trading. Much depends on who receives the proceeds of trading. Industry
will argue that since they deliver the emission reductions that back the sale
of emissions, they also have a right to the proﬁts from the trade. If indus-
try receives the full proceeds from trading, it will back government trading.
However, if it does not, and receives less than its costs (or even nothing),
industry will oppose government trading vehemently.
National relative standards or national credit trading are second (or
perhaps ﬁrst) in the ranking of industry’s preferences. If credit trading is
implemented nationally, ﬁrms can easily be connected to the international
emissions market. The question is again whether or not this is in the inter-
est of industry. Suppose that marginal abatement cost functions of industry
are uniform and that the emission quota price on the international market
is higher (lower) than the credit price on the national market. In that case
all ﬁrms will be sellers (buyers) on the international emission quota mar-
ket and will have beneﬁts from international trade, either through higher
revenues or through lower costs. Industry will thus support international
emissions trading unanimously without any restrictions. However, unanim-
ity will disappear if marginal abatement costs diﬀer between ﬁrms. Now
low-cost ﬁrms are sellers and high-cost ﬁrms are buyers on the national
market. If the international quota price is above the national credit price,
international trade is unequivocally in the interest of ﬁrms that will become
sellers on the international market. However, for ﬁrms that already were
buyers on the national market and that will still be buyers on the inter-
national market costs will increase and hence they will lose from the shift
to international emissions trading. But it will normally be such that some
ﬁrms that are buyers on the national market will become sellers on the in-
ternational market when the international price is above the national one.
It is not immediately clear whether these ﬁrms will gain or lose from inter-
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national emissions trading. If the international price is below the national
price, the reverse will be the case. Therefore, there will only be unanimous
support for international emissions trading when all ﬁrms become either
sellers or buyers on the international market. That will be the case if the
international quota price diverges enough from the national credit price. If
this is not the case, the position of industry as a group depends on the gains
or losses of the dominant subgroups within industry.
Industry may also prefer a national grandfathered permit trading scheme
if shareholders’ interest in high proﬁts dominates managers’ preferences and
decisions. Also a national permit trading scheme can easily be connected
to an international emissions trading market. Whether industry prefers
international emissions trading again depends on the relation between the
national and international permit price. Suppose that potential buyers of
quotas dominate the industry lobby and that the international quota price is
below the national price. International emissions trading will then lower the
total costs of abatement and permit expenditure for buyers of quotas, similar
to the case of credits. However in this case ﬁrms have received permits for
free and the value of the grandfathered permits are a rent to shareholders.
The lower international price of permits then also lowers the rent reﬂected
in the value of shareholders’ stock. This means that now there is a trade-
oﬀ between the direct loss for shareholders and improved prospects for the
ﬁrm due to lower costs of output. The latter may give short run proﬁts,
but more importantly will increase the likelihood that the ﬁrm will survive,
especially if it operates on an international output market where some of its
competitors are not regulated. In this case, a prediction about the ﬁrm’s
preference cannot be made. Whether it is in favor of international emissions
trading depends on the impact of the two eﬀects. In Table 9.1 four possible
cases are given. Only for ﬁrms that are sellers both on the national and
the international market an unambiguous assessment of preference can be
made. These ﬁrms are against international emissions trading when the
international emissions price is lower and are in favor when the international
emissions price is higher than the domestic permit price. For all other cases,
the outcome is ambiguous.
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Table 9.1: Impact of a shift to international emissions trading on permit
rent and ﬁrm costs




rent lower − rent higher +
cost lower + cost higher −
Seller
rent lower − rent higher +
cost higher − cost lower +
Support for private emissions trading, be it credit or permit trading,
does not prevent industry from supporting government trading at the same
time. If the government buys emission quotas in the international market,
there is room to relax the stringency of national environmental policy. As
long as the additional emissions are handed out for free to industry, this
would be a gain to them. For credit trading it would imply more lenient
relative standards, while for grandfathered tradable permits it would mean
a larger initial distribution of permits. In all cases, abatement costs would
be lower for industry. For permit trading, it could mean a larger rent to
shareholders if ﬁrms are allowed to trade internationally. If not, the domes-
tic price of permits would decrease as a result of the higher total ceiling
on emissions, which would counteract the larger distribution of permits to
industry. Industry would however oppose government trading if this implies
sale of emission quotas that are backed by more stringent environmental
policy toward industry.
The conclusions of the analysis of industry preferences for international
emissions trading scheme are summarized in table 9.2. It appears that sup-
port for international emissions trading depends on whether the industry is
a seller or buyer of quotas in the international emissions market in the case
of voluntary agreements or direct regulation; on being a seller or buyer and
on the international emissions price compared to the national credit price in
case of national credit trading; and with permit trading both these and the
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impact on the rents to the shareholders. It turns out that it is far from clear
which instrument of international emissions trading industry prefers and
their support for international ﬂexibility instruments is far less than for na-
tional ﬂexibility instruments. Furthermore, it is easier to determine whether
industry supports international emissions trading the less sophisticated the
national instrument is. For example if industry is a buyer of emissions quo-
tas on the international market, they will support international trade when
voluntary agreements are the national instrument. If the national instru-
ment is credit trading, industry will support international trade in this case
when next to being a buyer, the international quota price is below the na-
tional credit price. With permit trading as national instrument it is hard to
say when industry will support international emissions trading when it is in
a position of being a buyer.
Labor unions The discussion on labor unions in chapter 8 showed that
their prime concern is employment. Assuming that employment is closely
related to output, labor unions should have a preference for instruments that
lead to the lowest decrease in output possible when environmental policy
is implemented. Their ﬁrst preference therefore is credit trading or relative
standards. However, they will also support voluntary agreements, especially
if these set relative standards for the individual ﬁrm.
For international emissions trading this implies that private trading is
possible if credit trading were implemented at the national level, otherwise
government trading and JI are possible. Whether labor unions support inter-
national emissions trading depends on whether the international emissions
quota price is lower than the domestic credit price (or whether the govern-
ment buys quotas). In that case, connection to the international emissions
market will mean that the regulated industry can reduce marginal costs and
expand production. On the other hand, a higher price than the domestic
one implies that marginal costs will rise and production will go down.
Hence, labor unions will support international emissions trading when
the international emissions quota price is below the national credit price. If
this case labor unions will reject a cap on trading; after all, such a cap will
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increase the cost of compliance for industry and thereby lower production.
Environmental organizations The main objective of environmental
organizations is to reduce pollution as much as possible. If there are any
targets, they must be met with as much certainty as possible. Only emis-
sion ceilings and tradable permits give certainty about the attainment of the
target and should therefore be the preferred instruments of environmental
organizations. Although traditionally environmental organizations have had
reservations about the use of tradable permits, lately they have been more
positive about this instrument. As we mentioned in the previous chapter,
with grandfathered tradable permits it is possible to abate more while at the
same time lowering costs relative to traditional command and control types
of regulation. Hence industry is willing to accept more stringent targets with
tradable permits than with direct regulation which is exactly what environ-
mental organizations want. However, diﬀerent from industry, environmental
organizations prefer the permits to be auctioned instead of grandfathered so
that the right to pollute is not given away for free.
Some countries have received hot air under the Kyoto Protocol. This
means that these countries can sell emission quotas without having to reduce
emissions. Hence, if the trade in hot air could be banned, total emissions
would be lower. For this reason environmental organizations may resist
international emissions trading in any of the three forms.
Besides the hot air argument, environmental organizations have a second
argument against international emissions trading. Restricting trade will
force industry to invest more in research and development of abatement
technology, making abatement cheaper. This would create more favorable
conditions for future negotiations on emission reductions (Woerdman 2002,
ch. 8).
A third reason to distrust international emissions trading is the fear that
it will deteriorate compliance of Annex B countries to the Protocol. For
example, if seller countries cannot be relied on to reduce their emissions in
accordance with their quota sales, and buyer countries see purchased quotas
as a legitimization to increase emissions, the prospects to realize the overall
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emission reduction target set in the Protocol will deteriorate. This concern
also spawned the discussion on whether sellers or buyers should be liable
for noncompliance by sellers of emission quotas (see Woerdman (2002, pp.
148-154) for an overview).
The consequence of these considerations is that if international trading
cannot be prevented, environmental organizations at least want a cap to
be imposed on the amount of permits bought abroad. This could at least
limit the negative environmental impacts that environmental organizations
expect from international emissions trading. Such a cap is however not easily
administered under permit and credit trading. If industry is only allowed
to purchase say 50% of their target abroad, does this then apply to every
individual ﬁrm or to industry as a whole? In the latter case, which ﬁrms are
allowed to trade? Furthermore, it may not be immediately clear whether
emission quotas bought are foreign or domestic. Hence, a cap on trading
can only work properly in the case of government trading. There are of
course other possibilities to limit international emissions trading. One could
for example limit trading to countries that do not have hot air and/or that
have a strong monitoring and enforcement policy. Also these limitations to
trading are most easily implemented in a government trading scheme.
We therefore expect that environmental organizations will oppose in-
ternational emissions trading, both in the form of private and government
trading, even though they do accept national permit trading. If international
emissions trading is inevitable, environmental organizations will prefer gov-
ernment trading since it then is possible to limit emissions trading in several
ways.
Environmental bureaucrats The bureaucracy has several motives.
Bureaucrats will be risk-averse, prefer a large bureau, resist new methods,
minimize resistance to their decisions and may have a preference for the
output of the bureau, that is they want to realize the national emission
target. Furthermore, they are split into command minimalists and command
expansionists.
As we saw in chapter 8, the environmental bureaucracy is divided over
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the choice of national instrument. The bureaucracy may have a preference
for voluntary agreements since these provide ﬂexibility to industry but still
give the bureaucracy a measure of control with the industry and they require
high bureaucratic labor input for the negotiations with industry. On the
other hand, relative standards are an already much used instrument. These
could relatively easily be made ﬂexible by allowing credit trading. However,
a part of the environmental bureaucracy wants less control with industry
and may therefore prefer permit trading.
Whether environmental bureaucrats support international emissions trad-
ing depends on whether the country will become a seller or a buyer of emis-
sion quotas in the international market. The less domestic industry has
to reduce emissions, the easier it is to attain the target. Therefore, bu-
reaucrats will support international emissions trading when the country is a
buyer. Selling permits is equivalent to more stringent environmental policy,
which will be harder to realize by industry. Bureaucrats will therefore not
support international emissions trading when the country becomes a seller.
Which form of international emissions trading scheme the environmen-
tal bureaucracy will prefer depends partly on their preference for national
instruments. If voluntary agreements are implemented, only government
trading and JI are possible ﬂexibility instruments, while if credit or permit
trading are implemented, both private and government trading are possible.
The question however is which scheme environmental bureaucrats prefer. If
industry would be a buyer of emission quotas internationally, the bureau-
cracy should be in favor of international private trading since this will make
it easier for industry to comply with the national target. But the environ-
mental bureaucracy may reject unfettered private trading.
One reason is that bureaucrats share with environmental organizations a
concern that international emissions trading will deteriorate the environmen-
tal eﬀectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Hot air will be seen as a problem as
well as possible non-compliance by sellers of emission quotas. Furthermore,
the environmental bureaucracy will demand a certain minimum abatement
eﬀort from domestic industry. This will increase the bureaucrats’ control
with the industry and lead to more national innovation in abatement tech-
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nology. These arguments all lead to a preference to restrict international
trade in emissions in certain ways. One possibility is to place a cap on
trading. This will lead to a certiﬁed level of domestic action, as wanted by
the bureaucrats. However, it does as such not prevent trade in hot air. To
achieve this, bureaucrats could push for government trading, which gives
them full control over who the trading parties are and how much is traded.
Another possibility is to ban trade with hot air countries and countries that
do not have an eﬀective emission monitoring and enforcement policy.
The conclusions for the environmental bureaucracy are presented in Ta-
ble 9.2. The bureaucracy will support international emissions trading when
the country is a buyer of emission quotas since this will increase the pos-
sibilities of compliance with the Kyoto commitment. However, it does not
support unfettered trade, but would like some limit both on how much is
bought abroad and who to buy from. Here, the bureaucracy would like to
restrict trade with hot air countries and with countries without proper con-
trol and enforcement policies. Limiting trade in this way can most easily
be achieved by only allowing government trading. If private trading is un-
avoidable, there should at least be a ban on trade with hot air countries and
those with ineﬀective enforcement policies.
Whether interest groups support international emissions trading depends
highly on the position of domestic industry vis a vis the international emis-
sion quota market. If the industry becomes a buyer in the international
market this will lower costs, increase output and make it easier to comply
with the national Kyoto commitment. On these grounds, industry, labor
unions and the environmental bureaucracy will support international emis-
sions trading when the country becomes a buyer of quotas. If on the other
hand the country becomes a seller, labor unions and the environmental bu-
reaucracy will not favor international emissions trading, while industry may
still favor it as long as it can proﬁt from it. Only environmental organiza-
tions resist international emissions trading in all cases.
Another result is that there is much support for government trading,
although for diﬀerent reasons. Industry hopes that emission quotas bought
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Table 9.2: Preferences of interest groups
National International Trade International
instrument trade limits instrument
Industry
VA yes or no no gov. trade; JI
credit trading yes or no no private and gov.
gr. permit trading yes or no no private and gov.
Labor
Unions
credit trading yes or no no private
VA yes or no no gov. trad.; JI
Env. org. Auct. permits no yes gov. trad.; JI
Bureaucracy
VA yes or no yes gov. trade; JI
credit trading yes or no yes gov. and private
gr. permit trading yes or no yes gov. and private
Note: gr. = grandfathered, gov.= government trading
by the government abroad will be distributed to them for free, thus lowering
compliance costs. For the environmental bureaucracy and environmental or-
ganizations, government trading gives most control with how much is traded
and who is traded with.
Since limits on trading increase the costs of compliance, industry and
labor unions will reject them. Environmental organizations and the environ-
mental bureaucracy, on the other hand, will support them. Their reasons
are that limits to trading can diminish the use of hot air and trade with
countries without eﬀective monitoring and control. Furthermore, limits on
trading make that domestic industry has to make an eﬀort to reduce na-
tional emissions, leading to more research and development of abatement
technologies.
9.3 Interest Group Preferences: Empirical Evi-
dence
In this section we present empirical evidence on the preferences of interest
groups for both a national instrument and an international emissions trading
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scheme. To gather the information, we used the Internet. Interest groups
will try to inﬂuence public opinion by arguing their case in public. Therefore,
we expected that interest groups would also provide information on their
opinions on the Internet. In general this was true, although we were not able
to ﬁnd information on all groups. More precisely, we only found information
on industrial and environmental organizations.
Environmental bureaucrats have no interest groups that voice their pref-
erences publicly. Hence, we could not ﬁnd information on their preferences.
Labor unions do not seem to be very involved in the debate on international
emissions trading and hardly any information on their preferences could
be found on the Internet. Therefore, we excluded them from the empirical
analysis. The research for this section was done in the year 2000 and reﬂects
viewpoints of interest groups at that time.
9.3.1 Industry
National instrument Most industrial organizations express a preference
for voluntary agreements. This is the case for the three global organizations
we found information on. Also, US industrial organizations express a pref-
erence for voluntary agreements, which is perhaps rather surprising when
one considers their warm support for tradable permits in the case of SO2
abatement (Svendsen 1998a. Noting the history of environmental policy in
Canada, Japan and Europe, the support for voluntary agreements in these
countries is less surprising. There is, however, also some support for market-
based instruments, especially grandfathered tradable permits. Such support
is found in the UK, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, Australia, and partly
in other countries.
Several reasons are given by industry for its preference for voluntary
agreements. In the ﬁrst place, as stated by the Edison Electricity Institute,
‘the best way to address climate change should be voluntary, cost-eﬀective
and ﬂexible’ (EEI et al. 1998). In general, industry sees voluntary agree-
ments as cost-eﬀective and ﬂexible (Toyoda et al. 1997 ; CEFIC 1998).
With ﬂexibility, industry means two things. In voluntary agreements, in-
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dustry negotiates certain abatement goals with the government. How these
goals are met is left to industry to determine. Hence, voluntary agreements
give industry a free choice of how to reduce emissions (Meller and Hildebrand
1998). By doing so, they allow for diﬀerentiation of emission reduction tar-
gets according to ﬁrms’ capabilities, thus reducing abatement costs for the
group of participants in the voluntary agreement. Most of the time, vol-
untary agreements specify a relative target. In the case of CO2 emission
reduction, the target is often to improve energy eﬃciency. This is, for ex-
ample, the case in the agreement between industry and the government in
the Netherlands, in which industry commits itself to be in the top 10 per
cent eﬃcient ﬁrms within their sector (VNO-NCW 1999a,b). This kind of
agreements allows industry to increase total emissions when production is
increased, although they have to reduce emissions per unit of production.
Thus, industry also wants ﬂexibility in the total level of emissions (Business
Roundtable (BRT) 1997 and EPSA 1998).
Another reason for supporting voluntary agreements is that they give
industry inﬂuence over the environmental bureaucracy and politicians. In-
dustry is surprisingly frank on this issue. It is, for example, said that in-
dustry should participate in voluntary agreements, because doing nothing
would ‘diminish electric utility inﬂuence on regulators, possibly subjecting
companies to government control that tell them what strategies and tech-
nologies to use’ (Kinsman et al. 1996). Furthermore, voluntary agreements
improve ‘the dialogue between those who set environmental objectives and
the economic actors’ (UNIPEDE and EURELECTRIC 1999b).
Industry does not support the use of taxes to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. It should be noted here that only the European industry voices
opposition to taxes. Whereas American industry has been able to avoid en-
vironmental taxes to a large extent, European industry is regulated partly
through taxes and charges although these are never set at a level reﬂect-
ing marginal damage to society, but act more as a device to collect taxes
earmarked for environmental projects (Stavins 2000). American industry,
therefore, concludes that taxes are not an option in the control of greenhouse
gases, while European industry feels that these might be used. The main
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reason for resisting taxes seems to be that industry is of the opinion that
taxes deprive industry of the funds needed to invest in abatement technol-
ogy (European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 1997, 1998b and Meller
and Hildebrand 1998). It is also argued that taxes are far less eﬀective than
voluntary agreements (Meller and Hildebrand 1998). Finally, taxes increase
the already high costs of energy in Europe (VBO-FEB 1998).
Emission ceilings per ﬁrm are rejected as well. According to indus-
try, they are ‘tantamount to rationing use of fossil fuels and would thereby
entail unacceptable limitations on production’ (European Chemical Indus-
try Council 1998a). Furthermore, absolute emission caps ‘could severely
threaten industrial competitiveness, employment and growth’ (IFIEC 1998).
The support for voluntary agreements is also shown in the large number
of agreements already in existence. The Canadian Pulp and Paper Associa-
tion (CPPA) and the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) support the
Voluntary Challenge and Registry (VCR) Program, a voluntary program to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Weyerhaeuser Jr. 1996, CEA 1996). Dutch
industry has likewise made an agreement with the government (VNO-NCW
(999a,b). Voluntary agreements also exist in Australia.
Although voluntary agreements are preferred by the largest number of
industrial organizations, there is also some support for (grandfathered) trad-
able permits. The support is concentrated in Australia, New Zealand, the
UK and Scandinavia, but some organizations in other countries also support
tradable permits. The main reason for preferring them is their cost-reducing
potential (Business Roundtable (BRT) 1999, Confederation of British Indus-
try (CBI) 1999a,b and NZBR 1996, 1999). Furthermore, tradable permits
will reﬂect the environmental costs in the energy prices (Næringslivets Hov-
edorganisasjon 1998, 1999) and ‘such instruments make sustainable energy
more competitive and will move the innovation process in an optimal direc-
tion’ (Metz 1998). Finally, there is an expectation that private international
emissions trading will be allowed. In that case, industry can prepare for this
by setting up a national tradable permit system. This seems to be one of the
reasons why the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has designed an
industry-wide scheme for emissions trading in cooperation with the British
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government (CBI 1999a,b). The CBI states that ‘The aim of the emissions
trading project is to design a scheme for emissions trading in the UK which
could then link into a future international emissions trading scheme’ (CBI
1999a). Furthermore, it is hoped that the scheme will keep the UK in the
‘vanguard of international emissions trading and in a good position to get
involved in any future schemes’ (CBI 1999b).
However, some objections to tradable permits have also been voiced.
For example, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) thinks that
tradable permits would place a disproportionately large share of the abate-
ment burden on industry. Furthermore, such a scheme would put small
manufacturers at a disadvantage (NAM 1999). There is also doubt about
the instrument because of the limited experience with it (Fay 1999).
Does the empirical evidence support the theoretical analysis? Above, we
concluded that industry’s preference ordering was voluntary agreements,
credit trading and permit trading. The empirical evidence shows that volun-
tary agreements are the preferred instrument of most industry organizations,
at least in the case of greenhouse gases, so that we have a conﬁrmation of
theory on this point. Furthermore, as industrial organizations often mention
themselves, the voluntary agreements almost always contain some relative
target. Thereby, they are closely related to relative standards as an instru-
ment where the level of the standard is set through negotiations between
industry and the government.
However, in some countries, permit trading is preferred to voluntary
agreements. This holds for the UK, Norway, Denmark, Australia and partly
New Zealand and Sweden. The reasons for this preference can vary between
countries. For some countries, it is expected that they will gain much from
international emissions trading. These are the high- and low-cost countries.
Norway and Sweden are high-cost countries. They rely on hydro power for a
large part of their power generation. Sweden has also decided to phase out
its nuclear power stations. These countries will presumably rely heavily on
emissions trading to comply with their abatement commitment under the
Kyoto Protocol. The UK, New Zealand and Australia on the other hand
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have negotiated rather high emissions ceilings. In addition, Australia and
New Zealand are large energy consumers per capita and per unit of GDP.
These countries should therefore have ample possibilities for reducing their
emissions. Although the UK does not have the same high level of energy
consumption, it received a rather high emission ceiling under EU burden
sharing agreement. Hence, Australia, New Zealand and the UK are poten-
tial sellers of emission permits. Industry in countries that expect to trade
permits may want to build experience in emissions trading as soon as possi-
ble. This will make it easier for their emission sources to join international
emissions trading.
Denmark is a rather special case. The country has set itself the ambitious
goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 21 per cent in the year 2010
compared to 1990. Although Denmark has rather low costs for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, it is not certain that the country can sell permits.
The reason for preferring tradable permits may be explained in another
way. At this moment, an intricate CO2 tax system is in use in Denmark
directed at industry (Svendsen 1998a). Since taxes are the least preferred
instrument of industry, it seems that Danish industry has not been able to
convince the Danish government of the usefulness of voluntary agreements.
Hence, the choice of instruments is limited to marked-based instruments.
Within this class, grandfathered tradable permits are clearly preferred to
taxes by industry.
Although the result is in line with the theory as described above, the lack
of support for tradable permits in the US is remarkable. Svendsen (1998b)
shows that American industry has a preference for grandfathered tradable
permits. Furthermore, there is substantial experience with tradable permits
in the US. Therefore, one would expect somewhat more support for tradable
permits. However, the US has not ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol and may very
well never do so. Industry may therefore be careful not to show too much
willingness to reduce emissions and not to give the impression that it is
willing to take on a ﬁxed ceiling.
International Trading Scheme In the theoretical analysis, we found that
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support by industry for international emissions trading depends on its po-
sitions relative to the international emissions market. Concerning how in-
ternational emissions trading should take place, we found that industry will
support both government and private trading and also a combination of
the two. Limits on international emissions trading are rejected since they
increase costs.
In their statements on the Internet, most industrial organizations ex-
press support for some system of private international emissions trading.
Government trading is, however, hardly discussed. The reaction to a cap on
trading is unequivocal; industry clearly rejects any restrictions on interna-
tional emissions trading.
Industry supports international emissions trading mainly because of the
reduction in compliance costs and because of the ﬂexibility that the instru-
ment brings. According to the Business Roundtable (BRT), international
emissions trading can ‘result in sharply reduced compliance costs, reducing
the impact of limiting the levels of these (GHG) emissions’ (BRT 1999). In
Europe, too, these advantages of international emissions trading are brought
forward. UNIPEDE and EURELECTRIC (1999a) argue that ‘free and open
trading can help to meet emission objectives by lowering compliance costs
and by giving a strong signal, via the price of CO2 permits, on the economic
implications of an emission objective’.
When endorsing international emissions trading, most industrial organi-
zations state a preference for trading between private entities. As the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) states, ‘govern-
ments should foster a market in which companies can participate directly in
international emissions trading and can trade credits obtained from projects’
(WBCSD 1998). Hereby, the WBCSD also states a preference for JI because
it emphasizes that trading should be based on projects.
The primary reason for preferring private emissions trading is that this
will be more eﬀective than government trading. The Pulp and Paper Man-
ufacturers Federation of Australia (PPMFA) states that ‘for international
emissions trading to work as an eﬃcient market mechanism, it is essential
that there are a large number of potential buyers and sellers’ (Cribb 1998).
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According to the International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers
(IFIEC) ‘the trading system would operate at company level, as only com-
panies can deliver the agreed eﬃciency improvements’ (IFIEC 1998).
However, international emissions trading is not always met with enthu-
siasm. Some organizations are doubtful about the instrument, for example,
because of the lack of experience with emissions trading at the international
level. The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) states that ‘until provisions gov-
erning emissions trading, joint implementation and CDM are fully ﬂeshed
out, the value of these mechanisms cannot be determined’ (EEI 1998). Other
criticisms have also been voiced. According to the NAM, ‘International emis-
sions trading would require U.S. companies to buy “credits” from Russia or
ex-Soviet bloc economies, which are really economic-growth rights, at near-
monopolistic prices. This private foreign aid will be a huge additional energy
tax on American business’ (NAM 1999).
Only the Japanese organization Keidanren mentions government trading
directly. They state that ‘the idea of JI and the emissions trading scheme
among governments and so on deserve consideration as approaches that pro-
vide ﬂexibility’ (Keidanren 1997), which clearly endorses government trad-
ing. In most other cases where government trading is mentioned, or even
more often hinted at, it is treated as something inevitable. Many industrial
organizations therefore plead for governments to allow trading between ﬁrms
alongside government trading.
Industry is strongly opposed to any restrictions on international emis-
sions trading. Several reasons are mentioned, but the most common ob-
jection is that such restrictions will increase costs of compliance for indus-
try. This view is clearly given by the WBCSD, for example: ‘Attempts to
elaborate supplementarity through national ceilings on trading will increase
complexity and cost. It may also erode conﬁdence in a traded commodity
relying on parties’ commitment to the targets that they have negotiated’
( WBCSD 1998). The European organization UNICE also expresses this
view: ‘it would be environmentally and economically counterproductive to
seek to put arbitrary limits on the use of ﬂexibility and trading’ (UNICE
1998). Other organizations are also very clear in their rejection of caps on
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trading. According to the Global Climate Coalition ‘We must do everything
we can to minimize the damage to the economy?. For that reason, any emis-
sions trading has to be unlimited’ ( GCC 1999). The EEI is very categorical
in its rejection: ‘there must be no quantitative or qualitative caps or limits,
individually or collectively, on the use of the market mechanisms’ (EEI et
al. 1999). Another reason for rejecting caps on trading is provided by the
Swedish industrial organization Industriforbundet. It states that restrictions
on trade may jeopardize the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol by certain
countries, notably the US (Industriforbundet (1999)).
The empirical ﬁndings are largely in accordance with the theory. Indus-
try states a clear preference for international private emissions trading and
rejects restrictions on international emissions trading. However, industrial
organizations in many cases do not discuss whether by private emissions
trading they mean permit trading, credit trading or JI. One reason for this
could be that industry has no clear insight into the trading schemes and
into the consequences of their choice at the national level on their options
at the international level. This is in particular true for Europe where mar-
ket instruments other than taxes have hardly been applied and industry
mainly has experience with direct regulation through relative standards and
voluntary agreements.
We expected clear support for government trading. However such sup-
port is almost never clearly stated. There is, however, an expectation that
trade between governments will take place. It may be for this reason that
industry does not bother to mention it. Other reasons for not stating a
preference for government trading could be strategic. Most of the reasons
for preferring government trading, such as the possibility to relax national
abatement requirements, would not give industry a good image if they were
expressed openly. Therefore, industry has every reason not to express them.
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Table 9.3: Industry preferences
Organization Location National Int. trading Trade
instrument scheme limits
ICCA Global VA − −
ICCP Global VA/permits Private No
WBCSD Global VA/permits Private No
WCI Global VA/permits Private No
BRT USA VA/permits Private −
EEI USA VA JI No
EPSA USA standards − −
GCC USA VA − No
NAM USA VA − −
AMEC CAN VA/permits − −
CEA CAN VA − −
CPPA CAN VA − −
FEPC J VA JI No
Keidanren J VA Government −
CEFIC Europe VA/credits JI −
e5 Europe Permits Permits −
ERT Europe VA/permits Private −
Eurelectric Europe VA JI No
IFIEC Europe VA JI No
UNICE Europe VA/credits Gov./private No
UNIPEDE Europe VA JI No
VNO-NCW NL VA Government −
VBO-FEB B VA JI −
BDI D VA − −
VDEW D VA JI No
CBI UK Permits Permits −
NHO N Permits Permits −
DI DK Permits Private −
Industriforbundet S − Government No
NZBR NZ Permits/taxes − −
ESAA AUS Permits − −
PPMFA AUS Permits Private −
Notes: A dash indicates that preferences on this issue were not found.
VA = voluntary agreement
Source: Boom and Svendsen (2000b)
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9.3.2 Environmental Organizations
National Instrument We showed in the theoretical analysis that envi-
ronmental organizations should prefer emission ceilings or permit trading
at the national level. The main advantage of these instruments for envi-
ronmental organizations is that they have a high certainty of realizing the
policy objective.
Environmental organizations do not, however, give a clear preference for
a national instrument in their statements on the Internet. Only the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund (EDF) states a preference for a single instrument.
According to the EDF, ‘Mandatory, permanent emissions caps are imper-
ative, but they will be eﬀective only if they are practical, enforceable, and
equitable. To achieve this, EDF has suggested a system based on tradeable
emissions allowances’ (Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 1993).
Other organizations emphasize that more than one instrument is needed.
For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) states that
‘tax incentives must be created in order to promote mass transit and en-
courage industries that develop eﬃcient technologies and renewable energy
sources’ and ‘the US must institute mandatory limits on global warming pol-
lution, using standards that optimize environmental performance, such as
limiting the pounds of carbon emissions per unit of electricity output’ (Lynch
1998). The Sierra Club Canada and the Worldwide Fund for Nature also
have detailed plans containing a wide array of instruments (Comeau 1998
and WWF 1997a,b,c). The case for a diversity of instruments as opposed to
only using tradable permits is most eloquently stated by the NRDC: ‘Ad-
vocates of emissions trading think that you sit down at the piano and you
play one emissions-trading key, and the sonata will play itself. We need to
press keys for energy eﬃciency, and we need to play renewable energy keys.
We need to press this series of keys to make houses, buildings, industry, and
vehicles more eﬃcient’ (Lynch 1998).
Another feature of the statements by environmental organizations is their
concentration on technical solutions to the problem of global warming. This
discussion is in many cases far more important than their discussion of the
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choice of instruments.
So we ﬁnd no clear preference for national instrument by environmental
organizations. The most likely explanation for this is that they are geared to
showing that emissions can be reduced with existing techniques. By doing
this they put pressure on both the government and industry, which now
have to explain why they do not take action to curb emissions. Because of
their concentration on abatement techniques, they have neglected the issue
of national instrument choice. Whether they further their interests best in
this way remains to be seen. It does show, however, that environmental
organizations are more interested in reducing emissions than in how this is
done.
International Trading Scheme The theoretical analysis showed that en-
vironmental organizations are opposed to international emissions trading.
The main reasons for this are that they want to ban trade in hot air and
trade with countries without proper institutions for monitoring and enforce-
ment of environmental policy and because they prefer abatement to be done
nationally so as to spur research and development of new abatement tech-
nologies. If international emissions trading is unavoidable, environmental
organizations prefer government trading because this gives the best possi-
bilities to limit trade.
As with instrument choice at the national level, we do not ﬁnd a clear
preference for an international emissions trading scheme. The EDF supports
the ﬂexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and gives a preference for
permit trading, although this is not stated very strongly ( Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) 1993, 1998). The Sierra Club is the only environmental
organization that clearly prefers JI (Corbett et al. 1997 and Rolfe (1998)).
The reason for this is that only credit trading will prevent trade in hot
air. Other environmental organizations do discuss international emissions
trading but give no preference for any scheme. Some organizations can even
see some merit in emissions trading, but they also see ‘many ways in which
a global emissions trading regime could go badly wrong’ (Greenpeace 1998).
Many environmental organizations view international emissions trading
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as a loophole that enables industrialized countries to ‘avoid taking domestic
action ... and continue on a path of dangerous emissions. This is not only
iniquitous but it is also ecologically ineﬀective’ (Climate Action Network
(CAN) 1999). The WWF had already stated before the negotiations that the
Kyoto Protocol should ‘not include an emissions trading system unless much
stronger reduction targets than those currently proposed by industrialized
countries are adopted’ (WWF 1997d). International emissions trading is
even rejected in principle as ‘unfair because it rewards large industrialized
polluters without compensating poorer nations which will suﬀer the worst
eﬀects of climate change’ (WWF 1998).
In general, environmental organizations prefer a cap on emissions trad-
ing. One reason for this is that it reduces the possibility of trade in hot
air. Hence, restrictions on international emissions trading will result in
lower aggregate emission levels. However, another reason also seems to be
very important. According to Friends of the Earth (FOE), ‘the majority of
emissions reductions must be achieved through domestic, veriﬁable emission
reductions’ (Friends of the Earth 1998). The reason for this is that ‘it is
essential to provide a clear signal to begin with redirecting investments to
environmentally sustainable technology’ (Friends of the Earth 1998). An-
other reason is that ‘placing a limit, or “cap”, on the proportion of Parties’
Kyoto targets that can be achieved abroad will promote new technologies
for domestic reductions and minimize trading in hot air’ (WWF 1999).
Only the EDF rejects restrictions on emissions trading (Environmen-
tal Defense Fund (EDF) 1998). Several reasons are given for this. Caps
on trading will increase compliance costs for industry without giving any
additional beneﬁt to the environment. Furthermore, contrary to the other
environmental organizations, the EDF argues that caps will lead to less in-
novation. The EDF also sees caps on trading as superﬂuous because a large
part of emission reductions will be realized domestically anyway.
This section that environmental organizations in general reject interna-
tional emissions trading. Most organizations call for a limits on trading.
One reason for this is to limit the trade in hot air. This would then lead
to lower emission levels. Besides this reason for limiting trade, it is also
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Table 9.4: Preferences of environmental organizations
Organization Location National Int. Trade Int.
instrument trade limits instrument
Greenpeace Global − No Yes −
CAN Global − No Yes −
WWF Global − No Yes −
FOE Global − No Yes −
EDF USA Permits Yes No Permits
NRDC USA Standards No − −
Sierra Club USA/CAN − No Yes JI
Notes: A dash indicates that preferences on this issue were not found.
Source: Boom and Svendsen (2000b)
argued that such a limit will spur technological innovation. Only the EDF
is against limits on trading. According to them, limits lead to higher costs
and to less innovation. The overall results on environmental organizations
are summarized in Table 9.4.
9.4 Conclusions
Interest groups are divided on the issue of international emissions trading.
Industry supports it in general, while environmental organizations reject it,
and labor unions and the environmental bureaucracy take an intermediate
position. Also on how international emissions trading should be organized
interest groups diverge in opinion.
For industry, international emissions trading will lead to higher proﬁts,
either through lower abatement costs if the international emission quota
price is below the national price, or through the proceeds from quota sales
on the international market. However, there are situations where industry
does not unanimously support international emissions trading. If there is
a national emissions trading scheme, either permit or credit, connection
to the international market may lead to losses, either because a buyer of
quotas now has to pay a higher price, or because a seller receives a lower
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price than in the domestic market. Industry supports both private and
government trading and would like to see a combination of the two as long
as the government is buying quotas. International emissions trading should
not be limited because such limits increase abatement costs for industry
Environmental organizations reject international emissions trading be-
cause they are concerned that it will deteriorate the overall emission target
and research and development of new abatement technologies. The problem
of hot air means that total emissions will be higher with emissions trading
than without. Furthermore, sellers may not comply with their revised abate-
ment commitment after the sale of quotas, thus inﬂating total emissions even
further. If instead, countries could only realize their emission targets domes-
tically, this would lead to more R&D investment in abatement technologies,
eventually resulting in lower abatement costs. This would then make it
possible in future commitment periods to reduce emissions even more. If
international emissions trading cannot be avoided, environmental organiza-
tions prefer government trading with limits both in the form of caps on the
quantity that can be traded and limits on which countries to trade with.
Labor unions support international emissions trading as long as this
leads to lower costs to industry and thereby to higher output. This will
be the case when the industry is a buyer of quotas. In itself, it does not
matter whether international emissions trading takes place between ﬁrms or
governments.
Also the environmental bureaucracy only supports international emis-
sions trading when industry is a buyer of quotas. Their reason is that this
will make it easier for industry to comply with the national target. The
bureaucracy would like to have some measure of control with international
emissions trading and would like domestic industry to make some abate-
ment eﬀorts on their own. Hence, they prefer a cap on the total amount
bought and would like to have control over the choice of trading partners.
This all points to government trading, although restricted private trading is
supported as well.
Empirical evidence on interest group preferences could only be collected
for industry and environmental organizations. The empirical evidence pre-
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sented largely supports the theoretical analysis. It shows that industry
prefers voluntary agreements or permit trading at the national level and
JI or private trading at the international level. Government trading is not
mentioned very often, but this may be caused by strategic considerations.
Caps on trading are rejected categorically.
Environmental organizations show no clear preference for a national in-
strument or an international emissions trading scheme. They mostly concen-
trate on technical solutions to reduce emissions, showing that abatement is
possible at reasonable cost. This indicates that environmental organizations
are only interested in reducing emissions and not so much in the regulatory
framework within which this should be done. Their support for a cap on
trading also ﬁts within this line of reasoning; it will reduce hot air trading
and force countries to take domestic action.
International emissions trading is not unanimously supported, sometimes
not even by industry. Implementing international emissions trading will
therefore be diﬃcult and it is likely that some limits will be placed on trad-
ing. These limits will especially be on who to trade with and perhaps also




The aim of this book is to analyze the political acceptability of interna-
tional emissions trading. Two main questions can be posed in this respect.
First, is it acceptable for countries that international emissions trading is
made possible or would they rather see international control of global emis-
sions without such trading. Second, when international emissions trading is
allowed which type of emissions trading scheme is preferred by countries.
In the ﬁrst part of the book (chapter 2 to 7) we have assumed that the
objective of the government is to maximize national welfare. It then follows
that whether international emissions trading as such is acceptable to coun-
tries depends on how this aﬀects their welfare. If international emissions
trading is implemented, the most preferred instrument is the one that gives
highest national welfare. In chapter 2 the ﬁrst question has been discussed.
We have shown in chapter 2 that when countries know that international
emissions trading is going to be a part of an international agreement, they
will alter their abatement commitments. This will happen when countries
behave non-cooperatively, that is, try to maximize their own national bene-
ﬁts, but also when they act cooperatively, that is, when they take the eﬀect
of their actions on other countries into account when setting their emission
ceiling. Basically, a potential buyer of permits will set a lower emission ceil-
ing since it now can purchase emission reductions at a lower price in the
market than it could at home. For a potential seller, the opposite occurs.
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The eﬀect on total emissions depends partly on the setting. The major result
of the analysis is that in certain settings international emission control with
international emissions trading will make that total emissions are higher
than control without emissions trading. As a consequence, a country may
end up with lower welfare if international emissions trading is allowed and for
that reason it will prefer international emission control without the option of
trading emissions. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of international emissions trading
on total emissions are the following. If countries behave non-cooperatively
and no country has market power total emissions always increase. For this
situation to occur, it is necessary that there are enough identical countries
with lowest abatement costs, which is not a very realistic assumption. If
countries are heterogeneous, it turns out that at least one country must
have market power. This country is a seller and therefore has monopoly
power in the market for permits. If all countries, sellers and buyers, have
market power, total emissions can increase or decrease as a result of inter-
national emissions trading. Even when countries behave cooperatively, we
ﬁnd that emissions trading can lead to higher total emissions. The eﬀect
on total emissions combined with the change in abatement costs because of
the shift to international emissions trading determines the overall eﬀect on
welfare. International emissions trading may increase or decrease a coun-
try’s welfare, where a decrease is more likely when emissions trading leads
to higher overall emissions. If it leads to lower welfare, international emis-
sions trading will not be acceptable for a welfare maximizing government:
after all, the country would be better oﬀ without emissions trading. How-
ever, even if international emissions trading makes some countries worse oﬀ
compared to the case without trading, international emissions trading may
still be implemented, since no country can forbid other countries to trade
emission quotas between them.
The second major question researched in the book was: when interna-
tional emissions trading is going to be an element of an international environ-
mental agreement, what type of emissions trading scheme will be preferred
by a participating country. In chapter 3 the diﬀerent options from which a
choice can be made have been presented and their strengths and weaknesses
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discussed. The basic alternatives are government trading and private trad-
ing. Government trading amounts to a direct transfer of assigned amounts
between governments; the commitments in terms of emissions ceiling of the
trading countries change accordingly. These changes in commitment will
have to be reﬂected in changes in domestic policy, for example setting emis-
sion standards which are more stringent (for a seller) or less so (for a buyer),
which will take much time if some policy already has been implemented. Be-
cause of the large costs of changing policy and large transaction costs per
trade, government trading is likely to be infrequent, involving a large amount
of emission quotas and to take place either before national policy is set, or
at the end of the commitment period when the eﬀect of national policy on
national emissions becomes clear and assigned amounts can be purchased if
it looks that the country will not be able to comply, while assigned amounts
can be sold if total emissions are going to end up below the emission cap.
A major advantage of government trading is that it is compatible with all
forms of domestic environmental policy and that it gives the government
full control over trading. However, because trade will be infrequent, with
relatively few actors involved, government trading will not be fully eﬃcient,
although it will lead to cost reductions compared to no trading.
Private trading refers to emissions trading between private entities. These
will most often be emission sources, but others can trade too. Private emis-
sions trading will lead to continuous trading, so that a market price for
emission quotas arises. Firms can easily observe this price and compare it
to their own marginal abatement costs to see whether they should sell or buy
emission quotas. However, emissions trading between private parties at the
international level can not be combined with all possible instruments at the
national level. Basically, international private emissions trading amounts to
a linking of national emissions trading schemes so that domestic emissions
trading becomes a precondition for international trading.
There are two basic possibilities for private trading schemes; permit and
credit trading. The diﬀerence between permit and credit trading is how
the emission target for the individual emission source is set. With permit
trading, the basis for the scheme is a ceiling on total emissions which is
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divided in permits that are made tradable. With credit trading, the basis
for the scheme is formed by deﬁning some emission standard other than a
ceiling on emissions. The emission target for the individual source is then
calculated using the emission standard. Credits can then be created and
sold if a ﬁrm can stay below the emission target.
There are several ways to organize a permit trading scheme. An obvious
choice is to distribute the permits over the polluters and allow them to trade.
This is known as a downstream scheme. The advantages are that there are
many traders, so that a market in permits will develop. This ensures full
eﬃciency. Furthermore, distributing the permits to the polluters makes it
more acceptable to grandfather the permits, so that the scheme becomes
more acceptable to the regulated emission sources. A disadvantage will be
that there are many emission sources for CO2, so that there will be high
monitoring and control costs if all sources are to be included. These costs
are assessed as being so high that a pure downstream system covering all
sectors is deemed to be not feasible. Another possibility is to distribute
the permits to the suppliers of fossil fuels, a system known as an upstream
scheme. The suppliers of fuels will pass the price of permits on to the
consumers, so that they in eﬀect pay a carbon tax. With an upstream
scheme, the number of control points is kept low, so that administration
costs are low and virtually all CO2 emissions can be covered. However,
there will be few traders, so that a fully developed market may not arise
and some traders may have market power. Another problem is how the
permits should be distributed. Grandfathering would amount to a large
transfer of rents to fossil fuel companies, which is unlikely to be politically
acceptable. However, auctioning the permits will meet stiﬀ resistance from
the suppliers. Hence, the political acceptability of an upstream system is
rather low. There is however another possibility that combines aspects of
upstream and downstream trading. In this alternative design, permits are
distributed to emission sources, big and small, but compliance is monitored
at the level of the suppliers. Basically, with every purchase of fossil fuel,
permits have to be handed over to the supplier (or distributor) covering the
carbon content of the fuel. In this way, the permits end up in the hands
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of the suppliers, where it is relatively easy for the government to monitor
compliance. The scheme is largely self-enforcing since sellers have an interest
to receive the right amount of permits from buyers. This scheme makes it
possible to distribute the permits for free to the polluters, thereby enhancing
political acceptability. Furthermore, there will be many traders, so that an
eﬃcient market is ensured.
With credit trading, an emission standard has to be deﬁned. In most
cases this will be a limit on emissions per unit of an input or output. In this
book we have assumed that credit trading is always based on a standard that
limits emissions per unit of output. The emission target for the individual
source is then deﬁned as the relative standard times output. Firms that
expect to stay below this target can sell emission reduction credits to ﬁrms
where compliance is very costly. The main advantage of credit trading is
that the political acceptability of such a scheme will be high. The design
gives ﬁrms maximum ﬂexibility in that emissions can be increased as output
is increased and ﬁrms can trade credits. Furthermore, the initial distribution
of the right to pollute is for free. For other actors, credit trading has the
advantage that it builds on existing regulation and therefore is only an
incremental change from current practices. Disadvantages are that credit
trading is ineﬃcient and not environmentally eﬀective. Another problem is
that credit trading cannot cover all emission sources since some output is
needed to be able to deﬁne a relative standard. This excludes households.
A formal analysis of permit and credit trading was given in chapter 4.
Here, we compared the performance of the two schemes with respect to
welfare and industry structure under both perfect and imperfect competi-
tion in a national setting. Furthermore, we analyzed the performance of
a combined scheme where one sector is regulated through permit trading
and another through credit trading, while trade of emission quotas between
the two sectors is allowed. The basic diﬀerences between permit and credit
trading are that credit trading leads to higher total output, higher total and
marginal abatement costs and a higher number of ﬁrms in the industry than
permit trading. The reason for this diﬀerence is that credit trading works
as a tax on emissions combined with a subsidy on output. Every additional
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unit of output produced by the ﬁrm gives it the right to increase emissions
by the amount of the relative standard. Since emissions are valuable to the
ﬁrm, this amounts to a subsidy. However, this constellation leads to higher
marginal abatement costs since the same total emission ceiling has to be
reached while output is larger. The implicit subsidization of output in the
credit trading scheme has consequences for welfare. Under perfect competi-
tion, output is too large in a credit trading scheme, and hence credit trading
leads to lower welfare than permit trading. A welfare maximizing govern-
ment should therefore prefer permit trading, at least as long as there is no
international trade. With imperfect competition, this picture may change.
Imperfect competition leads to lower than optimal output levels. What is
called for if the sector also pollutes, and imperfect competition cannot be
transformed in perfect competition by way of competition policy, is a combi-
nation of a tax on emissions and a subsidy on output. This is exactly what
the credit trading scheme does. However, the implicit output subsidy in a
credit trading scheme is only at the optimal level by accident and may be
too large in which case it leads to too high production levels. Hence, credit
trading only improves on the outcome with permit trading if it does not
lead to too much output. A welfare maximizing government will therefore
prefer credit trading to permit trading when the regulated sector is char-
acterized by imperfect competition and credit trading does not lead to too
high output.
It is possible that two sectors or countries are regulated through diﬀerent
trading schemes, one through permit and the other through credit trading.
It is then possible to combine the two markets by allowing the transfer of
credits to the permit sector and vice versa. As mentioned credit trading
leads to higher marginal abatement costs than permit trading. The result is
that with separate markets and all else equal, the credit price is higher than
the permit price. As a consequence, permits will ﬂow to the credit sector
when the two schemes are connected. This will stimulate output in the credit
sector and increase the discrepancy in terms of output and abatement eﬀort
between the two sectors. The even larger overproduction in the credit sector
and the lower output in the permit sector means a welfare loss, at least
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under perfect competition. However, the sale of permits to the credit sector
makes that abatement eﬀort increases in the permit sector where marginal
abatement costs are relatively low, while abatement decreases in the credit
sector where marginal abatement costs are relatively high. The result is that
total abatement costs will go down. Whether combining the two sectors
leads to higher welfare than keeping them separate depends on whether
the savings in total abatement costs exceed the welfare loss due to higher
production in the credit sector. It should be borne in mind though that
under perfect competition welfare would be even higher if both sectors were
regulated through permit trading. Under imperfect competition the eﬀects
of combining the two schemes are the same as under perfect competition.
However now the output increase in the credit sector may also lead to a
welfare increase, thus enhancing the positive eﬀect of lower abatement costs.
A question that has not received much attention in the literature is how
smooth the transition from the equilibrium without environmental regula-
tion to the equilibrium with regulation is. If a transition to regulation leads
to more volatility under one instrument than under other instruments this
would be seen as a negative factor for that instrument. The main reason
for this is that volatility in markets can lead to eﬃciency losses in that the
market has to adapt all the time. In general, it is implicitly assumed that
the industry will move to the new equilibrium and the transition period
and its problems are simply neglected. In chapter 5 we have focused on
the transition period to see whether the transition is smooth and whether
an equilibrium is always reached under all circumstances. To see whether
volatility can arise, we constructed a discrete time model with production
and emission control through a permit scheme, a credit scheme, or ﬁrm emis-
sion ceilings where the government can behave myopically. This means that
the government sets its policy in the current period based on sector output
and number of ﬁrms in the previous period, thereby assuming that neither
output, nor the number of ﬁrms will change in the following period. For per-
mit trading this behavioral assumption does not alter government decisions.
A total limit is set and the permits are grandfathered to incumbent ﬁrms
in each period. For credit trading this means that the relative standard is
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revised in every period, simply by dividing the total emission limit by to-
tal output in the previous period. For absolute standards, the government
adjusts the ﬁrm emission ceiling by dividing the total emission ceiling by
the number of ﬁrms in the previous period. For ﬁrms we have assumed that
there is no time lag in adjusting emissions and production to new policy, but
there is a time lag in exit and entry: ﬁrms’ entry or exit decision depends
on proﬁts and government policy in the sector in the previous period. This
type of model is hard, if not impossible, to analyze analytically. Therefore,
some numerical simulations were done with diﬀerent price elasticities of de-
mand for the good and with diﬀerent abatement costs. The results are based
on these simulations. We found that when both the government and ﬁrms
behave in the manner just described, the introduction of environmental reg-
ulation can lead to persistent volatility under credit trading, but not under
permit trading. This is especially the case when demand for products is
elastic. This outcome holds under both perfect and imperfect competition.
Under perfect competition, a higher speed of adjustment by ﬁrms, through
entry and exit, may exacerbate volatility when product demand is inelastic
and mitigate it when demand is elastic.
Although adjustment of environmental policy does take place in reality,
it does not commonly happen on a regular basis. Therefore, a more realistic
scenario may be the one where the government sets certain standard for the
ﬁrst period and does not change this standard over time. We also modeled
this case. Here, we assumed that the government has perfect foresight and
sets the standard at its long-run equilibrium level. The result is that the
transition to the new equilibrium is always smooth under all instrument,
at least with perfect competition, even though the transition period could
be longer than under myopic behavior by the government. However, under
imperfect competition, we found that even a constant standard can lead to
persistent volatility in the market under credit trading. This is due to the
time lag in entry or exit of ﬁrms combined with the fact that ﬁrms assume
that their rivals will produce the same amount as in the previous period and
adjust their own output accordingly.
The result is that credit trading may be a less attractive instrument be-
349
cause it may lead to persistent volatility in the market if the assumptions of
the underlying model are fulﬁlled. This will especially be a problem if the
government wants to pursue a policy where it regularly adjusts the standard
until it reaches the optimal level. In most cases however, governments set
a ﬁxed standard and only adjust it when real emissions are very far oﬀ the
target, otherwise, over- or undercompliance is just accepted. As we argued
above, it is under imperfect competition that credit trading may lead to
higher welfare than permit trading. But precisely under imperfect compe-
tition even a constant relative standard may lead to persistent volatility,
which makes this a less attractive instrument in this case.
So far we have left aside the possibility that ﬁrms trade goods interna-
tionally. In chapters 6 and 7 that assumption was dropped and we have
analyzed how the fact that governments of countries have market power on
international goods markets may aﬀect the optimal instrument choice for a
welfare maximizing government. Speciﬁcally, we investigated which type of
national instrument would lead to highest welfare and whether it would be
welfare improving for countries to allow their ﬁrms to participate in inter-
national emissions trading. In chapter 6, we have analyzed the case where
the sector regulated is perfectly competitive. However, the government has
market power and can through its environmental policy aﬀect output and
thereby the price on the international market. Here it is important that
there is a diﬀerence between the output of the regulated industry under
credit trading and permit trading. In chapter 7 we have presented the case
where there is a duopoly in the product market, with each producer located
in a diﬀerent country. Output is consumed in both producer countries and
in a third market.
In both cases, countries that can inﬂuence the world market price of
a good and aim at maximization of national welfare have an incentive to
choose their national policy strategically. That is to say, governments have
an incentive to alter the output of their industry if they have the possibility
to aﬀect world prices of goods. In which direction they want to alter prices
depends on whether the industry is competitive or not and on whether the
country exports or imports the good. Furthermore, in some cases countries
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are better oﬀ when they do not allow their sector to participate in interna-
tional emissions trading. With international emissions trading there are two
eﬀects that have to be taken into account. First, permit trading leads to less
output than credit trading. Second, when the international price of emis-
sion quotas is higher than the domestic price, the country becomes a seller
of quotas. This will make that it will abate more, resulting in lower output.
When the country becomes a buyer of quotas, domestic output will increase
when the country allows international emissions trading for its ﬁrms.
Under perfect competition, when a country exports the good, the coun-
try’s welfare is maximized by increasing the producer surplus even though
this diminishes the consumer surplus somewhat. This means that the gov-
ernment wants to reduce output to raise the world price of the good and
thereby increase ﬁrm proﬁts. In this case, the best choice of domestic in-
strument is permit trading since this leads to the lowest output level. When
the country imports the good, welfare can be increased by increasing the
consumer surplus somewhat at the expense of the producer surplus. This
gives a preference for credit trading. However, credit trading can also lead
to too large an increase in output, turning the importer into an exporter.
In those cases, the country prefers permit trading.
In contrast, when there is a duopoly in the goods market, the government
wants to increase the output of its ﬁrm, no matter whether the country im-
ports or exports the good. The reason for this is that an increase in output
by the domestic ﬁrm leads to a decrease in production by the foreign ﬁrm, so
that the domestic ﬁrm captures market share and increases its proﬁts at the
expense of the foreign ﬁrm. The more of the product is consumed domes-
tically, the stronger the incentive to increase output becomes since higher
output increases the consumer surplus. Since credit trading leads to higher
output than permit trading, the government may prefer this instrument.
However, credit trading can also lead to too high production, in which case
the country is better oﬀ with permit trading.
Whether a country wants to allow its ﬁrms to participate in international
emissions trading depends on the world price of emission quotas relative to
the domestic quota price and to the direct gain from emissions trading. The
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outcome for perfect competition is again somewhat diﬀerent from the one
for imperfect competition. We ﬁrst look at the case where the sector is
perfectly competitive. When the country becomes a seller of quotas, this
will lead to a reduction in output. This increases welfare when the country
is an exporter of the good, both because it increases proﬁts from exporting
output and because it gives a proﬁt from selling emission quotas. When the
country is an exporter of the good and becomes a buyer of emission quotas
the two eﬀects work in opposite direction. The country’s and thereby total
output will increase so that proﬁts decrease too. However, the country still
gains from international emissions trading because of lower abatement costs.
Whether welfare increases from a shift to international emissions trading
then depends on whether the direct gain from emissions trading is larger
than the fall in monopolistic proﬁt on the product market. If welfare does
not increase, the country is better oﬀ by not joining international emissions
trading. If the country is an importer of the good, the reverse holds in
general. In this case, it will generally gain when it becomes an importer
of emission quotas and it is uncertain whether it gains when it becomes
a seller of emission quotas. Also here, the country may prefer not to join
international emissions trading.
When there is imperfect competition, the country is generally better oﬀ
when its output increases, so that it wants to join international emissions
trading when it becomes a buyer of emission quotas. However, this may also
lead to too large an increase in output, but only when it uses credit trad-
ing. In that case, it may prefer not to join the international emissions quota
market. On the other hand when it becomes a seller of emission quotas,
ﬁrm proﬁts and consumer surplus will decrease which has a negative eﬀect
on welfare. The country however still gains from the sale of emission quo-
tas. Whether it then wants to join international emissions trading depends
on whether the latter gain is larger than the loss in proﬁts and consumer
surplus. If this is not the case, the country prefers not to join international
emissions trading.
We have also presented an analysis of countries’ equilibrium instrument
choice in a two country setting. Here, we have shown that a country’s choice
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of instrument depends on the instrument choice by the other country. The
reason for this is that instrument choice inﬂuences a country’s reaction to
foreign changes in output. One consequence of this is that under imperfect
competition, identical countries may prefer diﬀerent instruments for inter-
national emissions trading in the Nash equilibrium for instrument choice.
In chapters 3 to 7, we have assumed in the analysis that countries max-
imize welfare. Acceptability of an instrument of environmental policy and
international emissions trading then depends on whether it increases wel-
fare. The best instrument is the one that gives highest welfare and countries
will join international emissions trading when that increases welfare. Which
type of emissions trading gives highest welfare depends on several factors,
such as market structure, behavior of government and ﬁrms, whether the
country has market power on the international market for goods and the
international emission quota price relative to the domestic one.
It is however doubtful that a decision on which instrument to implement
in environmental policy is based solely on welfare considerations. Therefore
in chapters 8 and 9 we turned to public choice theory for an explanation of
instrument choice. The underlying theory in these chapters is that interest
groups try to inﬂuence policy outcomes. This can be done by supporting
certain politicians or parties during election campaigns so that the politi-
cians have a higher certainty of being (re)elected. In return, the interest
groups expect favorable policies during the turn in oﬃce of ’their’ candi-
date. Another method for gaining inﬂuence is by providing information
to legislators. Legislators typically make their decisions under uncertainty
about the costs and beneﬁts of certain policies. Interest groups are often
relatively well informed on these issues and are able to inﬂuence decisions by
selectively providing information. In chapters 8 and 9 we have not dwelled
on how interest groups aﬀect government decisions, but analyzed the pref-
erences of these groups for national instrument of environmental policy and
for international emissions trading scheme. Speciﬁcally, we analyzed the
preferences of shareholders, ﬁrm managers, the environmental bureaucracy,
labor unions and environmental organizations for both national instrument
and international emissions trading scheme. Furthermore, we found empiri-
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cal evidence on preferences by industry and environmental organizations on
both issues.
In chapter 8 we started by analyzing interest group preferences for na-
tional instrument. As already mentioned earlier, the choice of national in-
strument aﬀects the options for international emissions trading. Interna-
tional emissions trading between private entities is basically a linkage be-
tween national emissions trading schemes. Therefore, international private
emissions trading can only be an outcome when emissions trading in some
form also is the outcome at the national level. For industry, preferences are
a mix of the preferences of shareholders and managers. Shareholders want
high stock value, which is attained by tradable permits, while managers want
large scale of production combined with a high certainty of ﬁrm survival af-
ter the introduction of regulation. This points to voluntary agreements or
credit trading. The main reason for choosing these three instruments is that
they allow for large cost savings compared to traditional forms of regulation.
Which of the three instruments is preferred depends on whether sharehold-
ers or managers have most inﬂuence. Labor unions prefer high employment.
Assuming that this is associated with high levels of production, labor unions
will prefer credit trading or voluntary agreements. The environmental bu-
reaucracy has some more complex preferences, including certainty of achiev-
ing the emission target, high input of bureaucratic labor and direct control
over polluters. However, there is a group of bureaucrats that values (indi-
rect) control over total pollution higher than direct control with polluters.
In the end, bureaucrats may prefer voluntary agreements, credit trading or
grandfathered tradable permits. Environmental organizations mainly have
a preference for low pollution levels and for certainty to achieve the emission
target. Tradable permits give high certainty of achieving the target and give
costs savings to industry, making it possible to achieve lower emission levels
while still giving lower costs to industry. Hence, environmental organiza-
tions prefer tradable permits, but want the permits to be auctioned, so that
the right to pollute is not granted for free. The empirical evidence largely
supports the theoretical analysis. Industry shows a preference for voluntary
agreements or permit trading. On the other hand, only one environmental
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organization directly supports permit trading, while the other organizations
do not state a preference for any instrument, but emphasize the possibilities
for reducing emissions.
Our theoretical analysis in chapter 9 predicted that interest groups are
divided on the issue of international emissions trading, both on whether or
not international trading should be allowed and on how it should take place.
Furthermore, there is disagreement on whether or not there should be lim-
its on the total amount traded and on whom to trade with. In general,
industry gains from international emissions trading. However, some groups
of ﬁrms or sectors may lose. Hence, industry will not always unanimously
support international emissions trading. The international emissions trad-
ing scheme supported by industry depends on the national instrument. If
voluntary agreements are implemented, then only government trading and
joint implementation (emissions trading between industrialized countries on
the basis of projects) are possible, which are both supported. When permit
or credit trading are implemented, industry supports private international
emissions trading. Industry would in this case also support the purchase of
emission quotas by the government, provided that the quotas are handed
to industry for free. The empirical evidence largely supports the theoretical
analysis. We found support for joint implementation and private trading
at the international level. Support for government trading was also voiced.
Since limitations on trading only add to costs, industry rejects any such
limitations.
For the environmental bureaucracy and labor unions, support for inter-
national emissions trading depends on whether the country becomes a buyer
or seller of quotas. If it becomes a buyer, output and thereby employment
will increase, which is a preferred outcome by labor unions. Furthermore,
buying quotas means that it is easier for industry to realize the national
emissions target so that environmental bureaucrats will support interna-
tional emissions trading in this case. For labor unions, it does not matter
much whether emissions trading takes place as government or private trad-
ing. The environmental bureaucracy would however like to have some con-
trol with international emissions trading. Reasons for this are that it wants
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to prevent trade in hot air and trade with nations that do not monitor and
enforce environmental policy eﬀectively. Furthermore, they would like do-
mestic industry to make an eﬀort in reducing emissions at home. Therefore,
they would prefer a cap on the total amount of emission quotas that can be
bought abroad. These limitations can most easily be implemented through
government trading. However, private trading with trading partners from
a limited number of countries that adhere to strict monitoring and enforce-
ment standards and that do not have hot air is acceptable too. Both labor
unions and the environmental bureaucracy will resist international emissions
trading when domestic industry becomes a seller of quotas.
For environmental organizations, any form of emissions trading presents
a loophole for industrialized countries not to have to reduce emissions at
home. They would prefer it if all industrialized countries implemented pol-
icy such that the national emission targets were realized domestically. This
would spur research and development of abatement technologies so that
emission reduction goals can become more ambitious in subsequent commit-
ment periods. Trading in hot air is rejected because this would increase total
emissions. Hence, environmental organizations do not support international
emissions trading. If such trading is inevitable, they would prefer govern-
ment trading so that it is easier to limit emissions trading. Also here, the
empirical evidence largely supports the theoretical analysis. Most environ-
mental organizations reject international emissions trading and would like
limits on trading if it is allowed anyway. However, they do not state a pref-
erence for any instrument, neither at the national, nor at the international
level.
In all, we can conclude that support for international emissions trading is
not unanimous. Since some countries may lose from emissions trading they
would rather not have it allowed at the international level. Furthermore,
if it is allowed, some countries may not let some of their sectors partici-
pate in international emissions trading for strategic reasons. The choice of
emissions trading scheme also depends on several factors. If the sector is
characterized by imperfect competition, the government is more likely to use
credit trading than when the sector is perfectly competitive. When there
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is international trade in goods and the country has market power on the
goods market the optimal choice of instrument depends on how much the
country consumes of the good and on whether it becomes a seller or buyer
of emission quotas in the international market. Finally, the preferences of
interest groups, especially of industry, are inﬂuential in the decision which
instrument to adopt and whether or not to allow international emissions
trading.
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